



# Evaluation of Project Implementation Modalities of the Cities Alliance

## Draft Final Report

Cities Alliance

A report submitted by GHK

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# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Context and Terms of Reference

GHK Consulting Ltd was selected to undertake the Evaluation of Project Implementation Modalities of the Cities Alliance. The Terms of Reference define the objectives of the assignment as follows: “The evaluation of client and of non-client grant implementation for city development and slum upgrading projects in cities or at national level should provide evidence to assess the applicability and effects of [client and member] implementation modalities”.

The evidence base emerging from the analysis will be used to provide guidance to the Alliance and its partners on improving ownership, ease of administration and the quality of projects and their results. The findings and recommendations will inform both strategic as well as managerial-level decision-making and business processes, and in particular will support the implementation of the Cities Alliance Medium Term Strategy, and the corresponding new CA business model.

The strategic goal of the Medium Term Strategy (MTS) is “for the Cities Alliance to increase its contribution to systemic change, and to scale.”<sup>1</sup> The specific meaning of “contribution to systemic change” and is “to scale” is currently being further elaborated through the CA’ *‘Theory of change’* and *‘results framework’*. Both are important if these key goals are to be tracked.

The MTS is yet to be fully implemented and thus this evaluation does not directly evaluate the Four Pillars of the Cities Alliance Work Programme:

- The Catalytic Fund;
- In-country Programming
- Knowledge and Learning; and
- Communication and Advocacy.

However, seeing the transition towards the MTS as part evolutionary this evaluation can have formative aspects in terms of the conceptual and operational refining of the MTS and the business model. Indeed, to varying degrees these “new” objectives are already partly captured in the existing assessment framework the CA Secretariat uses, for example around government commitment and approval, participation, scaling up, coherence of effort and linkage to follow-on investment.

In terms of client focus there is an intended shift in relative emphasis towards low income countries. Within this context, an important element of the Alliance’s core objectives, as articulated in its Medium Term Strategy, to ‘systematically increase ownership and leadership of cities and countries’. It is consistent with wider strategic agendas for increasing aid effectiveness through increased ownership- note in particular, *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2005) and *Accra Agenda for Action* (2008). This evaluation is intended to contribute to the implementation of the CA MTS. Throughout the study process GHK has maintained a regular dialogue with CA to ensure that MTS matters are fully considered.

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<sup>1</sup> Cities Alliance: Medium Term Strategy 2008-10, 06 May 2008. Medium Term Strategy (MTS) Update to Executive Committee (EXCO) July 2010, MTS Update to CG October 2010.

## 1.2 Scope

The scope of the study was changed during the inception period and ratified in July 2010 at the CA meetings. Specifically, the following were agreed:

- Extending the desk reviews to include a projects in Mozambique;
- Extending the target field work to 6 case studies with a relative emphasis on Africa – Syria (1 project), Philippines (3 projects), Mozambique (8 projects), Senegal (1 project), Cameroon (1 project) and Malawi (1 project);
- Placing relatively more emphasis on the lessons going forward and the integration into the MTS.

**Overall, the weight of the analysis is placed on the field studies** – which in any event cover 15 of the 33 projects reviewed. The desk reviews were used principally to assess the effectiveness of the Grant Administration Process; the evidence in the files on project quality was highly variable and there was limited evidence to triangulate claims; save for those few projects where there was a field visit to assess results and impacts.

## 1.3 The Evidence Base

The evidence base will be:

- *Desk based:*
  - a structured review of general Cities Alliance documentation; and
  - a more detailed and selected review of specific Grant documentation as provided by the Cities Alliance for a set of 33 country target projects.
- *Key stakeholder interviews:* Covering CA members, client groups and stakeholders participating in / material to the CDS / SU project activities. These will supplement the desk reviews; and
- *Field Visits:* Up to 6 field visits that will be focused on semi-structured in-depth interviews with CA members, client groups and key stakeholders (civil society, urban poor representatives and private sector) participating in Grant supported CDS / SU activities.

As noted above, the review of the *existing* data sets suggests the evidence base is at best partial in numerous cases and thus particular emphasis will be placed on interviews and field visits. Pro-forma research tools will be used to attempt to systematize data structuring and comparisons.

## 1.4 Conceptual Benchmarks: Defining the Quality of Projects

There are no simple measures of the “quality” of projects that CA supports – what defines a successful project and set of result is not clear cut nor indeed agreed upon among CA members. The strategic goal of poverty reduction remains primary, although references recently have been made to more broad based / multi-dimensional goals of urban transformation towards inclusive cities which would in any event include urban poverty reduction. CA funded support to CDS / SU / knowledge activities may, and should, contribute to the goal of poverty reduction. However there are many intervening variables influencing results and CA grant contributions are only one factor in the complex environments of urban and economic development leading to poverty reduction. Therefore it is challenging not only to attribute results to CA investments, but even to identify their contribution to the process of change.

In the case of CDS activities, the strategic nature of these activities should be assessed in terms of their likely contribution towards improving pro-poor policy and planning frameworks. The Grant Application / Grant Agreement documents provide some

parameters of positive results which can be measured and monitored and potentially captured in the Grant Completion Reports. These could include project outputs, the quality of partnerships and strategic use of participation, linkage to follow-on investment and coherence of effort among members. More strategically, the evaluation will need to capture both process and output parameters such as attitude and behavior changes, organization / institutional changes, pro-poor participation, implementation progress and resource mobilization that need to be combined into a format that is logical and valid for assessing quality.

Thus, this report defines conceptual benchmarks relating to success indicators and the evidence base relating to whether these success indicators / result / development outcomes are likely to be achieved. In the first instance, our approach is to define conceptual benchmarks that are likely to be useable within the context of existing CA business processes, hence useful in this evaluation in terms of document and desk reviews. In the second instance, these benchmarks will be refined and validated to inform the field visits / detailed case studies through semi-structured interviews – in effect, to drill down deeper into the evidence base to assess what results and impacts have and/or are likely to be achieved. This requires going beyond the existing data sets.

From a CA perspective, success can be defined at three levels:

- CA goals and approaches
- national / local government goals and strategies
- and the project level.

Success of the project should support both of the other levels.

#### **1.4.1 Cities Alliance Goals and Strategies**

The first level of analysis refers to CA goals and approaches, in other words, to what extent CA succeeds to apply its specific approaches (CA's added value) to the project, assuming that this added value by CA contributes to better pro poor outcomes of the project. Based on a document review, discussions at the CA Annual Meetings in Bombay and initial interviews, four areas where Cities Alliance may provide value to clients are:

- *Coherence of Effort:* There are two elements to coherence of effort. First, better co-operation and co-ordination among members such that clients are able to get more effective and efficient support from the CA members – this evaluation will assess the extent to which coherence was achieved and the results / benefits of that coherence; and second, coherence of effort between members and clients / partners to ensure alignment of with national, regional and local policy priorities and approaches (in line with Paris / Accra guidance).
- *Knowledge Management:* Improved access on the part of clients / local stakeholders to knowledge and networks that can be used to improve development outcomes, and in particular pro-poor outcomes. The evaluation will assess access to knowledge / networks, the usefulness of these and the results / benefits to clients / key stakeholders.
- *Provision of flexible grant funding:* CA provides relatively small scale grants that can assist clients undertake activities that are catalytic and/or fill gaps to enable better development results – keys here are complementarity and leverage.
- *Reputational leverage:* The CA can provide convening power and legitimacy in support of clients will to take forward innovative and challenging development

initiatives, through this the risks to local clients of trying new development approaches may be in part offset by CA endorsement and support.

*The basic proposition is that these services together provide beneficial inputs that ought to contribute towards clients being better able to deliver pro-poor development initiatives and results. This proposition will be tested to assess whether these potential inputs were in fact produced and that they made a positive contribution to client needs and project execution.*

Table 1.1 provides the types of evidence that will be used to assess whether these sources of value-added were in realized on the part of clients. The evidence will be triangulated for each of the detailed case studies / field visits on the basis of:

- Grant related documentation,
- Interviews with members (in the case of member execution), CA Secretariat team responsible for the grant and with clients (all cases); and
- Other key stakeholders where appropriate and practical.

Ownership is important to the CA. A key factor in the Grant Application review process is the extent of government support and participation – the proposition being that ownership is a *pre-condition* for good project execution and likely future implementation and replication. Thus, the Grant Application process is in part focused on enhancing ownership and this remains an important priority through the Grant Execution Phase. What is important is that the CA Grant Facility Administration process and the “normative” approaches on how to do CDS / SU project formulation as advocated (if softly) do systematically encourage greater ownership. The extent to which the CA achieves this is central to this evaluation. ***The keys to the value added are that coherence of effort, improving access to and use of better information, techniques and networks, reputational leverage and enabling grant funding will increase the likelihood of better pro-poor development results.***

**Table 1.1 CA Success Benchmarks: Testing Value – Added Propositions**

Benchmark	Evidence Sources Desk / Document	Question Themes	
		Members	Client
Coherence of effort	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Grant Application has explicit criteria in line with CA mandate;</li> <li>• Partial evidence of actual coherence through PRs, GCR and field visit reports.</li> <li>• Grant outputs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What type of support was provided to the client prior to the Grant Application?</li> <li>• What was the value of that support?</li> <li>• Did the proposed CA members work together as suggested in the Grant Application?</li> <li>• What type of support was provided to the client during grant execution?</li> <li>• What problems, if any, problems were encountered?</li> <li>• What if any follow-on support will be</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What type of support did CA members provide in the pre-Grant phase? Was it helpful?</li> <li>• Did CA members work together as suggested in the Grant Application?</li> <li>• Did you get the type of support you needed? If no, what were the gaps?</li> <li>• What additional support would have been beneficial?</li> <li>• Was the Grant supported activities in alignment with other policies, programs and projects in the city? Region?</li> </ul>



Benchmark	Evidence Sources Desk / Document	Question Themes	Question Themes
		<p>provided?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Overall, what was the value-added in your role? The role of CA members?</li> </ul>	<p>Nationally?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were the Grant supported activities in alignment with other urban development initiatives in terms of approach and methods?</li> <li>Overall, what was the value-added of CA members you worked with?</li> <li>What could be done better?</li> <li>What further support would you like to have?</li> </ul>
Knowledge Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Grant Application – Description of project / approach may reference what knowledge products are used and/or how CA related networks may be accessed</li> <li>Partial evidence through PRs, GCRs and field visit reports.</li> <li>Study outputs – especially during the study process.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What types of CA member KP and or services were provided to the clients / project?</li> <li>Did the clients have any difficulties accessing the KPs?</li> <li>What were the benefits of KPs?</li> <li>Who benefitted</li> <li>How are the KPs likely to support sustainable change?</li> <li>What improvements can be made to enhance the value of the KPs?</li> </ul>	<p><i>Access</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Did the project access any CA member guidelines, tool kits, information networks, advisory services?</li> <li>Were the KP easy to access?</li> </ul> <p><i>Usefulness</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were the tools easy to use?</li> <li>Were the KP useful – were they relevant to your needs and priorities?</li> <li>What were the benefits of the KPs to your needs? How were they used?</li> </ul>
Grant Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Grant Application documentation</li> <li>Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What were the benefits of Grant funding?</li> <li>What difference did the Grant funding make to the project?</li> <li>Would the project (or essential parts of it) have happened without CA Grant funding?</li> <li>Was the funding easy to access and manage?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What were the benefits of Grant funding?</li> <li>What difference did the Grant funding make to the project?</li> <li>Would the project have happened without the funding?</li> </ul>

Benchmark	Evidence Sources Desk / Document	Question Themes	Question Themes
Reputational leverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project documentation – especially GCR and Field Visit Reports</li> <li>Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was CA involvement beneficial in convening key stakeholders to participate in the sponsored activities?</li> <li>Was CA involvement beneficial in supporting innovative development processes?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was CA involvement beneficial in assisting you convening key stakeholders to participate in the sponsored activities?</li> <li>Was CA involvement beneficial in assisting you try new and innovative development processes? If yes, how?</li> </ul>

### 1.4.2 Grant Quality: Client and CA Metrics

One of the most basic challenges is answering the question, what defines a successful grant at client level? An agreed results framework does not exist as such and getting agreement on this on the part of the CG is necessary going forward as part of the shift towards the new business model outlined in the MTS. However, the formal documentation, including the Grant Application, relating to this key question is *suggestive* of key elements of what is important to success. There is on-going work related to a results framework that also provides a reasonable starting point – Figure 11.1.<sup>2</sup> The indicative framework illustrates key actors (drivers of change) inter-relate through a series of inter-linked activities and how these activities contribute towards short and long term results / development outcomes. From the grant support point of view, there are strong *process* (how CDSs / SU projects ought to be formulated) as well as *content* elements (the types of outputs produced) – these are emphasized for example in the Cities Alliance knowledge products.<sup>3</sup> The process and content elements link into the framework described in Figure 11.1. A few observations are worthy of note:


- On the left side, the numerous actors involved in urban transformation and poverty reduction are identified; the implication being that they are all to varying degrees, ways and times a part of the transformation process and thus ownership also needs to be distributed among these actors. It also suggests why participation and partnerships are needed to foster transformation.
- Also on the left side, the various boxes indicate the types of activities that need to be undertaken to take forward the transformation process to achieve poverty reduction results – all are important and a key is to ensure interventions are targeted at the appropriate requirement in any given context. CA interventions needed to fit into the specific requirements of the client if they are likely to be effective.
- On the right side, the aim is to illustrate the result chain, beginning from the bottom where the CA is providing inputs – as described above in terms of coherence of

<sup>2</sup> It is understood from Inception Phase interviews that the CA Secretariat is developing a results framework. An initial approach has relating to this framework was presented to the Consultative Group during the CA Annual Meetings in Mexico in November 2010.

<sup>3</sup> For example - Cities Alliance (2006), City Development Strategy Guidelines: Driving Urban Performance; and Understanding Your Local Economy: A Resource Guide for Cities (2008).

effort, knowledge, grant funding and reputational leverage – to deliver outputs (for example as described on the pink boxes on the left) which will contribute towards short term project outcomes and hopefully longer term development results. Given the scale and duration of CA engagement, the CA role is primarily aimed at providing a *positive contribution* to these more strategic and longer term results.

**Figure 11.1 Towards a Cities Alliance Results Framework**



Based on CA, *Towards a Theory of Change*, April 2010.

From a *pragmatic* point of view a sensible starting point is to identify the key elements, in part defined through the grant application process, that are deemed important to success and use them as initial benchmarks for evaluation. Each of these forms a basis from which further elaboration of benchmarks is possible.

### Process benchmarks

- Participation: Getting the urban poor engaged
  - What stakeholders were involved in the CDS / SU formulation process? How were then involved?
  - To what extent and how have the urban poor (and other vulnerable groups) been engaged in the CDS / SU formulation process?
  - What were the results of the participation process in terms of improving awareness and knowledge of urban poverty? In terms of the likelihood of elaborating and implementing pro-poor policies, plans and investments?
  - What were the existing participatory systems and how did CA improve them
- Partnerships: Working with civil society and the private sector
  - What partners were involved in the CDS / SU formulation process? This will seek to look at public – private partnerships, partnerships with civil society.
  - How were they involved?
  - What partners will be involved in the future implementation of the CDS / SU project strategies, plans and projects?

- How will potential partners be involved in the future implementation of the CDS / SU project plans and projects?
- Ownership: A key pre-condition for positive development results
  - To what extent is the CDS / SU working through existing (improved) local systems – procurement and financial systems?
  - To what extent is the grant process linked into existing institutional structures and processes? For example, linked to existing planning and budgeting processes?

### **Content benchmarks**

- Pro – poor focus
  - To what extent are the outputs produced focused on contributing to better pro-poor urban governance, management and service delivery?
  - To what extent are the outputs likely to contribute to future pro-poor outcomes?
- Institutionalization
  - To what extent has the likelihood for systemic change for poverty reduction been secured?
  - To what extent have roles and responsibilities for future implementation been clearly defined and agreed?
  - To what extent do the responsible institutions / agents have the capacity to discharge the allocated roles and responsibilities?
  - What capacity building requirements have been identified and how will they be implemented?
  - To what extent are the results of CA support likely to be replicated and scaled up? (in the future will comparable activities be undertaken and achieve quality results without CA (or other external) support?)
- Linkages to follow on investment
  - Have future resource and investment requirements to implement organizational changes, policy, plans and investment strategies been identified?
  - Is there clear allocation of responsibilities for resource mobilization and investment?
  - Have the funding sources been committed? How secure are the commitments?
- Catalytic effects
  - Has CA engagement leveraged/triggered systemic changes towards poverty reduction which would not have happened without CA?

### **1.4.3 Unlocking and enhancing ownership**

Defining, identifying the determinants of and “measuring” ownership are key foundations of the evaluation; simply put ownership is seen as a key part aid effectiveness and sustainability. CA documentation and business processes are suggestive of, rather than definitive on, these issues.

Based on the draft CA results framework, it is possible to put forward an approach on how to assess both the extent and depth of ownership at different points in the results framework (target results) and propose how this will likely have stronger or weaker development results; that is, the likelihood of effecting pro-poor benefits and poverty reduction. **Error! Reference source not found.** summarizes target results and how ownership of these is likely to be manifest. It also suggests that while ownership is necessary it is not sufficient to achieve development results – ultimately implementation of pro-poor development initiatives is required.

**Table 1.2 Ownership: Indicators and Evidence**

Target Results	Indicators of Ownership	Evidence Sources
Living conditions of the poor improved		
Implementation of pro-poor policies, plans and investments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policies and plans in place and <i>operational and sustainable</i></li> <li>• Sustained resource allocation towards pro-poor activities / targets</li> <li>• Accountability structures and processes in place focused on results and learning</li> <li>• Monitoring and Feedback mechanisms</li> <li>• Participation mechanisms in place</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Official documents</li> <li>• Laws and regulations</li> <li>• Budget / budget analysis</li> <li>• M&amp;E reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> <li>• Customer feedback loops</li> </ul>
Elaboration of policies and plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organizational ownership / leadership defined, agreed and supported</li> <li>• Participation mechanisms in place</li> <li>• Accountability in place to support delivery and results</li> <li>• Pro-poor policies and plans drafted for review</li> <li>• Public debates on policies and plans</li> <li>• Supporting frameworks in place to enable implementation</li> <li>• Resource proposals to support implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Official documents</li> <li>• Draft / working documents</li> <li>• Government orders</li> <li>• M&amp;E reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>
Organizational change / behavior change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organizational ownership / leadership defined and supported</li> <li>• Policy / plans prepared and adopted by the client</li> <li>• Capacity building needs defined and resources</li> <li>• Organizational change proposals (structures and procedures)</li> <li>• Pro-poor HR initiatives: supporting behavioral change, urban poverty competency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Official documents</li> <li>• Draft / working documents</li> <li>• Government orders</li> <li>• M&amp;E reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>
Improved knowledge of urban challenges / poverty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved quality &amp; access to urban poverty data</li> <li>• Greater awareness by key stakeholders of urban poverty</li> <li>• Defined ownership of knowledge / allocation of knowledge resources and maintenance roles</li> <li>• Likely use of knowledge</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public information documents</li> <li>• Poverty maps / data published</li> <li>• Public forums and pro-poor participation</li> <li>• Interviews with multiple stakeholders who depend on the knowledge for advocacy, rights and services access</li> </ul>

A few points are worth further elaboration.

First, the “level” of ownership can be high at each of the target results; and it is important that ownership needs to be distributed among agencies and partners that are most likely to

be a part of change and implementation. Progressing up the results “ladder” is suggestive of high ownership and necessary to achieve poverty reduction results.

Second, high levels of ownership need not lead to improved policies, programs and investments and indeed pro-poor outcomes. This will depend on how well ownership can actually translate into better policies, plans budget processes and investments and getting these actually implemented – moving vertically up the table. Strength of leadership, favorable policy frameworks and capacities are likely to be important here.

Third, where ownership is high then a key success factor is likely to focus on ensuring leadership, enabling policy frameworks and capacities are put in place across the stakeholder map. Ownership alone does not guarantee pro-poor focus or results, but a pro-poor focus without ownership is certainly unlikely to lead to desired poverty reduction.

Thus, a key part of the likelihood of success and achieving desired results will depend on how capacity building requirements are considered and developed (in the widest sense); both through the Grant Execution process and critically, as part of implementation strategies.

## **1.5 Organisation**

The report is organized into three main chapters:

- Chapter 2 is a review of the CA business model and the grant administration process – this is basically an analysis focused on the desk reviews;
- Chapter 3 is a summary of the findings from the field visits on project performance; and
- Chapter 4 is a summary of the findings and recommendations.

## 2 THE CA BUSINESS MODEL AND OPEN ACCESS GRANT

### 2.1 The CA Mission

The Cities Alliance (CA) is a multi donor coalition of cities and their development partner. CA was launched in May 1999 by the World Bank and the United Nations Center for Human Settlements (Habitat); together with a group of municipalities (“cities”) worldwide, with the aim of:

**Improving the living conditions of the urban poor through shelter/housing upgrading and developing, and through provision of basic urban utilities such as water and sanitation, urban transport, health, education**


In order to achieve the above, CA’s two priority areas for action are:

- **Cities Without Slums**, through the citywide and nationwide upgrading of low-income settlements to improve the livelihoods of the urban poor; and
- **City Development Strategies**, aimed at formulating a broad consensus on a vision and a set of priorities for city actions.

### 2.2 The Grant Facility Administration Process

The core focus of the Cities Alliance business model is Grant Facility Administration. The Grant Administration process is summarised in Figure 2.1

**Figure 2.1: The Grant Facility Administration Process**



The basic points regarding the business processes related to the Grant Facility Administration process are:

- *Application Phase:* This is the most important part of the Grant Facility Administration process in terms of quality control. The principal effort to ensure Grants are focused on the CA objectives and are likely to contribute to objectives is during the pre-grant period where the CA Secretariat interacts extensively with applicants on objectives, scope and approach of the proposed activities. A pro-forma application form is structured around key criteria aligned to the CA Mission and core objectives – see Annex 1. A Grant Agreement signed between the CA and the Applicant signifies the end of the process and defines expected timelines, financial parameters and milestones / deliverables.
- *Grant Execution Phase:* The grant execution process is generally marked by routine progress and financial reports focused on ensuring the grant is used properly and the project is managed effectively, in terms of timeframes, fund release and deliverables. The Grant Execution Phase used to be structured to be completed within 24 months but this is not a requirement.
- *Grant Closing Phase:* The grant closing phase aims to document that the grant was executed in line with the Grant Agreement and to capture some of the anticipated benefits and results of the process. Given the relatively short time frame between the completion of project activities and deliverables and the submission of the Grant Completion Report *only limited evidence* is collected on likely contribution to wider development goals and attributable results. Two field visits are undertaken per year, one for CDS and one for SU projects, to provide more detailed evidence on likely results of grant support.

Overall, the existing CA business processes provide only limited scope for capturing the benefits and results of the activities funded through the grants. To date it is not clear what monitoring systems and mechanisms are actually in place at project level that can be accessed to get longitudinal evidence on implementation progress and/or results.

### **2.3 Business Process Review: Evidence from the Project Reviews**

The purpose of this section is:

- to assess how well the current CA Grant Facility Administration process works from a primarily procedural point of view with the aim of better structuring interview design and field visit objectives.

The data cover the majority of the case studies selected by the CA..



### 2.3.1 Application Phase

The Cities Alliance Draft Grant Facility Procedures Manual<sup>4</sup> (Manual) provides an overview of internal business processes at the Secretariat. The Manual is organized into 6 chapters describing one section of the project cycle each, as follows:


1. Proposal Evaluation and Approval;
2. Grant Set Up & Project Initiation;
3. Grant Implementation (Extension/Amendments);
4. Grant/Project Monitoring;
5. Grant/Project Closing;
6. Information/Document Management and Work Flow.

In this chapter we are assessing the application phase, which starts with the submission of informal proposals and finishes by signing the Grant Agreement (GA). According to the Manual, it is divided into 3 phases as follows:

1. Proposal Evaluation and Approval
2. Grant/Project Initiation Process
3. Preparation of Grant Agreement, according to the source of funding:
  - Development Grant Facility (DGF)
  - Trust Funds (TF)
  - Grant Management Agreement (GMA)

The following diagram demonstrates the length of the application phase in the case of DGF, TF and GMA grants. A more detailed workflow diagram is provided in Annex 6.1.

**Figure 2.2: Length of Application Phase**



As the above figure shows, the length of the application phase of the three grants agreement types only differs at the last, “preparation of grant agreement” stage.

<sup>4</sup> CA Revised Grant Facility Procedures Jan 2010


GHK has examined the duration of the application phases of each project. The project were first grant types (DGF, TF and GMA) (only considering the first GA in case more than one GA was signed for the same project). Projects were then split by implementing bodies (Member or Client) and the length of the application phases were tested against the project cycle described in the Manual.

### Comparative analysis

The duration of the application phase of 32 projects (for which grant agreements were signed) was examined and compared. It has been found that the individual lengths of application phases were longer in the majority of cases (25 out of 32) than the timing indicated in the manual for the three different grants types.

The below charts demonstrate the average length of application phase of member versus client executed projects and show the timeframe indicated in the Manual for comparison. Given the fact that the application phase of the DGF-type grants are designed to be substantially longer than the other two, DGF grant project are featured in a separate chart.

**Figure 2.3: Average application phase of member versus client executed grants**




### FINDINGS

**Longer application phase than duration prescribed in CA Procedures Manual in 78% of the cases. Projects with shorter pre-application phases are mostly preparatory grants.**

**No evident pattern identified in delayed application phases of client versus member executed projects.**

The application of African projects (with the exception of Benin and Nigeria, where the proposals were approved but no grant agreement was signed as of 25th March 2010) have been examined in further detail. The application was divided into phases, each marked by a date: submission of grant application; threshold screening; individual technical assessment; notification of approval; signing of grant agreement.

**Figure 2.4 Phases of application period of member vs. client executed African grants**



The question is what accounts for the delay of the grant application process, evaluation and approval? Why does the application phase of the client executed projects take longer? In which phase of the pre-grant period does the delay generally occur?



***In which phase(s) do slippages typically occur?***

The analysis has shown that major slippages of the grant application process generally occur at two phases of the pre-grant process. First, after the threshold screening or following the independent technical assessments. Usually the beneficiary is required to make adjustments to the grant application and re-submit it. Once the application is re-submitted the procedure starts over again. Re-submissions are fairly common and in case of the Togo project (with the longest application phase) 6.5 months elapsed between the reception of the Secretariat's comments and the re-submission of application form. Similarly, one of the Mozambique project examined, experience a years delay between threshold screening and approval.

**TOGO, MOZAMBIQUE – Delayed re-submission, re-started screening and evaluation procedures**

Total duration of application phase: 653 days and 616 days – as opposed to 209 days described in Manual for DGF type grants.

**SENEGAL, CAMEROON – Delayed issuance of grant agreement**

Grant agreement signed 477 and 387 days after notification about grant approval. Took 7-8 times longer than the relevant period described in Procurement Manual

Second, delays occur after the grant is approved and the beneficiary is notified. The process leading to signing the grant agreement, involves the grant initiation process; drafting of grant agreement; clearance; etc and is supposed to last around 112 days (weighted average) according to the manual. Two projects with the longest delays at this stage were in Senegal and Cameroon, with 477 and 387 days respectively.



***What accounts for the delay of the grant application process, evaluation and approval?***

Each individual case is different, in some cases re-submissions of grant applications may re-start the process evaluation and approval phase, including threshold screening and independent technical evaluations. However, it is understood this is not the norm.

The analysis hasn't been able to fully determine the causes of the delayed issuance of grant agreements, experienced in several cases.

***How does the duration of the application phase of client executed African projects compare to member executed ones?***




Based on the 18 African projects analysed, the average duration of the application period of client executed grants (353 days) was longer than member implemented ones (237 days). This was due to the slippage experienced by a number of client implemented projects: Namibia; Togo; Senegal; Mozambique and Cameroon. At the same time, only the Mali project had exceptionally long application phase out of the member implemented projects.

**CLIENT EXECUTED PROJECTS – Delayed application phase**

Out of 11 client implemented African projects, 5 (Togo, Cameroon, Senegal, Mozambique and Namibia) had exceptionally long application phases, 2.5-4 times longer than the duration described in the Manual.

The graph below gives comparison of member and client implemented grants.

**Figure 2.5: Average application phase of member versus client executed grants (African projects)**



### 2.3.2 Grant execution period

In general CA favours projects with well-defined timeframes and an execution period of no longer than 24 months. It has been found that the 32 projects, for which grant agreements were signed, had an average expected duration of 25 months (as per original grant agreement). However, most grant agreements were extended once or more times. Based on the actual or expected completion dates (whichever was available) the projects had an average duration of 30 months in case of all client implemented grants and 37 months in case of member implemented grants.

**EXTENDED GRANT EXECUTION PERIOD**  
 In most cases the grant expiry date is extended by at least once but usually more times.

**Figure 2.6 Average length of grant execution period**

	Africa	Other	Average
<b>Member</b>	36	38	<b>37</b>
<b>Client</b>	26	40	<b>30</b>
<b>Average</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>34</b>

Furthermore, problems faced by African grant beneficiaries have been explored in order to shed light on the causes behind the delayed project execution. Progress reports of 11 African grants<sup>5</sup> have been examined and the findings have been grouped into 7 different types, as follows:

- Delay in disbursement of own contribution;
- Delay in disbursement of member contribution;
- Unfamiliarity with lengthy procurement procedures;
- Bureaucracy, slow decision-making processes at ministerial, local governmental level;
- Lengthy mobilization of local stakeholders and/or other administrative/ technical disruptions;
- Lack of experience in project planning and design (technical and/or financial);
- Unforeseen causes, eg. natural disasters, political instability, currency rate fluctuations, etc.



**What are the main problems accounting for slippage in grant execution faced by beneficiaries of African grants?.**

The most frequent problems encountered by 7 implementing agencies out of 11 African projects were related to unforeseen circumstances, such as exchange-rate fluctuations, local or national elections (appointment of new staff at key roles).

Another common problem was, in 5 of the cases, to involve and mobilize all local stakeholders and relevant actors. In most cases, beneficiaries found it difficult to involve high-level ministries, local governments and giant organizations, where decision-making

**MAIN PROBLEMS DELAYING GRANT EXECUTION IN AFRICA**

- **7 cases** of delay in **disbursement** of grant funds;
- **5 cases** of delayed **mobilization** of local stakeholders;
- **4 cases** with lengthy administrative procedures at local governmental level;
- **3 cases** with lack of experience in **project design**

<sup>5</sup> Excluding the 8 Mozambique projects.

processes are generally very complicated and rather slow.

In order to implement project activities in accordance with plans, beneficiaries need a timely disbursement of grant funds from CA members as well as release of own contribution from the local parties involved. Beneficiaries frequently experienced problems in this regard, projects were stalled on several occasions due to insufficient own resources. Failure of grant disbursement from part of local authorities (own resources) was experienced by 5 grant beneficiaries, whereas disbursement of member contribution delayed 2 of the projects,

In a few cases (3 projects out of 11), the inexperience of project planning was the cause of slippage in timely execution, as activities were overambitious, designed to be implemented within unfeasible timeframes. Similarly, inappropriate financial planning (budgeted consultancy rates were below market rates, distance between point A and B wasn't considered when budgeting for local travel and communication) resulted in a shortage of funds.

**Table 2.1 – Causes delaying project implementation**

Problems delaying grant implementation	Member-Implemented Grants	Client-Implemented Grants	Total
Delay in disbursement of own contribution	3	2	5
Delay in disbursement of member contribution	1	1	2
Unfamiliarity with lengthy procurement procedures	0	2	2
Bureaucracy, slow decision-making processes at ministerial, local governmental level	3	1	4
Lengthy mobilization of local stakeholders or other administrative/ technical disruptions	1	4	5
Lack of experience in project planning and design - technical/financial	2	1	3
Unforeseen causes, eg. natural disasters, political instability, currency rate fluctuations, etc.	3	4	7

Comparing client versus member implemented projects, it has been found that both experienced delays attributed to more or less unforeseen but certainly unplanned causes, such as exchange-rate fluctuations, national/local governmental elections and consequent appointment of new staff at high-level positions.

One of the biggest issues faced by client-implemented projects was to mobilize all the local stakeholders in a timely manner (4 cases), whereas member implemented projects (3 cases) struggled with the slow decision-making procedures and heavy bureaucracy at the local governments and ministries.

Slippage due to the delayed release of own resources was experienced by both members (3 cases) and clients (2 cases).

Two member executed grants (Habitat) showed lack of experience in project planning and design. Burkina Faso experienced problems as the available financial resources were insufficient to meet the fee costs of consultants and local research firms, as the unit rate of remuneration for local experts stipulated in the project budget was below market rates.

Whereas in Mali, the long distance between the cities and capital made communication/transport very expensive. In addition, a large number of cities (17) covered by the project, had an impact on the allocated budget. These aspects were not considered at the time of financial planning.

## 2.4 Summary

The analysis above is focused on the portfolio of projects provided to GHK by the CA – it is weighted to a challenging set of projects and does not represent the CA's wider portfolio. The analysis above indicates:

- The Grant Administration process can be lengthy and result in high transaction costs for both the Cities Alliance (Secretariat and Members) and clients – this is a mission critical problem to be resolved;
- The CA (Secretariat / Members) often play a key beneficial role in facilitating the grant process even if client executed; and
- The shift toward lower income countries may result in more difficulties in preparing and executing grants especially where client capacities are lower – simplification of the process, streamlining and reducing timeframes and ensuring members take a pro-active support role would likely be beneficial.

The importance of streamlining and reducing the costs and processing time of grant formulation and agreements is well understood by the CA and changes are being put in place to improve the process. The risk are not only excessive costs but as we show in the case studies potentially missed opportunities.





### **3 FIELD VISITS: EVIDENCE OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The purposes of this chapter are:

- To describe the grant funded activities;
- To report on progress, findings and results of the grant funded activities based on the data review and field interviews; and
- To draw lessons and signposts for the CA going forward.

Table 3.1 below provides an inventory of the projects reviewed and their status. As is evident the projects are at varying stages of completion and thus determination of results / impacts are partial in many cases.

**Table 3.1 Project Inventory of the Case Studies**

Country/City	Project Number	Activity	CDS/SU	Type of Grant Agreement	Grant Amount	Project Amount	Implementing Body	Status	Start Date	Actual Completion Date	Expected Completion Date
<b>Cameroon</b>	P099682	Urban development and Poverty Reduction Strategy: City of Douala and its Greater Urban Area	CDS	GMA	500,000	1,161,000	Client	Active	08/12/2006	Not completed	31/12/2010
<b>Malawi</b>	P111963	Preparatory Grant for Development of Lilongwe CDS	CDS	DGF	72,375	101,350	Client	Active	30/06/2008	Not completed	30/06/2010
<b>Senegal</b>	P099681	National programme for slum Improvement and Slum Upgrading in Senegal's Cities	SU	TF	430,000	830,000	Client	Active	08/03/2007	Not completed	31/12/2010
<b>Mozambique 1</b>	P079602	Slum Upgrading and Vulnerability Reduction in Flood Prone Cities/Towns in Mozambique (Maputo, Chokwé, Teté, and Quelimane)	SU	DGF	495,000	1,110,000	Member	Closed	29/07/2002	30/09/2004	30/06/2003
<b>Mozambique 2</b>	P101077	Improving Water and Sanitation in Quelimane City, Mozambique	SU	DGF	500,000	1,220,000	Member	Closed	08/05/2006	Not Completed	31/03/2009
<b>Mozambique 3</b>	P098754	Slum Improvement Demonstration Project for Maputo City	CDS, SU	GMA	75,000	100,000	Member	Active	18/10/2005	Not Completed	31/12/2008
<b>Mozambique 4</b>	P105796	Preparatory Grant for the Development of a CDS for Vilankulo	CDS	DGF	42,000	49,080	Client	Dropped	16/04/2007	09/04/2009	31/03/2009
<b>Mozambique 5</b>	P105795	Preparatory Grant for the Development of a CDS and Slum Upgrading Strategy for Chimoio	CDS, SU	DGF	42,000	49,080	Client	Dropped	27/04/2007	09/04/2009	31/03/2008
<b>Mozambique 6</b>	P116501	Preparatory Grant for the Development of a State of Mozambican Cities Report	CDS	DGF	52,500	59,500	Client	Active	27/01/2009	Not Completed	30/06/2010
<b>Mozambique 7</b>	P115734	Slum Upgrading and City Development Strategy for Nampula City, Mozambique	SU	DGF	353,000	860,000	Client	Active	30/06/2009	Not Completed	30/06/2011
<b>Mozambique 8</b>	P121002	Mozambique Support for Upgrading the Chamanculo C Neighbourhood Maputo Municipality - Preparatory Grant	N/A	DGF	73,500	103,500	Client	Active	12/05/2010	Not Completed	30/06/2011
<b>Philippines 1</b>	P094656	Integrated Approaches to Poverty Reduction at the Neighborhood Level – a Cities Without Slums Initiative	SU	TF	500,000	1,725,000	Member	Active	15/03/2005	Completed, project to be closed,	30/06/2008
<b>Philippines 2</b>	P098173	City Development Strategies in Philippines: An Enabling Platform for Good Governance and Improving Service Delivery	CDS	TF	541,100	1,406,100	Client	Active	09/10/2005	Completed, but not audited	31/12/2008
<b>Philippines 3</b>	P104278	A Metro Manila 'Cities Without Slums' Strategy	SU	TF	500,000	2,925,000	Member	Active	04/12/2006	Not completed	30/06/2010
<b>Syria</b>	P111519	Aleppo CDS	CDS	DGF	380,000	1,180,000	Member	Active	04/05/2008	Not completed	30/06/2010

## 3.2 Project Summaries

### 3.2.1 Cameroon

- City Development Strategy (CDS) for Douala and Greater Urban Region

#### **Introduction: Context**

**Government:** With 19 million people, Cameroon is a republic dominated by a strong presidency. Cameroon has a multiparty system, but Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) has been in power since 1985. The President controls legislation and can rule by decree. In 2004, CPDM leader Paul Biya won re-election as president, a position he has held since 1982. The election was flawed by irregularities, particularly in voter registration. The 2007 municipal elections also had deficiencies, including barriers to registration and fraudulent voting. In 2008, price hikes, in combination with frustration over political prospects, led to widespread rioting. Authorities reacted with force, killing between 40 and 100 people, and arresting 1600 demonstrators.

**Economy:** Due to its modest oil resources and good agricultural conditions, Cameroon has one of the best-endowed primary commodity economies in sub Saharan Africa. Agricultural is the backbone of the economy, but most output is for subsistence. Cocoa, coffee, timber and cotton are the main exports. Lower global demand/prices lead to lower growth for these sectors in 2009. Despite oil production decline, it still represents 10% of GDP and 40% of export revenues (2008). Although under-explored, extractive resources are becoming increasingly attractive to the world's mining companies.

Cameroon faces similar problems to other emerging economies in the region (e.g., stagnating per capita income, inequitable distribution of income, a top-heavy civil service, and a poor business climate). Since 1990, the government has embarked on various IMF and World Bank programs designed to spur business investment, improve trade, etc. The economy contracted by over 1%, down from 3.3% in 2008, against an anticipated growth of 2% for 2009. GDP growth prospects for show a slow pace of recovery. With exports forecast to continue to decline, per capita income growth will be flat in the coming years. Estimates suggest 35% of GDP is in the informal sector. The World Bank's 2007 Doing Business Report judged Cameroon one of the most difficult countries in the world to start a business. Ranked 152/175, urgent reforms are needed.

**Socio-Economic Profile:** The 2008 riots indicated growing dissatisfaction among the urban poor. Cameroon was ranked 150th of 182 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2008, barely qualifying as a country with "medium human development," and the fourth-last country in that category of 77. GDP per capita declined to \$2,043; 57% of the population lives on or below \$2 per day; and life expectancy is 50 years. In 2007, Cameroon ranked 64th of 107 on the Human Poverty Index for developing countries - and 125th of 157 on the Gender Development Index. Health indicators show problematic trends. According to the UN, the state spends only 1.5% of GDP on health.

**Human Rights:** The human rights record is found wanting and a key background to the issues of urban poverty reduction. Abuses include torture, beatings, and other abuses. Authorities arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens advocating secession, human rights activists, and persons not carrying identity cards. Freedom of speech, press, association and assembly are restricted. Other problems include corruption, female genital mutilation, and human trafficking. Cameroon is a source, transit, and destination country for trafficking of woman and children. Children are trafficked into Cameroon from adjacent states for forced labour (e.g., transit country) and women are transported by sex-trafficking rings to Europe (e.g., source country).

**Property Rights/Land Tenure:** Property acquisition/purchase of land titles remains problematic as conflicts arise between competing 'modern' and 'traditional' concepts of law.

The weakness of administrators combined with obsolete land tenure regulations ill-suited to the pace and type of urban growth (particularly in Douala) is contributing to the growth of sub-standard housing and slums, which accounts for 72% of stock in Douala. The precariousness of land tenure is thus contributing to slum development.

**Corruption:** Corruption is pervasive. Cameroon was twice designated the most corrupt country on earth in Transparency International's Corruption Index (1998 and 1999).

**Administration:** State infrastructure is differentiated. Ministries provide provincial and sometimes district-level services, but frequently lack resources. Decision-making is centralized in Yaoundé, and the process of decentralization has been slow. Institutions are often ineffective, and the government has been losing ground to privatization of services (e.g., electricity) and internationalization (e.g., health and education) of public goods supported by developmental cooperation, particularly China (health).

**Debt Cancellation:** Debt cancellation by France (Debt Reduction Development Contract - C2D) has enabled Douala to achieve key economic and social development projects. In 2006, an agreement between Cameroon and the Urban Community of Douala (CUD), set-out funding mechanisms for future investments in Douala. Under the terms of the debt cancellation, Cameroon and the French Development Agency (AFD) have agreed to direct AFD funding (51.5 billion FCFA) to: 1) strengthen the living conditions of populations, especially poor and vulnerable groups and, 2) strengthen the economic role of Douala through an the emergency rehabilitation of infrastructure.

**Cooperation with China:** Cooperation with China has increased exponentially. There is a large Chinese community in Cameroon - especially Douala. Chinese are active in all sectors, including infrastructure. A cooperation agreement with China (valued at 9.9 billion CFA) focuses on ongoing road maintenance in Douala region - utilizing technical abilities of Chinese firms/employees in major road work upgrades. The agreement also provides capital investment in health projects (obstetrics, gynaecology, paediatrics).

**Poverty Reduction Strategy:** In 2003, in support of the Government's objective to reduce poverty, Cameroon adopted a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) aimed at diversifying of the economy; developing basic infrastructure and natural resources; strengthening integration of vulnerable groups into the economy; and good governance. Cameroon is now developing its second poverty reduction strategy paper.

**Douala:** Economic centre of the nation, generating 25% of GDP and accounting for 40% of non-agricultural value-add in the "modern sector". Douala plays a crucial role in economic development of neighboring countries in the Central African sub region, particularly in external trade. It is the site of the main airport and handles 95% of Cameroon's maritime traffic through the Port of Douala - now the fourth largest on Africa's Atlantic coast. Douala faces major development problems, including: inadequate infrastructure, scarcity of formal sector housing land supply, inadequate financial resources to fund urban growth, poverty (13% of households) and unemployment (27% of the labor force). Informal sector activity is widespread in Douala, creating wealth and many jobs, but also resulting in significant migration to the city. The growth of informal sector jobs has caused growth of informal markets/street vendors along major traffic arteries and in the middle of residential and industrial areas, thus creating significant problems, not only for participants in the informal sector, but also for city administrators trying to cope with the spatial demands of the informal sector.

### **Systematic Change and CA Interventions**

The Douala CDS is aimed at enhancing the overall context for development of the city of Douala and its environs. The activities of the CDS are expected to facilitate better integration of interventions in the city of Douala, to realize the strategic objectives of economic development, poverty reduction and achievement of MDGs. In this regard, its

main objective is to describe and assess the extent of its impact on the business climate, and on the implementation and management of urban infrastructure, with a view to establishing a credible action program for poverty reduction and economic vitalisation in Douala. The specific activities of the CDS Douala include:

- A report on the description of the economy of the city of Douala and its environs (including satellite towns), and an analysis of its role as a regional, national and sub-regional economy
- The diagnostic report of the development of the city and its environs, and the analysis of the outlook for socio-economic development and of its impact on the city and its environs, including institutional constraints;
- Operational tools (guides) developed for use in participatory consultations, simplified planning, programming and monitoring and implementation or urban investments and their management by beneficiaries; (Note: This product has not been submitted; however the subsequent development strategy has been submitted and accepted by the World Bank / AFD)
- Formulation of a sustainable medium and long term development strategy (e.g., the strategy document);
- Priority interventions and investment areas; and,
- Dissemination of the strategy to communicate the relevance of the strategy and action plan to a broad segment of the public and development partners.

The following impacts are anticipated:

- Significant improvement of Douala's physical environment and institutional framework for urban management, given the various issues relative to the city's development and economic role, which are crucial to poverty reduction, the reduction of slums and environmental protection;
- Strengthening the role of local actors - and especially civil society in their own development and creating a better understanding on the part of various urban actors, of the tools of participatory management;
- A better choice of investments for the city; greater responsiveness to the needs of vulnerable populations; a better fit with local resources (financial, human and technical) needed to maintain or operate the facilities or infrastructure put in place;
- Greater sense of ownership of the planned investments on the part of beneficiaries.

The recent field interviews indicate that principles of systemic change, including achievements in enhancing ownership, increasing awareness of how the city functions and its growth potential, greater understanding of the informal sector and its linkages to overall growth, and a basis for scalability, have been achieved in the first phases of the project. The outputs of the City Development Strategy focus on ensuring that Douala growth trajectory is aimed at social inclusion and poverty reduction. Specifically, the completion of the first three phases of the project illustrates strong ownership characteristics based on effective participatory activities, significant opportunities for scalability given the projects' coordination with the government-approved poverty reduction strategy as well as other long-term donor investment strategies (e.g., AFD, World Bank, UN Habitat, etc.).

CUD has taken the lead in the preparation of the strategy, and strong and committed partners have worked through the process. These allies include the "Mayor" of Douala, local and national government officials, the private sector (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce), several Civil Society Organisations representing the urban poor, vulnerable groups and women; selected stakeholders outside the city boundaries (e.g., in Yaoundé),

and various interested and financially-committed donors who have demonstrated ongoing investment in Cameroon's social, economic and infrastructure programs (e.g., AFD, World Bank, KfW, UNDP, UN Habitat)

The appointed Mayor of Douala has emerged as a 'champion' and indicated that a broad cross-section of stakeholders have been involved in the participatory process. He has indicated that his role will be to champion the project to national government ministries and the prime minister's office as the project moves through subsequent stages of development and implementation. This illustrates that from the initial stages of project conception and design, stakeholders concerns have been factored into the process, enhancing ownership and opportunities for scalability and sustainability. The process, to date, appears to have a high degree of transparency within the community and interviews with select CSO representatives (e.g., representatives of women's group) suggest that the process has been responsive to the needs of residents and has encouraged participation.

The outputs have, in general, been produced as anticipated. The diagnostic and strategic formulation process, which was carried out in a participatory manner, identified 10 priority interventions emphasizing: 1) improvement of quality of life and reduction of slums, 2) sustainable growth and improved economic development and competitiveness, 3) environmental protection, and 4) improved urban governance and institutional frameworks.

#### Improved Quality of Life:

- Improve transportation within Douala and in the peripheral corridors to improve access to services for Douala inhabitants and opportunities to participate in commercial activities;
- Reorganize the commercial marketplaces to facilitate the activities of the informal economy and expand the main food market in Douala;
- Improve the Utilisation and Management of Public Spaces while developing the role of Private-Public Partnerships in Douala;
- Sustainable Growth and Improved Economic Development and Competitiveness
- Develop a Medium and Long-Term Infrastructure Investment and Upgrading Program, including the Improvement of Industrial and Logistic Zones to Improve Overall Export and Distribution Opportunities;
- In conjunction with other municipal planning initiatives, develop the 'Central Business District' in the city centre of Douala in order to provide an attractive forum for investors;
- Environmental Protection
- Promotion of Douala as a Sub-Saharan African pilot project for sustainable environmental protection in management/treatment of solid and liquid waste;
- Improve Urban Governance, Management and Institutional Development
- Develop a Medium Term Expenditure Framework to Forecast and Access (e.g., Source) Needed Public Investment for Douala and Region;
- Establish Mechanisms to Coordinate the Principal Projects in Douala Region with Principal Investment Sources
- Improve Delivery of Essential Services (including management, administrative, cost-recovery, and accessibility issues) to those who need them most;
- Create a Land Agency for the Urban Development of Douala and Region

Essentially, the outputs developed comprise an array of short to medium term interventions (e.g., actions) in the area of facilities and infrastructure and institutional structures to support these actions. This focus on institutional, administrative, cooperative and governance frameworks to support the short-medium strategy bodes well for longer term sustainability and scalability of the anticipated interventions.

#### Short-Medium Term Actions Involving Financing Framework

- Construction of Access Roads Covering all Districts within Douala
- Implementation of a Formal Plan to Direct Growth of Commercial Marketplaces
- “Instant Solutions” for Markets Impacted by East-West Arterial Roads (Note: The French wording of Instant Solutions may be a random choice of wording or it may be deliberate. If it is deliberate then it suggests the local implementing body may be under the false impression that there is a magic bullet to the transportation/infrastructure problems identified).
- Launching of the First Phase of a Drainage Program

#### Short-Medium Term Actions to Reform Public Administration

- Framework for Medium Term Regional Expenditures
- Technical Coordination of Medium Term Projects (CUD/MO)
- Policy Coordination between CUD and business owners

#### Short-Medium Term Actions Launched through Private Public Partnerships

- Logistics Zone
- The development of a major industrial zone in East Douala
- Development of a Central Business District in Douala to attract investment

In conclusion, the findings of the field interviews indicate that the information and diagnostic phases and the analysis and strategy development processes provided a mechanism to engage a broad range of stakeholders and fostered both horizontal (important local stakeholders) and vertical collaboration (high level decision makers at regional and national levels of government) across a range of issues.

The prioritisation process (which comprised up to 30 separate consultative workshops by sector) has encouraged a high degree of ownership and support among a number of key stakeholders. However, successful implementation will depend on the buy-in of the national government at a time when national/sub-national political pressures resulting from economic challenges are likely to influence overall investment priorities. The prioritization process is evidence based and had the backing of the key members: World Bank and AFD. In terms of *linkages to follow-on investment* these were not fully finalized but AFD had endorsed their broad commitment to selected priorities; discussions with central government were on-going as part of the finalization process.

### **Going Forward**

The field interviews concluded that the success of the cooperation and collaboration demonstrated in the project has enabled the building of trust and relations between a network of stakeholder groups and has acted as a mechanism for social inclusion. In particular the project has created a foundational network which includes a representative management group (e.g., Committee Suivi), as well as a network of involved and engaged stakeholders at the local and regional level. The Committee Suivi, which is chaired by the implementing agency, the Urban Community of Douala (UCD) - is an impressive collection of actors representing a cross section of Douala and nationally, who are integral to



catalyzing urban transformation. Specifically, the Committee includes: elected officials, representatives of civil society (e.g., associations, NGOs, cooperatives, mutual societies, unions, etc.), private economic operators involved with the informal sector and with the Port of Douala, representatives of the administration including the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MINDUH) and the media. The general success of the project supports the fact that the participatory and collaborator mechanisms of this project have produced a legitimate and representative strategic plan for the City of Douala – which was the overall objective.

The field interviews also confirmed that the project exercise has helped to build and improve the capabilities of stakeholder groups to not only better understand the phenomenon of city development strategy in the local context, but also to augment their own governing capabilities, which furthers the overall goals of the CDS strategy.

The excellent participatory and collaborative processes the CUD managed to infuse into the project have begun a process to change institutional behaviour and, according to discussions with the Mayor, have produced new internal abilities and capacities in the institutional organisations in Douala. According to the Mayor, this means that more people in Douala will be able to take ownership in the process to guide the development of the future economy in Douala and manage the important input of civil society as part of that process.

In all of the interviews conducted in the field, it was agreed that the process had encouraged people to think about the development of Douala and the surrounding region in a different way than they had thought about it in the past. Furthermore, because of the success of CUD's advocacy initiatives to include as many stakeholders as possible in the process of identifying needs and priorities, it was also noted that this project, unlike many others, had enabled a critical mass of citizens, stakeholders, administrators and decision-makers to think concurrently and strategically about the future of the city.

### ***Learning from Experience***

Once again, it is evident that the service-provision of the CA could have been improved in the early stages of the project formulation. The project proponents have indicated in the interview process that the communication and administrative problems created misunderstanding, delay and frustration; although the grant application process was deemed to provide a learning opportunity. Hence, it is clear that the CA support role, with members in the field likely to be very important, in cities needs to be re-evaluated if programs of this nature are to be delivered on-time, on-budget and on-target - with original project objectives being met and achievement of broader issues realized (e.g. MDGs, etc.).

Despite the relative overall success of the Douala City Development Strategy – the project was 18 months off the original timetable. Given the demonstrated capabilities of the implementing agency it is reasonable to assume that the delays in the early stages of the project were not entirely the responsibility of the local actors; again members have a key role here to work with clients (even in a client executed mode).

The evaluation suggests that despite the delays associated with the administrative process, in-country capacity weaknesses and uncertain government commitment and funding support to implement the short and medium term urban strategies, the project demonstrates all of the metrics of success relative to: participation, knowledge-sharing and building of trust between stakeholders, inclusivity, coordinated strategic approaches, and the overall strengthening of local institutional, political and community capacity to respond to the challenges of urban growth in Douala.

From the discussions held, the following specific areas for improvement include:

- Tighten up the timeframe for approvals that currently applies to projects over a certain cost limit;
- Ensure that all administrative steps in the Grant Approval and Execution process are language sensitive. React promptly and appropriately to client feedback on language needs. If a client says that the documents still do not make sense in the language of preference – then find ways to rectify the situation to the expectation of the client;
- Simplifying the proposal format—in particular; pragmatism is needed where there are information gaps and capacity weaknesses;
- Streamline the bureaucracy, especially as it relates to the efficient and effective disbursement of resources needed to finance the early steps in the process (e.g., setting up of local accounts, adhering to local regulations, etc.) Accept the feedback from the client on ways to improve steps related to timely disbursements, procurement;
- Ensure that government support is bona fide and sustainable through to the implementation of strategy. If national government support is untenable in the long-term then this undermines each project and can seriously damage gains made in citizen driven innovation, commitment and ownership of solutions to improve future living conditions and economic prosperity. Stronger up front assurances may be beneficial; but even here if project delivery of too long commitment wanes or political / administrative priorities change and projects are “stranded”.
- Develop a firm timeline for decision making, so that applicants know where they stand. There should be more defined benchmarks for each stage of the grant evaluation and process. Timelines for each should be established and adhered to;
- Visibility of CA in-country on a regular and planned basis — the CA (with a particular role for members directly engaged in execution) should allocate more time for more frequent missions that should include field visits – on the ground presence is valued;
- Better coordination and information sharing between partners at the international level (e.g., AFD, WB, Habitat, French Cooperation, KfW, etc.). The field visits indicate that this coordination could be strengthened. Clearly it is not the role of the CA Secretariat to manage this coordination, which in practice is very much taking place *in country* among the key members / and other stakeholders engaged in the process. Accountability for co-ordination is needed and an “in-charge” designated; ; and
- Define roles between partners more clearly, so that legitimacy, trust, transparency, communication, and cooperation are enhanced.

### **3.2.2 Malawi**

- Preparatory Grant for Development of Lilongwe City Development Strategy

#### **Introduction**

The Malawi government formulated its Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (2006) under the theme ‘From Poverty to Prosperity.’ Echoing this, in late 2007 the Lilongwe City Assembly (LCA) proposed creating a City Development Strategy (CDS) through a participatory process spearheaded by a dedicated Task Force, and by drawing upon the mentorship and exchange of experience from the City of Johannesburg (COJ), South Africa. The main objective of the proposal was to use the preparatory grant to develop a full-scale proposal for a CDS to deal with rapid urbanization and slum creation. Ultimately, the intention was to create a CDS based on the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy, itself framed by the government’s intention to tackle and fulfil the Millennium Development

Goals (MDGs). Malawi, a country of some 13 million, is only 20% urbanized, but with a high current urbanization rate of 6.3%. The country's cities and towns are growing at very rapid rates, then, and, according to UN-HABITAT, absolute urban population is expected to almost double by 2020 and will surpass rural population growth. The CDS was to be aimed at:

- Localizing the MDGs
- Managing sustainable urbanization
- Bringing stakeholders together
- Monitoring the achievement of the MDGs.

Activities were proposed as:

- Establish a Task Force composed of representatives from a variety of stakeholders
- Initiate a relationship with consultants from the COJ to learn from their previous experience with developing a CDS
- Launch an awareness campaign through media, aimed at informing the public of the CDS project and inviting other urban areas to the table
- Invite contributions and input from a range of interest groups by hosting consultative meetings and workshops for communities, political leaders and other stakeholders
- Prepare draft CDS program proposals, allowing the Task Force and consultants to evaluate the process through interim reports
- Conduct field visits to Johannesburg for members of the Task Force in order to gain a 'hands-on' experience and assist in localizing the implementation of a CDS in Lilongwe
- Disseminate the finalized CDS proposal in various media formats (hardcopy, CD, etc.) as reference material to be used by other cities in Malawi and the region overall.

The finalized CDS was to be used by the Lilongwe City Assembly as a tool for effectively planning and managing the growth and development of the city, providing guidelines for resolving current issues and for preventing future negative ones. Specifically, the CDS would also be used in future slum upgrading programs and in preventing future slums through effective planning, and in achieving sustained urban mobility through the well-planned expansion of infrastructure.

### ***Systematic Change and CA Interventions***

The Lilongwe CDS process stemmed from LCA's participation at a United Cities and Local Government (UCLG) and Cities Alliance (CA) City Futures meeting hosted by the City of Johannesburg in July 2007. Through UCLG, LCA requested mentorship by COJ, which was approved with the South African Local Government Association's (SALGA) support in December of that year. The grant application proceeded in parallel, and was positively influenced by the involvement of UCLG (and COJ and SALGA) in the mentorship discussions. The application was nonetheless an LCA output (i.e., it was produced in-house with the then Chief executive playing a prominent role). The Mayoral Committee of COJ approved the mentorship programme in March 2008.

After approval of the Cities Alliance preparatory grant, totalling \$72,375, to LCA, which provided approximately \$25,000 of in-kind funding, there was a significant delay in the disbursement of the funds by CA. Lilongwe's overall administration was in a parlous state at the time, owing to what is now perceived as mismanagement. As LCA financial systems were also in extremely poor condition and were unprepared for grant execution, further

access to the funds was not as efficiently organized as expected; delays in the carrying out of activities was a consequence. Nonetheless, during what is now termed Phase 1 (see below), the anticipated outputs were produced, namely:

- Establishment of a Task Team and Extended Task Team
- An institutional analysis
- A stakeholder analysis
- An audit and analysis of currently available development information, including critical research gaps
- An analysis of donor projects and its potential alignment to the CDS process
- The development of a CDS framework and draft funding application for Phase 2.

The Completion Report is dated June 30 2009, and reports on activities to May 2009. Most activities seem to have taken place in the preceding six months. Although, the available documentation does not explicitly specify why an amendment to extend the grant to mid-2010 was required and agreed, there were apparently some financial reporting and auditing issues that required resolution. The Completion Report states that the outputs above were largely produced in accordance with the original plans for the preparatory grant project. The Completion Report also noted that some information gaps still existed, necessitating that subject surveys be conducted in Phase 2. It is acknowledged in the report that COJ mentors played a vital role in assisting in the production of the outputs, quality assuring them, and in facilitating their absorption by the management of LCA. The lessons identified are that:

- There must be stronger leadership committed towards the CDS change process.
- It is crucial that all stakeholders participate from the start to ensure ownership of the entire CDS process
- Mentorship methodology is very helpful to beginner cities such as Lilongwe.
- There is a need for consistent follow-ups with partners in order to maintain momentum.

It is also clear from the Consultant's site visit, that there has been much reflection by participants on the preparatory grant experience with such issues as leadership commitment, stakeholder participation, data availability, management involvement and maintaining momentum all consistently stressed.

It is vital to highlight here that UCLG's and CA's promotion of the mentorship scheme and its execution by COJ, with support from SALGA, were all crucial to the successful completion of the preparatory grant, which is now seen as Phase 1 of a three stage CDS process. In effect, the CDS process in Lilongwe was reconceived in mid-stream as a three stage process.

In this trajectory, the Phase 1 Preparatory Stage which is formally evaluated and discussed here was used to gather basic data about the city, to conduct an institutional audit and to prepare a stakeholder analysis. The envisaged full-scale proposal output of the preparatory grant, although completed in draft form, was then effectively superseded and/or suspended. This is because during a Phase 2, Development of the CDS, from mid-2009 through early 2010, the City of Johannesburg mentored the LCA in actually fully developing the Lilongwe CDS, which includes a comprehensive overview of the city, a vision statement, goals, objectives and projects/activities. Funding for this Phase 2, estimated at \$250,000, was provided by COJ and internally by LCA. In effect, LCA decisively took ownership of the process, supported by COJ. Other CA members, JICA and GTZ, usefully played a minor

but supportive role – with a JICA-funded land use plan (Master Plan) for Lilongwe being drafted in the 2008-2010 period, which is now seen as a complement to the CDS itself.

At present, for what is being termed Lilongwe CDS Phase 3 Implementation, CA is in the process of approving a grant in the second half of 2010 for \$249,000 to the LCA, which builds on earlier support from CA and the COJ, and which aims to support LCA to move from strategic planning to implementation. Phase 3 thus focuses on supporting the now LCC to make the CDS operational, and includes the following activities: finalizing the LCC business plan and departmental score cards, formalizing a CDS Unit in the office of the Chief Executive, and setting up a reporting system on CDS-related activities for the LCC's departments. Other activities include pre-feasibility studies for the seven "iconic projects" highlighted in the actual CDS document, as well as awareness raising and advocacy on the CDS, including stakeholder meetings and a "road show" to other cities in Malawi.

All of this marks, at least to date, a very successful outcome in terms of ownership and going to scale – at least at the level of Lilongwe itself. Participation by other stakeholders in the process to date appears to have been good. In the preparatory grant application form, the LCA proposed taking the lead in preparing the full-scale proposal for Lilongwe's CDS. Local stakeholders included Lilongwe Water Board, Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi, the Roads Authority, with the private sector represented by its mother body, Malawi Chamber of Commerce and Industry while the informal sector was to be represented by the Vendors' Association. The formation of a task team and an extended task team permitted involvement of these stakeholders through the Phase 1 process, and outputs were presented and discussed in a series of stakeholder workshops.

The following partners were also proposed to be involved:

- Centre for Community Organisation and Development (CCODE): the coordinating NGO of the slum dwellers known as the Malawi Homeless People's Federation. They were to be involved in all the activities and their role in implementation will be in community mobilization, facilitation of community enumerations and surveys.
- Malawi Institute for Physical Planners (MIPP): To be part of the task force with the role of providing professional advisory services throughout implementation.
- Malawi Local Government Association (MALGA): To be actively involved throughout the CDS process. Their role in implementation will include documenting the process for dissemination for replication of the process to other cities.
- Blantyre City Assembly: To be actively involved in all workshops and activities throughout the process.
- Mzuzu City Assembly: To be actively involved in all workshops and activities throughout the process.
- Zomba Municipality: To be actively involved in all workshops and activities throughout the process.

Phase 1 involvement of these partners was also satisfactory, with participation in information gathering and the work shopping of outputs.

Participation by these national-level actors also appears to have catalysed further, similar activity in Malawi's urban sector. In addition to the proposal to CA for Phase 3 noted above, the Government of Malawi's Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development has also made a grant application to the Cities Alliance for a country-wide CDS and slum upgrading initiative. This application has been jointly made with UN-Habitat, with sponsorship by JICA, World Bank and UNDP. It is seen as a complementary initiative to the CDS. In addition, LCA has secured a \$2.6 million grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for an informal settlement service upgrading project, in direct consequence of the promotion of the

CDS process by LCA's new Chief Executive, Mr. Kelvin Mmangisa who has been deeply committed to the CDS process. Phase 3 of the Lilongwe CDS is therefore 'owned' by the re-named Lilongwe City Council (LCC). However, in addition to coordination with the linked initiatives discussed above, there is the strong intention to involve city, national-level (notably MALGA and CCODE) and international partners (COJ, UCLG) in the implementation process.

The three other cities mentioned above, Blantyre, Zomba and Mzuzu, participated actively in all major workshops, which were intended to be learning platforms for possible replication of the CDS process in these cities. Both Blantyre and Mzuzu are now involved in an extension of the UCLG-supported mentorship scheme with the South African cities of Ekurhuleni and eThekweni (Durban) respectively, which will be part funded by the grant above.

### **Going Forward**

The full implications for the new CA business model and pillars are partial at this stage; the grant very much as positioned in the old business model. That said, respondents stated that Phase 1 should be seen as *laying the groundwork for urban transformation* and consideration of poverty issues and the conceiving of pro-poor policies and schemes in Phase 2, as the CDS was developed. The finalized, Phase 2 CDS is a pro-poor document. Here, the presence of the Centre for Community Organisation and Development (CCODE) in discussion/consultation of Phase 1 (and Phase 2) activities was stressed by respondents.

***Previously, LCA did not have a strategic urban planning and development process that was either participatory or transformative in intent.*** In the absence of this, the assembly was not able to effectively plan for future development in line with the MDGs. The completion of Phase 1 and its successful continuation in Phase 2 attest to improvement in the participatory process, which must now and in the future be enhanced and sustained through CDS implementation. (At this point it is more difficult to address the inclusive city concept, as it was not commonly in use during the CDS process.)

Phase 1 outputs (as something of a State of the City analogue) were oriented to a pro-poor perspective. The CDS produced in Phase 2 is explicitly pro-poor and addresses the MDGs in sectoral analyses of governance, shelter and land, infrastructure and environment, community development, and economic development. This is carried through in its proposed City Vision, and in the objectives stated and activities designed to implement the CDS. In addition, Phase 1 of the CDS contributed to providing the evidence base for making systemic improvements in LCA's administration. The CDS produced in Phase 2 highlighted a Stabilisation Strategy for LCA, which proposed short-term improvements to administrative and financial systems which are now under implementation and will be continued in Phase 3.

*The likelihood is good that the progress seen to date, which was effectively stimulated by a small CA preparatory grant, will continue* – provided, that is, that momentum is maintained and actual implementation of the CDS gets underway soon (November 2010). Potential impacts are impossible to quantify at this point in any robust manner, but there are real opportunities for promoting change leading to poverty reduction. This means progress being made with Phase 3, notably with the following proposed activities:

- Finalisation of an Assembly business plan and departmental scorecards (outlining 2010/11 implementation priorities, funding sources and capacity requirements)
- The formalization of a CDS Unit in the Office of the Chief Executive
- Formalisation of a reporting system (progress against commitments)
- Feasibility investigations of proposed Iconic Projects

- Advocacy and awareness of CDS
- Initiation and facilitation of CDS projects with external support
- Coordination of Year 1 thematic priorities as outlined in CDS Implementation Plan
- Independent oversight and technical advice to Lilongwe Assembly

As can be seen, Phase 3 is oriented to building internal administrative systems and capacity, in conjunction with implementation of measures, feasibility studies of larger projects and the mainstreaming of the CDS approach. Detailed business planning is to occur in Phase 3. In terms of funding, the commitments from CA and the Gates Foundation are apparently secured. Other LCC internal and external funding sources will be identified and programmed during Phase 3. It should be emphasized that LCC staff will require continued mentorship, support and skills upgrading. Phase 3 foresees mentorship continuing through COJ, as well as support from CA members. It appears that attention will also be required to training and capacity enhancement, notably of LCC staff and the local/national consultant base.

***CA engagement, as discussed above, has had a strongly catalytic effect, in large part as a result of powerfully-committed involvement from COJ.*** Provided implementation of the CDS – or even aspects thereof – plays a demonstration role, the impetus towards systemic change will continue, notably within the LCC. Whilst there can therefore be some impact on urban poverty reduction, sustained improvement in Lilongwe will require more than a strategic urban planning process and its implementation – it is fundamentally dependent on Malawi continuing on its current path of private sector-driven economic growth, with consistent guidance by government. Here as urban strategic guidance at the level of the Capital City and through replication elsewhere in the country, the CDS can have real impact.

### ***Learning from Experience***

A number of issues arose in discussion with GHK around the grant application and execution processes. Respondents stated that the application form itself is not difficult to use, although it is wordy and could be streamlined. However, the details required by CA mean that applicants need to have some knowledge of project preparation and budgeting, and hence of the terminology typically used in project formulation and management. The required response to assessment comments in reworking the proposal also follows in this line, presuming real experience on the part of the applicant. It was stated that consideration could be given to greater discussion of concepts and terminology and even a measure of training in the use and completion of the form. As discussed above, there was a significant delay in the disbursement of the funds by CA. As LCA financial systems were also in extremely poor condition at the time, further access to the funds was also delayed, as were activities. As one interviewee put it, “The CA needs to understand better the way we have to operate...our systems are often not in place and need to be added.”

Finally, as also seen above, the CDS process in Lilongwe was reconceived in mid-stream as a three stage process. It was suggested that any future grant structure could follow a similar phasing, wherein the small preparatory grant, with its significant and out-of-scale compliance costs, could be seen as a first stage, followed by a second phase of collaborative CDS drafting, and with an implementation phase to succeed that. Assistance and financial support could be given to complete the overall grant application.

While the Lilongwe – and Malawi – experience emerges as positive for the CA’s approach to date, and this precisely in the context of emerging urbanization, there was little discussion of a programmatic approach as such: as is implied above, the small grant process can be seen as an entry point to developing a long term engagement process that is built on incremental / demand driven steps.

### 3.2.3 Senegal

#### *National Program for Slum Improvement And Slum Upgrading in Senegal's Cities – “Senegalese Cities Without Slums”*

##### **Introduction**

The National Programme for Slum Improvement and Slum Upgrading in Senegal's Cities supported by Cities Alliance should be evaluated in light of parallel activities and investments that have been undertaken at the national level to stem poverty. In particular the implementation of the 2003-2005 Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP I) and the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP II) covering the period 2006 – 2010 which, at its conception, sought to push the poverty agenda forward to meet the objective of raising economic growth to about 7% per year – necessary to halve poverty by 2015, in line with the targets set out in the Millennium Development Goals illustrates both the opportunities and challenges faced in the current policy and economic environment. With a population estimated at about 12.5 million, Senegal's economy is dominated by a few strategic sectors, including groundnuts, fisheries and services. The role of the agricultural sector has declined over time as the result of frequent droughts. High rural poverty and limited access to rural infrastructure and basic services have fuelled migration to urban areas, and the country's informal sector accounts for about 60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

Senegal has shown remarkable political stability since independence in 1960, exemplified by consecutive peaceful presidential transitions and by the 2004 Casamance peace agreement. Yet Senegal appears to be at a critical juncture. From the mid-90s until 2005, Senegal had one of the best economic performances in Sub-Saharan Africa with real GDP growth averaging 5 percent annually. This growth contributed to a sharp drop in poverty incidence. Poverty declined rapidly—the fraction of the population that fell below the national poverty line declined from 68 percent in 1994/95, to 57 percent in 2000/01, and to 51 percent in 2005/06.

Although Senegal continues to maintain a relatively stable political environment and macro-economy, and it is making progress on key infrastructure - successive external and internal shocks since 2005 have had a negative impact on Senegal's economy. The run up in oil prices and the surge in food prices in 2007 overloaded Senegal's open economy and drove up inflation. The onset of the global recession in 2008 and its deepening in 2009 has exacerbated the situation. More recently, floods in the Dakar area, affecting an estimated 450,000 people, have created additional economic and social challenges. Taken together, these successive crises largely account for Senegal's weaker performance in the second half of the decade. The result is that growth has slowed to a near halt and reversed some of the gains in poverty reduction of the early decade. Furthermore, the economy has shown little structural change, achieved insufficient diversification, continued to depend on public spending to spur growth, and generated relatively weak export growth and limited net job creation in the formal private sector. Growth has remained concentrated in the modern, largely urban, construction and services sectors, fuelled by public works spending and remittances from Senegalese abroad. The capital city, Dakar, accounts for only 0.3 percent of the land area of Senegal, but for one-quarter of its population and over 60 percent of the country's economic activity. Tackling the main structural feature of poverty in Senegal and the deepening of entrenched disparities between Dakar and the rest of the country continues to be a significant challenge.

In this context, the partnership that was formed in 2007 between Cities Alliance (UN-Habitat, World Bank and KfW) and Senegal's institutional actors (MUAT, FDV and AMS) to support the development and implementation of the “Senegalese Cities Without Slums” program is aimed at building on previous national slum upgrading initiatives and attaining the MGGs. The specific objectives of the program are:



- Further develop the “Senegalese Cities without Slums” program, including logistics, monitoring and evaluation;
- Identify opportunities for mobilizing public and private investment to realize the main objectives;
- Strengthen the capacities of MUAT and FDV in the area of prevention and improvement of substandard housing;
- Strengthen the urban development observatory in Senegal (responsible for assessment of the phenomenon and progress reports on meeting MDGs) ; and
- Document and disseminate Best Practices and Lessons Learned by Government, cities and communes under the “Senegalese Cities without Slums” program and communicate them to the local, national and international community

Overall, the assessment of the effectiveness of CA programming must be viewed in the context of other parallel actions to reduce poverty as well as the current economic circumstances that have arisen since the submission of the original proposal in 2005.

### ***Systematic Change and CA Interventions***

An assessment of overall systemic change, including ownership and scalability elements is premature given the limited progress achieved to date. The signing of the Grant Agreement took two years from the original submission date. Since the signing of the Grant Agreement (March, 2007), only the diagnostic steps have been completed. The project time-table is now acknowledged to be 18 months behind the original schedule. The project outputs and current timetable for delivery is as follows:

- Establishment of baseline situation and cartography of the urban phenomenon (Complete)
- Analytical Report: Slum Phenomenon, Best Practices on Urban Restructuring/ Tenure Regularization, and Lessons Learned (submitted September 30, 2010 – GHK have not had further documentation on this)
- Draft Strategy for national “Senegalese Cities without Slums” Program, including monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (Estimated completion date: February 2011)
- Draft Action Plan for Implementation “Senegalese Cities without Slums” Program, (institutional, regulatory and financial tools and mechanisms in existence and to be put in place for strategy implementation (Estimated completion date: April, 2011)
- Communication and Institutionalisation Plan to promote public awareness and public participation of local associations and citizenry (Estimated Completion Date: April, 2011)
- Final Strategy and Action Plan for “Senegalese Cities without Slums”, including a report on the training program for all relevant actors (Estimated Completion Date: June, 2011).

The CA initiative has suffered significant time delays due to financial, administrative and participatory challenges. Although the national government indicated a willingness to participate at the outset of the project, current economic realities appear to have hindered the government’s role in the project (e.g., the project is yet to receive any monies from the Senegalese government). Far from enhancing ownership and going to scale, the project has been hindered by lack of financial commitment at the national level and lack of political will at the district level (e.g., in field discussions with the Association of Senegalese Mayors, the Deputy Chief of this organization explicitly noted that he does not agree with the philosophy of the “Senegalese Cities without Slums” Program, that he believes it is a “waste

of money” and that programming should be target at the source of the problem (in the rural areas) rather at the symptom of the problem (urban slums).

These findings appear to contradict other recent experiences at both the national and district levels where there has been a successful collective energy to tackle the problems of poverty and slum upgrading. Specifically, according to the World Bank, the PRSP-II (mentioned in the introduction) was prepared in a participatory manner. Extensive consultations took place both at the national and district levels with a broad range of stakeholders, including representatives from the parliament, central and local governments, donors, the private sector, think tanks, trade unions, and civil society organizations. The process whereby the PRSP-II was presented to the country laid the foundation for wide support for poverty reduction and slum upgrading strategies generally.

However, the CA project has not demonstrated equivalent findings, to date. The delays, obstacles in obtaining national funding, lack of commitment demonstrated in discussions with the Association of Senegalese Mayors, lack of involvement of the private sector and civil society organisations indicates that these parallel efforts have not contributed to major follow-on commitments by government. The CA initiative, although perceived to be supported at the outset by national and district government entities, has not produced systemic change nor has it demonstrated a willingness on the part of local stakeholders to play a more active ownership role in the development and implementation of strategies to overcome the challenges of poverty and slum upgrading. In this context, it should be noted that, according to the Independent Technical Assessment of Proposals Submitted for Funding, there “was no formal documentation attesting to the support of the Ministry and other Senegalese organizations attached to the proposal,” but it was assumed that “the explanation of the current policies of the government and support of the Association of Mayors in the proposal itself (made) their support very clear.”

The CA project was developed locally, but the delays caused by administrative and capacity inefficiencies have now collided with the new economic realities. At the outset of the project, annual economic growth was anticipated to be 7%. However, the impact of successive economic crises has severely altered this economic assessment with annual economic growth now falling significantly below that which was estimated at the commencement of the project.

A cursory review suggests the research and analytic phase of the project has not seemingly adopted participatory approaches in its formulation. Although there may be some incremental gains in the transfer and sharing of knowledge between local and national authorities and donor agencies of the slum phenomenon in Dakar and surrounding region, it is not clear whether, or the extent to which, this knowledge transfer includes those vulnerable populations, poor families and women who are directly affected by poverty and who comprise those living in slums. This potentially represents a disturbing trend in the overall formulation of the project which will in all likelihood impact on the subsequent steps in the process. In the evaluation interviews, all parties (including UN-Habitat) indicated that the research and analytic phase of the project was “too technical” for affected populations to understand; how evidence was collected, analysed and communicated is not fully clear. However, if local stakeholders are not part of the strategy / planning and analytical processes from inception, then concepts of ‘ownership’ will be compromised; as well the validity and robustness of the evidence base may also be compromised.

### **Going Forward**

In the case of the “Senegalese Cities without Slums” Program, it is too early in the process to assess the overall impact of the CA approach relative to positive indicators of urban transformation and poverty reduction and inclusive cities; the process to date is however not satisfactory. Discussions in the field indicate that the completion of the diagnostic and analytic reports has resulted in a more in-depth knowledge of the urban phenomenon

(history, trends, current status, mapping), at least among authorities responsible for the design and implementation of the project. A marked feature of the Senegal example is the substantial shift in the commitment of the key partner, the Association of Senegalese Mayors (AMS). Field discussions indicate that since the original proposal submission the AMS has had a change of opinion on the validity of the CA program. Specifically, the Deputy Chief of this Association articulated that the research indicates that the program does not deal with the underlying causes of urban poverty; it is “a waste of money to improve slums” and “resources should be directed to the provision of essential services and employment generation in rural areas.” This is not a new or surprising argument. However, what is surprising about this diagnosis is the source. If this is the position of Deputy Chief of the AMS, the key co-financing partner at the district level for the “Senegalese Cities without Slums” Program, then perhaps the future of this project needs to be re-evaluated. His comments indicate that strong ownership by mayors and local authorities, sustainable financing strategies at the district levels and future cooperation may not be as forthcoming as the project moves through the stages of strategy, action plans and eventual implementation.

The comments of the AMS should be considered in context with available information on the rapid rate of urbanisation in Senegal. Specifically, at the current pace, it is projected that almost six out of ten Senegalese will be living in cities by the year 2015\* (less time than the period between the proposal application and current deliverables of the CA “Senegalese Cities without Slums” Program). The vulnerability of the rural population (in relation to the internal/external shocks previously described) has led to higher emigration rates toward cities, in particular Dakar, contributing in turn to the further deterioration of living conditions in urban areas and to the emergence of new vulnerable groups (e.g., street children). Clearly, this rapid pace of urbanization raises a key challenge for Mayors and district authorities who urgently need to find the right balance between urban and rural development policy; and resources to manage urban population growth.<sup>6</sup> Recent field discussions also indicate that the degree of alignment among national and local levels is limited and has deteriorated since project inception. Discussions with the partners (FDV, AMS) revealed that there is a lack of understanding between actors, tensions due to misaligned goals and objectives of different parties, and disagreement on the philosophy how to deal with the problem of slums in general. Furthermore, there appears to be a significant degree of turf protection and mistrust amongst actors. The AMS indicated that they should be the organisation that determines how the money will be spent, but that the other partners do not share this view.

On the issue of trust – interview discussions reveal that the FDV as the implementing agency does not appear to be a legitimate organization in the eyes of the national government. There were several comments in interviews that suggested that the delays relative to the receipt of monies from the national government is somehow related to fact that MUAT does not view FDV as a legitimate body. The Committee Suivi was created after the project commencement to allay some of these concerns. However, the Committee, because it was not part of the original project structure (e.g., it is not identified in the Grant Agreement framework) cannot act as a clearing house for any of the project financial operations and has no authority to deal with budget matters directly.

Finally, the defined role of the Senegalese Government in this project has also created tensions which, in all likelihood, have contributed to the delays, inefficiencies and obstacles. In field discussions it was determined that the Senegalese Government is uncomfortable in a role that requires them to pay for almost 40% of the project costs, but affords them little authority on how the project is undertaken and, more importantly, on what kind of strategy

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<sup>6</sup> Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 4 Country Department ,AFCFI, Africa Region, World Bank)

for implementation will be developed. To quote one of the interviewees, the national government “wants to the VIPs.”

### ***Learning from Experience***

In the case of the CA Senegal project, it is evident that the service-provision of CA could have been improved in the early stages of the project formulation. The project proponents have indicated in the interview process that the communication and administrative problems between CA in DC created misunderstanding, delay and frustration. Hence, it is clear that the CA support role, again how members operate in the field and liaise with the Secretariat, in cities needs to be carefully designed / agreed in advance if projects are to be delivered on-time, on-budget and on-target. Related to this, it is also important to carefully assess the foundations of client commitments, capacities and the risks related to this; long project gestation times run risks of local ownership and priorities shifting. Related to this remains the vital role of members on the ground working collaboratively with clients – whether client or member executed.

The evaluation suggests that despite the delays associated with the administrative process, in-country capacity weaknesses and uncertain government commitment and funding support, the (partial) success of project, to date, has been improved understanding and knowledge of the evolution of slums (e.g., factors relating to rural-urban migration) and the economic and social impact of the slums on local, regional and national frameworks and strategies. The completion of the diagnostic and analytic steps in the project have provided a compendium of information that local partners acknowledge has provided a better understanding of the issues, challenges and potential solutions to the problems of rural-urban migration and evolution of slums and slum upgrading responses. Although the funding received by the implementing agency to date represents only a very minor portion of the overall funding envelope (approximately \$150,000 of the total \$830,000 has been received), these monies have been used to hire consultants to assist in the preparation of reports - the diagnostic and analytic studies. However, there are still four (4) subsequent stages of document development to be completed.

Given the problems which have been identified: lack of cooperation and communication; fissures amongst national and district actors; delays in funding; turf protection amongst partners; lack of public consultation and participatory planning activities with affected groups and no visible role identified for the private sector, it is questionable whether or not the project will be able to proceed as planned through subsequent phases.

The next four outputs include more difficult and complex tasks. In particular, the development of strategies, the assessment of regulatory mechanisms (current and future) to support these strategies, and communication plans and implementation mechanisms to engage the local population, civil society and the private sector. Major questions arise as to whether or not follow-on implementation will be accomplished given the complexity of tasks to be undertaken and the impediments that have been identified at this stage of the project. Forward thinking around implementation is also not clear – there was limited evidence of how to execute the strategy and overcome the political and organizational obstacles that may stand in the way of successful implementation. Added to these challenges is the fact that the identification of follow-on investment linkages to ensure some measure of project sustainability appears to be weak at the time of this assessment.

From the discussions held, the following specific areas for improvement include:

- Tighten up the timeframe for approvals that currently applies to projects over a certain cost limit – extended Grant preparation and execution periods run the risks of exposure to changing politics, priorities and funding windows.

- Ensure that all administrative steps in the Grant Approval and Execution process are language sensitive and as simplified as possible – it is understood the language and application issues are now being addressed.
- At the commencement of the project, it would be helpful to have an overall 'orientation' on the grant proposal and administrative processes. The only assistance provided is the finance side and in the finalizing of the proposal. Other assistance would be beneficial
- Ensure that government support is defined, real (stronger written commitments up front) and sustainable. If there are significant changes to government commitment and resourcing capabilities then a stronger / pro-active approach would be recommended; do not wait for the situation to 'work itself out'. There is a strong role again for members as they are on the ground and should be working with the local stakeholders and Secretariat to address challenges or plan for an exit.
- Visibility of CA in-country on a regular and planned basis — CA (Secretariat or members as agreed up front – with members likely to be in a stronger position where there is on the ground presence) should allocate more time for direct client engagement and to assist with problem solving.
- Formulation of, and agreement to a work-plan between the CA and the client (, which would make clear timelines tied to actions and what deliverables are expected and when. Defining the roles between partners more clearly, so that legitimacy, trust, transparency, communication, and cooperation are enhanced.

#### **3.2.4 Mozambique**

- Slum Upgrading and Vulnerability Reduction in Flood Prone Cities/Towns in Mozambique
- Improving Water and Sanitation in Quelimane City, Mozambique
- Slum Upgrading and City Development Strategy for Nampula City
- Slum Improvement Demonstration Project for Maputo City
- Mozambique Support for Upgrading the Chamanculo C Neighbourhood Maputo Municipality - Preparatory Grant
- Preparatory Grant for the Development of a State of Mozambican Cities Report
- Preparatory Grant for the Development of a CDS for Chimoio
- Preparatory Grant for the Development of a CDS for Vilankulo

#### **Introduction**

Through the last decade, Cities Alliance (CA) has funded what can be seen as a 'portfolio' of projects in Mozambique. This marks a significant multi-million dollar investment by CA in improving urban conditions and strategic urban planning capacity in the country. The period since 2000 has seen economic growth in Mozambique average 8%, with a rate of just over 6% recorded in 2009. Despite close to a doubling in per capita GDP in that time, to around \$440 in current terms, the country, with a present population estimated at 22.4 million, and growing at 1.8% per annum, is afflicted by extreme poverty – Mozambique is in the bottom five countries globally in terms of life expectancy, and in the bottom 10 with regards to the Human Development Index. Urbanisation is rapid, at a rate of approximately 4% with some 36% of the population living in urban settlements in 2009. This is projected to rise to 60% by 2030, an increase of some 12 million urban dwellers. The projects which have been or are being implemented predate CA's recent thinking on country programmes. Accordingly, no formal Mozambique programme was formulated by CA. CA's experience in Mozambique

can thus be seen retrospectively, if not as an actual test case for CA's intention to become more involved in programmatic fashion in the urban sector of poorer developing countries, then certainly as providing useful lessons towards this end.

The CA projects evaluated are summarised below:

- Slum Upgrading and Vulnerability Reduction in Flood Prone Cities and Towns in Mozambique (henceforth Flood Cities SU; total budget \$1,110,000; CA funding \$495,000; sponsoring member/s UN-HABITAT, UNDP; Grant recipient UN-HABITAT)
- Improving Water and Sanitation in Quelimane City, Mozambique (Quelimane City Water and Sanitation; \$1,220,000; \$500,000; UN-HABITAT, World Bank; UN-HABITAT)
- Slum Upgrading and City Development Strategy for Nampula City (Nampula City SU and CDS; \$542,000; \$135,000: UN-HABITAT and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG); Nampula Municipal Council and UN-HABITAT)
- Slum Improvement Demonstration Project for Maputo City (Maputo City Slum Improvement; \$100,000;\$75,000;World Bank; World Bank)
- Preparatory Grant Support for Upgrading the Chamanculo C Neighbourhood, Maputo Municipality (Chamanculo C Neighbourhood Upgrading; \$103,500;\$73,500; Brazil Ministry of Cities and Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Municipal Council of Maputo)
- Preparatory Grant for the Development of a State of Mozambican Cities Report (State of the Cities; \$59,500; \$52,500; CIDA; National Association of Municipalities of Mozambique)
- Preparatory Grant for the Development of a CDS for Chimoio (Chimoio CDS; \$49,080; \$42,000; USAID; Chimoio Municipal Council)
- Preparatory Grant for the Development of a CDS for Vilankulo (Vilankulo CDS; \$49,080; \$42,000; USAID; Vilankulo Municipal Council).

### ***Systematic Change and CA Interventions***

The experience in Mozambique strongly indicates the limitations of smaller-scale interventions, notably those in the preparatory grant format, and the greater utility of larger grants in delivering planned outputs and improving the chances of ownership and sustainability – and in catalysing further activity and change. However, even larger CA grants are constrained by their own limited scale. What emerges as crucial is linking CA grants and the projects they fund to wider initiatives in a variety of ways, most particularly as catalysts.

Both the Chimoio CDS and Vilankulo CDS projects, the grant agreements for which date to March 2007, and were extended in 2008, were closed the following year after the grant agreements expired. Documentation on the projects is limited. It does appear that some half of the grant was spent in the case of Vilankulo, Outputs are not available. In both cases, institutional memory is almost wholly lacking. But it appears that the small scale and preparatory (i.e., without guaranteed further funding) nature of the grant, which followed a thorough-going and time-consuming application process, served, at least to some degree, to frustrate proper buy in and commitment from city mayors and municipal councils. As one informant put it, citing the scale of urban needs and lack of resources and capacity as rationale, "My mayor is only interested in the big money." Local government elections in November 2008 further compounded this debility, as political representatives and staff changed at municipal level. USAID's PROGOV programme, with which the grants were associated, was also closed in 2009 after five years of implementation.

In the case of the State of the Cities project, the preparatory grant format fared somewhat better. The grant agreement to the National Association of Municipalities of Mozambique (ANAMM) was made in January 2009, less than three months after the grant application was received. No significant delays were incurred in the receipt of the first tranche of funds. There were then delays in execution, some caused by management changes at ANAMM – and here the actual role of the sponsoring member, CIDA-PSU, is unclear in terms of its proposed operational and financial supervision of the grant – which meant that the project was not completed within its original six month timeframe, or within 2009, necessitating extension.

The grant output of a full-scale application to CA for the preparation of a State of the Mozambican Cities Report was nonetheless produced and submitted to CA in July 2010. This application is supported by a report which outlines relevant issues in the urban sector, provides a comprehensive bibliography of source material, details a process of consultation at city (Maputo, Nampula and Quelimane), national government ministry and development partner (notably UN-HABITAT, GTZ, DANIDA and SDC), and discusses a study visit to the South African Cities Network (SACN) in Johannesburg. A budget of \$932,500 is proposed with Cities Alliance to contribute \$460,000 primarily to ANAMM as recipient. GTZ, UN-HABITAT (which will receive \$35,000), and UCLG are proposed as sponsoring members; all provide co-financing as does DANIDA, SACN, ANAMM itself, 23 involved municipalities, the Ministry of State Administration (MAE), the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) and the Centre for Sustainable Urban Development (CDS-ZU).

The proposal is now being evaluated by CA. Whatever the outcome, the proposed implementing partnership appears to represent a workable ownership structure or vehicle for the purpose of developing a State of the Cities report through a collaborative, multi-stakeholder process. Such a report would also represent a consolidated and larger-scale effort to produce data and a municipal or city-focused perspective on Mozambique's urban challenges. However, and whatever the causes, on all accounts it has now taken much time and plentiful resources to reach this point. Respondents suggested that a better approach might have been to produce the (full) proposal for the process and report without a preparatory phase (or funding – which is a drawback), and if awarded, to disburse funds on the basis of milestones, with CA reserving the right to withdraw further and future funding.

The two slightly larger grants directed at slum upgrading in Maputo, namely Maputo City Slum Improvement and Chamanculo C Neighbourhood Upgrading, are both linked to, supportive of and have also arguably had a catalytic effect on larger initiatives in ways that were not necessarily predictable or foreseen. Roughly 75% or 800,000 of the city's 1.1 million people live in informal settlements. The Maputo City project was conceived as an adjunct to the first phase of the two phase 2007-2016 World Bank funded Maputo Municipal Development Program (MMDP I). The ProMaputo program, as it was known in this phase, was directed at making systemic financial, organizational and institutional reforms within Maputo's municipal government structure.

The Maputo City project aimed to support, and even initiate, the ProMaputo process by developing and piloting an incremental but integrated approach of participatory upgrading in order to improve living conditions in one of the city's many informal neighbourhoods (bairros), Chamanculo C, with a population of between 25,000 and 30,000. The project was in essence designed to demonstrate upfront commitment on the side of funders to Maputo Municipal Council (MMC) with regards to the broader ProMaputo process.

Strictly in its own terms, the project it is generally acknowledged to have been problematic. The grant agreement dates to October 2005. There were significant delays in the mobilisation of consultants, notably a Project Manager; difficulties in understanding procedural requirements; and differences in opinion on the project's direction between the ultimate beneficiary, MMC, and the consultant team which was engaged. The original

proposed two part phasing of the project was eventually re-emphasised, with the first phase results including a series of socio-economic studies, surveys of services (solid waste, storm water and drainage, and water) and land use, topographical and cadastral maps.

A proposal was thus made for an extension of the project in January 2008; a grant amendment extended the original grant's validity, at apparently no cost, through 2008. At this stage, on accounts, MMC itself took the lead in finalising project activities, with outputs including revised mapping, including a cadastre for a small part of the bairro, and the issuing of some 200 land titles. It appears as though no Completion Report exists (explaining this to a degree is that the 2008 local government elections, mentioned above, resulted in wholesale change in senior positions in MMC).

Despite these difficulties, and with the benefit of hindsight, the Maputo City Slum Improvement Project can now be seen to have had a very useful spurring or instigative impact. In 2007 discussions began on development cooperation between Brazil and Italy, with third countries. One theme of the Italian-Brazilian Triangular Cooperation Programme (IBTCP) that resulted is the upgrading of "degraded" city neighbourhoods. Maputo was identified as a priority city for intervention. Through 2008 and 2009 discussions occurred between the parties on the shape and scope of such an intervention. These were informed by the experience of the Maputo City project, notably in sensitizing the community to and mobilizing it for a participative approach for improving neighbourhood conditions, by the ongoing implementation of ProMaputo, and also by MMC's own initiatives – the City Master Plan, and a Municipal Strategy and Action Plan for Integrated Intervention in Informal Settlements. In November 2009 IBTCP approved a proposal for a two year project called Support for the Upgrading of the Chamanculo C Neighbourhood, prospectively budgeted at \$2,700,000 with funding envisaged from Italy, Brazil and CA.

The CA Chamanculo C Neighbourhood Upgrading preparatory project now underway is designed, in similar fashion to its predecessor's linkage with ProMaputo, to support and to lay the ground for the larger implementation project above. Approval of the proposal was rapid, within three months of submission. Some delays then occurred with transmission of funds, as a special account had to be created by MMC. The project is now well underway, with keys outputs in the form of an operational plan for the project above, and the application for CA funding of \$500,000 already completed. There has also been a sharpening of scope with one of the outputs now conceived as a monitoring and evaluation framework for the Tripartite or Triangular project, as it is known (the budget envelope for the project is now \$2,900,000).

In the process of development and execution to date of the preparatory project and the application for funding to CA for the Tripartite Project, the assistance of the CA regional representative in Brazil was acknowledged in a highly positive fashion by several informants. In addition to a shared language, it was emphasized that working with Brazilian colleagues was highly beneficial owing to a mutual understanding of what are, in some ways, similar political cultures: "They understand how we have to work here," one interviewee put it.

The two CA projects in Maputo, then, are now regarded as part of the same longer-run process of neighbourhood improvement (with the country's strong positive tradition of a neighbourhood-based urbanism, the term slum upgrading is disdained), and demonstrate the advantages of linking small CA projects to larger initiatives in supportive fashion, which can have stronger scale and catalytic effects than if they are implemented as standalone projects. The linkages which have been at play and the future perspective are well-summarized in the following extract from the MMDP II Project Appraisal Document (2010, p. 55) from the section on the programme's Component C Urban Planning:

MMDP II will provide support for the development and implementation of socially and technically appropriate methods for upgrading Maputo's dense "inner ring" of informal



settlements. During MMDP I, with the support of Cities Alliance, CMM [i.e. MMC] undertook an experiment in the dense, socially complex neighborhood of Chamanculo C; using a highly participatory process to pursue the limited goals of improving roads and pathways and providing a basis for regularizing tenure. MMDP II will build upon this experience to implement a more integrated model, using participatory planning processes to plan the rationalization of land boundaries and public spaces, as well as providing funds for modest neighborhood infrastructure improvements for internal access roads and paths, drainage, illumination and sanitation based on community identified priorities. Methods adapted from experience with “slum upgrading” programs in other parts of Africa, Latin America, and Asia will be employed as a basis for CMM’s own participatory neighborhood development program. In addition, IDA-supported efforts will be implemented in collaboration with a tripartite Brazil-Italy-Mozambique Integrated Neighborhood Development Project, also supported by Cities Alliance. The project will build upon earlier efforts in the Chamanculo area to pilot more intensive methods for promoting social development, as well as land use regularization and infrastructure improvement in poor periurban neighborhoods. The CMM field teams implementing IDA-supported neighbourhood improvements and the team implementing more intensive Tripartite Project work in Chamanculo will share technical assistance resources, specialized staff, and field experiences, thus maximizing synergies between these two closely related efforts.

As principal sponsor, UN-HABITAT has now executed three projects in Mozambique. The first two, Flood Cities (with UNDB as co-sponsor) and Quelimane City Water and Sanitation (World Bank) were larger-scale projects than those discussed above, with total budgets of \$1.1 to \$1.2 million. In each case, UN-HABITAT was the grant recipient and implementing agency, receiving around \$500,000 for each from CA. Flood Cities was subjected to detailed and positive evaluation in 2005 after completion. The only proviso was a lack of clarity about future investment in the cities where the project was implemented, The outputs, though, which included land use plans, disaster management/flood control precautionary measures, capacity development and a ground-breaking training manual, “Learning to Live with Floods” (which served as an example for the development of further materials in the region via a Global Environment Fund project in the lower Limpopo Basin) were of extremely high quality. By all accounts, this was a very successful project.

The Quelimane City Water and Sanitation project, which built on the Flood Cities experience in aiming to improve water and sanitation conditions in slum areas, also arguably demonstrates at least the potential advantages of operating on a larger-scale, and with ongoing facilitation and assistance. Notwithstanding a drawn-out formulation and application process, and delays during execution, owing largely it appears to lack of municipal capacity and limited financial management procedures, the project did make improvements and innovations for Quelimane Municipal Council in planning methods, in the setting up of community structures and building community facilities, and did improve some municipal services and infrastructure, notably water supply and roads. Sanitation outputs were largely not completed. Evaluation indicates that the project may well have actually been overly-ambitious in its design: the highly participative city-wide improvements proposed likely required an extended project duration and a far higher budget. Disappointingly, there has not been large-scale follow up on the initiative – an investment proposal submitted by UN-HABITAT to the European Commission was not accepted – although WaterAid has continued supporting the Community Committees and centres that were established.

The ongoing Nampula SU and CDS project is funded to a lower degree by CA, and is now fully operational. The formulation and approval process also took a long time (approximately one-and-a-half years), and was followed by roughly a year’s delay in mobilising the project. This is ascribed to an initial mismatch between municipal procedures and CA requirements, and miscommunication on this between Nampula Municipal Council

and CA. Facilitation by CA regional representation based in Brazil has assisted here. The project is based on the development of partial urbanisation plans for all 11 city neighbourhoods which will cumulate in a City-Wide Slum Upgrading Plan, and the elaboration of a CDS for the city itself and the surrounding Nampula District. It thus has real potential for making innovations in urban and city region planning methodologies in a city whose national importance is perhaps under-recognised. At this stage, it can be recommended that the CA Secretariat/Members assist in giving the project a higher profile – in a sense compensating for the project's apparent relative isolation from other initiatives, which is a difficulty which may have also affected the Quelimane Water and Sanitation project.

### **Going Forward**

The Mozambique experience to date justifies CA's emphasis on catalytic funding as one of the four pillars of the new work programme. The ongoing utility of a source of town and city or municipally-focused funding is unquestionable. Such funding, however, needs to be used in targeted and truly catalytic ways. It should stimulate, instigate, support or foreshadow through demonstration and innovation an actually existing or, perhaps better, an envisaged wider initiative (i.e., programme or project). The record with very small preparatory grants, with their high and extremely time consuming transactions and compliance costs, particularly at application stage, is not positive in Mozambique. Several informants stated that such grants were, in effect, far more trouble to their promoters – and their political overseers – than they were worth. In future, these should arguably be discouraged, as even if executed (and usually late at that) they also often seem to have a discouraging and chilling effect on future activities.

Catalytic grants should therefore be larger-scale, and will likely work best if they are connected to and contribute towards even larger scale potential or actual initiatives. In that way, they will be better suited to the large challenges of reducing urban poverty and creating inclusivity in even smaller municipalities in Mozambique, and other countries like it marked by low incomes, poor social conditions and rapid urbanization.

The second pillar of the new programme would also assist here. An in-country programme can of course take a number of forms and be founded on a variety of urban development strategic imperatives or policy themes (the present slum upgrading and City Development Strategy can be seen broadly as imperatives). But in Mozambique, given the significant involvement there over the decade by CA, a programme framework of some kind for such a level of engagement would definitely have served to clarify the intentions and expectations of all involved parties. The connections between CA projects themselves in the (or any) country, and the linkages with other initiatives, would have been (and will need to be) better specified if they are not to appear as a collection of ad hoc actions.

This in turn will help with the aggregation and dissemination of knowledge, the probabilities for which would be improved if projects are seen within a programmatic framework. In Mozambique, there is actually good knowledge of at least the existence CA member and/or client projects amongst what is a relatively small group of urban development specialists and actors within municipalities, national government, academic or research institutions, development partners and consultants. The broad trajectory of individual projects is often recognized. But there is little understanding of impacts or wider use of what are often very useful outputs within this group (the latter are not readily available), let alone beyond it.

Several of the projects have produced innovative and useful reports and innovative planning methodologies and techniques. This learning certainly could be better captured and distributed amongst partners and stakeholders. There are several possible hubs for such dissemination, not least the Faculty of Architecture and Physical Planning at University Eduardo Mondlane, which has been involved in several projects.

Finally, the experience in Mozambique underscores the need for the CA Secretariat and members to engage in a more concerted programme of communication which explains what the CA is, what its Secretariat and members do, and how to distinguish between their roles. This will enhance the potentially powerful reputational effect of CA which, when actually attended to, is far better valued. The high approval ratings given to the facilitation offered in Mozambique in the recent past by regional advisors based in Brazil attests to this. In Mozambique this facilitation counteracted misperceptions about CA, in particular the blurring of the functions of the Secretariat and members in project execution (as seen by clients). This arose because what partners and stakeholders see is a large and then seemingly, in retrospect, disproportionate effort by the Secretariat at application stage – a lot of input goes into the assessment of small grants – and what is then viewed, including by members, as a virtual disappearance at execution stage, at least publicly. This may well be a misimpression or confusion about what the Secretariat does, but it is understandable. Moreover, the Secretariat may be under-rating its own role is overtly encouraging, exhorting and giving confidence to its members and client project implementers. Such confidence-building is a key to successful implementation and sustainability.

### ***Learning from Experience***

The record in Mozambique can offer some lessons in how to improve CA performance and make operational the proposed four pillars of the MTS.

The grant application process requires streamlining and simplification and should be less time consuming and far less protracted for applicants. It should also allow greater realism and flexibility in terms of implementation methods (i.e., ways of getting things done). This does not mean sacrificing rigour, but rather an acknowledgement of the circumstances applicants find themselves in, particularly in poorer countries where urbanisation is earlier stages: very limited time, resources, capacity and experience in facing significant challenges relating to urban development and urban poverty. At present, the details needed by CA mean that applicants need to have not inconsiderable knowledge of project formulation and management. Information to and coaching and facilitation for applicants may need to be increased (what are probably the best procedures in this regard can be drawn from by the grant making processes of the European Union and the Commission).

The grant facility, however it is redesigned, should also be located better within its country (and potential programme) urban sector policy context. The CA Secretariat/Members and regional representatives can also possibly play a more promotional and instigative role (to reiterate: where this has happened in Mozambique, it has been hugely appreciated). The CA needs to be, as much as possible, visible and present.

This need for visibility – again, as possible – carries through into the grant execution phase. It is not easy, but CA country programmes or frameworks, CA grant-funded projects (as linked to other programmes and projects), the better capturing and dissemination of relevant learning, and a creation of a real understanding of the alliance's purposes will need to be more closely integrated and perceived as such by members and clients at operational level, and other stakeholders, as they implement projects. These projects need, most importantly, to be on a larger scale (not less than \$250,000), of a longer duration (more than two years), and linked to other initiatives. Facilitation and/or capacity development by the Alliance (with members critical here) will continue to be required to deal with grant execution procedures which currently, following World Bank modalities, incur large compliance costs for underprepared and inexperienced clients.

Here, greater clarity of purpose – put simply, as in why are we doing this – is also needed: the CA now needs to respond to and shape a new urban agenda in developing countries that conjoins the dynamics of both urban economic growth and urban poverty, and which, and this is novel, in the name of inclusivity will require the reconciliation of the differing interests of residents in informal settlements and a rising, suburbanised urban middle class.

### 3.2.5 *Philippines:*

- Integrated Approaches to Poverty Reduction at the Neighbourhood Level – a Cities Without Slums Initiative [IMPACT Project]
- City Development Strategies (CDS) in the Philippines: An Enabling Platform for Good Governance and Improving Service Delivery
- A Metro Manila “Cities Without Slums” Strategy in Support of the Metro Manila Urban Services for the Poor Investment Program (MMUSP)

#### **Introduction**

The three Philippine projects fell into two categories: (i) cities without slums (CWS) initiatives that were related to ongoing or proposed ADB loans and involved subproject feasibility studies and the formulation of strategies; and (ii) improving city planning and urban management through the preparation of city development strategies (CDSs) and the institutionalisation of the process. Both must be seen within the context of developments in the country, where urban poverty has increased from 16.8% of the urban population in 2000 to 19.5% in 2006 and from 27% to 29% of total poor over the same period. Later figures are not available, but the devastating typhoons of 2009 are likely to have further increased urban poverty.

A recent report by the World Bank on the Philippines has shown that slow economic growth has been a long-standing problem. And even though growth has increased considerably in the past decade, its sustainability remains in doubt. Improved economic performance has not translated into poverty reduction, indicating that growth has not really been inclusive. The lack of progress in poverty reduction stems from the relatively modest growth by regional standards, combined with high degree of income inequality that makes poverty less responsive to economic growth. Key factors impacting on poverty include:

- An unequal sectoral distribution of income—manufacturing growth has been capital intensive and has not generated many new jobs; agriculture, the prime employer of low skilled workers, has slow growth.
- Unequal pattern of regional development—dominance of the National Capital Region.
- Severe demographic pressures because of rapid population growth—working age population has increased more than employment opportunities.
- Declines in the relative price of labour typically provided by the poor.
- Unequal distribution of human capital and access to social services.

The recent economic downturn has refocused attention on the need to restore rapid growth, and to make it more inclusive. To reduce poverty and build a broader base for economic prosperity there is a need to increase income earning opportunities—ensuring that constraints on economic growth are eliminated, improving productivity and allowing a better functioning labour market; and to ensure that poor households can participate in markets and benefit from growth by enhancing their human capital—improvements in health, education and skills, and strengthening social protection. The assessment of the effectiveness of the three CA interventions must be seen within the context of actions to reduce poverty and improve economic growth.

#### **Systematic Change and CA Interventions**

***The two CWS initiatives neither enhanced ownership nor led to slum upgrading going to scale.*** Government, both at national and local levels, lacked the political will to tackle the slum problem, despite a long history of successful engagement with communities in slum upgrading. From the early days of the Tondo Foreshore Development Project,

through the Zonal Improvement Program of Metro Manila and the Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program in the regional cities, to the Community Mortgage Program and later SET-UP, successful in situ slum upgrading projects have been implemented. However lessons from each have not been learnt and seldom have these efforts led to major follow on commitments by government and self sustaining programs. The CA initiative, although welcome, did not change the apathy of government towards in situ slum upgrading.

Although a slum upgrading strategy was developed for Metro Manila, it was neither endorsed locally nor nationally. Very little public investment has taken place, and the current approach is oriented more towards out of town relocation than on-site or in-city improvement. Neither projects nor further feasibility studies have been implemented on the scale envisioned since the ADB loan funds never materialised—under the Metro Manila Urban Services for the Poor Project. The Department of Finance did not support the proposed implementing agency—the Social Housing Finance Company (SHFC). Nor did they agree to provide a 100% guarantee on borrowed funds—they wanted the LGUs to guarantee 50%. Also they wished to change the rules whereby there would be sub-sovereign borrowing by 1st class cities. LGUs did not wish to commit to these arrangements, especially for investments in low-income housing where beneficiaries' willingness to pay was seen as questionable.

The initiatives using homeowners associations as a modality for slum improvement was never really tested. The scheme was part of a wider ADB-supported initiative under its nationwide Development of Urban Poor Communities Sector Project. The on-lending agency was the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), but initially they were not convinced that the modality would work. The subsequent cancellation by the ADB of the substantial unused funds—US\$20 million—meant that the major funding source was lost. No projects were funded that could test the entire process.

***The CDS initiative was more successful, and seems to have led to significant improvements in city management. It changed attitudes and mindsets both at local and national levels.*** Even though the published CDS documents are relatively simple and focused more on what the local government can do, rather than the broader needs of the city overall, the key has been the institutionalisation of the system within the participating cities, and its acceptance at national level. Encouraging signs are that most cities now wish to prepare a CDS and adopt participatory approaches in its formulation. Mayors and councillors are much better informed, more data is available and stakeholders are increasingly engaged. City government capacity has been developed. A fourth project is currently being prepared and approaches are to be made to the CA for funding. More embracing CDSs are being proposed with a shift in emphasis towards enhancing local economic development—improving competitiveness and generating jobs, and responding to climate change and enhancing disaster preparedness.

### **Going Forward**

The overall approach of focussing on slum upgrading and city development strategies is well founded. But more efforts are needed in future to take a wider view of poverty reduction through local economic development, and the preparation of more extensive city development strategies. These seem to have been given less attention in the three projects, although some cities are now looking towards more embracing coverage of their future CDSs. ***The focus on knowledge, learning, communications and advocacy seems to have been undertaken well in the three projects.*** National government agencies and cities in Metro Manila are at least more aware of the slum problem, even if they do very little about it. The HOA modality is technically sound and innovative. Perhaps the most successful though is the CDS project which has led to considerable change in approaches to city planning and stakeholder engagement. The focus on capacity building has proven to be beneficial.

The lack of human resources within the CA meant inadequate supervision and too little follow up on the projects. The learning and knowledge sharing elements could have been made more effective with client engagement / additional field visits. This would have led to a greater transfer of knowledge than was achieved, especially on worldwide trends in urban management and low-income housing.

Funding of the two slum upgrading initiatives was undertaken by the CA in the absence of sufficient ADB technical assistance funding. While it is clear that these initiatives should have been budgeted by ADB, the use of CA funds was seen as easy substitute to raising more resources internally. Using CA funds to supplement those of ADB must be a questionable use of scarce resources.

All three projects enabled city governments and national agencies develop a better understanding of the issues related to urban transformations, poverty reduction and inclusive cities, going to scale has not been possible in the absence of funds to prepare further feasibility studies and/or finance development. Many of the larger CDS projects are dependent on foreign funding, and although JICA and WB have supported some, the amounts involved are insufficient. Clearly implementation of major CDS priority projects and slum upgrading schemes is reliant on linking to programs of donor agencies and multilateral funding agencies. But these agencies are notorious for their slow follow up on potential project. As a result much of the impetus gained from each project has now been lost, while waiting for an appropriate funding source. The projects did, however, increase awareness and enhance local ownership.

The debate about the most appropriate approach towards slum upgrading and the impact of such projects on poverty alleviation continues unabated. In-situ upgrading and tenure security increases the capital assets of the poor and enables them to pursue income generating opportunities, and as such contributes to poverty reduction. While the two CWS projects produced the required outputs—strategies and feasibility studies—actual development never took place and thus their impact on poverty reduction could not be tested. Follow-on investment linkage was weak in these cases.

### ***Learning from Experience***

Highly centralized administrations dealing with local issues never prosper for long. CA is perhaps perceived as centralised in Washington; but needs to consider decentralization by extending its outreach more directly to the cities of the developing world. Regional or even country offices should be considered to strengthen engagement; but this is of course a key issue as on the ground member presence should be the core of the business model. Stronger linkages could be fostered with city associations, educational institutes, and funding agencies, including CDIA for example.

CA projects appear to have been most successful in knowledge and learning (for example initiating participatory / evidence based planning processes), and communications and advocacy—all three contributed to a better understanding of issues and solutions. Funding covered the hiring of consultants to assist in the development of strategies and subproject feasibility studies, and prepare operational guidelines. All funds were disbursed and required outputs generally accomplished.

*Follow-on implementation did not happen as planned*, since additional money was not available to support the preparation of further feasibility studies, nor for actual project implementation. The real gap is between projects identified in the CDS or CWS and the ability of local governments to fund and prepare feasibility studies. Perhaps the CA could be more active in helping seek out strategic partners for the cities to assist with feasibility studies and project implementation. From the discussion held, the following specific areas for improvement include:

- Eliminating the threshold (7 months appraisal period) that currently applies to projects over a certain cost limit.
- Doing away with asking donor agencies for written comments on the grant application—perhaps this could be on a “no objection” basis, instead of expecting written comments.
- Simplifying the proposal format—compare to PPIAF for example.
- Developing a firm timeline for decision making, so that applicants know where they stand. There should be more defined benchmarks for each stage of the evaluation process. Timelines for each should be established and adhered to. For each stage a maximum number of days should be set over the application and evaluation period, right up to signing of the grant agreement. CA has weak and limited timeline management.
- Engaging the CA Secretariat much more with participating cities in future— CA Secretariat should allocate more time for more frequent missions that should include field (subproject) visits.
- Agreeing a work-plan between the CA Secretariat/member and the client, which would make clear what deliverables are expected and when.
- Defining the roles between partners more clearly, so that key agencies do not feel left out—as HUDCC did in the IMPACT project.
- Improving communications, more timely responses to questions from proponents and improving knowledge sharing all around.

### **3.2.6 Syria**

- Aleppo City Development Strategy

#### **Introduction**

The Aleppo City Development Strategy is implemented by GTZ with cooperation and strong ownership of the Municipality of Aleppo. The CDS formulation process, the likely future implementation as well as its part success has to be seen within the country’s specific political, economic and institutional context. A few important influencing factors are detailed below: Syria is a republic under an authoritarian military-dominated regime. The president, approved by referendum for a 7-year term, has the right to appoint vice presidents, ministers, to declare war and states of emergency, to issue laws (which, except in the case of emergency, require ratification by the People’s Council), to declare amnesty, to amend the constitution, and to appoint civil servants and military personnel. Syria is a single-party state and only one political party, the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party is legally allowed to hold effective power. The National Progressive Front (NPF) was established to provide for a limited degree of participation in government by political parties other than the ruling party. Traditionally, the parties of the NPF are socialist and/or Arab nationalist in orientation, and a strict ban on religious and right-wing parties is in force. The ruling party is dominated by the military, which consumes a large share of Syria’s economic resources. The Syrian military expenditure, 5.9% of GDP, ranks the country 12th highest in the world.

The economy is highly controlled by the Government. Syria’s economy is mixed, composed of large state enterprises and private small businesses. During the 1960s, the Government nationalized most major enterprises and adopted economic policies designed to address regional and class disparities. Along with the NPF, the president approves the state’s 5-year economic plans. The NPF also acts as a forum in which economic policies are debated and the country’s political orientation is determined. Although legislators may

criticize policies and modify draft laws, they cannot initiate laws, and the executive branch retains ultimate control over the legislative process.

The President has recently started introducing modest economic reforms, including cutting lending interest rates, opening private banks, consolidating all of the multiple exchange rates, raising prices on some subsidized items (gasoline and cement), and establishing the Damascus Stock Exchange - which was set to begin operations in 2009. In addition, President ASAD signed legislative decrees to encourage corporate ownership reform, and to allow the Central Bank to issue Treasury bills and bonds for government debt.

The main export commodities of Syria are crude oil, minerals, petroleum products, fruits and vegetables, cotton fiber, textiles, clothing, meat and live animals, wheat. Syrian economic growth slowed to 1.8% in 2009 as the global economic crisis affected oil prices and the economies of Syria's key export partners and sources of investment. Long-run economic constraints include declining oil production, high unemployment, rising budget deficits, and increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy use in agriculture, rapid population growth, industrial expansion, and water pollution.

Local governments are weak and highly dependent on central leadership. Syria is divided into 14 governorates and each is headed by governors appointed by the Ministry of Interior. These governors report directly to the president. The governors control provincial government offices as well as the local offices of ministries and state-owned enterprises. All government expenditures are included in one national budget produced by the Ministry of Finance. Local governments receive all operating funds from the central government and any excess revenues collected are returned to the national treasury.

Bureaucratic, time consuming and costly directives and management procedures in force do not take into account the management capacity at local level, particularly the capacity of local administrations to apply the national planning provisions, formulate master plans, as well as enforcing development and building regulations.

There is serious land and housing supply problem in Syria. Approximately 50 per cent of the urban population lives in informal settlements. According to the Syrian government, the term 'informal settlements' refers to houses built outside the boundaries of urban planning regulations. They are, therefore, despite their long-standing existence, technically illegal. However, poor urban planning policies and rapid urban growth over the last 50 years means that for many city residents informal settlements are the only affordable way of living. As urban centres have experienced rapid development since the 1980s – growth is now estimated at 3 percent annually – inadequate provision of new serviced land has fallen short of what is needed. According to the Tenth Five-Year Plan, the country's current housing deficit is estimated at 687,000 units. The result is that families have increasingly been pushed towards the informal housing sector and settlements have flourished.

There are inter-related processes causing the rise of informal settlements. On the one hand, informal development has resulted from the lack of sufficient and affordable official market options of access to serviced urban land and housing thus leading to increasing land and property prices and excluding in the process a growing part of society. On the other hand, informal development has resulted from the nature of state action, including:

- lack of a consistent pro-poor social housing policy;
- lack of a social rental policy (12% of the urban poor rent houses);
- legal order has failed to provide specific mechanisms for the necessary release of the very significant stock of public land into the market for housing purposes in urban areas.



The problem needs solution at grass-root level, an overall legal-institutional framework regulating land rights, land management, urban planning and urban management has to be introduced.

### ***Systematic Change and CA Interventions***

It would be too optimistic to assume that systematic change has been achieved, but the project has certainly made a step into the right direction. The Aleppo CDS has set out a new institutional structure, better suited to the implementation of the CDS. The new structure is currently pending approval. Once approved, the Municipality of Aleppo (MoA) will have a joint CDS and Local Economic Development Department responsible for leading the implementation of the CDS. Other relevant Departments will be created and/or strengthened, including Informal Settlements Department, Children and Youth Department, which will aim to implement the corresponding pro-poor components of the CDS. According to project stakeholders, it is likely that the Ministry of Local Administration will adopt this new institutional structure in other Syrian municipalities. Through the GTZ Urban Development Programme, the findings of the assessments prepared for the Aleppo CDS were included in the Memorandum on Sustainable Urban Development in Syria, a document which later led into the approval of the Syrian Urban Development Policy in 2010.

It is unclear whether the CA intervention in itself or rather the overall GTZ UDP umbrella programme (which has 3 pillars in Aleppo, one of these is the CA project), led to enhanced ownership from part of the MoA, but it is certain that ownership and political will has been very strong at local level: there was at least of common pathway and coherence of effort. The challenge lies in the fact, as mentioned above, that local government structures and capacities are very weak and the governance system is highly centralised. The adoption of systematic changes in Syrian governance and city transformation are likely to be long time owing to its highly bureaucratic institutional structure.

### ***Going Forward***

The presence of GTZ in Syria and in particular the fact that it took the lead on executing the project (the MoA admitted that it did not have the resources to furnish the application form and manage the project), was beneficial in terms of timely implementation, knowledge transfer and advocacy. The field visit concluded that the CDS is a new approach in Syria and its innovation lies in triggering community participation and recognizing pro-poor aspects in urban planning. The CDS formulation process has started at the right time, as (non-) existing participatory systems are currently going through a reform process. This may explain the high public interest and voluntarism of working group members who enthusiastically work extra hours to support the initiative. This climate may give the project a good opportunity to introduce improvements but it is crucial that current structures are susceptible to change to maintain the momentum. The project has also witnessed unprecedented visibility among the public through the introduction of an elaborate communication strategy and branding process. The slogan of 'Madinatuna' (Our City) refers to the whole CDS process starting with the preparation of poverty assessments; thematic actions plans; project identification; institution restructuring and actual implementation. It has become independent from CA and GTZ.

### ***Learning from Experience***

During the field visit, the following issues were identified:

- The grant application form was deemed too complex and the MoA would not have had adequate resources to respond without the assistance of GTZ. A consultant was

hired specifically to prepare the application and it took over a year to process the grant.<sup>7</sup>

- There is seemingly a difference between the understanding of terminology used by the Member and CA Secretariat. A glossary of terms would clarify these issues and could save time at both ends. Where the member is unclear, a visit from the CA Secretariat at the application phase would help to clarify uncertainties, which could speed up the whole process and foster stronger cooperation during project implementation.
- The application form required written commitment from supporting organisations. However, the lengthy application process and delayed project start-up many of these commitments lost their momentum and did not materialize.
- Before starting the grant application, the concept of integrated, strategic development planning needs some clarification to be understood politicians / urban governments and their administrations. Ownership can will likely develop quicker once this is understood. Champions have to be identified before the application process starts to prepare the ground.
- Country-specific circumstances, e.g.: political, economic and institutional context, should be taken into consideration at the time of project formulation and the CDS should be better tailored for the local settings. In the context of Syria:
  - Local governments are weak in Syria and governance is centralised. In this specific case, stronger involvement of central institutions may increase the likelihood of future CDS implementation.
  - In case local capacities are insufficient to implement the CDS, then the project should have a stronger focus on capacity building, which should be reflected not only in the methodology but also in the budget. The Aleppo CDS did identify capacity building requirements but failed to deliver necessary training due to the limited budget available.
  - The problem of informal settlements is a major issue in Aleppo and will be an important component of the CDS. However, before preparing an action plan and identifying projects, the problem has to be tackled at grass-root level by the central Government, i.e.: create a legal framework regulating property rights, land titling.
- The identification of potential obstacles in the way of CDS implementation, should be mapped as part of the formulation process. This should come before the identification of projects and follow-on investment sources.

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<sup>7</sup> This issue was identified by GTZ during interviews separate from the Syria case study.

## 4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 4.1 Strategic: Does the CA deliver value added?

The CA business model has focused on providing small grants to support clients / members prepare participatory pro-poor plans, and specifically to support the following


- City Development Strategies;
- Slum upgrading (cities without slums); and to a lesser extent,
- National policy frameworks.

The two main products CDS and SU plans / initiatives have merit and are recognized by clients as being innovative and encouraging new and better ways of planning. Support for City Development Strategy formulation probably leads to better results relative to the slum upgrading initiatives which run into wider problems of national / urban policy frameworks not being conducive to implementation (as in the case of the Philippines and Senegal in the case studies).

#### 4.1.1 *The value-added scorecard*

The overall assessment of the performance of the CA project portfolio reviewed as part of the case studies was summarized in a simple traffic light score card: the card focusing on where the value added of CA interventions reside and contribute to project quality as outlined in Chapter 1. More detailed country / project level assessments leading to the summary below are provided in the attached Annex. Leaving aside the grant funding role, the CA adds value to city development strategies, slum upgrading plans and national policy frameworks through facilitating coherence of effort among partners, by bringing member knowledge and innovation into the strategy / planning processes and by adding credibility to these through reputational leverage. On balance, the evidence from the detailed project reviews, and in particular the case studies, is that the CA performs reasonably well in terms of delivering value through knowledge inputs and reputational leverage – Figure 4.1 – and these contribute to enhanced project quality. A short discussion of key points follows below.

**Figure 4.1 Testing the Cities Alliance Value Propositions**



**4.1.2 Coherence of Effort: When it works it is highly beneficial and valued by clients**

In terms of coherence of effort, this is focused on the objective of achieving harmonization among CA Members – in line with Paris Declaration principles. Performance is mixed across the portfolio and even within particular countries: The Metro Manila “Cities Without Slums” Strategy in Support of the Metro Manila Urban Services for the Poor Investment Program (MMUSP) witnessed significant differences between ADB and UN-H post Grant Agreement signing where as the City Development Strategies (CDS) in the Philippines: An Enabling Platform for Good Governance and Improving Service Delivery seemed to bring a number of Members together at Application and Execution. In the case of Lilongwe, Malawi, UCLG worked collaboratively with JICA and GTZ also contributed and this provided a good platform to build on (including getting the City of Johannesburg, (backed by the SA Local Government Association to assist in enabling the process to carry forward). Where Members jointly work together, if with different weight of effort, the likelihood of positive results may be enhanced – the Douala / Cameroon case, where the World Bank and AFD collaborated, there seemed to be a good complementarity that both improved the overall quality of the project and provided potential linkages to follow-on support (via AFD).

Overall, the issue is not about getting as many members as possible to sign up to the grant application but the quality of working together and with clients to secure positive project outcomes. Critically, coherence of effort is also beneficial in terms joint working to support follow-on investment and capacity building: moving from strategy / plan formulation towards implementation.

**4.1.3 Knowledge Management: A fundamental source of CA’s of value**

One key value-added of the CDS / CWS projects supported in the African context was assisting Clients (the cities, civil society, urban poor representatives and to some extent national level partners) to better understand and acquire the evidence base on urban poverty and it drivers. From the early days of preparing Grants through to (participatory) diagnostic exercises the case of Malawi, Cameroon and Senegal all benefited from CA / CA

Member knowledge contributions: all stated the benefits of CA Grant Funding support. Where urbanization and urban poverty issues have had limited purchase at national policy levels and where local capacities are weak, this is a very valuable contribution – and was recognized by Clients and their partners. The Philippines experience demonstrated some positive learning and knowledge sharing across projects and among participating stakeholders over time: this is a positive learning and capacity building outcome. In the case of Cameroon, the stated intention is to leverage the knowledge and experienced gained and try to replicate the work in other cities – again a good case of a Client gaining capacity through CA Members support on CA Grant supported activities.

#### **4.1.4 *The Grant Administration Process needs Repairs: Transaction costs are high***

The evidence from the project reviews, and Chapter 2, is clear on one issue: the grant administration process is not working well and is in need of improvement in terms of streamlining processes and reducing the time required to complete grant agreements. It is noted that the projects selected as part of this evaluation were challenging and weighted towards Africa where capacities are weak. On the upside, the CA is working to improve this area and the procedures outlined as part of the new Catalytic Fund should remedy many of the problems that contributed to lengthy grant making.

#### **4.1.5 *Summing up***

The project portfolio covers a wide range of development contexts and challenges; and as the portfolio shifts towards lower income countries with low capacities at city level project performance will be stress tested.

On the downside, the CA's grant making function needs significant improvement to reduce transaction costs and length of preparing Grant agreements. The CA is aware of these and is understood to be working to improve the process and reduce costs and time lines to formulate and process Grant Applications: this responds well to client feedback and our research as part of this evaluation/

On the upside, CA interventions and the value-added they bring can be highly beneficial and contribute to improved project quality and the likelihood of downstream pro-poor results.

The review of projects and the field visits undertaken as part of this evaluation reveals a mixed performance in terms of project quality and adding value: this is not surprising. The comparative performance of project success in CA Grants versus other Grants was not tested (the evidence in any event would need some consideration of control for complexity, types of clients etc). However, where projects are executed with good client – member relationships then the results are generally likely to be more positive and moreover, contribute to a greater likelihood of pro-poor outcomes. The core CA products were both deemed valued by clients. A stronger focus on engagement and implementation is warranted in both Grant formulation as well as execution – this places a premium on structured member roles “on the ground” and strengthening these up front.

## **4.2 Client vs Member Execution**

This was one of the core questions that this evaluation was intended to address. The proposition tested was whether strength of ownership and quality of projects varied by mode of execution. The results of the analysis suggested there is no simple relationship – high degrees of ownership can be attained by either mode: the issue was the quality of the relationship between clients and members. While there may be a desirability to have client execution – with a narrow focus on transaction flows – in the context of a small grant facility it may not be appropriate or pragmatic: national systems may not be fit for purpose in processing and flexibly enabling fund flows / disbursements needed to support small short term planning processes supported by the CA.

There is evidence that there is a fine balance to be struck between strength of member roles (relatively hands on vs a lighter touch) and quality of projects: there does seem to be a positive relationship with stronger member roles and higher quality projects. Importantly, our case studies reveal that this is appreciated by clients and indeed is a core source of CA Grant funding value added. A key is that local stakeholders take a leadership role in the planning processes and “own” the decisions and results: the Malawi and Douala CDSs are good examples of client execution but with members playing a very key role in stimulating innovating processes.


Related to this notion of relationship is the strength of member engagement: it was noted that where members take an active and routine engagement with clients / local stakeholders this was deemed beneficial by clients. This is important where capacities are limited and suggests a deeper “on the ground” member role would be beneficial: this was noted across the main case studies.

Where members are also beneficial is guiding clients through the Grant Making Process – this was evident from the Africa case studies / project reviews; weak client capacities need to be addressed and members play a vital role here.

**4.2.1 Impacts: The evidence is partial and data not fit for purpose**

The evidence related to the pro-poor impacts and results of CA Grant supported activities is at best partial and moreover difficult to conclude as a result of attribution gaps – Figure 4.2. The results framework and related data generally do not exist thus making claims about results difficult. Notwithstanding this, there are logical issues in bridging the attribution gap.

**Figure 4.2 Capturing Results: Mind the Gap**



Source: CA, Theory of Change, April 2010.

Getting evidence of CA grant support contributing to desired pro-poor results is challenging owing to:

- the relatively “light touch” approach of CA in its grant facility administration monitoring such that documentation related to monitoring of results is limited;
- the practicality that many of the impacts and results are likely to materialize well beyond the grant completion and take several years to materialize – there is only limited, if any, longitudinal tracking of results and the extent of on-going project M&E is unclear; and
- the “attribution” gap between what can reasonably be attributable to the Grant Supported project and desired development / pro-poor impacts – the grants are small.

In effect, the current CA business processes only allow *partial capture* of relevant data through Progress Reporting, Grant Completion Reports and selective field visits. Systematic M&E and longitudinal data collection is not undertaken and in practice is difficult in any event under the current business model.

This is a critical issue to address. First, getting a results framework is likely to be necessary to attract funding and securing on-going revenue streams. Investors will want to know what results are being achieved and at this point there is no agreed framework in place or systems to routinely capture results and learning.

Second, and equally important, the core source of CA value-added is knowledge and innovation, which underpin the CAs reputational leverage. Thus, to sustain and enhance this source of value the CA needs to strengthen its knowledge management function in the Grant Administration Process: this requires more systematic approaches to monitoring and evaluation and building in mechanisms to capture and share lessons learned across the CA network. Our field work revealed clients / local stakeholders very much valued international comparators, leading / best / promising practices and dialogue to explore how to address the challenges of their cities. The South – South knowledge sharing in the Mozambique and Malawi examples demonstrate how powerful this source of value can be. Our work in Doula similarly revealed a great desire to be linked into to other cities and to share experience.

#### **4.3 Wrap-up**

The CA Grant supported activities, when working well, are able to achieve successful participatory partnerships among clients, local stakeholders and the CA (and in particular members). The interventions supported through the grants are relevant and effective – they are focused on processes that increase the likelihood of urban poverty reduction. They are recognised as contributing value to clients by clients. The processes supported tend to be very front end and grants are small. Measuring results and impacts is challenging even if valid baselines and data were collected. However, are field results did suggest participating stakeholders did acknowledge that grant supported activities did make a difference in many cases; that is increasing awareness, the knowledge base and the way urban planning and engagement with the urban poor were undertaken. The tests of scaling up, replication and sustainability are only partially evident and indeed addressed in the cases reviewed. On the upside, the CDS initiatives seemed to have potential catalytic effects and as in the case of the Philippines achieved a degree of mainstreaming in urban planning.

#### **4.4 Recommendations**

The evidence from the project reviews and in particular the case studies suggest a number of recommendations at the strategic level, CA organization level and in terms of business processes.

Table 4.1 Securing Value Added

<b>Recommendations</b>		
<b>Strategic</b>		
Adapt CA Business Model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assess shift from strong focus on small grant provider towards extended and long term engagements – a sequence of interventions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Create a framework with members and clients that provides structure and predictability to engagement at the country and / or city level</li> <li>The grant making elements should be redesigned to be an engagement process of the Alliance with the client group – this plays to the comparative advantages of the Alliance members</li> <li>Take a longer term perspective on support: for capacity building, investment and knowledge transfer</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assess merit of entry strategies and risk assessments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The purpose of this step is to better identify opportunities / constraints to successful projects – members should have a strong role here given their operational presence on the ground.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Prepare 3 year business plan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Align business products (pillars) to the new engagement model</li> <li>Define operational mechanisms to leverage the collective strengths of the Alliance</li> <li>Establish priority action areas</li> </ul>



		•
<b>Processes</b>		
Strengthen coherence of effort	There should be greater up front effort on defining roles and responsibilities of partners throughout the CA Grant Process (this includes not just in the Grant pre / application stage but also during Grant Execution). Extending this, consideration also should be given ensuring closer and more hands-on engagement of members (and the CA Secretariat as appropriate and practical):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Members convene a meeting to discuss roles and responsibilities throughout the Grant period – preference is for at least two members but the criteria is on adding value to the client</li> <li>• Agree MoU or TOR for the engagement period and ratified by managers of each member</li> <li>• Nominate lead manager to be the client engagement manager throughout the Grant engagement process at a minimum</li> </ul>
Reduce Grant Making Transaction Costs	Streamline Grant Application Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Simply the Grant Applications form</li> <li>• Define timelines – Grant Application process should be reduced to less than 3 months as a target given the size of the Grants.</li> </ul>
Knowledge / Learning	Results Monitoring / Sharing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New initiatives – country programmes / Catalytic Fund – should have agreed results framework in place up front</li> <li>• Each project should report back to the Alliance on results and lessons learned within 6 months of Grant Completion and should be presented at the CG meeting – this could be linked to other</li> </ul>

		international events (e.g World Urban Forum)
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**5 ANNEXES**

5.1 Project List – Status

To be inserted

## 5.2 Method: Description, Pro-forma and Scoring System

### 5.2.1 Questionnaire pro-forma

<country>

**Table 2: Project at a Glance**

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<b>Project Title</b>
<b>Total Project Cost</b>
<b>Project Focus</b>
<b>Other Project Focus</b>
<b>Region</b>
<b>City/Area(s)</b>
<b>City/National Partner</b>
<b>Cities Alliance Member(s) Sponsoring the Project</b>
<b>Grant Recipient/ Implementing Agency</b>

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**Table 3: Timeline**

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<b>Submission date</b>
<b>Threshold screening</b>
<b>ITAs</b>
<b>Comments</b>
<b>Re-submission</b>
<b>Notification of approval</b>
<b>Signing of Grant Agreement (xxx)</b>
<b>Completion date</b>

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### **Project Summary**

<from CA website>

#### *Project objectives*

<from CA website>

#### *Project activities*

<from CA website>

#### *Expected impact & results*

<from CA website>

#### *Assessing the Grant Facility Administration Process*

#### *Grant Application Process*

*Was the Grant Application form easy to use and complete?*

*How could it be improved?*

*Were there any major problems in preparing and signing the Grant Agreement? If yes, what were they?*

*Were there any variations from the guidelines in terms of timelines? Procedures? If yes... What were the causes?*

*Is there any difference between member and client execution?*

*What value did CA members add in the Grant Application preparation process? In the finalization of the Grant Agreement?*

*Was the quality of the design improved through CA / Member participation?*

*Did CA members respond to the queries of the client promptly?*

*How can the process work better?*

*What can the CA Secretariat and sponsors do to provide better support?*

#### *Grant Execution Process*

*Were there any variations, delays and/or change of scope, from the Grant Agreement? If yes...*

*What were the major causes of variations from the GA?*

*Who was responsible for the variations?*

*Were the CA reporting requirements easy to use? Useful? Contribute to better project management/results monitoring?*

*Were funds easy to access and administer?*

*How well did the Grant Execution process fit into local systems?*

*What value did the CA Members provide in assisting with the Grant supported activities? What value did the CA Secretariat in supporting Grant supported activities?*

*What can be done to improve the Grant Execution process? By the Cities Alliance? By CA Members? By participating stakeholders / local executing agencies?*

### *Grant Completion Process*

*Was the Grant completion process beneficial for capturing results?*

*Was the Grant completion process useful as a learning process to improve future program / project design?*

### **Process Benchmarks**

#### *Participation*

*What stakeholders were involved in the CDS / SU formulation process? How were they involved?*

*To what extent and how have the urban poor (and other vulnerable groups) been engaged in the CDS / SU formulation process?*

*What were the results of the participation process in terms of improving awareness and knowledge of urban poverty? In terms of the likelihood of elaborating and implementing pro-poor policies, plans and investments?*

*What were the existing participatory systems and how did CA improve them?*

#### *Partnerships*

*What partners were involved in the CDS / SU formulation process? This will seek to look at public – private partnerships, partnerships with civil society.*

*How were they involved?*

*What partners will be involved in the future implementation of the CDS / SU project strategies, plans and projects?*

*How will potential partners be involved in the future implementation of the CDS / SU project plans and projects?*

#### *Ownership*

*To what extent is the CDS / SU working through existing (improved) local systems – procurement and financial systems?*

*To what extent is the grant process linked into existing institutional structures and processes? For example, linked to existing planning and budgeting processes?*



## **Content Benchmarks**

### *Pro-poor focus*

*To what extent are the outputs produced focused on contributing to better pro-poor urban governance, management and service delivery?*

*To what extent are the outputs likely to contribute to future pro-poor outcomes?*

### *Institutionalization*

*To what extent has the likelihood for systemic change for poverty reduction been secured?*

*To what extent have roles and responsibilities for future implementation been clearly defined and agreed?*

*To what extent do the responsible institutions / agents have the capacity to discharge the allocated roles and responsibilities?*

*What capacity building requirements have been identified and how will they be implemented?*

*To what extent are the results of CA support likely to be replicated and scaled up? (in the future will comparable activities be undertaken and achieve quality results without CA (or other external) support?)*

### **Linkages to follow on investment**

*Have future resource and investment requirements to implement organizational changes, policy, plans and investment strategies been identified?*

*Is there clear allocation of responsibilities for resource mobilization and investment?*

*Have the funding sources been committed? How secure are the commitments?*

### **Catalytic effects**

*Has CA engagement leveraged/triggered systemic changes towards poverty reduction which would not have happened without CA?*

**5.2.2 Traffic-light Scoring**

	OWNERSHIP				QUALITY					VALUE ADDED		
Countries	Participation of key members of the executing/ implementing agency (evidence of participation)	Level of support for grant-funded activities (evidence of Government Orders / Edits)	Level of insitutionalization (outputs specifying institutional allocation of responsibilities and/or evidence of outputs integrated into planning/financial systems)	Linkages to follow-on investment (evidence of potential resources committed/proposed to support actions recommended )	Pro-poor focus		Participatory approach			Scaling-up (evidence of the activity to trigger a pro-poor strategic planning process)	Replication (evidence of activity to trigger similar activities in other cities)	Awareness-raising (evidence of process contributing to better understanding of urban poverty issues)
					Depth of poverty assessment (evidence of poverty analysis completed)	Level of pro-poor focus (extent of poverty focus of outputs/recommendations)	Participation of the urban poor, vulnerable groups and women	Participation of key stakeholders, including civil society, private sector	Participation of key Government departments			
<Country>	Select one...	Select one...	Select one...	Select one...	Select one...	Select one...	Select one...	Select one...	Select one...	Select one...	Select one...	Select one...

### 5.3 Field Visits: Summary of Each Case Study

#### 5.3.1 Cameroon

- **Summary of Grant Administration Process: Value, Timeline and Execution Arrangements – Table Format**

<b>Project Title</b>	Urban Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy: City of Douala and its Greater Urban Area
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	Cities Alliance: \$ 500,000 Co-financing: \$ 661,000 Total Budget: \$ 1,161,000
<b>Project Focus</b>	CDS
<b>City/National Partner</b>	Communauté Urbaine de Douala (CUD)
<b>Cities Alliance Member(s) Sponsoring the Project</b>	Agence Française de Développement (AFD) , World Bank
<b>Grant Recipient/ Implementing Agency</b>	Communauté Urbaine de Douala , World Bank

<b>Submission date</b>	03 Mar 2005
<b>Threshold screening</b>	03 Mar 2005
<b>ITAs</b>	11 Apr 2005 15 Apr 2005
<b>Comments</b>	11 May 2005
<b>Re-submission</b>	20 Sep 2005
<b>Notification of approval</b>	16 Nov 2005
<b>Signing of Grant Agreement (DGF)</b>	24 Jan 2007
<b>Completion date</b>	30 June 2009, extended until 31 Dec 2010

- **Project Description**

Within the context of the national Poverty Reduction Strategy, the city of Douala proposes to develop, through a participatory process, a strategy for the city aimed at poverty reduction and sustainable growth and development, creating the conditions for greater metropolitan Douala to become a regional economic hub, capable of attracting investors and promoting new activities.

The Cameroon case is a hybrid example of client and member execution, with the Cities Alliance grant being implemented primarily (92 per cent) by the Urban Community of Douala (CUD) as well as by the World Bank. World Bank execution relates to the strategy formulation component of the grant, which is also programmed into the World Bank funded Douala Infrastructure Project.

Project objectives

1) Identify, through a participatory process, specific interventions for sustainable growth and economic development, and poverty reduction in Douala and its metropolitan area; 2) Establish and test, at the metropolitan level, institutional mechanisms and participatory, operational approaches that enhance the impact of economic development programmes on poverty reduction; 3) Establish and validate, through a participatory process, the medium- and long-term strategy for the development of Douala and its metropolitan area, based on a programme of short-term priority interventions.

Project activities

1) Develop a diagnostic of the economic development and urban poverty of the city and its environs (including satellite towns); 2) Identify economic development and poverty

reduction constraints, including institutional bottlenecks; 3) How the potential for sustainable growth and development might be better exploited; 4) Prepare a medium- and long-term City Development Strategy for Douala and its metropolitan area; and Disseminate the metropolitan City Development Strategy.

#### Expected impact & results

(i) Significant improvement of Douala's physical environment and institutional framework for urban management ; (ii) A clarification of roles of the different actors intervening in local development, strengthening their roles in their own development and their grasp of participatory urban management; (iii) A better choice of urban investments: better matched to local resources and more responsive to the needs of the urban poor; and (iv) Stronger ownership of urban investments by beneficiaries.

- **Evidence of Ownership (Good)**

The excellent leadership of the implementing agency (CUD) is very evident in the processes undertaken and in the results achieved. The participatory and collaborative processes the CUD managed to infuse into the project from its inception, have begun a process to change institutional behavior and, according to discussions with the Mayor, have produced new internal abilities and capacities in the institutional organisations in Douala which have fostered a willingness and ability to sustain participation in the project. According to the Mayor, this means that more people in Douala will be able to take ownership in the process to guide the development of the future economy in Douala and manage the important input of civil society organisations who represent affected populations as part of that process.

The Mayor of Douala has emerged as a 'champion' and indicated that a broad cross-section of stakeholders have been involved in the participatory process. He has indicated that his role will be to champion the project to national government ministries and the prime minister's office as the project moves through subsequent stages of development and implementation.

The field interviews also confirmed that the project exercise has helped to build and improve the capabilities of stakeholder groups to not only better understand the phenomenon of city development strategy in the local context, but also to augment their own governing capabilities, which furthers the overall goals of the CDS strategy.

Given that the actual implementation of the strategies are yet to occur - it is difficult to assess the actual level of institutionalization at this point in time. However, the selection and prioritization of outputs do illustrate that institutional capacities have been considered and that the priorities are clearly integrated into ongoing planning and financial systems. Several of the outputs complement existing initiatives, in particular infrastructure upgrading (e.g., drainage facilities and waste water treatment facilities, as well as road construction)

- **Evidence of Quality (Good)**

The level of pro-poor focus is good; however it should be noted that a significant portion of this focus is also on improving the economic development infrastructure of the city. If outputs are delivered as envisioned - there will be a significant improvement in Douala's physical environment and institutional framework (particularly in the administration and regulation of land tenure issues) that will enhance urban management that is critical to poverty reduction , the reduction of slums and environmental protection. Second, there has clearly been a strengthening of local actors - especially CSOs that perhaps have not in the past been integrated into the development of a coordinated approach to better livelihoods in the past. This has created a better understanding on the part of all actors in the continuum. Finally, the outputs of the process demonstrate a considered approach on prioritized

investments for the city to enhance pro-poor decision-making, facilities upgrading and urban management to better respond to the practical needs of vulnerable groups.

Participation of urban poor and vulnerable groups and woman is very good. The implementing agency (CUD) set out in the very preliminary stages of project development to garner support and participation from these key groups. Up to 15 of these groups were represented in organized participatory planning sessions at the outset of the project. These groups remain committed and it appears that they will form an important element in the implementation of the strategies that have been concluded from the project.

In all of the interviews conducted in the field, it was agreed that the process had encouraged people to think about the development of Douala and the surrounding region in a different way than they had thought about it in the past. Furthermore, because of the success of CUD's advocacy initiatives to include as many stakeholders as possible in the process of identifying needs and priorities, it was also noted that this project, unlike many others, had enabled a critical mass of citizens, stakeholders, administrators and decision-makers to think concurrently and strategically about the future of the city.

- **Catalytic Impacts (Good)**

The project has identified a comprehensive set of strategies to intervene in key issues that are obstacles to mobility. If these interventions (e.g., ease of transport, revisions to commercial market sites, reform and reorganisation of land control agencies, investment in provision of basic services, business development infrastructure, etc. With the successful implementation of the project and the realization of this set of outputs, the opportunity of 'scaling up' or more concisely the evidence to trigger an ongoing pro-poor strategic planning process in the medium and long term is very high.

The project has been executed using excellent collaborative and cooperative processes. The results of these activities have demonstrated that targeted strategies (that have community ownership) can be developed and, with adequate financial support, can be sustained. In this context, the project has demonstrated a level of success that should capture the attention of policy makers and political interests in other cities.

- **Lessons recommendations**

The recent field interviews indicate that principles of systemic change, including achievements in enhancing ownership and scalability, have been achieved in the first phases of the project. The outputs of the City Development Strategy focus on ensuring that Douala will become a venue for social inclusion and poverty reduction. Specifically, the completion of the first three phases of the project illustrates strong ownership characteristics based on effective participatory activities, significant opportunities for scalability given the projects' coordination with the government-approved poverty reduction strategy as well as other long-term donor investment strategies (e.g., AFD, World Bank, UN Habitat, etc.).

In conclusion, the findings of the field interviews indicate that the information and diagnostic phases and the analysis and strategy development processes provided a mechanism to engage a broad range of stakeholders and fostered both horizontal (important local stakeholders) and vertical collaboration (high level decision makers at regional and national levels of government) across a range of issues. The prioritization process (which comprised up to 30 separate consultative workshops by sector) has encouraged a high degree of ownership and support among a number of key stakeholders. However, successful implementation will depend on the buy-in of the national government at a time when national/sub-national political pressures resulting from economic challenges are likely to influence overall investment priorities.

### 5.3.2 Malawi

- **Summary of Grant Administration Process: Value, Timeline and Execution Arrangements – Table Format**

<b>Project Title</b>	Preparatory Grant for Development of Lilongwe CDS
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	Cities Alliance: \$ 72,375 Co-financing: \$ 28,975 Total Budget: \$ 101,350
<b>Project Focus</b>	CDS
<b>City/National Partner</b>	Lilongwe City Assembly (now City Council)
<b>Cities Alliance Member(s) Sponsoring the Project</b>	GTZ, Japan International Co-operation Agency, UCLG, USAID Malawi
<b>Grant Recipient/Implementing Agency</b>	Lilongwe City Assembly

<b>Submission date</b>	21 Nov 2007
<b>Threshold screening</b>	06 Dec 2007 and 22 Feb 2008
<b>ITAs</b>	Not available
<b>Comments</b>	06 Dec 2007
<b>Re-submission</b>	12 Feb 2008
<b>Notification of approval</b>	08 Mar 2008
<b>Signing of Grant Agreement (DGF)</b>	30 Jun 2008
<b>Completion date</b>	31 Mar 2009, extended until 30 June 2010

- **Project Description**

Framed within the window of opportunity created by the Malawi government in its formulation of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy under the theme 'From Poverty to Prosperity', the Lilongwe City Assembly (LCA) proposed to create a CDS through a participatory process spearheaded by a dedicated Task Force and through the mentorship of and exchange of experience from the City of Johannesburg (COJ).

The main objective of the proposal was to use the preparatory grant to develop a full-scale proposal for a CDS to deal with rapid urbanization and slum creation. Ultimately, the intention was to create a CDS, based on the MDGs and the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy. The CDS is aiming at: 1) Localizing the MDGs; 2) Managing sustainable urbanization; 3) Bringing stakeholders together; 4) Monitoring the achievement of the MDGs.

The developed was going to be used by the Lilongwe City Assembly as a tool for effectively planning and managing the growth and development of the city, providing guidelines for resolving current issues and preventing future negative ones. Specifically, the CDS would also be used in future slum upgrading programs and prevention of future slums through effective planning, and in achieving sustained urban mobility through well-planned expansion of infrastructure.

During its trajectory, Phase 1 Preparatory Stage which is formally evaluated and discussed here was used to gather basic data about the city, to conduct an institutional audit and to prepare a stakeholder analysis. The envisaged full-scale proposal output of the preparatory grant, although completed in draft form, was then effectively superseded and/or suspended. This is because during a Phase 2, Development of the CDS, from mid-2009 through early 2010, the City of Johannesburg mentored the LCA in actually fully developing the Lilongwe CDS, which includes a comprehensive overview of the city, a vision statement, goals, objectives and projects/activities. Funding for this Phase 2, estimated at \$250,000, was

provided by COJ and internally by LCA. In effect, LCA decisively took ownership of the process, supported by COJ. Other CA members, JICA and GTZ, usefully played a minor but supportive role – with a JICA-funded land use plan (Master Plan) for Lilongwe being drafted in the 2008-2010 period, which is now seen as a complement to the CDS itself.

At present, for what is being termed Lilongwe CDS Phase 3 Implementation, CA is in the process of approving a grant in the second half of 2010 for \$249,000 to the LCA, which builds on earlier support from CA and the COJ, and which aims to support LCA to move from strategic planning to implementation. Phase 3 thus focuses on supporting the now LCC to make the CDS operational, and includes the following activities: finalizing the LCC business plan and departmental score cards, formalizing a CDS Unit in the office of the Chief Executive, and setting up a reporting system on CDS-related activities for the LCC's departments. Other activities include pre-feasibility studies for the seven "iconic projects" highlighted in the actual CDS document, as well as awareness raising and advocacy on the CDS, including stakeholder meetings and a "road show" to other cities in Malawi.

- **Evidence of Ownership (Good)**

Phase 1 of the CDS contributed to providing the evidence base for making systemic improvements in LCA's administration. Phase 2 highlighted a Stabilisation Strategy for LCA, which proposed short-term improvements to administrative and financial systems which are now under implementation and will be continued in Phase 3. Furthermore, Phase 3 is oriented to building internal administrative systems and capacity, in conjunction with implementation of measures, feasibility studies of larger projects and the mainstreaming of the CDS approach. LCA staff will require continued mentorship, support and skills upgrading.

- **Evidence of Quality (Fair)**

Phase 1 outputs (as a State of the City analogue) were oriented to a pro-poor perspective. The CDS produced outputs in Phase 2 are explicitly pro-poor and address the MDGs in its sectoral analysis of governance, shelter and land, infrastructure and environment, community development and economic development. This is carried through in its proposed City Vision, and in the objectives stated and activities designed to implement the CDS.

Provided momentum is maintained, the poverty-focused recommendations and proposals in the CDS are likely, during implementation, to enhance the capacity of the LCA to address and mitigate urban poverty, notably through improvement of services and economic development measures.

- **Catalytic Impacts (Fair)**

CA engagement, has had a strongly catalytic effect, in large part as a result of powerfully-committed involvement from COJ. Provided implementation of the CDS – or even aspects thereof – plays a demonstration role, the impetus towards systemic change will continue. Whilst there can therefore be some impact on urban poverty reduction, sustained improvement requires far more than a strategic urban planning process and its implementation – it is fundamentally dependent on Malawi continuing on its current path of strong private sector-driven economic growth, as guided by government. Here as urban strategic guidance at the level of the Capital City and through replication elsewhere in the country, the CDS can have real impact.

Furthermore, participation by national-level actors (including Centre for Community Organisation and Development, Malawi Institute for Physical Planners, Malawi Local Government Association, Blantyre City Assembly, Mzuzu City Assembly and Zomba Municipality) also appears to have catalysed further, similar activity in Malawi's urban sector.

The upcoming Phase 3 demonstrates the intention by LCA to implement on greater scale. The Gates Foundation support represents upscaling at the level of Lilongwe. The application to the CA by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development for a national CDS and slum upgrading program also demonstrates upscaling potential. For impact and sustainability, a far larger program will be required.

Three other cities (Blantyre, Zomba and Mzuzu) participated actively in all major workshops, which were intended to be learning platforms for possible replication of the CDS process in these cities. To facilitate this, both Blantyre and Mzuzu (with Zomba expressing interest) are now involved in an extension of the UCLG-supported mentorship scheme with the South African cities of Ekurhuleni and eThekweni (Durban) respectively, which will be part funded by the Ministry of Lands grant if awarded.

- **Lessons recommendations**

A number of issues arose in discussion with the Consultant around the grant application and execution processes. Respondents stated that the application form itself is not difficult to use, although it is wordy and could be streamlined. However, the details required by CA mean that applicants need to have some knowledge of project preparation and budgeting, and hence of the terminology typically used in project formulation and management.

The required response to assessment comments in reworking the proposal also follows in this line, presuming real experience on the part of the applicant. It was stated that consideration could be given to greater discussion of concepts and terminology and even a measure of training in the use and completion of the form.

As LCA financial systems were also in extremely poor condition at the time, further access to the funds was also delayed, as were activities. As one interviewee put it, “The CA needs to understand better the way we have to operate...our systems are often not in place and need to be added.”

It is acknowledged in the Grant Completion Report that COJ mentors played a vital role in assisting in the production of the outputs, quality assuring them, and in facilitating their absorption by the management of LCA. The lessons identified are that:

- There must be stronger leadership committed towards the CDS change process.
- It is crucial that all stakeholders participate from the start to ensure ownership of the entire CDS process
- Mentorship methodology is very helpful to beginner cities such as Lilongwe.
- There is a need for consistent follow-ups with partners in order to maintain momentum.

It is also clear from the Consultant’s site visit, that there has been much reflection by participants on the preparatory grant experience with such issues as leadership commitment, stakeholder participation, data availability, management involvement and maintaining momentum all consistently stressed.

It is vital to highlight here that UCLG’s and CA’s promotion of the mentorship scheme and its execution by COJ, with support from the South African Local Government Association’s (SALGA), were all crucial to the successful completion of the preparatory grant, which is now seen as Phase 1 of a three stage CDS process. In effect, the CDS process in Lilongwe was reconceived in mid-stream as a three stage process.

All of this marks, at least to date, a very successful outcome in terms of ownership and going to scale – at least at the level of Lilongwe itself. Participation by other stakeholders in the process to date appears to have been good. In the preparatory grant application form, the LCA proposed taking the lead in preparing the full-scale proposal for Lilongwe’s CDS. Local stakeholders included Lilongwe Water Board, Electricity Supply Commission of



Malawi, the Roads Authority, with the private sector represented by its mother body, Malawi Chamber of Commerce and Industry while the informal sector was to be represented by the Vendors' Association.

### 5.3.3 Senegal

- **Summary of Grant Administration Process: Value, Timeline and Execution Arrangements – Table Format**

<b>Project Title</b>	National Programme for Slum Improvement and Slum Upgrading in Senegal's Cities
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	Cities Alliance: \$ 430,000 Co-financing: \$ 400,000 Total Budget: \$ 830,000
<b>Project Focus</b>	SU
<b>City/National Partner</b>	Association of Mayors of Senegal
<b>Cities Alliance Member(s) Sponsoring the Project</b>	KfW Bankengruppe , UN-HABITAT, UNDP, World Bank
<b>Grant Recipient/ Implementing Agency</b>	Fondation Droit a la Ville

<b>Submission date</b>	22 Jul 2005
<b>Threshold screening</b>	28 Jul 2005
<b>ITAs</b>	25 Aug 2005
<b>Comments</b>	27 Sep 2005
<b>Re-submission</b>	21 Oct 2005
<b>Notification of approval</b>	16 Nov 2005
<b>Signing of Grant Agreement (xxx)</b>	08 Mar 2007
<b>Completion date</b>	30 June 2009, extended until 31 Dec 2010

- **Project Description**

The purpose of the project was to establish a national 'Villes sans Bidonvilles' programme, with provisions for monitoring and evaluation; Identify opportunities to mobilise public and private investments; Strengthen the capacity of the Ministère de l'urbanisme et de l'aménagement du territoire (MUAT), the 'Droit à la Ville' Foundation, and communities for slum upgrading; Set up an Urban Development Observatory in Senegal to evaluate the programme, with regard to meeting the MDGs; Document and disseminate through the Senegalese Urban Forum, the experiences and lessons learned by the cities and national government.

The proposal outlines that project activities are to include an analysis of the slum phenomenon in Senegal since 1980 (mapping, practice and policy analysis, lessons learned on secure tenure, evaluation of results to date); the development of the strategies for the 'Villes sans Bidonvilles' programme; and an action plan for its implementation (methodology, regulatory measures, actors, institutionalisation). Parallel to these activities, the sponsors will work with within partner relationships to mobilise local, national and international financial resources for implementation.

- **Evidence of Ownership (Fair)**

The CDS is working through existing local systems through its affiliation with local partners. But it is still too early to determine other linkages with local systems. The Grant process is linked to the national PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Program), which includes linkages to the national budget process, as well. For the FDV, all of the different projects and

accounts of these initiatives are separated. In the future, the partners will have to plan how to effectively use the financial resources in different accounts to achieve coordinated results.

The level of institutionalization at this stage is still too early to determine, but the responsible institutions/agents have a basic capacity to discharge the anticipated roles and responsibilities, but in the end, it will depend upon the government's involvement and FDV experience. This remains undetermined at this stage. However, the consortium of partners has established a Committee Suivi – this Committee is independent and the purpose of the committee is to validate the project and assess each step of the project. It is anticipated that the Committee Suivi will allocate roles and responsibilities.

- **Evidence of Quality (Poor)**

The diagnostic documents contribute to a better understanding of the systemic elements of poverty in Senegal. The diagnostic also provides a source of new information that can be evaluated relative to other initiatives that are underway at the national level. However, the final outputs have not yet been realized, so specific indicators do not yet exist. The reports also provide new information that can help to focus national and local efforts on prioritizing steps to improve living conditions and the sequencing of those priorities.

However, there are ongoing problems with the communication between the members, partners and stakeholders. They need to meet regularly or the project is likely to fail. Each of the partners has its component parts which need to be brought together. There is a need to communicate and collaborate on an ongoing basis. Because there are no meetings – they don't understand which money is missing and why. The CA is more committed to the project than the government – they need to put pressure on the government. There are delays in the project because the Senegalese government is not fulfilling its commitments and because there is no pressure from the other stakeholders for it to do so.

Both partners and members report that there has been no participation of urban poor, vulnerable groups and women at this stage in the process. It was reported that the analytic stage of project development is 'too technical' for these groups.

The implementing agency (FDV) has a broad role in the Dakar region, as does the AMS. Despite the leadership and 'reach' of these two organizations, the participation of key stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector has been limited in the analytic stages of the project. It appears that the local sponsorship and funding agencies do not see the value of engaging community stakeholders and affected early on in the process.

- **Catalytic Impacts (N/A)**

The project is at a very early stage, therefore it is difficult to determine any potential catalytic impacts. By virtue of the intended scope of the program (e.g., national), if delivered successfully, the program could be used as a model for scaling-up.

The reticence of the Association of Senegalese Mayors (as indicated in the field interviews) perhaps does not bode well for the objective to replicate in other cities/regions.

In effect, CA engagement has resulted in a better understanding of urban poverty and has also provided a more comprehensive vision regarding poverty and the inter-relationship between rural and urban poverty.

- **Lessons recommendations**

Recommendations to improve the process focus on: improved communication, coordination, accountability/authority, time-line management and benchmarking. Because this is a national project, enhanced efforts are needed to augment regular communication to ensure meeting of partners in all the regions to validate the studies which are the first outputs of the project. Because the coordination of the project elements has been so

extremely difficult, partners have created a Committee Suivi. This mechanism was created after the commencement of the project. However, there should have been a provision in the Grant Agreement framework that necessitated such a mechanism. The initial lack of a legitimate coordinating mechanism (considered legitimate/accountable by all the partners) resulted in poor coordination causing delays, misunderstandings, and tensions. Although the Committee Suivi is now serving a useful purpose, it would have more authority if it had been part of the initial project structure. The Ministry of Urbanism is more likely to meet their financial obligations if financial disbursements go to the Committee Suivi, rather than the FDV directly.

The process would also work better if there were firm timelines. This applies to timelines for delivery of outputs, as well as financial payments on a regular and anticipated schedule. For example, when the 1<sup>st</sup> deliverable was submitted, the CA money was received within a reasonable timeframe, but the matching funds from the Senegalese government have still not been received and it is unlikely that they will get the money until June 30, 2011. Therefore, for each step in the process, there should be a defined number of days, which if not met, will then impact on the receipt of monies, etc.

### 5.3.4 Mozambique

- **Summary of Grant Administration Process: Value, Timeline and Execution Arrangements – Table Format**

<b>Project Title</b>	Slum Upgrading and Vulnerability Reduction in Flood Prone Cities/Towns in Mozambique (Maputo, Chokwé, Teté, and Quelimane)	Improving Water and Sanitation in Quelimane City	Slum Improvement Demonstration Project for Maputo City	Slum Upgrading and City Development Strategy for Nampula City
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	Cities Alliance: \$ 495,000 Co-financing: \$ 615,000 Total Budget: \$ 1,110,000	Cities Alliance: \$ 500,000 Co-financing: \$ 720,000 Total Budget: \$ 1,220,000	Cities Alliance: \$ 75,000 Co-financing: \$ 25,000 Total Budget: \$ 100,000	Cities Alliance: \$ 353,000 Co-financing: \$ 507,000 Total Budget: \$ 860,000
<b>Project Focus</b>	SU	SU	CDS, SU	CDS, SU
<b>City/National Partner</b>	xxx	Xxx	Xxx	Nampula Municipal Council
<b>Cities Alliance Member(s) Sponsoring the Project</b>	UN-HABITAT, UNDP	UN-HABITAT, World Bank	World Bank	UN-HABITAT and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG)
<b>Grant Recipient/Implementing Agency</b>	UN-HABITAT	UN-HABITAT	World Bank	Nampula Municipal Council
<b>Submission date</b>	14/09/2001	31/10/2005	14/09/2005	23/10/2007
<b>Threshold screening</b>	15/09/2001	15/11/2005	03/10/2005	18/12/2007
<b>ITAs</b>	01/10/2001	08/12/2005	04/10/2005	19/12/2007
<b>Notification of approval</b>	15/01/2002	15/03/2006	05/10/2005	10/12/2008
<b>Signing of Grant Agreement</b>	05/07/2002	20/04/2006	18/10/2005	29/06/2009
<b>Completion date</b>	30/09/2004	31/03/2009	31/12/2008	30/06/2011

<b>Project Title</b>	Preparatory Grant for the Development of a CDS for Vilankulo	Preparatory Grant for the Development of a CDS and Slum Upgrading Strategy for Chimoio	Preparatory Grant for the Development of a State of Mozambican Cities Report	Preparatory Grant Support for Upgrading the Chamanculo C Neighbourhood, Maputo Municipality
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	Cities Alliance: \$ 42,000 Co-financing: \$ 7,080 Total Budget: \$ 49,080	Cities Alliance: \$ 42,000 Co-financing: \$ 7,080 Total Budget: \$ 49,080	Cities Alliance: \$ 52,500 Co-financing: \$ 7,000 Total Budget: \$ 59,500	Cities Alliance: \$ 73,500 Co-financing: \$ 30,000 Total Budget: \$ 103,500
<b>Project Focus</b>	SU	CDS, SU	CDS	CDS, SU
<b>City/National Partner</b>	xxx	Chimoio Municipal Council	National Association of Municipalities of Mozambique	Municipal Council of Maputo
<b>Cities Alliance Member(s) Sponsoring the Project</b>	UN-HABITAT, UNDP	USAID	CIDA	Brazil Ministry of Cities and Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>Grant Recipient/Implementing Agency</b>	UN-HABITAT	Chimoio Municipal Council	National Association of Municipalities of Mozambique	Municipal Council of Maputo
<b>Submission date</b>	16/11/2006	16/11/2006	15/09/2008	29/12/2009
<b>Threshold screening</b>	18/01/2007	18/01/2007	06/10/2008	24/02/2010
<b>ITAs</b>	18/01/2007	18/01/2007	07/10/2008	24/02/2010
<b>Notification of approval</b>	18/01/2007	18/01/2007	30/10/2008	24/02/2010
<b>Signing of Grant Agreement</b>	15/03/2007	15/03/2007	14/01/2009	04/05/2010
<b>Completion date</b>	Dropped	Dropped	30/06/2010	30/06/2011

- **Project Description**

The CA projects evaluated are summarised below. Fuller descriptions of objectives, activities and outputs follow in Annex A.

- Slum Upgrading and Vulnerability Reduction in Flood Prone Cities and Towns in Mozambique (henceforth Flood Cities SU; total budget \$1,110,000; CA funding \$495,000; sponsoring member/s UN-HABITAT, UNDP; Grant recipient UN-HABITAT)
- Improving Water and Sanitation in Quelimane City, Mozambique (Quelimane City Water and Sanitation; \$1,220,000; \$500,000; UN-HABITAT, World Bank; UN-HABITAT)
- Slum Upgrading and City Development Strategy for Nampula City (Nampula City SU and CDS; \$542,000; \$135,000: UN-HABITAT and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG); Nampula Municipal Council and UN-HABITAT)
- Slum Improvement Demonstration Project for Maputo City (Maputo City Slum Improvement; \$100,000;\$75,000;World Bank; World Bank)
- Preparatory Grant Support for Upgrading the Chamanculo C Neighbourhood, Maputo Municipality (Chamanculo C Neighbourhood Upgrading; \$103,500;\$73,500; Brazil Ministry of Cities and Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Municipal Council of Maputo)
- Preparatory Grant for the Development of a State of Mozambican Cities Report (State of the Cities; \$59,500; \$52,500; CIDA; National Association of Municipalities of Mozambique)
- Preparatory Grant for the Development of a CDS for Chimoio (Chimoio CDS; \$49,080; \$42,000; USAID; Chimoio Municipal Council)
- Preparatory Grant for the Development of a CDS for Vilankulo (Vilankulo CDS; \$49,080; \$42,000; USAID; Vilankulo Municipal Council).

	OWNERSHIP				QUALITY					VALUE ADDED		
	Participation of key members of the executing/ implementing agency (evidence of participation)	Level of support for grant-funded activities (evidence of Government Orders / Edits)	Level of institutionalization (outputs specifying institutional allocation of responsibilities and/or evidence of outputs integrated into planning/financial systems)	Linkages to follow-on investment (evidence of potential resources committed/proposed to support actions recommended)	Pro-poor focus		Participatory approach			Scaling-up (evidence of the activity to trigger a pro-poor strategic planning process)	Replication (evidence of activity to trigger similar activities in other cities)	Awareness-raising (evidence of process contributing to better understanding of urban poverty issues)
					Depth of poverty assessment (evidence of poverty analysis completed)	Level of pro-poor focus (extent of poverty focus of outputs/recommendations)	Participation of the urban poor, vulnerable groups and women	Participation of key stakeholders, including civil society, private sector	Participation of key Government departments			
<b>Mozambique</b>												
<b>Slum Improvement Demonstration Project for Maputo City P098754</b>	Fair	Poor	Fair	Good	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Poor	Good	Fair	Fair
	There was interest in the project from Maputo Municipal Council (MMC), but this did not translate initially into participation, which mobilisation difficulties also served to frustrate. MMC itself eventually took the lead in finalizing project activities, with outputs including revised mapping, including a cadastre for a small part of the bairro, and the issuing of some 200 land titles.	First phase results were limited, including a series of socio-economic studies, surveys of services (solid waste, storm water and drainage, and water) and land use, topographical and cadastral maps. MMC's later stronger role was to influence MMC policy on informal settlements, but this came significantly late/r.	The project was conceived as an adjunct to the first phase of the two phase 2007-2016 World Bank-funded Maputo Municipal Development Program (MMDP I), known as the time of the first phase as the ProMaputo program. This was directed at making systemic financial, organizational and institutional reforms within Maputo's municipal government structure. This linkage facilitated the later institutional learning and adaptation mentioned alongside.	The project had a very useful instigative impact. In 2007 discussions began on development cooperation between Brazil and Italy, with third counties. One theme of the Italian-Brazilian Triangular Cooperation Programme (IBTCP) that resulted is the upgrading of "degraded" city neighbourhoods. Maputo was identified as a priority city for intervention. Through 2008 and 2009 discussions occurred between the parties on the shape and scope of such an intervention.	Outputs in the project focused on piloting new methodologies of neighbourhood improvement, backed by evidence (surveys, studies) in which the community conditions, characterized by poverty, were assessed.	The pilot process in Chamanculo C was oriented towards improving conditions of the urban poor; this catalysed further concern and involvement, as alongside, with a pro-poor emphasis.	Reasonably good participation was witnessed from the community, including organisations of urban poor, women, youth and slum dwellers.	Although more limited, there was also participation from the wider community, including business interests and a wide range of representative institutions.	Aside from MMC, little other Mozambique government involvement was visible.	Tripartite discussions mentioned earlier, were informed by the experience of the Maputo City project, notably in sensitizing the community to and mobilizing it for a participative approach for improving neighbourhood conditions. In November 2009 IBTCP approved a proposal for a two year project called Support for the Upgrading of the Chamanculo C Neighbourhood, prospectively budgeted at \$2,700,000 with funding envisaged from Italy, Brazil and CA. Scaling up thus can be seen as very positive.	If well-disseminated, there is reasonable chance of replication – with this facilitated by the involvement of Eduardo Mondlane University Faculty of Architecture, which is active all over Mozambique in neighbourhood improvement.	The incremental changes in attitude the project produced are becoming well-known, with this assisted by scaling-up.
<b>Mozambique Support for Upgrading the Chamanculo C Neighbourhood Maputo Municipality - Preparatory Grant P121002</b>	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Good	Good	Fair	Fair
	The project is designed, in similar fashion to its predecessor's linkage with ProMaputo, to support and to lay the ground for the larger tripartite implementation project. Support for the Upgrading of the Chamanculo C Neighbourhood, MMC is clearly taking the lead here and is deeply committed to the project.	The project is now well underway, with keys outputs in the form of an operational plan for the tripartite project, and the application for CA funding of \$500,000 already completed by MMC.	As alongside. There has also been a sharpening of scope with one of the outputs now conceived as a monitoring and evaluation framework for the tripartite project.	Investment in the tripartite project is close to \$3 m. Further investment prospects look reasonable and the project is linked to MMDP II.	The project motivates for greater resources to go into land use regularisation and infrastructure and service improvements to benefit mostly urban poor residents of Chamanculo C. Evidentary base is pro-poor oriented, as are recommendations.	See alongside.	The community was strongly mobilised in the first Maputo City Slum project (above); their participation has continued in this project.	As above, although more limited, there was also participation from the wider community, including business interests and a wide range of representative institutions.	There is now a strong integration with MMDP II, the second phase of 2007-2016 World Bank funded Maputo Municipal Development Program (i.e., ProMaputo II). This, in turn, is linked to the tripartite project. Government departments and development partners are working together.	The integration of the project with MMDP II and the tripartite project represents good upscaling.	If the experience of the two CA Maputo projects, MMDP I and II and upcoming tripartite project is disseminated, replication is certainly possible.	To date, project experience is certainly known with urban sector community in Mozambique; broader dissemination is required to raise awareness on urban poverty.
<b>Slum Upgrading and Vulnerability Reduction in Flood Prone Cities/Towns in Mozambique (Maputo, Chokwé, Teté, and Quelimane) P079602</b>	Good	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Good	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair
	Participation by the City Councils of Maputo, Chokwe, Tete and Quelimane in developing measures to reduce the vulnerability of communities living in flood prone areas, through environmental land use planning and service upgrading was very good.	National government was involved in a very comprehensive consultative process, especially on local environmental planning. Territorial planning policy and law proposals were also outputs.	Production of outputs was good – environmental land use plans for each city, flood protection measures, training manuals and courses. Integration within (limited and weak at the time) municipal systems was reasonable.	There was good linkage with a Global Environmental Facility Disaster Preparedness and Vulnerability Reduction project in the lower Limpopo Basin, particularly with regard to land use planning. But no major additional funds were procured.	The highly participative planning process was focused on the needs of poor, vulnerable urban communities and neighbourhoods.	As alongside: outputs were directed at reducing vulnerability of poor communities, and improving neighbourhood conditions.	The consultative process involved all stakeholders, highlighting community representatives.	The consultative process led to a comprehensive national training programme, featuring some imaginative and useful methods (manuals, posters, card game). Elected leaders, community representatives and technical staff were all involved.	Process already detailed incorporated national government in important but not decisive position.	The good linkages with other regional projects continued, but it appears that the project outputs were not disseminated as widely as hoped after the project.	The project experience strongly influenced the design of the Quelimane project below, and later flood risk management initiatives in Mozambique. But significant investment in the cities concerned in the flood management field did not occur.	The training programme in particular certainly raised awareness on the requirements for flood risk management in poorer communities.
<b>Improving Water and Sanitation in Quelimane City, Mozambique P101077</b>	Fair	Good	Good	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair
	Despite a drawn-out formulation and application process, and delays during execution, owing largely it appears to lack of municipal capacity and limited financial management procedures, Quelimane Municipal Council (QMC) participated well in securing outputs.	The project did make improvements and innovations with and for QMC in planning methods, in the setting up of community structures and in building community facilities, and did improve some municipal services and infrastructure, notably water supply and roads. Sanitation outputs were largely not completed. Documentary outputs (plans, schemes) are of high quality.	Planning methodologies and the plans that were developed are innovative and involved QMC.	While there has not been large-scale follow up on the initiative – an investment proposal submitted by UN-HABITAT to the European Commission was not accepted – some incremental investment has occurred, largely through WaterAid continuing the support of the Community Committees and centres that were established under the project.	The analysis of land use and infrastructure and service conditions highlighted the situation in poor neighbourhoods and the lack of infrastructure and services, as well as urban and land use planning.	The recommendations and improvements in planning and services, including community facilities, reflected the needs of poorer urban residents.	The project was participatory in nature, in fact ambitiously so, and incorporated input from urban poor stakeholders.	Key stakeholders in civil society also appear to have been afforded good opportunities to participate through the process which was characterized by workshops, meetings, etc.	Participation from QMC seems to have been at expected levels, but there is little evidence of other government involvement.	WaterAid's continued investment already noted, but project did not go to scale in the way that was initially hoped for.	The project built on the Flood Cities (above) experience in aiming to improve water and sanitation conditions in slum areas, and can be seen as inspiring the Nampula project (below) – but performance here was perhaps below high expectations, give the larger scale of the budget (which, paradoxically, may have impelled too high a level of ambition).	As alongside: the outcome was not negative as such, and linkage with Danida 7 (now 13) cities project demonstrated sharing of knowledge and experience. But the impression is that performance could have been stronger.
<b>Slum Upgrading and City Development Strategy for Nampula City, Mozambique P115734</b>	Fair	Poor	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair
	A lengthy formulation and approval process and long delays in start-up meant initial limited participation by Nampula Municipal Council (NMC). Mobilization problems are ascribed to an initial mismatch between municipal procedures and CA requirements, and miscommunication on this between NMC and CA.	Delays described alongside actively frustrated political buy-in and created a negative perspective on the project. Facilitation by CA regional representation based in Brazil has recently assisted in much improving the situation.	The project is based on the development of partial urbanisation plans for all 11 city neighbourhoods which will cumulate in a City-Wide Slum Upgrading Plan and the elaboration of a CDS for the city itself and the surrounding Nampula District. Implementation is only now underway, but possibility of institutionalization is fair.	As alongside – too early to assess, but possibilities of further investment are also fair.	Too early to assess, but likelihood also fair	Design is strongly pro-poor, and it is likely this will be carried through in implementation.	The project is designed to improve services and conditions for urban poor.	The project is designed to offer opportunities for participation of key stakeholders, including local and regional government.	See alongside.	The project has real potential for making innovations in urban and city region (thus on a wider spatial scale than previous CA projects in Mozambique) planning methodologies in a city whose national importance is perhaps under-recognised.	Because of spatial scale and project location, there are opportunities for a larger influence and hence also replication in northern part of Mozambique.	There is a reasonable chance, given efforts made at dissemination, that the project can offer a model or inspiration for other initiatives focused on the urban poor, particularly at city region level.
<b>Preparatory Grant for the Development of a State of Mozambique Report P116501</b>	Fair	Poor	Fair	Good	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Poor	Fair	Fair	Fair
	Despite delays, the grant output of a full-scale application to CA for the preparation of a State of the Mozambique Cities Report was nonetheless produced and submitted in July 2010, with ANAMM playing the lead role in its development.	ANAMM consulted with cities (Maputo, Nampula and Quelimane), national government ministries and development partners, but there is limited evidence of real influence on government at this point. If the SOC report is funded, this may still occur.	Given its preparatory nature, overall institutional support with partners was reasonable.	A budget of \$932,500 is proposed with CA to contribute \$460,000 primarily to ANAMM as recipient. GTZ, UN-HABITAT, and UCLG are proposed as sponsors members.	This application is supported by a report which outlines relevant issues in the urban sector, and provides a comprehensive bibliography of source material. Much of this is urban poverty-focused.	As in previous cell. Recommendations will follow properly in the full State of Cities Report, if produced (i.e., funded)	Consultation process included representation from urban poor.	Consultation process included many key stakeholders, and appears in-line with preparatory scope of grant.	As already stated, this was limited, but can improve during development of the SOC report.	All proposed sponsor members are to provide co-financing as are DANIDA, SACN, ANAMM itself, 23 involved municipalities, the Ministry of State Administration (MAE), the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) and the Centre for Sustainable Urban Development (CDS-ZU).	The proposed implementing partnership appears to represent a workable ownership vehicle for the purpose of developing a State of the Cities report through a collaborative, multi-stakeholder process, including urban poor interests. A national-level report is envisaged, but this would involve cities across Mozambique.	SOC report, if developed, would represent a consolidated and larger-scale effort to produce data and a municipal or city-focused perspective on Mozambique's urban challenges, highlighting urban poverty.

### 5.3.5 Philippines 1 (P094656)

- **Summary of Grant Administration Process: Value, Timeline and Execution Arrangements – Table Format**

<b>Project Title</b>	Integrated Approaches to Poverty Reduction at the Neighbourhood Level – a Cities Without Slums Initiative [IMPACT Project]
<b>Total Project Budget (USD)</b>	1,725,000
<b>Cities Alliance Funding (USD)</b>	500,000
<b>City/Area(s)</b>	Eight cities—Puerto Princesa, Iligan, Munoz, Iloilo, Escalante, Zamboanga, Sorsogon, and Valenzuela, and one municipality—San Vicente.
<b>City/National Partner</b>	Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, supported by the Philippine Urban Forum
<b>Cities Alliance Member(s) Sponsoring the Project</b>	World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UN Habitat
<b>Grant Recipient/ Implementing Agency</b>	UN-Habitat for Philippine Urban Forum

<b>Submission date</b>	06/05/2004
<b>Threshold screening</b>	?
<b>ITAs</b>	19/06/2004 and 22/06/2004
<b>Comments</b>	?
<b>Re-submission</b>	?
<b>Notification of approval</b>	?
<b>Signing of Grant Agreement</b>	08/03/2005
<b>Completion date</b>	28/02/2007, extended until 31/12/2007

- **Project Description**

The purpose of the project was to strengthen participatory planning approaches between Local Government Units (LGUs) and urban poor communities covering upgrading of shelter and neighbourhood physical and social infrastructure, better social development, and improved income security. The project aimed to prepare subprojects for financing under the ADB-funded Development of Poor Urban Communities Sector Project (DPUCSP) by institutionalizing an asset-based approach to poverty reduction at community level through a Cities Without Slums (CWS) initiative. This included the following activities:

- Shelter and neighbourhood upgrading;
- Social development;
- Livelihood and income security for the poor; and
- Policy learning.

- **Evidence of Ownership**

It was reported that communities were involved from day one and that the entire process was bottom up.

The communities were involved from day one and the entire process was reported to be a bottom up programme. The CDS included consultations with concerned citizens and LGUs in shelter planning, strategy formulation, project preparation and council approval. Communities were involved in all aspects of the slum upgrading process, including the establishment of Home Owners Associations. The urban poor were involved through community organizing, including mapping, layout plans and the evaluation of alternatives.



They were also part of the LGU shelter planning process. Civil society—Cooperatives and NGOs—were key participants, especially in livelihood activities, community contracting and monitoring against baseline indices they helped to build.

This led to the reactivation of interest in a community-based approach to slum upgrading. It also increased the political awareness of slum upgrading, and the need for more involvement of urban poor communities in urban governance. The current Philippine Vice President – a former mayor and Chairman of HUDCC – is much more aware of the role of the LGUs in solving the shelter problem.

In terms of institutionalization, the project sent a strong message to government that it must address the housing problems of the poorest 30% according to their capacity to pay and willingness to participate. It demonstrated the need to start from the asset base of the urban poor and build on this. It also sent a message that innovation is needed to pursue a project pipeline focussed on slum upgrading. The need for a major change in roles and approaches has been recognised by HUDCC, although the political will of the new government remains to be seen.

In addition, capacity building at local and community levels is essential—LGUs, civil society and communities. But the models are available and only roll out is needed. HUDCC's capacity has reportedly not improved despite the assistance provided. There was not much involvement of the technical staff of HUDCC, even at regional level. UN-Habitat went alone—no real transfer of technology to HUDCC, since the operational regional offices were not engaged.

In terms of linkages to follow-on investment, future resources and the investment program have been identified on a number of occasions; but the political will to implement change is lacking. GOP still looks towards the World Bank and ADB to fund, but is not prepared to follow their conditions.

Nevertheless, DBP are still supporting the approach, although the real issue with HOAs is how to overcome their credit risk—officers are elected annually and there is no continuity; capacity is often lacking. But DBP may use its second generation funds from DPUCSP to prime the program, either by lending or using them to build capacity of HOAs. There is talk of a DPUCSP II through which funds could be provided, although the external funding agency has still to be identified.

- **Evidence of Quality**

Awareness was largely improved for the LGUs and NGOs. This was through the shelter planning aspects which extensively involved the communities. For example, a number of communities presented the shelter plan for approval to a number of LGU Councils.

The project introduced much of this to LGUs, including shelter plan preparation and community engagement in project mapping and layout planning and evaluation. Before the Project, most LGU consultations did not involve the participation of vulnerable groups, and before many LGUs did their own shelter and development assessments without community involvement.

As noted previously, communities, LGUs, NGOs and other branches of civil society were involved. Private business too was involved, especially the construction sector, where efforts were made to lower costs. However, there were no formal partnerships. Instead there were informal arrangements. The project also built upon the corporate social responsibility programs of private companies, where resources were tapped to assist communities.

Since the Project did not prosper—DBP did not lend to any HOA, and ADB eventually cancelled the loan—the major source of funding. Hence, there is no continuing programme.

Nevertheless some civil society organizations are still involved with communities, and a number of cooperatives are still working well.

The project provided the framework for HOA and community involvement. But the lack of political support for slum upgrading in the Philippines means that very few projects will be implemented in the absence of a sustainable funding source. But the HOA modality should have a future, especially as the criteria developed for screening such associations has been accepted by DBP.

- **Catalytic Impacts**

The project did make a differences in that it reactivated approaches on community based slum upgrading—CMP, STEP-UP and ZIP; and increased awareness of such approaches within DBP. All could be reactivated with political support. It is probably best to approach slum upgrading through local initiatives in future, without the strings attached by programs of the international funding agencies. Hence, the project was totally dependent on the CA funding, especially the capacity building components. No other funding was available.

- **Lessons recommendations**

There were a number of lessons learnt and recommendations put forward in the Grant Completion Report.<sup>8</sup> The beneficiary listed the following:

- The Shelter Strategy/Plan:
  - Served as the framework by which the HUDCC and the LGUs could rally the different stakeholders to support the socialized housing sector and the issues surrounding it.
  - The change in perspective from “housing” to “shelter” broadened the way the stakeholders viewed the issues as well as the response interventions.
  - Became an advocacy instrument for institutionalizing shelter programs through legislative action, allocation of budget for shelter, creation/strengthening of Local Housing Board and Housing Office or Department.
  - Was developed to be consistent with the other plans by broadening the analysis and scope to capture the realities and opportunities in the city that will benefit the socialized housing sector.
  - Prepared in phases based on the readiness and absorptive capacity of the multi-stakeholder TWG. It was a locally-driven process that promoted active involvement and ownership by the key stakeholders. It served as a capacity building intervention for the LGUs, civil society, national shelter agencies, urban poor groups or HOAs, and academe.
  - Should be a dynamic document, reviewed periodically.
- Shelter Financing:
  - One of the DPUCSP’s project components is a credit facility intended to meet the shelter financing needs of the informal sector. The funds were coursed through the Development Bank of the Philippines, a government bank which understandably should be able to bring together development financing and self-sustainability. As such, its lending structures are set to address the

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<sup>8</sup> Grant Completion Report, section 8 – Key lessons learnt

needs of those considered as creditworthy borrowers. The borrowing capacity among each group of the identified conduits: LGUs, private developers, MFIs and now HOAs coming from the informal sector, is very uneven that a financial package meant to fund the requirements of all these groups, with varying levels of creditworthiness, is not practical.

- While funds were available, accessing by the target sector was initially difficult because of MFI's partiality to existing client base with credit history, and LGUs' complexity in budgeting and approving shelter projects. A well targeted type of financing and effective technical assistance such as HOA lending and capability building are acknowledged possible solutions at successfully addressing shelter financing problems in the country.
- Developing Designs of Investments
  - Affordability-based and incremental mode of development should be primarily considered in developing investment designs to ensure project acceptability and viability
  - IMPACT communities needed subsidy support from the LGU and private sector—discounts on costs of housing materials—without undermining the capacity of the homeowners in designing, managing, and maintaining the project.
  - Direct HoA project management requires adequate capacity building support to ensure that skills, systems and policies at the HoA level are in place.
  - IMPACT validated that some LGUs still have weak understanding or insufficient information on existing housing laws and technologies.
  - Design of investments should be aligned with the City's CLUP.
  - Formal financing institutions such as DBP are constrained by standards that require full structure development as basis for financing viability.
- Income Security:
  - Housing construction and site development projects offered great opportunity for temporary employment and generation of immediate incomes among targeted beneficiaries.
  - Integrating community investment projects with community contracting schemes enhanced income augmentation. It served and enhanced the HOAs' project management capabilities and ultimately, intensified the community's ownership and accountability on the projects.
  - Community contracting is not limited nor confined to housing projects and community infrastructures.
  - Transforming individuals or their HOAs into entrepreneurs has proven to be a big challenge.
  - A community lending system should be started prior to relocation
  - Lending was approached very methodically as learning new means of livelihood is not easily achieved. As a safety net, loan releases was provided on staggered basis so that financial exposure amongst IMPACT beneficiaries

were controlled and managed for sustainability. Thus, rigid project monitoring was ensured to avert problems.

- Sustained partnership of business groups must be approached in the framework of business and community interest. The partnership must contribute to the developmental goals and financial objectives of business while simultaneously contributing to the economic and social well being of the communities. To increase business sector involvement, project partnership must be aligned with the core business of the company.
- Savings mobilization emanated from the households and communities. External pressure to immediately adopt and implement savings project tended to develop a top down approach and undermined community participation. Livelihood projects can be a good entry for community savings.
- Social Development: Institution Building
  - The project validated the emerging roles of HOAs as critical catalytic organizations in the development process at the neighbourhood level. Given juridical personality and with a clear mandate, HOAs are indispensable actors in social development. HOAs and their communities have emerged to be viable and trustworthy project planners and managers from just being plain beneficiaries and needs elaborators.
  - Institution building at the neighbourhood level requires strong LGU participation and involvement
  - Local NGO plays a crucial role in developing community capacities.
  - Pro-active involvement of the Barangay Government in settlements development is beneficial and vital
  - National government's support through facilitative national policies and improved regulations is essential in view of the emerging roles of local governments and HOAs in shelter financing. .
  - Social networks should be maximized when pursuing community development initiatives including institutional building for HoA..
  - Private Sector contribution/participation in community development must always be explored to support an institution building program. .
  - Inclusion of safety nets such as loan insurance can only happen once concrete projects (i.e. housing, site development) are already in the implementation phase, since they can easily relate its usefulness to the project.
  - Converting “need” to “viable demand” for shelter development loans (site development, housing, and livelihood) can be achieved through a directed, well-planned and implemented IB for HoA within a realistic timeframe.
  - Institution building requires “realistic timeframe” to ensure sustainability. CBO/HoA capacities are of varying degrees thus realistic time-framing of interventions should be ensured by projects—three years minimum especially if the CBO partner is newly formed.

### 5.3.6 Philippines 2 (P098173)

- **Summary of Grant Administration Process: Value, Timeline and Execution Arrangements – Table Format.**

<b>Project Title</b>	City Development Strategies (CDS) in the Philippines: An Enabling Platform for Good Governance and Improving Service Delivery
<b>Total Project Budget (USD)</b>	1,406,100
<b>Cities Alliance Funding (USD)</b>	541,100
<b>Project Focus</b>	City Development Strategy
<b>City/Area(s)</b>	25 cities—Bago, Baguio, Balanga, Bayawan, Calbayog, Canlaon, Cavite, Dapitan, Iloilo, Iriga, Kabankalan, Laoag, Legazpi, Makati, Masbate, Marikina, Naga, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, Roxas, Sagay, San Jose, Santiago, Sorsogon, Tagaytay, Tanauan, Tanguib, Tanjay, Zamboanga
<b>City/National Partner</b>	League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City Councils
<b>Cities Alliance Member(s) Sponsoring the Project</b>	World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Japan International Cooperation Agency, UN Habitat
<b>Grant Recipient/ Implementing Agency</b>	LCP, World Bank
<b>Submission date</b>	28/07/2005
<b>Threshold screening</b>	?
<b>ITAs</b>	27/11/2004
<b>Comments</b>	?
<b>Re-submission</b>	?
<b>Notification of approval</b>	29/11/2004
<b>Signing of Grant Agreement</b>	29/11/2004
<b>Completion date</b>	30/09/2007, extended until 31/12/2008

- **Project Description**

The purpose of the project was to support the government's key objective to make decentralization work better, and enhance economic competitiveness and social equity through improved city planning and project identification and financing. It was expected that over an 18-month period, all 117 cities in the Philippines would have an opportunity to participate in the CDS program; that CDS would be adopted and recognized by the national government as a main tool for local development planning, becoming a key catalyst for good governance, modern municipal management and resource mobilization; that the financing of priority projects identified under the CDS would be facilitated; and that LCP would successfully implement the CDS National Framework. This included the following activities:

- Consolidating and expanding CDS.
- Facilitating LGU access to a broader range of financing options.
- Institutionalizing CDS in the Philippines, integrating the CDS into the national development planning process.

- **Evidence of Ownership**

The CDS has now been integrated into the planning system, and institutionalised at local level with the City Planning and Development Offices (CPDOs) taking the lead but working with other city departments, outside agencies and non-government stakeholders.

At the beginning many thought that CDS was surplanted the existing land-use planning system. The prevailing attitude within many local governments was to prepare the City Land Use Plan (CLUP) for compliance with the regulations—to satisfy HLURB requirements

instead of treating them as documents that are of use by themselves for the benefit of the cities. The project changed this attitude and the CDS is now also seen as a compliance document by national agencies.

Systemic change has also occurred with the city planning framework, especially the introduction of participatory planning in cities, and the CDS document. The CDS puts more pressure on local governments to perform and satisfy stakeholders' wishes. It may even be possible to mandate that a CDS should be updated during each mayors term—possibly best in mid-term, after 1.5 years so that ownership is assured and continuity encouraged.

The CDS process helped to enable city departments define their roles better. CPDOs now coordinate more with other officers and stakeholders. Implementing roles have been more clearly defined. Better coordination is a key outcome. Also many cities now share experiences with others—pier to pier learning process, where cities showcase their CDS or innovative interventions.

LCP's capacity was strengthened under the project as well. There was no organizational structure before when it functioned purely as an administrative body, largely serving the needs of mayors. The project helped LCP to reorganise and develop a new structure. A business operating unit was established and technical and support staff hiring was encouraged and secured. Currently LCP has a full staff complement.

Most cities are aware of the need to improve basic services for the poor, and the CDS process has enhanced this in many. It enabled a better understanding of what poverty really is—lack of income, secure tenure, education, health care, basic infrastructure, etc. But some cities are thinking further and want to move away from the narrow view of an urban poor focus towards wider interventions under a broader local economic development (LED) approach. This sees the urban poor problem within its broader economic context—generating jobs, making cities more competitive, developing growth strategies, for example. However a number of cities are still largely rural in character, and investments in those are more likely to be towards basic services such as farm to market roads, wholesale markets, etc.

- **Evidence of Quality**

The formulation of the CDS encouraged participation of many major stakeholders. Participation enabled city authorities and mayors to embrace more of what stakeholders wanted, including taking on board their major concerns. This made stakeholders much more aware of problems and solutions, and was a significant change from the past. In the beginning mayors thought they knew all the problems. But as the project progressed, many changed their opinions and began to take into account the views of others. Mayors also became more aware of the needs and aspirations of the urban poor and initiated programmes for them. However, there was insufficient trickle down to the communities.

There was very little stakeholder involvement in many of the participating cities before the project. This process was largely through the local development council. But the CDS process changed this—more involvement of stakeholders, better data gathering, and the old one-way approach of government over the people became more a two-way exchange. In some cities, the participation of non-government groups in the local development councils improved. From a minimum requirement of 25% NGO membership, some cities had 50% of their LDC members from NGOs or other civil society bodies. Also the private sector began to learn more about and better understand what government was doing.

City governments and their staff and LCP were also involved directly. The project introduced them to the process—consultation->vision->strategies->programmes->projects. However, partnerships were not usually formal, legally constituted ones. They tended to be informal liaison between trade bodies, chambers of commerce, NGOs, and barangays—the lowest unit of local government, based on a small district. Many of the latter—councillors in

particular—were involved, and this enabled resources to be allocated to promote barangay development strategies that supported locally determined priority interventions (for example in Marikina).

Involvement was mainly through consultation. But in some cities, JICA had money to address problems, including solid waste management problems, and worked directly with cities. San Fernando developed a land fill under a design-build-operate modality. And there were joint efforts between the public and private sector in health care, for example.

The partnership approach in most of the participating cities has now been institutionalised. Local stakeholders now participate in the deliberations of local development councils, for instance. The approach also encouraged greater transparency in city finances—many post financial statements on their web site, and some have local publicity boards regarding aspects of financial performance of the local government.

But in others, the change of mayors as a result of the 2007 elections inhibited progress and necessitated starting the project again. Briefings were needed to secure buy in of the new local administrations. Mainly through the continuation of the approach that started under the project, especially when the current CDS needs to be updated. The aim is to extend the approach to all cities in the Philippines. Inter local government collaboration was encouraged and this has continued in a number of cities—Metro Iloilo-Gumaras institutional arrangement, and joint road projects between neighbouring cities, for example.

- **Catalytic Impacts**

Feedback from the mayors is positive, and some cities have been encouraged to borrow for development projects. Improvements have been seen in managing city finances—more awareness of the need to raise revenues and improve cost recovery. Before the CDS approach was adopted, programmes and project prioritisation were driven by politics. The mindset, however, changed as a result of the CDS, where many city governments learnt the importance of data and analysis. Long-term visions have been established that last beyond the 3-year term of mayors. There have been more exchanges between cities, and knowledge sharing has taken place—cities like to show off their CDSs and innovative projects. There have been other benefits of exposure through city to city exchange of learning and experience.

There are differences between cities, and success is very much dependent on the quality and commitment of the local leadership. Some CDS are very good, others still are a wish list of projects. But all are reasonably well written and follow a similar format and scope. The aim was for the process to start simple and gradually increase in sophistication. The tendency was to focus more on what the LGU could do—a “CDS” more for the local government than the city as a whole. They now need to expand coverage to a CDS that identifies strategies, programmes and priority projects to make the strategies happen regardless of which agency is responsible, the funding source and project implementation modalities. Furthermore the CDS would have been enhanced by the inclusion of an outline spatial strategy that shows the structure of the city and the directions of its growth and expansion. Future CDS should have a broader view on pro-poor development, through better focus on local economic development, infrastructure investment needs, generating jobs and improving competitiveness, for example.

The project was constrained by the three-year terms of local elected officials—this often meant that the process had to start again within the city when a new mayor was elected. But it was not possible to assess whether or not priority projects identified in the CDS had been or were being implemented. The lack of a funding source and capacity to prepare prefeasibility and feasibility studies is a stumbling block. But some cities are known to have implemented some projects. Many cities have used the CDS document as reference when determining their capital budget

According to feedback from the cities, the project was considered to be very successful and had a significant impact. A new mindset has developed within city governments and there is a willingness to continue with the approach. Many other cities are requesting participation, but CDS4 can only proceed once an evaluation of CDS3 has been carried out by CA. This is delaying the follow on project. Future CDS would emphasise LED to reduce poverty, and increase preparedness to respond to climate change and disaster management.

The Philippine government has entered into a framework-type contract with the CA. This is supposed to support a 5-year program of activities with a value of between US\$5 and US\$10 million, covering shelter, city development strategies, institutional strengthening, etc. Representing the government are HUDCC, DILG and LCP as member organizations.

- **Lessons recommendations**

There were a number of lessons learnt and recommendations put forward in the Grant Completion Report. The beneficiary listed the following:

- Participating mayors and city officials are very effective in promoting CDS as a planning and governance tool.
- Participation of city mayors in the CDS activities is crucial for success of CDS in each of the cities.
- The CDS promotes wide stakeholder participation in city planning.
- Funding institutions prefer to consider projects of cities that have undergone some form of systematic city planning.
- Projects for which some resources are allocated to by cities themselves are more likely to be successfully implemented—a stake by cities in programs is an important ingredient to realizing projects.
- The CDS approach should not be pursued in isolation—it is best carried out within the context of the overall planning system.
- Partnering with academic institutions is vital in the institutionalization process.
- The CDS process should continue to fill capacity gaps, especially since the CDS process itself helps cities in diagnosing these shortcomings.

Based on the above and discussion with key stakeholders, LCP and the city governments found the learning process useful for future program design. During implementation, change occurred slowly in many places—especially in those cities where resources and capacity were limited. But the project was initiated by the cities and so there was ownership—it was viewed as a local cities programme. The project led to a change in mindset at local levels—broadened the approach to planning, and widened a cities perspective regarding problems and solutions both locally and in some cases, regionally.

### 5.3.7 **Philippines 3 (P098173)**

- **Summary of Grant Administration Process: Value, Timeline and Execution Arrangements – Table Format.**

<b>Project Title</b>	A Metro Manila “Cities Without Slums” Strategy in Support of the Metro Manila Urban Services for the Poor Investment Program (MMUSP)
<b>Total Project Budget (USD)</b>	2,925,000
<b>Cities Alliance Funding (USD)</b>	500,000
<b>Project Focus</b>	Cities Without Slums Strategy formulation
<b>Other Project Focus</b>	Institutionalization of Cities Without Slums Strategy



<b>Region</b>	Asia
<b>City/Area(s)</b>	Metro Manila—Manila, Makati, Mandaluyong, Marikina, Quezon and Valenzuela Cities
<b>City/National Partner</b>	Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)
<b>Cities Alliance Member(s) Sponsoring the Project</b>	Asian Development Bank, UN-Habitat
<b>Grant Recipient/ Implementing Agency</b>	Asian Development Bank for Metro Manila League of Mayors

<b>Submission date</b>	08/11/2006
<b>Threshold screening</b>	?
<b>ITAs</b>	21/10/2005 and 31/10/2005
<b>Comments</b>	?
<b>Re-submission</b>	?
<b>Notification of approval</b>	8/11/2006
<b>Signing of Grant Agreement</b>	9/1/2006
<b>Completion date</b>	30/06/2009, extended to 31/12/2009, and to 30/06/2010

- **Project Description**

The project was designed to support the formulation of the Metro Manila-wide 15 year city without slums (CWS) strategy and subproject formulation activities to supplement those prepared under ADB-funded Project Preparatory Technical Assistance (PPTA) for the MMUSP Project. It aimed to provide LGUs with pro-poor shelter plans, including CWS strategies focussing on a broad range of needs in poor communities, including physical infrastructure, housing and livelihood development by developing a strategy and an institutional framework linking HUDCC, local government units (LGUs), financing institutions and NGOs through a Cities Without Slums initiative, operationalizing the 15-year strategy for a Sum Free Manila. This included the following activities:

- Preparation of feasibility studies for subprojects—Subproject Appraisal Reports (SPARs)—under MMUSP for the cities of Manila, Makati, Mandaluyong, Marikina, Quezon City and Valenzuela. For each, pro-poor city shelter strategies, land consolidation, site development and infrastructure components were proposed.
- Preparation of the Metro Manila road map for urban renewal and basic urban services for the poor—overall metropolitan CWS strategy.

- **Evidence of Ownership**

The creation of sustainable and disaster-resilient human settlements in Metro Manila remains a challenge. As long as there is no fundamental change in approach by government, chances for success for upscaling of interventions are slim.

The Metro Manila wide strategy has not been institutionalized—neither officially adopted nor regularly updated. No metro-wide program has been implemented. Feasibility studies were delivered to LGUs, and most are going ahead in some form, including those under joint venture arrangements. But the real impetus—ADB loan funds—never materialised, and as such implementation on the scale envisaged has not occurred.

Capacity is there, but HUDCC needs strengthening in its urban development functions. DOF did not believe in the ability of the SHFC to participate—financial and technical capacity weaknesses.

There are currently no plans to scale up, although GOP is rekindling its interest. Agencies however do have the capacity to undertake similar work without CA support, although

further consultancy assistance may be required. External support is required to provide the funding for TA and investments.

An ADB RRP was produced which clearly outlined resource requirements and their sources. Subproject appraisal reports documented city-wide strategies and detailed subproject evaluations, but there has been no implementation.

GOP is now considering World Bank funding in view of ADB's indifference. The change of government has meant that HUDCC is now more LGU oriented, especially regarding housing—a mandated role under the Local Government Code, 1991. However, the involvement of micro finance institutions (MFIs) is continuing—the approach is now institutionalised and accepted.

No funds have been committed either due to the governments lack of interest and confidence in the proposed local financing agency—SHFC, and the willingness and ability of the beneficiaries to repay loans.

- **Evidence of Quality**

The Project responded to the government's request for assistance for (i) preparation of a comprehensive slum upgrading and urban renewal program for Metro Manila, and (ii) for implementation of the 15-year slum eradication policy that had been developed by ADB with HUDCC and LGUs of Metro Manila. This policy was designed to address the results of rapid urbanization in the Philippines and in the megacity of Metro Manila in particular.

An ADB Technical Assistance Completion Report<sup>9</sup> concluded that: (i) there is currently no political support for a metropolitan 'CWS' strategy. HUDCC failed to impress on the DOF the urgency and importance of a metro-wide investment program for housing of the urban poor; (ii) the decision of the DOF not to support the MMUSP implementation demonstrated that the Government has no confidence in some of its own housing finance institutions, especially the SHFC, the designated financial conduit for the MMUSP loan; (iii) the Government showed no confidence in the paying capacity of the urban poor; did not expect that SHFC could recover the MMUSP loan adequately, and did not want to shoulder loan obligations created by defaulting households; and (iv) the MMUSP subproject designs have demonstrated that commercial land development and a system of cross-subsidies can make housing affordable for the urban poor, and that a system of usufruct tenure can become bankable collaterals and enable the urban poor to become bankable.

If the Project is reactivated, then they will be according to those outlined in the ADB MMUSP Report and Recommendations of the President to the Board of Directors (RRP), perhaps with some modifications. If not, then each LGU is likely to go alone under modified arrangements and smaller subprojects.

- **Catalytic Impacts**

The interviews and reports suggest no catalytic impacts. It simply increased the scope of work that ADB and the GOP had already been working on. There were no more funds available within ADB to supplement it earlier work, and as such CA provided the needed resources. But it did make some difference as its output has shown—SPARs in major cities that still could be implemented; updating of the shelter sector road map, and capacity building within cities, LGUs, HUDCC and communities.

- **Lessons recommendations**

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<sup>9</sup> PPTA 4616-PHI: Preparing the Metro Manila Urban Services for the Poor Project, Technical Assistance Completion Report, 2010

Based on the Grant Completion Report<sup>10</sup>, the beneficiary listed the following key lessons learnt:

- There is currently no political support for a metropolitan CWS strategy. HUDCC failed to impress on the DOF the urgency and importance of a metro-wide investment program for urban poor housing.
- The decision of the DOF not to support the MMUSP implementation demonstrates that the Government has no confidence in some of its own housing finance institutions (like the Social Housing Finance Corporation [SHFC]), the designated financial conduit for the MMUSP loan.
- The Government also had no confidence in the paying capacity of the urban poor, expected that SHFC would be unable to recover the MMUSP loan adequately, and did not want to be shouldered with loan obligations created by defaulting households.
- The MMUSP subproject designs demonstrated that commercial land development and a system of cross-subsidies can make housing affordable for the urban poor and that a system of usufruct tenure can become bankable collaterals and enable the urban poor to become bankable.

Based on the above, The Cities Alliance grant has improved the capabilities of LGUs in assessment of demand for housing and habitat-related services, and in financial planning. The creation of local housing units at the LGU level was also encouraged in those LGUs where they did not yet exist. The SPARs represent the end product of training and technical assistance extended under the grant. The shelter plans conducted with HUDCC at the helm improved the awareness of each LGU on the needs of the informal settlers, their affordable limits, LGU assets, and resources needed to implement their plans. But, the technical assistance project failed to lead to the expected investment program, and to endorse a metro-wide CWS strategy.

The DOF did not support the proposed implementing agency—SHFC. Nor did they agree to provide a 100% guarantee on borrowed funds—they wanted the LGUs to guarantee 50%. Also they wished to change the rules whereby there would be sub-sovereign borrowing by 1<sup>st</sup> class cities. LGUs did not wish to commit to these arrangements, especially for investments in low-income housing where beneficiaries willingness to pay was seen as questionable.

### 5.3.8 Syria

- **Summary of Grant Administration Process: Value, Timeline and Execution Arrangements – Table Format**

<b>Project Title</b>	Aleppo City Development Strategy
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	\$ 1,180,000 (CA financing \$ 380,000)
<b>Project Focus</b>	City Development Strategy
<b>City/National Partner</b>	Municipality of Aleppo
<b>Cities Alliance Member(s) Sponsoring the Project</b>	Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit GTZ (GmbH)
<b>Grant Recipient/Implementing Agency</b>	Municipality of Aleppo and GTZ

<sup>10</sup> Grant Completion Report, section 8 – Key lessons learnt

<b>Submission date</b>	12/10/2006
<b>Threshold screening</b>	17/07/2006
<b>ITAs</b>	17/11/2006 and 23/11/2006
<b>Comments</b>	19/12/2006
<b>Re-submission</b>	02/10/2007
<b>Notification of approval</b>	04/12/2007
<b>Signing of Grant Agreement (DGF)</b>	10/04/2008 (\$200,000) and 01/03/2010 (\$180,000)
<b>Completion date</b>	30/06/2010 and 30/06/2011

- **Project Description**

Development in Aleppo is guided by a Master plan adopted in 2002 and City Council priorities adopted in 2003. The aim of the project is to review these and prepare a city development strategy that meets feasibility criteria, funding constraints, and the reform agenda of the next national 5-Year Plan. The strategy will focus on key concerns related to poverty, income and employment and quality of life concerns in the following focal areas:

- Local Economic Development,
- Urban Service Delivery and Disaster Management,
- Urban Environment,
- Urban Spatial Development,
- Administrative and Financial Modernization.

Other focal areas added during project implementation:

- Informal settlements,
- Children and youth.

- **Evidence of Ownership (Fair)**

The Municipality of Aleppo (MoA) is the owner of the CDS, whereas the project is financed and administered by GTZ. The two parties together are strong driving forces with regards to implementation, which is demonstrated by active participation at workshops, Steering Committee/Working Group meetings.

Through the GTZ Urban Development Programme (UDP), the findings of the assessments prepared for the Aleppo CDS were included the Memorandum on Sustainable Urban Development in Syria, a document which later led to the approval of the Syrian Urban Development Policy in 2010. The Ministry of Local Administration (MLA) is a stakeholder of the project and participates at major workshops and dissemination seminars. The fact that, MLA is not involved on a regular basis, may pose future problems when it comes to CDS implementation.

The current institutional framework is very weak, therefore the project aims at restructuring the administrative and financial management system within the MoA. The final structure has been designed and is currently under discussion with the MLA. The MoA is expected to set up departments specifically dedicated to urban services; informal settlements; CDS & LED, etc. The intended outputs will create clear allocation of responsibilities, prepare job specifications and complete a training needs assessment.

It is certain that ownership and political will has been very strong at local level. The challenge lies in the fact that, as mentioned above, local government structures and capacities are very weak and the governance system is highly centralized. The adoption of

systematic changes in Syria takes a very long time owing to its slow and highly bureaucratic institutional structure.

- **Evidence of Quality (Good)**

The project team was responsible for the assessment of informal settlements in Aleppo which produced rapid profiles of the 28 settlements (50% population lives in informal settlements in Aleppo). Several additional assessments were completed and GTZ made available all the other poverty assessment produced through its UDP project.

Two of the projects focal areas, informal settlements; and children & youth, have fairly strong pro-poor focus, consequently the outputs are aiming at reducing urban poverty. Outputs included the preparation of resettlement plans; delivery of training for young people living in informal settlements, etc.

Participation is one of the strongest elements of the project. This is in fact regarded as novelty approach by project stakeholders, as there is no precedent of participation in Syria. Each focal area is represented by a Working Group composed of volunteers coming from public & private sectors as well as civil society. Workshops were organized with the participation of young adults from informal settlements with the aim to involve them in the CDS process.

The project witnessed unprecedented visibility among the public through the introduction of an elaborate communication strategy and branding process. The slogan of 'Madinatuna' (Our City) refers to the whole CDS process starting with the preparation of poverty assessments; thematic actions plans; project identification; institution restructuring and actual implementation. It has become independent from CA or GTZ and rightly so, as ownership will ultimately have to remain with the Municipality.

The project has a website, through which the public is kept informed and the project team has been receiving continuous interest. Furthermore, the project team organised a city-wide information campaign in July 2010. Panels and information kiosks were set up at 5 places across the city to raise public awareness.

- **Catalytic Impacts (Fair)**

Given the fact that project outputs were included in the national Urban Development Policy, the CDS may trigger further similar initiatives in other cities. The actual implementation may however face impediments, due to weak local governance and institutions, highly bureaucratic and top down decision making, lack of legal base enabling land titling.

GTZ was contacted by other Syrian municipalities asking for assistance to engage in similar endeavours. Furthermore, the Aleppo CDS project team welcomed the team of another CA project in Damascus, led by the French Development Agency (AFD), for discussing best practices.

- **Lessons recommendations**

The presence of GTZ in Syria and in particular the fact that it took the lead on executing the project (the MoA admitted that it did not have the resources to furnish the application form and manage the project), was beneficial in terms of timely implementation, knowledge transfer and advocacy.

The field visit concluded that the CDS is a completely new approach in Syria and its novelty aspects lie in triggering community participation and tripartite consultation, as well as recognizing pro-poor aspects in urban planning. The CDS formulation process has started at the right time, as (non-) existing participatory systems are currently going through a reform process.

This may explain the high public interest and voluntary involvement of working group members supporting project implementation. This climate may give the project a good opportunity to introduce improvements but it is crucial that current structures are susceptible to change in order to maintain the momentum.

During the field visit, the following possible problematic issues were identified:

- The grant application form was too complex and the MoA would not have had adequate resources to respond without the assistance of GTZ. An individual consultant was hired specifically to prepare the application and it took over a year to process the grant.
- There is difference between the understanding of terminology used by the GTZ and the CA Secretariat. A glossary of terms would clarify these issues and could save time at both ends. Additionally, a visit from the CA Secretariat at the application phase would help to clarify uncertainties, which could speed up the whole process and would create better cooperation during project implementation.
- The application form required written commitment from supporting organizations. The process of collecting these was very time-consuming and cumbersome. The added value of these letters is questionable at such an early stage. Following the lengthy application process and delayed project start-up many of these commitments lost their meaning and did not materialize.
- Many cities in developing countries are used to sector planning. This is mirrored in the administrations, which are usually organized by sectors. Before starting the grant application, the concept of integrated, strategic development planning needs some clarification to be understood in its complexity and interdisciplinarity. Ownership can only develop once this is understood. Champions have to be identified before the application process starts to prepare the ground.
- Country-specific circumstances, e.g.: political, economic and institutional context, should be taken into consideration at the time of project formulation and the CDS should be better tailored for the local settings. For example:
  - Local governments are weak in Syria and governance is centralized. In this specific case, stronger involvement of central institutions may increase the likelihood of future CDS implementation.
  - In case local capacities are insufficient to implement the CDS, then the project should have a stronger focus on capacity building, which should be reflected not only in the methodology but also in the budget. The Aleppo CDS did identify capacity building requirements but failed to deliver necessary training due to the limited budget available.
  - The problem of informal settlements is a major issue in Aleppo and will be an important component of the CDS. However, before preparing an action plan and identifying projects, the problem has to be tackled at grass-root level by the central Government, i.e.: create a legal framework regulating property rights, land titling, etc.
- The identification of potential obstacles in the way of CDS implementation could be mapped as part of the formulation process. This should be done as a priority before the identification of projects and follow-on investment sources.

## 5.4 Scoring Table

To be inserted

5.5 Meeting Records

Name	Affiliation	Position	Email
<b>Cameroon field mission –xxx</b>			
<b>Malawi field mission – xxx</b>			
<b>Senegal field mission – xxx</b>			
<b>Mozambique field mission – xxx</b>			



<b>Philippines field mission – xxx</b>			
<b>Syria field mission – 26-28 October 2010</b>			
Dr Thomas Pritzkat	GTZ	Project Manager, Aleppo Urban Development Project	<a href="mailto:Thomas.pritzkat@gtz.de">Thomas.pritzkat@gtz.de</a>
Dr Maan Chibli	Municipality of Aleppo	Mayor of Aleppo	<a href="mailto:Alp-cityh@net.sy">Alp-cityh@net.sy</a>
Lian Touma	GTZ	Finance Officer, Aleppo Urban Development Project	<a href="mailto:Lian.touma@gtz.de">Lian.touma@gtz.de</a>
Boutros Merjaneh	General Manager, Planning Execution Consulting	Member of Urban Environment Working Group	<a href="mailto:pecbym@scs-net.org">pecbym@scs-net.org</a>
Raed Arslan	Volunteer	Member of Urban Services Working Group	
Dalia Moukayed	Municipality of Aleppo	Coordinator and Member of Urban Environment and Spatial Planning Working Groups	
Caesar Kabbash	CEO, Kabbash Co. International Trading	Member of Urban Economic Development Working Group	<a href="mailto:Caesar@kabbash.com">Caesar@kabbash.com</a>
Fateh Oliver Hamoui	Expert for LED, Aleppo Chamber of Industry	Member of Urban Economic Development Working Group	<a href="mailto:Oliver.hamoui@ci-online.de">Oliver.hamoui@ci-online.de</a>
Ghada Rifai	Volunteer	Member of Children and Youth Working Group	
Razan Abdul Wahab	Architect, Architecture & Interior Design Studio	Member of Informal Settlements	<a href="mailto:rawa1@scs-net.org">rawa1@scs-net.org</a>

