



# THE STATE OF AFRICAN CITIES 2008

A framework for addressing  
urban challenges in Africa



UN  HABITAT

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United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)  
P.O. Box 30030, Nairobi, Kenya  
Tel: +254 20 7621 234  
Fax: +254 20 7623 904  
Website: [www.unhabitat.org](http://www.unhabitat.org)

**Cover photo: Satellite image of Maputo, Mozambique. ©Space Imaging**

**This image shows the spatial layout differences of a “fragmented city”, consisting of a low density formal city with regular street patterns, public open spaces and public green, that clearly contrasts with the dense, unplanned and *ad hoc* developments within the informal parts of the city.**

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UN  HABITAT



ECA-CEA



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IDRC  CRDI

# Foreword by UN-HABITAT



It gives me great pleasure to introduce the first State of the African Cities Report, a cooperative effort between UN-HABITAT and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

This is the first issue in an evolving series of state of the African cities reports, intended to provide both a tool and a platform for debate on urban issues within Africa. It aims to provide focus and encouragement to African governments at the central and local level as well as to other key actors in the broad area of sustainable human settlements development. We hope to promote new thinking about sustainable urbanization by drawing attention to critical housing, urban development and governance issues in this new age of globalization.

Contrary to common perception, most urban growth in Africa now takes place in secondary and tertiary settlements, the towns with less than 500,000 inhabitants, rather than in its largest cities. Consequently, the smaller African cities will need the close attention of policy-makers if their growth is to be pragmatically guided taking into account challenges imposed by environmental changes resulting from population pressure and climate change.

Meanwhile, the larger African cities will continue to grow as well and the mega-city has now also emerged in Africa. More and more African cities will soon join ranks with the world's largest cities. In addition, there are now indications of the emergence in Africa of very large 'city regions' and urban development corridors as a result of spatial and economic synergies between cities in relative proximity. Increasingly, urbanization is moving from city-based to region-based configurations, which poses a host of entirely new challenges over and above the already complex issues of Africa's current urban transition. This is an even more noteworthy phenomenon given that the bulk of Africa's urban transition, though yet to come, is only a generation away. By 2030 the majority of Africans will be urban residents, and the majority

of them are predicted to live in slums and informal settlements unless radical corrective measures are taken.

Over the past 15 years, democracy and economic change have transformed many African nations. The region's commitment to good governance can be seen in the establishment of NEPAD and its governance counterpart – the African Peer Review Mechanism. Continental economic growth has exceeded 5 percent for several years – a positive change over the dismal economic performance of the 1980s and 1990s. The number of conflicts in the region has declined by two-thirds since the late 1990s and African nations themselves now build and maintain peace within the continent.

Africa's burgeoning urban problems have received less attention than warranted and now, at the dawn of Africa's urban age, these need to be urgently addressed. The challenges clearly put a premium on vision and leadership for addressing such issues as deep urban poverty, the need for closing the affordable housing gap, safe drinking water, sanitation, transportation and livelihoods for swelling urban populations, regardless of whether they live in Africa's mega-cities or smaller settlements.

Finally, I like to commend the good spirit of inter-agency cooperation in a true One UN manner for the preparation of this publication. I thank all our partners for their vision, contributions and cooperation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Anna K. Tibaijuka'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with some loops and flourishes.

**Anna K. Tibaijuka**  
**Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director**  
**United Nations Human Settlements Programme**  
**(UN-HABITAT)**

# Foreword by UNECA



The sustainability of the continental environment and human life requires, amongst other things, that human settlements in both urban and rural areas are made economically buoyant, socially vibrant and environmentally sound with full respect for cultural, religious and natural heritage and diversity. Urban settlements hold a promise for human development and for the protection of the region's natural resources through their ability to support large numbers of people, especially when negative impacts on the natural environment can be limited. However, many cities in Africa are witnessing harmful patterns of growth, of land use and of degradation of their physical structures. Such problems are often accompanied by soil, air, water and waste pollution and destruction of resources. Many cities are also subject to limited water supply, sanitation and drainage and dependent on toxic and non-renewable energy sources. Many of these trends are aggravated or accelerated by high population growth and rural-to-urban migration.

Many African countries' improved economic performance is being threatened by a global economic crisis and can be exacerbated by high population growth rates and environmental degradation. Previous economic crises, including the debt burden and the collapse of import-substitution industries, increased the number of Africans living in absolute poverty and without access to adequate shelter. Indeed, the increasing incidence of squalid shelter conditions and homelessness is cause for concern in many African countries and threatens health standards, security and even life itself. It is estimated that 46 percent of the African urban population lives in slums and informal settlements where poverty, overcrowding, unemployment, crime and pollution are prevalent. African cities must therefore be reoriented to provide environments where people can live and work in social harmony and can overcome negative urban features.

Poverty reduction and the creation of economic opportunity is a key goal for Africa. However, tackling poverty requires not only significant increases in GDP per capita, but also requires reduction of inequality and investing in social development to enhance the capabilities of those living in poverty and other vulnerable groups. Additional action is needed to overcome disparities in the opportunities available to different sections of society, such as those between men and women living in urban agglomerations. These disparities start during childhood when girls have limited access to education and the resulting gender-related inequalities adversely affect human development at individual, family and community levels.

With the present prevailing conditions in the cities and towns of Africa, the magnitude of the problems and the sheer size of the challenges, Governments should gear up to implement strategies for the sustainable facilitation of adequate shelter for rapidly growing urban populations and for the urban poor through enabling approaches to shelter development and other improvements that are environmentally sound.

As in the past, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is extremely pleased to have worked successfully with UN-HABITAT on the State of the African Cities Report 2008. It is an excellent initiative and a good example of our commitment to working with various partners to enhance our collective support to, and impact on Africa's political, economic and social development.



**Abdoulaye Janneh**  
**Under-Secretary-General**  
**Executive Director Economic Commission for Africa**

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In seeking to cover in detail conditions and trends throughout the African continent, this report has drawn on the knowledge of a range of specialists. This included a process of peer review for sections of the draft report and a review of the first consolidated draft by experts who constituted the editorial board. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) hosted and sponsored a meeting of the editorial board in their Headquarters in Addis Ababa from 16 – 18 July 2008.

The Report was written under the direction of Alioune Badiane, Director of the Regional Office for Africa and the Arab States (ROAAS) of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT). The coordination of the report was undertaken by Jos Maseland, assisted by Lusungu Kayani, both of the UN-HABITAT Regional Office for African and the Arab States.

The following contributed sections to the report or assisted in the drafting of these sections: Oseni Adeniyi, Daniel Adom, Barnabas Atiyaye, Babatunde Agbola, Philippe Bocquier, Monceyf Fadili, James Fairburn, Johnson Falade, Michael Filani, Ayman el-Hefnawi, Kunle Ifesanya, Faith Kasim, Lusungu Kayani, Alan Mabin, Jos Maseland, Beacon Mbiba, The Megacities-Dar es Salaam Project Team (A. Hill, M. Lenke and C. Lindner), Jay Moor, Robert Obhudo, Stanley Okafor, Josiah Olayide Omirin, Samuel Owour, Mona Serageldin and François Vigier. The statistical annex was prepared the Global Urban Observatory team

consisting of George Madara, Julius Majale, Gora Mboup, Philip Mukungu, Omondi Odiambo and Raymond Otieno

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“... I left [the city] as early as the fourth month of my pregnancy and went back to live with my mother and son in the village. That was when I realized that the city had gotten under my skin. Each passing day, awaiting the arrival of my second child, was like a year to me, because I was no longer able to identify with and integrate back into village life. I had sampled city life.”

**BEYOND THE HORIZON - AMMA DARKO**  
HEINEMANN INTERNATIONAL, 1995



A busy city street in Mombasa on the coast of Kenya 2008.  
©Charlie Grieves-Cook





# Introduction



▲ Girls collecting water from a well beside the Lomé Lagoon, Lomé, Togo.  
©Tugela Ridley/IRIN

The *State of the African Cities Report 2008: A Framework for Addressing Urban Challenges in Africa* is envisaged by UN HABITAT and its partners to provide an overview of issues related to the urban transition now taking place throughout Africa. It is intended both as a start in benchmarking city-level data and for sensitizing African governments at all levels about the challenges of rapid urbanization. This report complements with a regional focus the State of the World's Cities report series, issued by UN-HABITAT on a biannual basis since 2001.

Clearly, the first *State of the African Cities Report* does not aspire to be comprehensive. Rather, it is an effort to create a general overview of African urban and shelter-related issues and shed light on the emerging key urban topics that

need African policy-makers, mayors and urban managers' attention. The present report advocates for Africa to become more cognizant of the increasing relevance of its spatial aspects to economic and social policy by explaining what makes cities grow and where. Understanding these determinants is critical to reinforcing cities' roles and dynamism for achieving broader national and regional development goals while also addressing asymmetric growth and regional disparities. The report is further intended to sensitize African governments, mayors and urban authorities about the need for more systematic collection of city level data for better informed decision making.

In 2008, Africa still had only 39.1 percent of its total population living in cities, making it the least urbanized

region in the world. African urban populations are also highly unevenly distributed over the continent's sub-regions, ranging from a 22.7 percent urbanization rate in East Africa to 57.3 percent in the Southern Africa region. Among individual African countries the contrasts in urbanization rates are even greater, from as low as 10.1 and 12.8 percent in Burundi and Uganda to Gabon's 84.7 and Djibouti's 87.0 percent. Africa's highest 2007 national urbanization rate of 93.1 percent was at the island Réunion.

African cities with less than 500,000 inhabitants are now absorbing about two-thirds of all urban population growth. During the next two decades, Africa will have to find ways of facilitating urban housing, services and livelihoods for


more than twice as many urban dwellers than it has today. Consequently, it is critical for national and local decision-makers to focus on enabling the smaller cities to provide for the projected very rapid urban growth. But Africa's larger cities continue to grow fast as well. In 2005, Africa had 43 cities with more than one million inhabitants, up from 28 a decade earlier. It is projected that by 2015 there will be 59 cities exceeding one million inhabitants.

Despite African cities generating about 55 percent of the continent's total GDP, a massive 43 percent of its urban populations live below the poverty line. In several Sub-Saharan nations that share even exceeds 50 percent and Africa's urban slum populations continue to grow. In some of the fast-growing African cities almost all of the current urban spatial growth is the result of slum and informal settlements proliferation. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that urban environmental problems claim an estimated one million African lives each year.


With insufficient political will, urban governance deficiencies continue to affect most African cities. Effective decentralization of authority and resources to the local level is still not widely enforced. Urban governance capacities remain severely lagging at a time that the absolute number of African urban dwellers is growing very fast. Poor local and regional infrastructures continue to be among the most significant hindrances to African socio-economic development and progress – urban as well as rural.

African cities and their inhabitants, despite the enormity of obstacles, display a remarkable resilience in adopting survival strategies, transforming any opportunity into positive action. But even this incredible resilience has its limits, especially under conditions of rapidly rising food and energy prices. Moreover, the larger any city grows, the more its systems and inhabitants become vulnerable to disasters, whether natural, social or as the outcome of negative symbioses between natural


### AFRICAN REGIONS' URBANIZATION TREND 1970-2050 (PERCENT)




### AVERAGE URBAN GROWTH



### AFRICAN POPULATION 2007



## 49 ONE + MILLION CITIES IN AFRICA (2008)




and human factors. Few African city managers are aware of these rising urban vulnerabilities and far too many African cities do not possess the disaster management structures to help save lives when disaster strikes.

Cairo and Lagos are the first African megacities. Before 2015, Kinshasa will be the third and is projected to surpass Lagos in size by 2025 when Kinshasa, Lagos and Cairo will have 16.7, 15.7 and 15.5 million inhabitants respectively. But this is not the full picture. Progressing urbanization introduces shifts in cities' spatial patterns and configurations. Traditional city-based urbanization is moving towards regional urbanization patterns, including the emergence of city regions and their associated urban corridors, creating what is known as mega urban regions. Such regional urban systems comprise several multi-million urban cores. The regional urban systems of Suez-Cairo-Alexandria, Kenitra-Casablanca, Gauteng, and Ibadan-Lagos-Accra are key examples.

All these trends and new urban configurations need to be recognized and acknowledged if African policy makers are to

turn latent potentials into real gains. Some emerging African city regions are prospective gateway cities and could enhance the continent's integration into the global economy. But they have an even greater potential of becoming cores of intense inequity, corruption and deep human suffering if poorly governed and left to the voracity of unregulated market forces.

To leverage Africa's options in an environment that is simultaneously global and local, it is important for its leaders at all levels to develop forward-looking visions based on analyses of where Africa is now and where it wants to be in the future. The strategic urban visionary agenda for tomorrow should be based on good leadership, anticipation and strategic interpretations of the realities of today. Improving the understanding of where the region is today and suggestions on where Africa may wish to go in the future – and the role of cities and urbanization in these processes – is what this and successive issues of the State of the African Cities Report series strive to contribute to.



▲  
A city street in Ghana, West Africa.  
©Raïdo Väljamaa/iStockphoto

# Chapter One

# THE STATE OF AFRICAN CITIES

# 01





# 1.1

## Summary and Policy Recommendations

Despite a globally slowing rate of urban growth, the worldwide 2007 urban population of 3.3 billion people is projected to double by 2050. The African urban population, however, is projected to more than double its 2007 level of 373.4 million by 2030. Projections show that by 2030 there will be 759.4 million African urban dwellers, more than today's total number of city dwellers in entire Western hemisphere. The world's shortest urban population doubling time, less than nine years, is found in the East Africa region, from 50.6 million in 2007 to a projected 106.7 million by 2017.

Africa is in a historic period of demographic change. In the early 1990s, two-thirds of all Africans lived in rural areas. Around 2030, Africa will enter its urban age with 759.4 million people - half of its total population - living in cities. It is projected that by 2050 there will be more than 1.2 billion African city dwellers. That means that by 2050 there will be more people living in African cities than the combined urban and rural populations of the Western hemisphere.

In 2007, Africa was still the least urbanized region in the world with only 38.7 percent of the continent-wide population residing in settlements classified as cities. The African population is geographically very unevenly distributed and there are significant intra-regional urbanization differences within Africa, as shown in Table 1.1.1 below. The East Africa region is the least urbanized of the world, but urbanizing rapidly. The North Africa and Southern Africa regions have

the continent's highest urbanizations figures and their average annual rates of urbanization, as expected, are now declining. They nevertheless continue to be rapidly urbanizing regions.

The rapid urban population growth in Africa is, contrary to common wisdom, not absorbed by its largest cities. In the foreseeable future, the intermediate cities (towns with less than 500,000 inhabitants) will be the localities where two-thirds of all African urban growth is occurring. The implications of this swift urban growth are clear: African governments should start strengthening the governance capacities of their intermediate and smaller cities so that these fast-growing towns will be prepared for rapid increase in new and additional demand for urban spatial planning, urban housing, urban services and urban livelihoods.

The larger African cities, however, will also continue to grow, albeit that their annual growth rates are now declining. But since these lower growth rates apply to ever-larger urban populations, these cities will, in absolute terms, still see more and more people added. The larger African cities will absorb the remaining one-third of the continent-wide urban growth and, consequently, both the number and average size of Africa's cities larger than 500,000 inhabitants is on the rise.

In 1950, Alexandria and Cairo were the only African cities exceeding one million inhabitants. In 2005, there were 43, with an average size of 2.5 million and a combined population of more than 110 million. In 2015, there will be 53, with an

TABLE 1.1.1: AFRICAN REGIONS' URBANIZATION RATES, URBAN AND TOTAL POPULATION AND GROWTH RATES


	Percentage urban 2007	Average annual urbanization rate 2005-2010	2007 Population (thousands)		Average annual total population growth rate 2005-2010
			Urban	Total	
North Africa	50.92	2.40	99,855	196,108	2.40
West and Central Africa	41.75	4.02	162,109	388,299	4.03
East Africa	20.48	4.05	50,629	247,267	3.92
Southern Africa	45.60	2.56	60,779	133,299	1.47
Africa	38.70	3.31	373,372	964,973	3.31






▲ Modern residential district at morning, Cairo, Egypt  
 © Mikhail Nekrasov/Shutterstock

**FIGURE 1.1.1: AFRICAN REGIONS' URBAN POPULATION TREND 1970-2050 (THOUSANDS)**



**FIGURE 1.1.2: AFRICAN REGIONS' URBANIZATION TREND 1970-2050 (PERCENT)**





▲  
Antananarivo, Madagascar  
©Rob Broek/iStockphoto

average size of 3.1 million and a combined total exceeding 168 million inhabitants.


Africa's three giant urban agglomerations, Cairo, Kinshasa and Lagos, continue to rise rapidly in their ranking among the world's largest metropolitan regions. In 2007, the urban agglomeration of Cairo had 11.9 million inhabitants; Lagos had 9.6 million and Kinshasa 7.8 million. In 2015, Cairo will have 13.4 million; Lagos 12.4 million; and Kinshasa 11.3 million inhabitants - 11th, 17th and 19th respectively among the world's largest metropolitan regions. Projections show that Kinshasa, with 16.7 million inhabitants, will be Africa's largest urban agglomeration in 2025, Lagos 15.8 million and Cairo 15.5 million, ranking 11th, 12th and 13th among the world's largest megacities.

TABLE 1.1.2: SIZE OF AFRICAN CITIES IN 2007 AND PROJECTION FOR 2025

Size	>10m	5-10m	1-5m	0.5-1m	<0.5m
Number	2	2	48	60	Unknown
Population (thousands)	23,076	14,238	102,418	41,057	231,404
Percent of urban population	6.18	3.81	27.43	10.10	52.48
Trend for 2025	3	8	73	84	Unknown

But these megacity figures do not take into account the new spatial urban configurations that have now also started to emerge in Africa: The City Region and the Urban Development Corridor. Large metropolitan cores in relative proximity have the tendency to merge through their political, economic and spatial synergies into huge *regional* urban systems with total population figures that, in the case of Africa, can only be guessed. Among these are the North Delta Region of Egypt (the regional urban system comprising Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said and Suez) with an estimated 2007 population exceeding 77 million; the Gauteng Urban Region of South Africa (Johannesburg, Tshwane/Pretoria and Emfuleni/Vereeniging) with an estimated 10.5 million inhabitants; and the GILA urban corridor (Ibadan, Lagos, Cotonou, Lomé and Accra)

FIGURE 1.1.3: URBAN GROWTH OF CAIRO, KINSHASA AND LAGOS



stretching along the Gulf of Guinea coast of Nigeria, Togo, Benin and Ghana, comprising about 25 million people.

Over the past half decade, there has been fair economic growth across Africa, albeit that this growth has not been evenly distributed and some nations have done better than others. Despite this economic progress, 40 percent of all Africans are still below the poverty line, living on less than US\$1 per day. Unless this poverty is addressed, African urbanization may have significant humanitarian consequences. African urbanization is a poverty-driven process and not the industrialization-induced socio-economic transition it represented in the world's other major regions. The 890 million inhabitants of the western hemisphere (700 million urban dwellers) generated a combined 2005 GDP of US\$17,548 billion - more than 16 times the 2005 GDP of US\$ 109.1261 billion generated by 922 million Africans (350 million urban dwellers). Africa's combined demographic and economic challenges are further compounded by threats of future urban food and energy insecurity and sea level rise that may impact on the 12 percent of Africa's urban population living in low-elevation coastal zones.

The legacy of colonialism has played a role in inhibiting Africa's post-independence political and economic development, while unfair global trade conditions have undermined economic growth and political stability. The impoverishment of Africa was further exacerbated by severe shortcomings in the post-independence policies of many of its governments, fuelled also by conflicts, extreme centralization of power and continuing rampant corruption in some countries. In recent years, the increased frequency of natural disasters and the scourge of HIV/AIDS have not been helpful either.


Post-independence African cities grew very rapidly. Initially this growth was mostly fed by rural-urban migrations but nowadays it is mostly the result of natural growth. As African

political constituencies were (and in many countries still are) overwhelmingly rural, the rapidly emerging cities received little attention. Central governments, apprehensive of strong or opposition-controlled local authorities, tended to see the larger cities as political hotbeds and often deliberately disabled the city managers through funds starvation and excessive central level interventions.

Business profits were frequently used for urban consumption purposes, rather than reinvested in social housing, infrastructures and employment-generation. Although after independence a large and growing number of newly employed government workers helped build an emerging middle class, structural adjustment programmes cut deeply in the city-based (and often bloated) civil service ranks. Urban economies soon afterwards started to crumble and African cities could not become the expected national engines of growth and development. Existing urban dwellers became poorer, while the flood of new arrivals from rural areas was desperately poor as well. In this manner, Africa's urbanization became a largely poverty-driven process.


Urban master planning for the rapidly expanding cities mostly failed, because these plans did not capture the speed of growth in peri-urban areas while they were also not backed up with infrastructural investments commensurate to this growth. With their capacities rendered inadequate, city managers soon fell behind demands for urban housing, social and physical infrastructures and urban livelihoods. The outcome was inevitable and identical among most cities across Africa: Continent-wide massive self-help urbanization dominated by uncontrolled informal and often illegal spatial developments and mushrooming numbers of poor urban dwellers without access to adequate housing or basic services like water, sanitation, electricity and roads, as illustrated by Figure 1.1.4 below.

FIGURE 1.1.4: DISTRIBUTION OF SLUM AND NON SLUM HOUSEHOLDS



Note: The data in figure 1.1.4 are based on the UN-HABITAT definitions of slums (a contiguous settlement where the inhabitants are characterized as having inadequate housing and basic services; a slum is often not recognized and addressed by public authorities as an integral part of the city) and slum households (a household that lacks one or more of the five elements: access to improved water; access to improved sanitation; security of tenure; durability of housing; and sufficient living area).

FIGURE 1.1.5: SLUM PREVALENCE IN AFRICA, 2005



	Country	Urban population 2005 (thousands)	Slum proportion 2005	Slum population (thousands)
<b>Highest prevalence: Top 5 countries</b>				
1	Sudan	14,771	94.2	13,914
2	Central African Republic	1,536	94.1	1,446
3	Chad	2,463	91.3	2,247
4	Angola	8,501	86.5	7,352
5	Guinea-Bissau	470	83.1	390
<b>Lowest prevalence: Bottom 5 countries</b>				
36	South Africa	28,119	28.7	8,077
37	Zimbabwe	4,667	18	239
38	Egypt	31,662	17	5,405
39	Morocco	18,469	13	2,422
40	Algeria	20,804	12	2,455

Source: UN-HABITAT Global Urban Observatory, 2008.

## Africa-wide Policy Recommendations

Attempts towards city-level analysis for the State of the African Cities 2008 made overwhelmingly clear that city data are close to non-existent in Africa. Without accurate local level data, it is difficult to recognize trends, assess urban processes and review urban conditions. Without accurate and reliable city-level data African urban managers are operating in an information and knowledge void. It is advisable that African governments undertake more concerted efforts to generate, collect and analyze accurate and reliable city-level data to better inform local and national decision-making processes.

As a result of the changing urban spatial patterns and configurations, urbanization is no longer a city-based process. For the larger cities in particular, urbanization patterns are rapidly shifting towards *regional* configurations. African governments and city managers need to act upon these new realities and view urbanization processes in regional rather than local contexts, aiming at nation-wide creation of a hierarchy of urban nodes with urban functions and roles assigned over this hierarchy of cities and towns, rather than concentrating them in the main city alone. Integrating cross-border regional economic growth models should be complemented with a shared approach to development at the city region level to eliminate duplication and mismatches between the plans and programmes of adjacent local authorities.

African governments are advised to take more proactive, strategic positions in promoting the role of African cities in the globalized economy. To this end, Africa needs to develop the trans-boundary economic, political and financial synergies of its cities to promote its urban cores as engines of regional, national and local growth and development.

With most of its rapid urban growth adding to the populations of its intermediate-size cities, Africa needs to focus on building capacity among its small and medium-sized cities to deliver and facilitate adequate housing, livelihoods and services for spiraling numbers of poor urban dwellers.

With Africa on the threshold of its urban age, strategic positioning should now be initiated to assure urban energy and food security, taking into account the different energy and food requirements of urban populations and the critical role of equitable access to land, water and livelihoods in sustainable human settlements development.

### The North Africa Region – Summary and Policy Recommendations

The North Africa region's urban population has passed 100 million and is projected to increase by over 80 million by 2030. Among the main challenges facing its cities is the provision of jobs, housing and community facilities required by a predominantly young urban population. Environmental considerations related to an arid environment, including water shortages and climate change are issues that must be addressed soon before they reach crisis proportions.

Algeria, Libya, Sudan and more recently Mauritania rely on their mineral resources. Other countries in the region are in the process of restructuring their economies to adapt to globalization. To capture a share of the knowledge-based economy of the 21st century, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have already initiated a shift to the services and high-tech sectors. This requires a two-pronged approach of imparting necessary skills to the workforce and creating conditions for development and job growth.

Given the region's historical, cultural, and environmental assets, tourism has always been considered a key service sector and continues to be a major generator of investments in commercial activities. Tourism, alone, however will not provide the robust economic base necessary to creating jobs for the 66 million North Africans under the age of 15, of whom roughly 60 percent will enter the labour force in the next two decades.

Although education policies have led to significant increases in average years of schooling, youth unemployment has increased over the past 10 years and is among the world's highest. As jobs requiring skilled labour - particularly in the information and communications technology sector - become more prevalent, equipping young entrants in the labour force with the skills required for employment is critical. Education systems should be strengthened in their ability to prepare students for the future job market. Increased options for microcredit and additional support to small and medium sized enterprises, specifically targeted toward youth, could provide vital opportunities for this segment of the population in the services sector.

All North African countries have made great strides in improving their cities and reducing the population living under slum conditions through a mix of upgrading and resettlement programmes. Most governments have been moving away from direct public housing construction and towards public-private partnerships. These initiatives have relied on providing private developers with tracts of serviced land at a reduced cost and requiring the construction of affordable units in large-scale mixed-income projects, including new towns. Public-private partnerships in housing provision should be reinforced by policies and measures designed to diversify housing options and introduce sustainable mortgage finance.

Housing finance systems in the North Africa region at present do not provide affordable borrowing conditions for limited-income households. At the same time, government-assisted programmes are too onerous to be sustainable. National policies are critical to enable cities to cope with their housing and urbanization challenges. Without a functional housing finance system accessible to limited-income families it will be difficult to envisage how the proliferation of informal settlements can be contained. Options of microcredit housing loans and credit enhancement schemes affordable to government and limited-income households should be more vigorously explored, as well as loan terms that can attract Islamic financial institutions.

North African cities have moved away from the periodic blanket legalization and regularization of violations of subdivision and building codes and a tolerance of encroachments on public space. Current policies still view regularization as the preferred option but give precedence to ensuring sustainable urbanization and improving the city's functional efficiency. When informal settlements encroach upon environmentally sensitive lands or public open space, adversely impact valuable archaeological sites, occupy strategically located areas in the urban fabric or pre-empt sites needed for public facilities, relocation into publicly provided housing or serviced sites should be the preferred option.

North African cities have to take into consideration the rapid appreciation of urban land prices and its adverse impact on housing affordability in the larger cities. Policies must be adopted to accelerate the release of public land and enact more flexible subdivision regulations to enable cities to modulate requirements, channel growth to desired locations and tailor them to fit specific local conditions. They should allow for a progressive upgrading of infrastructure as a mechanism to increase the supply of building plots and to divert demand away from informal subdivisions. More attention should be given to promoting the private rental sector as a solution to housing the urban poor.

Primarily desert, North Africa suffers from limited supplies of fresh water. Population increase, agriculture, and increasing wealth are putting higher demands on water resources. Egypt only has 25 m<sup>3</sup> of renewable internal fresh water per capita compared to 9,443 m<sup>3</sup> in the United States. As a result of high usage, the Nile is almost drained dry before it reaches the Mediterranean Sea. Water conservation is of critical importance to ensuring that cities have the water supply they need to remain engines of economic growth. There has been a growing urban demand for water resulting from population growth and water and sewer connections. While pricing may be an effective means of rationing consumption, access to safe water is widely viewed in the area as a basic human right. While recognizing the critical importance of water conservation, the supply of safe urban water needs to be increased rapidly to meet basic consumption and health requirements. In urban areas, water system losses should be remedied by repair of system leakages and by collecting, treating, and reusing household grey-water and storm-water for industrial or agricultural purposes.

Many North African cities are in or arriving at a state of transportation crisis. In the larger cities, congestion and pollution have reached levels that start to impair cities' functional efficiency. As cities continue to expand and as wealth grows, roads become more congested despite the pace of highway construction. To discourage a rapid increase in congestion, governments should invest in efficient public transport starting with cost-effective rapid bus systems on dedicated lanes, expand the network to reach the urban periphery and improve non-vehicular systems: sidewalks and bicycle paths/lanes. Off-street parking for all city centre buildings should become mandatory and on-street parking regulations should be strictly enforced to reduce congestion.

Decentralization laws have been in place for several decades but, throughout the North Africa region, urban planning and administration is still primarily centralized. The relative lack of autonomous financial resources compared to need has hindered local initiatives. Despite growing powers of provincial governors and mayors of large cities, important local-level decisions should be more systematically decentralized to the local level. Functional devolution could also be more holistically applied to fiscal decentralization. Although all major cities in North Africa have taken measures to streamline cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, processes toward the use of information and communication technology to build geographic and statistical databases and improve the delivery of public services need to be sped up. Significant efforts have also been made to encourage the participation of civil society and the activities of non-governmental organizations. Community development associations at the neighbourhood level are emerging and becoming significant partners in developing and implementing community-based initiatives, often with the support of national and local NGOs.

## **The West and Central Africa Region – Summary and Policy Recommendations**

The evolving cities of West and Central Africa are mostly unplanned and haphazard spatial entities consisting of informal settlements and mega-slums. The grim woes of its emerging cities are compounded by worsening national/regional macro-economic performance and the impacts of global environmental change. The moral and political responsibilities lie with the governments – individually and as a regional group. With appalling poverty extending to a majority of their urban populations, West and Central African politicians at all levels should start mustering the will to redress the region's ugly urban, urban-economic and urban-social trends. There is urgent need to create better living environments for the millions of poor urban dwellers and to confront the pervasive problems of mismanagement. Corrupt practices have so deeply entrenched themselves in the societal fabric that they are, possibly, the single-most important blockage to equitable social, economic and political development in several countries.

The rapid growth rates of urban agglomerations and the lagging response by governments have been associated with significantly increasing urban poverty, problematic urban environments and ever more complex urban management issues, including uncontrolled growth of urban informal settlements, prevalence of substandard and overcrowded urban housing, inadequate basic urban services and infrastructure provision, declining urban livelihood options, frequent civil unrest, and infectious diseases and crime. Apart from the odd exception, West and Central African cities and urban agglomerations have become centers of urban squalor, aggravated poverty and human misery. They are rapidly becoming social hot-beds and breeding grounds for unrest and political risk.

Upgrading of underserved areas should be a key investment area, including the use of basic city management and monitoring technologies. Interventions should support people's livelihoods and endeavour to maximise involvement of all stakeholders, including households, civic associations, business and the public sector.

The 2007 overall urbanization rate of the West and Central Africa region was 41.7 percent. Seven of its 25 nations had more than half their population living in urban areas. This number will have doubled by 2030. The West African sub-region is projected to have an urban majority just before 2020, while Central Africa may reach that stage by 2025. In 2007, 21 cities in the region exceeded one million inhabitants, six of these were in Nigeria and three in the DRC. In 2010, the region will host 25 cities larger than one million.

Persistently very high urban growth rates are foreseen for Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger, currently the region's least urbanized nations. Ouagadougou is projected to more than double its 2005 population by 2020. Other very rapidly growing large cities include Lubumbashi, Kinshasa and Mbuji-Mayi in the DRC, which all three will double their 2005 populations by 2020. Kinshasa's growth is nothing less than worrisome: from 7.7 million in 2005 to a projected 13.8 million by 2020 – in merely 15 years the urban agglomeration will have to cater for an additional 6.1 million urban dwellers.

By 2025, Kinshasa will be the world's 11th largest urban agglomerations, surpassing the population size of both Lagos and Cairo.

Unless carefully managed, the urban transition in West and Central Africa could have seriously adverse implications for the regional economy, the environment and social stability. Most of the nations have unbalanced population concentrations and experience rapid urbanization without effective physical planning, development control and urban social policy. Lagos and Kinshasa are classic examples, combining haphazard, uncontrolled and unrestrained population and spatial growth with few additional housing, infrastructures, services and livelihood opportunities. The region's urbanization is driven by demographic forces and perceived availability of urban livelihoods rather than by significant broad-based economic progress and urban livelihood creation. Despite the relative expansion of economic activity, the cities are becoming increasingly dysfunctional in terms of access to key resources and livelihoods for its urban dwellers. Social unrest and violence could be the outcome of these poorly functioning cities. The region's governments should pay closer attention to the relationships and impacts of spatial policy or the lack thereof. Separating spatial policy from other macro-level interventions - and from social policy in particular - is no longer an option the region can afford.



▲ Water supply in Cape Verde : public fountain  
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Contrary to public perception, the region's city growth is no longer mostly due to rural-urban migration but now largely based on natural growth and *in-situ* urbanization (the absorption of smaller satellite settlements in the spatial growth of the larger neighbouring city). New urban configurations have started to emerge with traditional city-based urbanization shifting to region-based spatial patterns. These new urban models account for much larger urban geographies and sharply increasing inequality, social fragmentation and socio-spatial segregation. Inter- and intra-urban differentials are becoming more pronounced as urban neighbourhoods get polarised and separated from their surroundings. The 'fragmented city' enforces separation and generates irreconcilable spatial, social, economic and political contradictions. It has a distinct spatial dimension because people with similar socio-economic characteristics tend to cluster together. This social and physical fragmentation is evident in settlements of all sizes. To correct this precarious situation, there is need for politicians and city managers to look inward, towards improving affordable and adequate housing and basic facilities and services delivery. The modalities most likely to achieve these aims are political inclusiveness, participation and local prioritization for more responsive interventions through public-private-community partnerships. But intra- and inter-city inequalities are hard to reduce because of the overwhelming force of the underlying economy and politics. Empirical evidence shows that similar levels of overall national development can still give rise to significant spatial inequality. This means that there is room for intervention through social and economic policy. With urban water and sanitation supply probably the most important factor in poverty and inequality reduction it is recommended that the governments of West and Central Africa undertake to improve equality in urban areas through more widespread access to improved water and sanitation.

Many West and Central African cities show declining school enrolment rates – particularly among female children in slum areas. Overall, this is not the result of low willingness to pay for education but rather of income deterioration among slum households. Gender inequalities must be tackled if the Millennium Development Goals are to be achieved. West and Central African governments should undertake more systematic efforts to support education in slums areas, notably for girls, and in this manner help reduce the social impacts of unequal access to jobs. Comprehensive social gender policy is also needed to protect the vast numbers of women engaged in the informal sector who require support as the survival mainstay for millions of poor urban households. Social policy should focus on micro-credit and market place development in slums to assist poor urban females in sustaining their economic activities. This will not only benefit them but also the children that often accompany them at their places of work.

Policymakers should resist the traditional view of 'rural' and 'urban' as separate. Rural and urban areas have become more interlinked than ever before. There is a growing proportion of

urban to rural migration with return migration no longer just concerning the elderly and retired. Increasingly, unemployed urban youths are seeking livelihoods in rural areas or small towns as many urban households would be unable to sustain themselves without rural linkages. It is recommended that governments facilitate and encourage rural-urban linkages for nation-wide diffusion of urban norms. Improving the attractiveness of smaller cities by stimulating urban services in smaller settlements is important as it will contribute to reducing growth pressures on primate and other large cities.

In the first decade of the 21st century, urban poverty could become the region's most important social issue. Today, more than 50 percent of all West and Central African urban dwellers live in poverty. The region's cities are rapidly becoming social hot-beds, breeding ground for unrest and significant political risk. Very large shares of the population experience at least one shelter deprivation: Niger 96.2 percent, Sierra Leone 95.8 percent, Guinea Bissau 93.4 percent, Mali 93.2 percent, Benin 83.6 percent and Togo 80.6 percent. Liberia stands out as the 'better' performer but still with a significant 55.7 percent of its households suffering slum conditions.

Although there is increasing private sector interest in housing production, market-driven housing delivery unequivocally favours higher-income groups. Private sector-produced housing does little for average household. The region's government should urgently focus on addressing the lack of access to shelter and service of their poor urban majorities. Addressing inequality in access to housing credit is essential to making inroads into the appallingly high number of people that suffer shelter deprivations.

The fast expansion of urban populations has caused rapid increases in the demand for urban land. Urban plots cannot easily be reproduced or have the demand met by converting rural land at the urban periphery. As a result, land prices rise sharply and land becomes increasingly unaffordable to the urban poor. Because of the strategic importance of land, the prevailing land tenure systems and because land markets are not serving the needs of the urban poor, governmental interventions - both directly and indirectly - are critical to broadening access to land beyond those who can afford the open market prices. Land policy is an important tool in modifying land markets in the interest of national development, and particularly as an instrument for achieving greater equity and social justice. Local authorities, within their ideological and political confines, can moderate the land market to achieve specific planning and spatial aims or improve accessibility to urban land for a broad range of stakeholders, including low-income households and slum dwellers.

In the absence of equitable land allocation in a market-driven environment, low-income households' limited financial capacities force them to solve their shelter and livelihood problems informally. Given their vast numbers, poor urban dwellers are now the dominant market sector. They transform the city to meet their needs in manners that are often in conflict with laws and urban development plans.



This creates frictions between the city administration and the inhabitants of informal housing developments. In response, many central and local governments reverted to forced eviction and demolition of buildings, citing non-compliance with planning standards, development plans and lack of documentation as proof of illegal tenure status. But the poor should not be punished for the systemic failure of urban governance. Instead, governance systems and approaches - not the informal housing solutions dictated by market forces - are in need of review and change. Governments and local authorities should work with, rather than against the urban poor. This includes dialogue, political inclusion, review of informal processes and procedures to elicit ways of forging cooperation between the formal and informal sectors and identification of workable modalities that generate mutual benefit.

Every nation in the region suffers from environmental ills. Wind erosion blows away the Savannah north. The coast washes away into the ocean. Other environmental problems include floods, untreated sewage, bush burning, oil spillages, air pollution and irresponsible waste disposal. Environmentally conscious and aware cities are proactive rather than reactive to the environmental problems they generate. There can be no enduring development unless there is sustainable urbanization. There can be no socio-economic development and sustainability in any situation where a majority of the urban population lives in poverty and lacking basic services. There is hardly a city in West and Central Africa where water and electricity supply are dependable. The provision of basic services remains the yardstick of urban environmental action.

Urban infrastructure provision and development are the key components of proactive environmental approaches. Unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene account for about six percent of the disease burden in the region. In terms of services Lagos, Kano and Ibadan rank among the region's most deficient cities. Only three percent of the Ibadan residents has access to piped water. Greater Lagos does not do much better, servicing only nine percent of its 10 million people. These are abysmally low rates, not only in absolute terms but also relatively if compared with Accra's 51.6 and Abidjan's 70.9 percent of the urban population served with piped water.

Poverty is central to the human settlement sector as housing and services have become market commodities with access determined by the ability to pay market prices. With piped water and improved sanitation economic rather than a social goods, they have gradually ceased to be the responsibility of urban managers. There is need for the region's governments and local authorities to start perceiving access to improved water and sanitation as a social good, a human right and an essential commodity for human health rather than marketable commodities.

Successive governments in West African countries have shown much concern for transport planning and development. Increasing road networks notwithstanding, transport is in a

poor state due to insufficient infrastructure maintenance. Few roads are tarred and many are in a poor condition. This is surprising given the region's acute dependence on road-based transportation. The region's governments are advised to rapidly improve the extent and quality of their road networks and simultaneously explore non-road based transportation options to reduce road traffic congestion and road-based freight transportation.

Many of the region's cities face high risk from climate change impacts. Vulnerabilities are heightened by the poor quality of housing, infrastructure, drainage and sea defences. Low levels of disaster preparation will cause preventable loss of human lives if disaster strikes. The realities of climate change are evident in several West African cities where flooding has become more frequent, intense and occurring in locations previously not at risk. The region's governments and local authorities should establish post-disaster management arrangements to reduce loss of life in the disasters. Even modest arrangements will have beneficial impacts.

Water and food supply insecurity, especially for large cities is looming large. At least 14 African nations are already facing water stress or scarcity and many more will start experiencing water and food stresses over the next decades. Agricultural lands are rapidly disappearing, particularly in the northern sections of the region. Water resources are becoming more and more scarce. It should be recognized that urban populations have different feeding patterns, use different food stuffs and tend to move away from traditional (rural) food preparation processes. Governments should take steps to conserve and better manage water supply and demand. Strategic positioning is required to assure future urban water and food security for rapidly increasing numbers of urban dwellers. Systemic losses in water supply systems should be addressed so that new and additional water sources can be better and more efficiently utilized for human consumption and agricultural purposes.

Urban governance in Nigeria cannot be fully understood without reference to the three principal levels of power: the local, the state and the federal government. Each of these levels intervenes more or less directly in urban management. Local governments, although saddled with urban governance responsibilities, have never had much autonomy. Reforms have been initiated but the states maintain their holds on local authorities. Local government ability to generate revenue has collapsed, increasing their dependence and reducing their capacities to face the challenges of run-away urbanization, while lack of co-ordination increases the difficulties of urban management. Several of the region's national governments should acknowledge the failure of their 'state-only' and 'market-only' approaches to urban management and act more proactively on shifts towards participatory management that help create ownership over decision-making and daily management practices. This requires, among others, a careful review of current land, housing and services provision practices that govern urban management in the context of much wider spatial, social and economic policies and strategies.

## The East Africa Region – Summary and Policy Recommendations

In 2007, East Africa was by far the least-urbanized region of Africa. Its total 2007 population was 247.2 million, projected to grow to 268 million by 2010 and 422.3 million people by 2030. Except for Tanzania, all nations have fertility rates higher than the African average of 4.71. Eritrea, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia have very high population growth rates, which, apart from Somalia, are explained by significant flows of returning refugees and which should therefore be a temporary phenomenon.

The region's 2007 urban population amounted to only 52.6 million (20.5 percent of the total population). It is expected to increase to 74.6 million by 2015 and 131.5 million in 2030. This means that between 2007 and 2030 the number of urban dwellers in the region will grow with a factor 2.5. The East Africa region will double its 2007 urban population around 2025 – in merely 17 years – and it is clear that urban growth has started to generate social, economic and spatial issues that need to be urgently addressed.

In descending order, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Antananarivo, Kampala and Mogadishu will remain the region's largest cities in the foreseeable future. Urban primacy will clearly remain high all over East Africa, with capital and port cities disproportionately large. In 2007, 22.5 percent of Ethiopia's total urban population lived in Addis Ababa and the city was more than ten times larger than the second largest city. Nairobi holds 37.7 percent of all Kenyan urban dwellers and is 3.7 times the size of Mombasa. Antananarivo's 1.69 million is 8.5 times the second largest city in Madagascar. Mogadishu holds 46.2 percent of all urban Somalis, Kampala 35.9 percent and Dar es Salaam 29 percent, Kigali 48.6 percent and Asmara 64.0 percent respectively of their nation's urban dwellers. These figures indicate the magnitude of region-wide urban primacy and lack of balanced national urban hierarchies. The good news, however, is that a region-wide 66.1 percent of the urban dwellers lives in intermediate and smaller towns that are now the most rapidly growing settlements. East African governments should strongly promote urbanization in intermediate size towns (<500,000). This requires significant assistance to small-city managers to enable these smaller settlements to absorb the projected growth. East African governments need to force a break in the historic patterns of persistent and significant urban primacy and geographically uneven social and economic development. Relocation of decentralized functions to medium-sized towns can be helpful in this process.

East African urbanization is a poverty-driven economic survival strategy. With urban populations growing significantly faster than the urban economies, between one-third and two-thirds of the people in East African cities now experiences at least one shelter deprivation. Sixty-nine percent of all households in Addis Ababa and 65 percent in Dar es Salaam are slum households. In Kigali and Kampala the share is about half, while Nairobi has a proportion of about 50 percent of its

population experiencing one or more shelter deprivations.

In East Africa, urban poverty is not primarily a function of urban expansion or a sign of the failure of urban economies. It relates to *systemic* institutional failures that perpetuate social exclusion and inequalities between the urban poor and rich. Urban agglomerations of scale have not been optimally utilized. Scarce political will in East Africa is today's main obstacle to reducing urban poverty and escalating urban slum proliferation is the inevitable outcome.

The growth, proliferation and persistence of urban slums in East Africa are caused and sustained by: (a) lack of urban land and planning policy; (b) unrealistic construction standards and regulations; (c) private sector housing mostly catering for high- and middle-income groups; (d) lack of strategic positioning by governments and local authorities; (e) lack of public infrastructure; and (f) the politicizing of informal settlements and social housing in party lines, current in election years and forgotten as soon as the ballot count is completed.

Slum interventions have had mixed results due to the persistence of exclusion of target groups; failure to recognize low-income households' ability and willingness to pay; untargeted subsidies; housing down-raiding and gentrification; frequent persistence of non-participatory approaches; lack of focus on the well-being of target households; inadequate partnerships, networking and coordination; upgrading non replicability; and top-down and unsustainable approaches. Effective strategies aimed at improving shelter conditions, especially for lower-income groups, cannot be divorced from overall poverty alleviation and social and political inclusion.

Attention to rural-urban synergies is essential to better understanding why and where East African cities are growing. Many urban migrants maintain close relations with their rural homes with return and circular migration patterns becoming more and more important as a cost-cutting measure. The rapidly rising costs of urban living – and the cost of urban food in particular – combined with better small town access to services, may be factors in return decisions. East African Governments should strengthen the attractiveness of secondary and smaller cities through enhanced services and, as an extension, attract populations to these smaller settlements.

Most cities in East Africa suffer frequent water supply interruptions. Kampala is particularly deeply lagging in piped water connections. In Addis Ababa and Nairobi, piped water is mostly provided but with varying quality of service delivery and overall water shortages continue to plague these cities. Urban water and food security are becoming important factors that may dictate the very feasibility of the region's cities in the very near future.

Septic tanks and other low-tech sanitation solutions may be considered 'improved sanitation' but are not sustainable in densely populated urban areas. Provision of appropriate urban sewerage systems in line with urban demands and human waste generation is required in many areas.



▲  
Moshi, Tanzania  
©Maciej Dakowicz

Most cities in East Africa suffer from lack of or severely limited mobility, or mobility at high social and economic costs. Increasing traffic volumes, even as some roads have been improved, continue to worsen travel conditions because road improvements do not keep track with rising private vehicle ownership. As long as there are no concerted and effective efforts to improve public mass-transportation, the cities in East Africa will get stranded in traffic congestion, pollution and rising traffic fatalities. The larger cities should consider options that reduce the heavy reliance of their populations on private cars. Urban bus fleets need to be expanded, routes increased and dedicated urban lanes created at the expense of road space for private vehicles. To reduce urban private car dependency, traffic management policies need to capture the mobility demands of the middle- and higher-income groups as these generate the highest urban private vehicle use rates.

Most East African nations entered independence without formulating a national urban policy serving the needs of the emerging new nation state. Rapid post-independence urban growth was mostly addressed through inward-looking local, master plans without any investment perspective. These plans failed to influence the speed and direction of peri-urban growth. Investment decisions on urban infrastructure, social housing and the spatial aspects of urban economic development soon started to contradict the spatial realities of the urban growth actually taking place. With East African cities increasingly spilling over their boundaries, encroaching on other municipalities' and counties' territories, the need for area-wide governance is becoming a matter of great urgency. Metropolitan governance is essential to coordinating and aligning the economic, social and

spatial agendas of the local authorities that co-exist within the region's greater metropolitan regions. The emerging regional character of all larger cities leaves no sustainable alternative to region-wide visions, coordination and spatial interventions.

Most of the region's central governments and local authorities claim to embrace good governance, public participation and public-private partnerships. Nevertheless, true decentralization of powers and resources to the local authorities and participatory urban decision-making is not yet put into effect. Local government reform takes a long time to achieve. Mistakes and setbacks are inevitable and the challenge is to use failures as learning opportunities, rather than excuses for abolishing reforms. Deep reforms are still required to ensure: (a) local autonomy from central government; (b) institutionalization of real citizen participation; (c) capacity-building among councilors and chief officers; and (d) direct election of Mayors by residents to make the function less vulnerable to political manipulation.

There is need for East African governments to start recognizing the roles that informal land markets currently play as the main supplier of residential land for the urban poor. Community-based structures are now increasingly filling governance voids in land provision and adjudication in the region's large cities. Cooperation between the public sector and the informal community-based land supply systems can be beneficial. It will take away an administrative burden from already stressed local authority capacity. With recognition of and support to community-based land management, the public sector can possibly get more grip on urban spatial developments than is currently the case.

## The Southern Africa Region – Summary and Policy Recommendations

The Southern Africa region is rife with contradictory land development and population changes. Its cities share a common colonial heritage of ethnic segregation and exclusion wherein the majority of the indigenous populations were denied citizenship and were regarded as sojourners in the city only there to provide their labour. Globalization and structural adjustment policies since the 1980s have exacerbated rather than helped reducing these inherited inequalities and have made decent work and livelihoods harder to realize. Integrating the lives of citizens through legislated ‘one city concept strategies’ or integrated development plans and local government systems remains a major policy sphere for addressing these issues. Despite favourable economic growth the gap between the rich and poor has worsened with the Gini-coefficient in South Africa rising from 0.596 to 0.635 between 1995 and 2001 and urban Gini-coefficients as high as 0.7 in some cities. No comprehensive policy has been formulated to integrate international migrants in Southern African cities. Migrants are simply perceived as temporary residents and therefore not considered a policy issue.

Land is a highly political issue, central to urban economies and livelihoods, and a political patronage resource in the region. Policy interventions should take a cautious approach sensitive to local cultures and identities. Research can be a powerful tool in understanding local dynamics and clarification of policy. Land rights are still in transition and peri-urban areas are the zones of rapid change and the highest levels of conflict. There is need to review the impacts of policy on fast-track land reforms in urban and peri-urban land, such as in Zimbabwe. Policies are needed that protect peri-urban agricultural land, land rights and livelihoods of the poor from globalization-induced urban expansion.

Experience confirms over and over again that policies targeted at the very poor only do not work. The region needs urban land policies that also help the current middle and lower-middle classes to counter housing down-raiding, area gentrification and to prevent that the not-poor do end up poor as well.

Countries in the region are struggling to implement new laws and policies because of limited technical, financial and institutional capacities and frequent misinterpretations of the law. There are powerful interests in favour of maintaining inequitable access to land, while political will (and therefore the ability to tackle this) is generally absent. Dependence on international donors or NGOs to fund and design land policies frequently undermines local popular ownership as these interventions lead to designs that may look good on paper but which are not implementable in practice.

Rights-based approaches are marginal to the practice of urban development and management in Southern Africa with evictions a common occurrence. Mobilising resources for housing development is the most challenging aspect in addressing urban poverty compared to other basic needs. Availability and access to land remains the major obstacle to

alleviating housing poverty and frustrates the work of the few NGOs seeking to contribute to the housing delivery process. To improve local government finances, governments should strengthen the institutions of land delivery and management, including the maintenance and updating of land valuation rolls that are central to healthy local government finance.

Mobility and population change in the Southern Africa region need to be better integrated in the planning of urban economies. Skilled and unskilled individuals participate in stepwise, onward and circular migration with cities acting simultaneously as hosts and senders of rural-urban, national and regional migrants. Mobility and circular migration are a key livelihood strategy for the poor and elites alike. Governments need to speed up implementation of policies that accommodate cross-border economic integration and livelihoods of ordinary citizens. At the city level, urban policies and practice should cease to stigmatize migrants or treat black Africans as sojourners in the city whose identity and citizenship remains rural. More accurate and updated information is needed to make ‘planning for population change’ more central to local governments’ and urban stakeholders’ programmes. Involving youth (half the population of Southern Africa is of age sixteen years and below) is a key aspect missing in existing programmes. This planning should fully incorporate development implications of the region’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of between 20 and 30 percent, a growing population of widows and orphans (children who have lost either one or both parents – with, for instance, 76,000 of them in Johannesburg, 21,000 in Cape Town).

Cities such as Cape Town and Johannesburg should be applauded for their efforts to integrate economics, resources and budgeting in their development plans when compared to cities where the strategic plans basically remain land-use plans devoid of economic and financial content. However, even in South Africa, greater integration is needed between spatial planning and economic planning to provide resources to urban economic development programmes. Further, the debate on pro-global growth versus pro-poor growth that remains contentious in Southern African cities could yield better practical outcomes. Cities should simultaneously seek growth from within and outside the region, rather than from global spheres alone. There is need to think regionally and improve cross-frontier multi-nodal, multi agency planning for integrating spatial, utility and economic planning. Integrating cross-border regional economic growth models should be complemented with a shared approach to development at the city region level to eliminate duplication and mismatches between the plans and programmes of adjacent local authorities.

Lack of regional data is a major weakness in urban policy in all city regions leading to failure to identify common opportunities. Collaboration and partnership initiatives



▲ A precious commodity flows in abundance, despite water shortage in the area in the past, Arusha, Tanzania 2008.  
©Julius Mwelu/IRIN

are urgently needed across local authorities and borders in regional resource exploitation, investment, infrastructures (water, hydro-electric power, roads) data collection and analysis, planning and policy.

City authorities are consumers of services and goods worth billions of dollars. This is their local authority dividend. They can use this dividend to mainstream sustainable development policies and do business with enterprises that pursue goals and targets in key policy areas: citizen participation in daily provision of goods and services, tackling poverty, HIV/AIDS, climate and population change.

Citizen involvement in urban policy and management remains a highly contested theme and has to be understood as part of the broader national and regional political transitions. There is a governance deficit in all Southern African cities due to tense centre-local relations, rigid patrimonial institutional cultures, citizens lacking trust in the authorities, and lack of capacity within local authorities and civil society. Weak electoral mandates are glaring in urban areas where the ruling parties at the national level no longer have a majority of elected urban councilors. As a result, in cities like Cape Town, Harare and Lusaka, the Presidents of the respective countries will be in 'foreign political territory'.

Many of the region's ruling political parties appear to believe that their mandates at the national level absolves them from promoting citizen involvement at local level. For achieving stable, accountable and representative local governments, there is no option but to pursue decentralization policies, including promoting offices of elected executive mayors for the region's cities. At the same time, the vibrant civic movements dominant on the eve of majority rule have lost their intellectual leaders to the civil service, leaving weakened

constituencies to confront confident, resourced and powerful global corporations. At the local level, lack of expertise remains a major problem, while only a few cities have been financially audited in recent years.

The climate change adaptation policy agenda should not be parallel or in competition for resources with ongoing and traditional development and poverty alleviation programmes. Climate change adaptation interventions should be assessed for their direct contribution to poverty reduction and be mainstreamed into these programmes. Planning for climate change in Southern African cities needs to be integrated at both the national and regional level focusing on priorities like urban water.

Upgrading of climate change monitoring systems and expertise and their broadening into underserved areas should be a key investment area, including the use of basic city management and monitoring technologies such as geographical information systems. Adaptations should be linked to people's livelihoods and endeavour to maximise involvement of all stakeholders, including households, civic associations, business and the public sector.

Urban water use is a link to climate change and floods. Local authorities could use their local authority dividend to encourage policy reform. But rather than keeping regulation as a development control measure, the impact data should also be uploaded by the strategic planning sections of the municipality for monitoring purposes; design of adaptation strategies; and management of the water supply chain. Water engineers, urban planners, investors, developers, climatologists, politicians and communities need to forge new partnerships around climate change adaptations especially with regard to water availability and use in Southern Africa.

## African cities at risk (1)



▲  
Downtown Cairo  
©David Peta/Shutterstock

As they grow, African cities become increasingly vulnerable to disasters. Vulnerability is the combination of socio-economic, physical and environmental conditions that determine whether and to what extent a hazardous incident turns into a disaster. Key risk enhancing factors are geographic location and city size. With progressing urbanization, losses resulting from catastrophes are increasingly dominated by large urban agglomerations. Every large urban system is predestined to suffer a major disaster at some point in time because:

- large cities are often both 'victim and culprit' and *reinforce* hazards from within;
- urban components' integrated nature assures that calamities affect many people and businesses;
- proximity to industrial areas makes it difficult to limit the impacts of technological accidents;
- the risk of an urban disaster is the outcome of hazard multiplication and mutual reinforcement.

Hazards come in three broad categories: (i) natural hazards; (ii) hazards amplified by a negative interaction between human interventions and nature; and (iii) human-made hazards.

Natural hazards (floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, droughts, tsunamis etc.) occur without human intervention and cannot be avoided. But proactive attitudes *can* reduce vulnerability by preparing for, adjusting to and mitigating the

events' impacts through evasion, organization or technical measures.

Hazards emerging from the interplay of natural forces and human activity include, for instance, landslides resulting from particular land uses or climate change-related hazards. Acknowledging the impacts of human actions and redress interventions can help in reducing this type of risk. Human-made hazards include technological accidents, crime, political instability, terrorism, armed conflict and civil strife, but also risk resulting from poorly managed wastes and sewage.

Obviously, these hazards are most responsive to change of action, legislation, relocation and policy actions.

Two key factors presently prevent adequate disaster management for large and mega cities:

- Lack of awareness and uncertainty about risk recognition. This often leads to decidedly lower threat perception than the actual risk. The relative absence of truly 'huge' disasters encourages widespread insensitivity to genuine risk; and
- Lack of disaster preparedness, including a lack of capacity to enforce building codes and other safety legislations, and lack of established post-disaster management arrangements.

Both factors are, worldwide, exacerbated by limited political and fiscal commitment to risk reduction, except, ironically, in areas most recently devastated by major natural disasters.

As African cities are becoming more numerous and larger, urban managers should start thinking about the true vulnerability of their urban populations and how to minimize their risk. For example, high-rise construction is proliferating in African cities, but how many municipalities have the equipment or know how to fight fire outbreaks that occur above the 5th floor level? Which African municipalities have established a functional crisis team for managing the inevitable chaos after calamitous urban events? Which African municipalities have functional arrangements for post-calamity medical provisions, expanding the number of hospital beds, providing emergency shelter and services, or managing crowd control? How many African cities have capacity for ensuring full compliance with or enforcement of adequate building regulations?

But even modest efforts towards risk identification, disaster preparedness and post-calamity management can significantly reduce the number of fatalities and economic damage from hazardous events and the often equally disastrous secondary effects in their wake. African cities must prepare for their vulnerabilities.

The following resources for information and assistance on urban disaster prevention, mitigation and management are available:

- <http://www.emi-megacities.org/>;
- <http://www.worldbank.org/hazards/index.htm>;
- <http://www.unisdr.org/>;
- <http://www.hews.org/>;
- <http://www.wbidm.org/>;
- <http://www.munichre.com>

Sources: *Megacities – Megarisks: Trends and Challenges for Insurance and Risk Management*, München, 2004, pp. 1-34, and *Risk Habitat Megacity, Concept for a Helmholtz Research Programme 2005-2013*.

## African cities at risk (2)

### Seismic Hazards

Africa should prepare for major volcanic and seismic activity during the 21st century. The continent has experienced over 50 serious earthquakes between 1980 and 2002 alone, resulting in over 23,000 deaths and unquantified economic losses. Large seismic fault zones include a 6,000 km rift from Lebanon to South Africa and the entire Mediterranean coast, while some West and Central African nations are known seismic risks areas too. Several large African cities face 'low-moderate' to 'high-moderate' seismic risk. They include Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Accra, Alexandria, Algiers, Bangui, Cairo, Casablanca, Dar es Salaam, Libreville, Nairobi, Rabat, Tripoli and Tunis, among others. Settlements in the Great Rift Valley and towns along Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika face high seismic risk.

An earthquake in Morocco in February 2004 left 600 dead and 30,000 homeless, while a similar event in 1960 saw 12,000 fatalities. Algeria suffered an earthquake in May 2003, with 538 deaths and 4,600 wounded; the worst earthquake since October 1980 when 2,500 Algerians lost their lives. In 1939, Accra experienced a massive earthquake and Accra's seismic activity is believed to be continuing with an approximately 50-year recurrence of magnitude 6 or more earthquakes. The time lapse since the last earthquake gives ground for deep concern that soon a major earthquake may hit

the present three million inhabitant metropolis. Nairobi, at 'low-moderate' to 'moderate' seismic risk, experienced a series of tremors in 2007 and although there were no fatalities, the event is a warning not to be ignored.

Whereas many African nations' building codes prescribe earthquake-resistant construction, their application is often problematic. With chilling regularity African newspapers report on the spontaneous collapse of multi-storey buildings due to substandard construction practices and corrupt approval and oversight procedures. The frequency of such spontaneous collapses indicates that any large African city struck by major seismic movements will experience devastating human and economic losses.

It is only a matter of time before a major earthquake hits one of Africa's larger urban centers.

### Sea Level Rise and Flooding

Low elevation coastal zones (LECZ) - coastal areas less than 10 metres above sea level - contain 10 percent of the world's population and 13 percent of its urban dwellers in 3,351 cities. They include our largest urban systems and all major seaports vital to the global economy. Many of these coastal areas are exposed to surge flooding and, with sea level rise, the urban populations of many river deltas will join the areas most exposed.

Coastal towns are Africa's most developed urban areas. They constitute 15 percent of the world's LECZ cities and host 11.5 percent of Africa's total urban population. African coastal cities vulnerable to the impacts of sea level rise include Abidjan, Accra, Alexandria, Algiers, Cape Town, Casablanca, Dakar, Dar es Salaam, Djibouti, Durban, Freetown, Lagos, Libreville, Lomé, Luanda, Maputo, Mombasa, Port Louis, and Tunis among many others, including smaller towns.

African cities will be among those most adversely affected by rising sea levels. Lack of adequate drainage, embankments and preparedness, but also Africa's much denser population distribution in LECZs all collude to portend devastating consequences in the case of storm or tsunami-induced surge flooding.

### Technological Hazards

Major technological incidents in Africa are mostly quite recent occurrences because these hazards increase with advancing industrialization and urbanization. Residents of large cities are most at risk. From 2000 to 2008, 205 recorded major technology-related accidents in Nigeria claimed 7,561 lives, of which 2,155 were in the Greater Lagos Metro Area. With Africa's increasing urbanization and industrialization, calamities of technological, transportation and industrial origin are becoming a statistical certainty with the large and mega cities at significantly higher risk.

### Urban Crime

Urban crime and violence is an issue worldwide. From 1990 to 2000, global violent crime increased from 6 to 8.8 incidents per 100,000 persons and since 2002, 60 percent of all urban residents in developing and transition countries have been victims of crime, with 70 percent in Latin America and Africa. The highest homicide rates are found in developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Urban crime and violence is now the first threat to security in African towns. In 2000, 30 percent of Johannesburg's residents reported to have been a victim of robbery. In recent years, African city authorities have made tremendous efforts to improve urban safety and security through people-oriented and participatory urban safety approaches.



▲ Flooding in Liberia  
©Alain Grimard

Sources: [www.munichre.com](http://www.munichre.com); [www.em-dat.net/disasters/](http://www.em-dat.net/disasters/); [www.reliefweb.int/rw/](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/); Low coastal zone settlements, G. McGranahan, D. Balk and B. Anderson, in *Tiempo*, 59, April 2006.

## African cities at risk (3)



▲  
Alexandria Bridge, Egypt.  
©Morozova Oksana/Shutterstock

### Early Recovery Model: The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF)

Since June 2007, the island states of the Caribbean have had access to regional insurance coverage against natural catastrophe-induced government losses. Following the terrible damage to the Caribbean wreaked by the 2004 hurricane season, the World Bank, in cooperation with global insurance brokers, developed the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF). Under the CCRIF, Caribbean nations can select various degrees of protection and insure themselves against hurricane and/or earthquake losses. Annual premiums vary from US\$200,000 to \$5 million for payouts from US\$1 million to \$100 million. Annual losses up to US\$ 10 million are carried by the CCRIF itself. Additional cover of US\$100 to 150 million is placed on the reinsurance and capital markets (depending on the profile of the underlying portfolio.) In its early stages, a degree of participant and donor support

in capitalising the Facility has been essential to ensuring the CCRIF's financial viability and long-term sustainability.

The innovative aspect of the CCRIF is the threshold 'parametric trigger'. If a natural disaster exceeds a pre-defined threshold level - measured in terms of wind speed in the case of hurricanes or ground acceleration in the case of earthquakes - the affected countries receive immediate payment of a percentage of the estimated losses sustained (the percentage being decided by countries and affecting the annual premium they must pay) once the requisite independent readings have been verified. This occurs typically within days and therefore helps overcome the national liquidity crunch that usually follows a major disaster. The rapid payment allows for expedient post-disaster repairs and gives governments additional time to raise further funds for intermediate-term and longer-term


recovery activities. In the first operational year the CCRIF parametric trigger was activated when an earthquake hit the islands St. Lucia and Dominica. Cash transfers in full settlement followed after just two weeks.

For 2008 coverage renewals, CCRIF premiums charged to participating governments decreased by 10 percent, while the minimum attachment point available for hurricane policies decreased from coverage provided for one in 20-year events to one in 15-year events. All 16 initial participants renewed their coverage, some at an increased level, firmly demonstrating the success of the initiative. This success has led to active investigation of the possibility of expansion of the concept to other risks, including rainfall and agriculture. This disaster recovery and losses coverage model helps financially weaker and small states to protect themselves against peak risks and could be replicated in other regions.

Source: [www.CCRIF.org](http://www.CCRIF.org); Munich Re Group, Annual Report 2007, München, 2008, pp.24-5,



FIGURE 1.1.6: AFRICAN CITIES AT RISK DUE TO SEA-LEVEL RISE



Source: UN-HABITAT Global Urban Observatory 2008

# 1.2

## The Historic Urban Perspective

### Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa: Transition to Independence

At independence, most African economies remained as externally centred as under colonial control. Business profits were often used for urban-based consumptive purposes or siphoned off, rather than reinvested in local productivity. This lack of investment would have long-term impacts on African cities' ability to become locally, nationally and globally effective as engines of growth and development. Africa's secondary cities particularly continued to lag behind in development and economic growth in the absence of effective policies guiding agriculture, resource extraction, establishment of local processing, and transportation infrastructure.

With political constituencies overwhelmingly based in the rural areas, post-independence African cities received little public attention. Many African nations responded to pressing urban issues with master plans. Almost all of these master plans failed, because they neither captured the speed and direction of growth in peri-urban areas, nor were they supported by investments in infrastructure. Moreover, due to central governments' general apprehension about strong or opposition-controlled local authorities, the managers of many African cities were *deliberately* disabled through revenue starvation, frequent national level interventions and



▲ Guineans demonstrating in the Koloma suburb of the capital, Conakry, Guinea. More than 100 people were killed in anti-government riots across Guinea, and hundreds more wounded and arrested  
©Maseco Conde/IRIN

other measures that compromised city managers' ability to operate effectively. With inadequate capacities to respond to the rapidly changing urban demography, local authorities increasingly fell behind escalating demands for urban housing, social and physical infrastructures and employment.

Externally imposed structural adjustment programmes enforced retrenchments in the public sector. These hit particularly hard the emerging African urban middle classes. Soon Africa's urban economies started to crumble, with incomes increasingly shifting to informal employment and survival strategies. Not only did existing urban citizens become poorer, most new arrivals were desperately poor too, and would remain poor because Africa's urbanization was (and in many cities still is) a poverty-driven demographic process rather than an industrialization-induced socio-economic transition as in most other world regions.

When market forces started to fill the urban governance voids, the emerging pattern was almost identical across all the larger African cities. During the decades immediately preceding and following independence, uncontrolled urban growth through informal and illegal spatial developments was not only the inevitable outcome for urban Africa, but the very reason why urban slums expanded so fast.

### Laissez-Faire Cities

Time and again, experience has shown that slum proliferation results from resource deficiencies, inappropriate standards and lack of effective policy across a range of sectors. In other words: high slum proliferation rates reflect *systemic policy failure*.

During the 1960s, strategic or policy-based responses to urban slum proliferation were non-existent. Until well into the 1980s, eradication of informal settlements was the general course of action, continuing urban slum clearances that had started under colonial rule. It was generally believed that persistent and repeated slum demolitions - often by force - would ultimately dissolve urban slum conditions. In reality, slum clearing merely exacerbated the already ominous lack of affordable shelter for the urban poor.

From the 1980s onwards, it became clear that African urban slum proliferation had spiralled beyond control. The prevailing public sector hostile attitudes towards urban slums and rapidly increasing numbers of poor urban dwellers steadily changed into a tacit acceptance of what appeared to be the inevitable. With the resultant *laissez faire* approach - neither persistently evicting nor instituting slum upgrading programmes - informal settlements continued to expand and proliferate through unsustainable forms of 'self-help urbanization'.

### Urban Primacy

With rapid rural migration and progressively higher rates of natural urban growth, the primacy<sup>a</sup> of most post-independence African capitals soared. Urban growth rates

frequently exceeded seven percent, implying urban population doubling within a decade. By 1990, 13 African countries had more than one-third of their national urban population living in the nation's largest town.

High levels of urban primacy concentrate people and capital to the detriment of the development of the remainder of the country, turning these primate cities into self-perpetuating magnets of attraction. When primacy continues to increase, urban diseconomies of scale (congestion, urban unemployment, crime, social unrest, environmental degradation and diminished quality of urban life) are the inevitable outcome. This, in turn, affects population distribution, because those who can afford it move to the high-income communities, to suburban residential areas, or to satellite settlements, further fuelling often already significant processes of urban sprawl.

But urban primacy is not entirely negative. Cities are nations' economic muscle, the wellsprings of innovation and the places where the highest skills are overwhelmingly focused. This can provide critical masses of human and other resources required to trigger the emergence of the tertiary and quaternary sectors. Linked to this is primate cities' potential for better utilization of urban infrastructures and economic activity in both time and space. Higher-income groups tend to concentrate in the primate cities as these are the localities for maximizing social contacts and access to highly income-elastic goods that, in turn, sustain a more diversified market place. The result of these factors is a series of positive outcomes that cannot easily be created outside cities and that can give cities their specific urban attraction.

### Cities in North Africa: Compromise between Tradition and Modernity

North Africa is a relative latecomer in the global urban transition, albeit to a lesser extent than sub-Saharan Africa. The sub-region's 2007 overall urbanization was 50.9 percent and the large cities are growing at a comparatively modest average annual rate of about 2.6 percent. But deep intra-regional differences will continue to prevail in the foreseeable future. It is expected that Egypt and Sudan will still be less than 50 percent urban in 2015, while Libya will then be 79 percent urbanized.

The on-going urban transition in North Africa brought deep societal shifts with the traditional rural majority comparatively quickly changing into urban mass-societies. These processes are proving deeply traumatic, particularly so for cities like Algiers and Cairo that have become centres of escalating numbers of poor urban slum dwellers - many below the age of 20. Between 1980 and 2000, the youth share in Egyptian cities increased sharply from 41.0 to 68.5 percent. Morocco experienced a similar trend with 19.5 percent youths in 1980 and 30.2 percent in 2000. But the better urban social and economic prospects these young people hope for are mostly not there.

<sup>a</sup> The phenomenon that a nation's largest city is three or more times the population size of the second-largest settlement.



▲ Alexandria, Egypt.  
©Holger Mette/Shutterstock



▲ Urban mass-housing in Cairo  
©Jos Maseland

Globalization, demographic growth and rapid urbanization all translated into escalating demands for urban livelihoods, better living conditions and societal modernization. But because few North African governments had prepared for the high urban household formation rates associated with young populations, impoverished and disoriented urban youths have now become one of North Africa's central political issues. Caught between tradition and modernity, large numbers of estranged, young urban dwellers in search of societal alternatives generated popular demands for deep political and socio-economic change. The recent history of the sub-region speaks for itself. Over the past two decades, virtually no North African nation has escaped urban social unrest, conflicts between tradition and modernity, and eroding political legitimacy among governments unable to deliver the necessary urban employment opportunities, housing, services and political change in a timely manner.

North African governments must act decisively in the crucial completion phases of the region's urban transition. Despite deep intra-regional differences, North Africa will soon be a region of cities and governments have to speed up secular change through political, socio-economic and urban policy reforms that can be espoused by their growing urban societies. With a currently very high youth component of its urban populations, North Africa may otherwise unintentionally foster the very urban-based cultures of violence, crime and political radicalism that disenfranchised urban youngsters appear to be particularly prone to. The challenge is to reshape social and urban policies towards sustained economic growth and adequate living conditions for rapidly expanding numbers of young and poor urbanites. But the confrontation with urbanity and modernity can only be resolved by the region itself, while the outcomes of policies to better integrate North Africa in the global economy will determine its future.

# 1.3

## Africa's Largest Cities

In 1950, only two African cities exceeding one million inhabitants. The number of such large cities reached nine in 1975 accommodating a combined population of about 19 million people. From 1975 to 2005 African cities exceeding one million rapidly increased to 43 with a combined population of 110+ million people. By 2015, there will be 59, home to more than 169 million individuals.

Whereas, small and medium-sized cities now take in most of Africa's current overall urban population increases, large cities continue to grow as well. They will accommodate more and more people in absolute terms and will be of larger average size.

But city size alone can be misleading, because *growth* rates rather than absolute size dictate how quickly settlements need to absorb people and provide urban livelihoods, housing and services. Growth rates tell us whether capacities to provide and manage these will have to be expanded and at what rate.

The growth rates of Africa's largest cities have now started to diminish, indicating that the growth of the larger cities may become more manageable. On the other hand, absolute population growth is still significant and these increases tell us what amount of services, housing, land, and transport will be needed by specific dates.

For the period 2005-2020, there are 35 African cities among the world's 200 most rapidly growing metropolitan areas. Bamako, Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa and Lagos are even among the world's ten fastest growing large cities with their populations nearly doubling over these 15 years. That is reason for considerable concern because history has shown that high urban growth rates in Africa tend to translate into significant urban informal settlement and slum formation. With many of Africa's largest urban agglomerations now experiencing informal hyper growth, the equation *mega-cities equals mega-slums* may very well be tomorrow's urban reality in Africa.

TABLE 1.3.1: AFRICAN 1+ MILLION CITIES, COMBINED POPULATION, AVERAGE SIZE, % OF TOTAL URBAN POPULATION

Year	1+ million cities	Combined population	Average size (millions)	% of total African urban population
1950	2	3.4 million	1.70	10.4
1955	3	5.3 million	1.77	12.8
1960	3	6.3 million	2.10	12.0
1965	6	11+ million	1.87	16.4
1970	8	15+ million	1.93	17.6
1975	9	19+ million	2.11	17.9
1980	15	30+ million	2.00	22.7
1985	21	43+ million	2.05	26.2
1990	24	53+ million	2.21	26.1
1995	28	68+ million	2.43	27.5
2000	38	89+ million	2.34	30.3
2005	43	110+ million	2.56	31.7
2010	44	137+ million	3.11	33.6
2015	59	169+ million	2.87	35.0

Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.

FIGURE 1.3.1: AFRICAN 1+ MILLION CITIES






FIGURE 1.3.2: URBAN SETTLEMENTS OVER 50,000 – POPULATION IN 2000



**Legend**

Urban Settlements over 50,000  
2000 Population

- 50,000 - 500,000
- 500,000 - 2,000,000
- 2,000,000 - 4,500,000
- 4,500,000 - 10,000,000
- 10,000,000 - 18,500,000



Sources: Centre for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University; International Food Policy Research Institute (IPFRI), the World Bank; and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT), 2004.

# 1.4

## Trends and Innovations

### From Big Cities to EMRs and MURs

In the industrialized economies, the combined dynamics of post-1945 demographic growth, private car ownership and modernist planning ideas spread urban populations and economic activities beyond cities' boundaries - a process that became known as 'urban sprawl'. By the 1960s, urban sprawl had become the norm in several industrialized nations. Large cities' spatial growth increasingly absorbed neighbouring towns and villages. Soon the Extended Metropolitan Region (EMR) - a regional urban entity centered on a *single*, leading core city - became a common phenomenon. Over time, EMRs in geographic proximity began to integrate through their economic and spatial synergies into yet another new regional urbanization pattern that would later be referred to as the Mega Urban Region (MUR) - a huge, multi-million-inhabitant urban system centered on *multiple* metropolitan cores. In the final quarter of the 20th century, this region-based urbanization phenomenon (as opposed to the traditional city-based urbanization) became increasingly relevant to developing nations too, albeit with regionally very diverse driving forces.

East and Southeast Asia saw rapid urban growth in the 1980s and 1990s mostly as an outcome of global investments in urban-based branch plant economies, replacing existing local import-substitution with export-oriented manufacturing. African nations, for many reasons, including lower political stability, inadequate infrastructure, underdeveloped labour force, small domestic markets and associated higher costs of doing business, received almost none of the outsourced production. Primary commodities (including oil extraction) remained Africa's sole comparative advantage, preventing widespread establishment of urban-based, value-added manufacturing processes. Meanwhile, the African urban transition took off, not as an industrialization-driven process, but as a demographic process in contexts of repeated natural disasters, security crises, insignificant urban economic growth and only marginal emergence of urban middle classes.

In spatial terms, African urbanization soon followed worldwide patterns of rapid urban sprawl around the largest cities and subsequent emergence of EMRs. But due to the poverty of the new urban arrivals and lack of real urban livelihood opportunities, this urban sprawl occurred almost

exclusively through informal urban hyper-growth. In this manner, many of the primate cities of Africa ended up with large numbers of poor dwellers and informal settlements.

### Urban Development Corridors

With the continued growth of its largest cities, the urban development corridor is now an emerging spatial phenomenon in Africa as well. Urban corridors are urban and semi-urban systems structured along the major economic arteries of agglomerations. Urban corridors typically take a linear or ribbon shape, extending over long distances along key logistics connections such as inter-city highways and water- or railways. They incorporate urban fabric, industrial plants and rural lands in the sphere of influence of a dominant urban core. These corridors tend to quickly attract industrial and residential developments, away from metropolitan pollution, congestion and high land prices but still close to its markets, services and institutions.

Most urban development corridors are sub-national and in Africa they include those between Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Ismailia and Suez; the Lagos-Ibadan corridor of Nigeria; the Kenitra-Casablanca corridor of Morocco; and the Gauteng (Pretoria-Johannesburg-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging) corridor in South Africa.

Some African urban corridors have now extended *across* national boundaries. The most prominent example of the latter is the Ibadan-Lagos-Cotonou-Lomé-Accra corridor linking the key coastal urban areas of Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana. It is yet too early to call this urban corridor skirting the Gulf of Guinea a single Mega Urban Region, but with current metropolitan growth rates and growing synergies between the individual urban cores it may very well move into that direction. Transnational urban development corridors, from a national point of view, may look spontaneous, accidental, disorderly or even irrelevant. They are notoriously difficult to manage due to their sheer size, while their cross-border nature introduces highly ambiguous spatial issues beyond national control with complex new questions of territoriality, authority and rights. But, their economic potential is huge.



Regional urban systems, whether national or transnational, are a new urban spatial reality. Through their vast economic powers and by transcending increasingly parochial notions of local or national territorial authority, MURs and the associated corridors need the attention of authorities in a *regional* context that goes well beyond traditional and territorially confined urban administrations and governance. In other words: the sheer size and political and economic prowess of MURs - particularly transnational ones – is bound to eclipse the traditional territorial sovereignty of national and local governments. Whereas until recently central governments merely dealt with the binary of national versus global authority or rural versus urban, now there is a rapidly emerging third, regional level with the potential competences, dexterity and power to render national and local spatial authority almost insignificant.

Many African nations realize the potentials of urban development corridors and a host of domestic and transnational corridors are now *deliberately* being promoted, among others to overcome the continent's poor inter- and intra-regional connectivity. Examples include the Maputo Development Corridor, linking the South African industrial heartland

of Gauteng with the seaport of Maputo, Mozambique; the Kenitra-Casablanca corridor; and the Thika-Nairobi-Machakos corridor (which can be part of a future Mombasa-Nairobi-Kampala development corridor that may further stretch into the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo).

The deliberate development of regional infrastructural arteries does not only serve major logistic and economic integration purposes. They unlock vast tracks of rural land and can be utilized to geographically better spread urbanization and its benefits. They provide a potential for guiding population pressure away from Africa's primate cities. In this sense, they offer opportunities for spatial interventions to become a tool of social and economic policy, addressing urban and rural poverty through geographic dispersal of manufacturing and trade. Key driving forces include the attraction of cheaper peripheral lands, avoidance of metropolitan congestion, cleaner air, more direct access to maritime and airports and strategic placement of economic activities away from (but still in relative proximity to) the major metropolitan cores. The examples of Cairo and Johannesburg demonstrate the huge economic and spatial potentials of this approach.



▲ A photo of a poor black township close to Cape Town, South Africa.  
©Socrates/Shutterstock

## ***Water Supply and Sanitation in Africa - Continental Trends (1990-2006)***

The latest available data on improved water supply and sanitation are derived from the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) that produced a monitoring report on Africa with preliminary estimates of the trends from 1990 to 2006. Data is based on information from national statistics offices, censuses, household surveys, demographic and health Surveys, Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and World Health Surveys.

### **Overall Trends for Africa**

#### ***Water***

In nine of the 54 African countries, improved water supply coverage is less than 50 percent while 64 percent of the population (341 million people) used an improved source of water supply in 2006. This constitutes an increase from the overall 56 percent recorded in 1990 for the continent. As of 2006, improved water

supply covered about half of Africa's rural and 85 percent of the urban populations. On the whole, 26 of the 54 countries are on track for meeting the MDG drinking water supply target. Between 1990 and 2006, 245 million Africans gained access to improved drinking water. However, due to population growth of over 300 million during the period, the number of people without access to improved sources actually increased by 61 million, from 280 million in 1990 to 341 million people in 2006.

#### ***Sanitation***

In 16 of the 54 African countries, sanitation coverage remains at less than 25 percent. Only the North African nations bordering the Mediterranean are on track for meeting the MDG sanitation target by 2015. The whole of Sahelo-Saharan and Sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely to achieve the MDG sanitation by 2015.

With the provision of improved water supplies for Africa not on track for 52 percent of the nations, a majority of countries needs to significantly speed up its efforts, both for keeping up with population growth and for meeting the agreed MDG 2015 water target. With improved sanitation coverage, Africa is clearly lagging with a paltry number of less than 10 percent of its nations on track for meeting the 2015 MDG improved sanitation target. Clearly, some African nations are doing notably better than others and there seems to be a correlation between level of urbanization and urban economies of scale in improved water and sanitation delivery. With rapid urbanization now taking place, African governments in the countries with the least improved water availability can and should do much better in raising at least the urban access to improved water.



▲ Slum residents collect water in Nairobi, capital of Kenya, November 2007. Mathare slum faces a serious water shortage due to major disconnections from slum inlet pipes.  
©Julius Mwelu/IRIN

## Improved water supply and sanitation in Africa-Regional trends (1990-2006)

### North Africa

Improved water and sanitation coverage across the North African region is quite high, second only to the Southern Africa region. For improved water supply, coverage increased from 84 percent in 1990 for a total regional population of 143.9 million to 88 percent in 2006 for 192.8 million people. This represents an 48.8 million additional people served. The urban-rural breakdown was 94 and 76 percent respectively for 1990 and 93 and 82 percent in 2006. There was a one percent decrease in the urban coverage (but still serving more people in absolute terms) and the overall increase was the result of a six percent increase in rural water supply. That is no small accomplishment given the aridity of the region. The trend for improved sanitation was 57 percent in 1990 to 68 percent in 2006 with an urban-rural breakdown of 79 and 40 percent in 1990, rising to 84 and 51 percent in 2006.

### Central/West Africa





The overall coverage for improved drinking water sources in Central/Western Africa region nations rose by seven percent between 1990 and 2006 from 49 to 56 percent. The 1990 coverage figure of 49 percent for a total population of 254.4 million people, is made up of 77 percent for urban and 35 percent for the rural population. Similarly, the breakdown for the 56 percent coverage as of 2006, with a total population of 395.1 million people was 76 percent for urban and 41 percent for rural. The corresponding improved sanitation coverage figures for 1990 and 2006 were 21 and 30 percent, representing an increase of nine percent. The urban-rural breakdown was 37 and 13 percent in 1990, and 39 and 20 percent in 2006.

### East Africa

Overall coverage for improved drinking water in the East Africa region rose with a significant 14 percent from 40 percent in 1990 to 54 percent in 2006. The urban and rural components were 85 and 30 percent, respectively. With urban improved water coverage stable at 85 percent (but in absolute terms this means an increase because of urban populations growth) the 2006 rural water coverage rapidly increased to 45 percent and the overall coverage improvement was therefore mostly the result of increased rural improvement. The corresponding improved sanitation coverage figure rose from 25 to 29% between 1990 and 2006. The urban and rural components were 31 and 24 percent respectively for 1990 and 37 and 27 percent respectively for 2006. Nevertheless, open defecation, the riskiest sanitation practice, is still widespread in Eastern Africa despite a decline in this practice from 44 percent in 1990 to 33 percent in 2006.

### Southern Africa

The highest 2006 improved water supply coverage of the African continent was in the Southern Africa region with 92 percent of a total population of 55.316 million supplied. This represents a rise with 8 percent from the 1990 (population of 41.828 million) level of 80 percent coverage. The urban-rural breakdown for 1990 was 98 and 62 percent respectively and 100 and 81 percent respectively for 2006. The region-wide improved sanitation coverage reached 57 percent in 2006 - the second highest in Africa after Northern Africa. This represents an increase of 5 percent over the 52 percent of 1990. The urban rural breakdown was 64 and 41 percent in 1990, and 66 and 46 percent in 2006.



# 1.5

## Governance in Regional Urban Systems

The global heritage of institutional and legal structures for traditional 'city-based' urban governance seems inadequate for managing *regional* urban systems. Efforts towards establishing regional or area-wide governance have proven highly contentious because they entail infringements on traditional territorial jurisdictions, authority and rights. Different cooperative or coordinative structures have been tried in various regions, but few have led to fully satisfactory results.

Although there are no universal solutions to addressing the governance structure of regional urban systems and whereas different political ideologies or cultures may demand their own specific solutions, there are a few key areas for broad policy setting that do appear to have a degree of global applicability for practical area-wide planning, coordination and development control. Policy may focus on facilitating:

- urban governance forms conducive to regional functionality and that view city regions and urban corridors as integrated systems comprising urban, peri-urban and rural sub-systems;
- legal and institutional structures that can coordinate the development, maintenance and operation of metropolitan areas or provide oversight over decentralized structures;
- trunk infrastructure and institutional development in support of regional integration, financing, management and maintenance;
- involvement of the private, public, community and non-governmental sectors in regional and local decision-making, particularly through public-private partnership arrangements;
- allocation of government roles according to the principle of subsidiarity in facilitating market functions, land tenure reforms, infrastructure and services delivery, and safeguarding the environment and welfare; and
- continuous territorial authority and administrative boundary adjustments over time.

Two major additional challenges are likely to be faced by African metropolises in their quest to seek functional and practical area-wide governance structures. They need to overcome:

(1) the issues of effectively decentralizing the public sector with local intra-metropolitan governance acquiring more responsibility; and

(2) the complex processes of socio-spatial segregation that tend to result from large intra-metropolitan differences in household incomes.

The latter is particularly significant in the African context due to huge numbers of low-income dwellers inhabiting urban slums lacking most municipal services, vis-à-vis the small share of urban residents enjoying high levels of municipal services delivery and security in gated communities.

The choice of which broad governance structure best applies clearly depends on the national political realities. The aim is to overcome the inability of market-driven urbanization processes to translate short-term interests into long-term social, political and environmental sustainability.

The emergence of regional urban systems drives home the fact that urbanization must be rethought in terms of the forces generating it and the spatial forms it produces. It is important to keep on realizing that with regional urban systems now spilling over national borders - physically or in terms of the flows of goods, services or people - African urbanization is becoming as much an international as a national process.



▲ Boy selling food at a stall in Antananarivo, Madagascar.  
©Muriel Lasure/Shutterstock

## African cities and energy



▲ Giant Owen Falls Dam in the river Nile, Jinja, Uganda.  
©Klaas Lingbeek- van Kranen/ iStockphoto

Urban areas consume 75 percent of the world's energy and produce 80 percent of all GHG emissions. This, however, does not make urban areas the ecological culprit. Cities are the living and working environment for a majority of the world's population and they are nations' most important wealth generators. But cities *do* hold the key to many environmental issues, including significant carbon emission reduction and long term energy security. Increasing oil prices have an enormous impact on the economy and on urban efficiency. The first step therefore is to focus on three key areas for city-related energy savings: transport, buildings and industry.

Transport emissions are rapidly increasing in Africa. With cities deeply dependent on transport, a critical look at transport of people and bulk goods would be a prime area for energy reductions. This includes higher vehicle efficiency standards; increased support for public mass transport; and better enforced speed limits. Urban transport demand can be significantly reduced through spatial planning that reduces distances between residences and work, schools or shops.

Individual buildings can be far more energy efficient if design focuses on natural indoor-climate control that requires less cooling and fewer air conditioners.

Sources: [http://www.sudnet.org/pageID\\_5767075.html](http://www.sudnet.org/pageID_5767075.html)

Significant energy savings and GHG reduction can also be achieved by better regulating the construction industry. The building sector is a hefty consumer of energy and GHG emitter. Encouraging the use of more energy-efficient and lower GHG-emitting construction materials and technologies can provide a rapid contribution towards climate change mitigation from within cities.

A key role for all the above lies with governments through promoting popular awareness of the benefits of energy efficiency; regulating design and construction and making more public funds available for affordable and efficient (inter and intra-urban) public mass transport.

Improving the energy security of the urban poor through slum electrification programmes can provide rapid environmental, social and economic benefits. It will reduce health risks; enhance social education through television and radio; lower energy costs for slum dwellers; improve security through better lighting; and phase out inefficient and polluting biomass fuel for cooking and heating. Access to electricity also influences people's living and cultural patterns, including shifts to smaller families. Electricity companies can benefit from slum electrification programmes as it will reduce illegal power tapping and associated damage to local power infrastructures.

Africa needs to rapidly start utilizing its significant non-conventional and clean energy potential, including solar, geothermal, (mini- and macro-) hydroelectric and wind power potential at the large, meso and micro scales. The viability of huge hydro-power supply from the Inga Dam in the DR of Congo project does not really hinge on financing but on political will in the DRC's peace building process, good governance, and timely electrical power infrastructure provision across the country.

Africa's energy security in the short term may depend on the efficiency of small scale production of energy. For instance, UN-HABITAT, as part of its Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Initiative, has helped in the realization of a hydropower plant to provide the power to pump water to the Kenyan town of Kisii, while biogas plants using local organic wastes produce methane-generated electricity. Energy use can also be improved at the household level through more efficient stoves, improving on traditional stoves' energy wastes of up to 90 percent. Small improvements and contributions will have major impacts if widely applied and urban areas provide the stage *par excellence* for multitudes of small-scale energy-efficiency interventions. If policies and strategies are combined with political will, then Africa can utilize the world's vast technological knowledge to provide equitable energy security for its urban dwellers – rich and poor.

## African cities and food security



▲ Market scene in Antananarivo, Madagascar.  
©Muriel Lasure/Shutterstock

For decades, some scientists and food economists have issued warnings that the world could reach a point where it may no longer be able to provide sufficient food for its urban dwellers. There was negligible governmental response to these warnings as urban food insecurity issues are relatively invisible to policymakers. However, the food pricing shocks of 2008 suddenly splattered the topic over the global front screen and many governments have now recognized that food-security policy should be revisited.

Over the next 20 years, the population of many African cities will double and, by 2030, nearly 50 percent of all Africans will be living in urban areas. This rapid urban growth should raise concerns about African urban food supply and distribution systems. Devising dynamic and effective supply and distribution services for Africa, able to continue feeding its rapidly growing city populations, has become a matter of concern. Meeting production targets for rising urban food demand; reducing dependence on imports; ensuring efficient logistics for delivering produce to consumers; and utilizing these issues

to also create additional employment are among the challenges.

Urbanization typically increases urban food demands at a time when urban spatial growth rapidly converts nearby agricultural areas into non-food producing land uses. This strains supply and distribution systems because distances between food producers and consumers grow and food becomes more expensive.

North Africa is an interesting example. The Maghreb countries follow a Mediterranean diet based largely on wheat. Due to limited and unpredictable local production, massive cereals imports are frequently required. Given the importance of wheat products, the governments of several Maghreb countries are forced to subsidize this staple food to guarantee price stability and shield their populations against variations on the international market.

In sub-Saharan Africa, until about the mid-1980s, local agriculture initially responded well to soaring urban food demand. Rural-urban linkages were

short, with peri-urban agriculture close to the urban markets and urban food demand became a major driver of local agriculture. There was also little competition from imported foods due to comparatively rigid urban food consumption patterns. Lower-income urban households' diets resembled those of rural areas - easy to prepare, cheap local staple foods. The medium and higher-income groups and expatriate urban communities, however, created demand for new processed products. But since external supply circuits were working fairly well, physical access to food for different socio-economic strata was possible in virtually all African cities.

But Africa's food production and supply systems are less and less able to meet the urban demand because:

- the development of dependable food infrastructure (production, transport, markets, industry) is not keeping pace with urban growth;
- urban food demand has started to outstrip the production capacity of the surrounding areas;
- urban spatial expansion increasingly converts peri-urban food producing areas to other uses;
- changing urban socio-economic composition raises demand for different staple foods, including imported and highly processed foods;
- urban regulation and multi-storey buildings change living cultures, often preventing the traditional preparation of dishes and causing shifts towards other foods; and
- urban rather than rural markets are becoming the source of food supply, with transportation costs assuming a rapidly growing share of food prices.

2008 has shown that there is nothing like a food riot to shake governments into action. But rather than applying crisis management through *ad hoc* responses, African governments could consider how they can strategically position themselves for changing urban food requirements and the need for supply strategies and systems in the short, medium and longer term so that they will continue to be able to feed their increasingly urban societies. Solutions can be found in stimulating agricultural production; improving infrastructure to facilitate inputs into agriculture and outputs from agriculture to cities; and better water management to convert the non-productive territories of the continent to food production for internal use and future export.

Source: *Food Security in African Cities - The Role of Food Supply and Distribution Systems*, FAO, 1997



▲ A woman fetches water from one of the burst pipes in Mathare slum, Nairobi, Kenya.  
©Julius Mwelu/IRIN

## Chapter Two

# THE STATE OF NORTH AFRICAN CITIES

# 02


The North Africa region, for the purposes of this analysis, encompasses Egypt, Sudan, Algeria Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania with a combined population of approximately 200 million people. Egypt, with 77 million has the region's largest population and Mauritania with 3.3 million the smallest. The combined 2006 regional GDP was US\$408 billion. Algeria and Egypt have the largest economies with GDPs of US\$115 billion and US\$107 billion respectively. Mauritania has the smallest with a GDP of under US\$3 billion. Nominal GDP in the region has grown on average with five percent annually over the last five years, well outpacing population growth. In 2007, GDP per capita in purchasing power parity ranged from US\$1,800 in Mauritania to US\$13,100 in Libya with an average of US\$6,000.

More than half of the region's population now lives in urban areas. Historically, urban settlements have been concentrated in two geographic areas, along the coast and in the Nile River Valley. Forty percent of North Africa's urban dwellers live in the Nile Valley and delta region and 49 percent live

Urban expansion, Cairo, Egypt  
©Manoocher Deghati/IRIN








in the Maghreb Mediterranean area. Only two urban areas of significant size, Nouakchott, Mauritania, and Khartoum, Sudan, are located outside of these areas.

North Africa's climate, geography, and history have differentiated the region's urban development trends from the rest of Africa. Although decentralization laws have been in place for several decades, administrative decisions are still primarily centralized. While oil revenue has provided several countries with funds for large public investment programmes, the predominantly young and urban population still faces significant challenges related to housing and employment. Environmental considerations related to a desert environment, including water shortages and climate change must be addressed before they reach crisis proportions.

# 2.1

## Population and Urbanization

FIGURE 2.1.1: POPULATION PERCENTAGE BY AGE GROUP – NORTHERN AFRICA



Sources: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision

The combination of rapid population growth and the shift from rural to urban population concentrations continues to put pressure on infrastructure, housing and services. Despite some problem areas, North Africa as a whole has responded aggressively to alleviate slum conditions and to provide basic water, electricity and sewerage. However, the region faces growing challenges, in particular relating to water shortages, poverty, congestion, food prices, unemployment, high land and housing costs and environmental pollution. Municipalities face these challenges with limited budget resources. Congestion in urban centres has outpaced the provision of transport infrastructure. As car ownership rates increase and public transportation provision stagnates, the problem appears set to increase in the coming years.

Pollution and the rapid loss of agricultural lands also create environmental challenges that North African nations will need to address through improved urban land management in the coming years. Recent increases in food prices and housing costs have increased social vulnerability. Protests have flared up in some cities where middle-income families have suffered from an erosion of their living standard.



▲ Pyramids along the River Nile: Most of the largest cities in the world have developed along riverbanks or deltas.  
©Madanmohan Rao

TABLE 2.1.1: NATIONAL POPULATION STATISTICS AND URBAN SLUM PREVALENCE (UN-HABITAT DEFINITION)

	2008 population	2008 urban population (%)	Annual average population growth rate 2005 – 2010 (%)		Median age	Under 15 (%)	2001 urban slum population (%)
			total	urban			
Algeria	34,138,500	64.9	1.51	2.48	26.0	26.3	11.8
Egypt	76,193,500	42.7	1.76	1.83	24.5	31.8	39.9
Libya	6,224,000	77.4	1.97	2.19	23.6	33.2	35.2
Mauritania	3,163,000	40.9	2.53	3.04	17.2	45.3	94.3
Morocco	31,438,000	55.9	1.20	1.84	24.7	30.5	32.7
Sudan	39,065,000	43.0	2.22	4.29	18.9	41.1	86.0
Tunisia	10,384,500	66.3	1.08	1.66	28.8	23.2	3.7

Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.

## Urbanization Rates (1980-2030)


Demographic patterns in North Africa have been marked by two major trends over the last 50 years: steady population growth and a population shift from rural to urban areas. In 1960, the urban share of the population was only 30 percent. Figure 2.1.2 shows the evolution of the region's urban population. Over the past five years, average population growth has been under two percent, with urban regions growing more quickly than rural ones. Although significantly older than in the rest of Africa, the North African population is still relatively young. The average median age is 23.4 and one-third of the population is under 15 years old. Despite solid economic growth, youth unemployment in North Africa has increased by 25 percent in the last 10 years and affects over 30 percent of the age group. This particularly troubling trend underpins the emphasis placed by governments on training and employment generation programmes and the creation of economic opportunities for young entrants in the labour force. Providing education, jobs and other opportunities for 66 million youths in the coming years is one of the region's greatest challenges.

Although the main component of urban growth in North Africa is now natural increase, younger rural residents, both males and females, continue to migrate to large, medium and small cities across the region in search of jobs, education and better living conditions. Many settle on the urban fringe, resulting in the development of new informal settlements and the urbanization of peripheral villages. As urban programmes successfully provide better housing and services to the existing urban population, increases in rural to urban migration will continue to offset some of these gains.

By 2005, the region's urban population surpassed the rural population and is projected to continue to grow steadily. From 2000 to 2030, it will increase by over 80 million, accounting

for about 4 percent of projected world urban population growth and 17 percent of projected African urban population growth. UN population projections indicate that regional urban growth rates have already begun to slow and will remain constant at between two and three million per year for the next 20 years. The majority of this growth will occur in eleven existing cities that absorbed 30 percent of North Africa's urban growth from 2000 to 2005 and are projected to account for 28 percent of urban growth from 2005 to 2010 (see Table 2.1.1). Rural population is projected to decline in absolute numbers by 2025 and is already declining in Algeria and Tunisia.

FIGURE 2.1.2: NATIONAL URBANIZATION RATES



Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision

## City Size and Population Distributions within Countries

Despite some overarching similarities, North African demographic trends and urban growth patterns vary greatly from country to country. As in sub-Saharan Africa, most urban residents in Sudan and Mauritania are clustered in the capital city. In Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia urban growth has taken place in multiple, geographically dispersed cities, and in major urban agglomerations, linked by development corridors, where new housing and employment activities are concentrated.

### Urban Concentrations in Egypt and Libya

With a population of 77 million, Egypt is the most populous country in North Africa. Despite large increases in population and rapid growth of Cairo and Alexandria, a nearly constant 42 percent of Egypt's population has been urbanized since 1970 as the fertile agricultural land in the Nile valley and delta has allowed it to maintain a rural-urban balance. Although Egypt's urban population is currently growing at an average annual rate of 1.83 percent, only slightly more than the national rate of 1.76 percent, the UN World Urbanization Prospects' figures predict that the urban growth rate will become twice the national rate in the next 15 years and that Egypt will be 62.4 percent urbanized by 2050.

With populations of 11.9 million and 4.1 million Egypt's two largest cities, Cairo and Alexandria, account for 50 percent of Egypt's urban population and 21 percent of the total population. Cairo is adding approximately 202,000 residents per year as compared to 85,000 for Alexandria. Greater Cairo is the only megacity of the North Africa region with an estimated population of 16 million. The Cairo-Alexandria Mega Urban Region is discussed in more detail in Section 2.6.



▲ Algiers  
©Andre Kurenbach/iStockphoto

Despite the current and future importance of Cairo as Egypt's capital and Alexandria as its largest port and industrial city, UN World Urbanization Prospects figures project that their relative importance will begin to decline, with the faster growth occurring in smaller cities (see Figure 2.1.3). As many of these smaller cities are located in the Nile River Delta, however, their expansion will result in the loss of valuable agricultural land.

Libya is North Africa's most urbanized country with 77 percent of its population of 6.2 million living in urban

TABLE 2.1.2: POPULATION DYNAMICS FOR SELECTED NORTH AFRICAN CITIES OF OVER 750,000

	2007 Population	Annual Growth Rate (%)	% of Urban Population	% of Total Population	Population Increase per Year
Cairo	11,893,000	1.7	36.9	15.8	202,000
Khartoum	4,754,000	2.8	29.0	12.3	131,000
Alexandria	4,165,000	2.0	12.9	5.5	85,000
Algiers	3,354,000	2.2	15.3	9.9	74,000
Casablanca	3,181,000	0.8	18.3	10.2	25,000
Tripoli	2,189,000	2.0	45.9	35.5	45,000
Rabat	1,705,000	1.9	9.8	3.2	33,000
Banghazi	1,180,000	2.7	24.8	19.2	31,000
Fes	1,002,000	2.0	5.8	2.8	20,000
Marrakech	872,000	1.7	5.0	5.5	15,000
Oran	798,000	2.2	3.6	2.4	17,000

Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.

areas and also the wealthiest, with a PPP GDP per capita of US\$13,100. However, only two dominant cities account for 55 percent of the urban population: Tripoli (2.1 million, or 35 percent) and Benghazi (1.1 million, or 19 percent). They are growing at 2 percent and 2.7 percent respectively. Both are located in the small coastal eco-region and have expanded from their historic centres to incorporate towns and villages in nearby oases. Libya's population is projected to be 80 percent urban by 2020 with just over 55 percent living in Tripoli and Benghazi.

## The Northwest Coast of North Africa

Morocco and Algeria have similar demographic characteristics. Algeria's population of 34 million is growing at 1.5 percent per annum while Morocco's population of 31 million is growing at 1.2 percent. The urban population of Algeria and Morocco account for 65 percent and 56 percent of the total populations and are growing at an annual rate of 2.5 percent and 1.8 percent respectively. As a result, Algeria is projected to become three-quarters urbanized in the next 20 years, by which time Morocco will attain Algeria's current urbanization rate of 65 percent.

Algiers, with a population of 3.35 million, and Oran with 800,000 are growing more slowly than the national urban average of 2.5 percent, at 2.2 percent and 2.1 percent per annum respectively. In Morocco, Casablanca, Rabat, Fes and Marrakech have respective populations of 3.2 million, 1.7 million, 1 million and 870,000. Collectively they represent 22 percent of the total Moroccan population and 39 percent of its urban population. While Casablanca is growing at under one percent per year, the other cities are growing at close to two percent.

As shown in Figure 2.1.3, many of the region's main cities have a declining proportion of the total urban population of each country and a majority of urban residents live in secondary and tertiary cities. Morocco in particular has experienced significant growth of its secondary cities which have grown by close to 10 million new inhabitants since 1960. Although Algiers has remained the country's main urban centre and one of the largest urban areas in North Africa, it has absorbed only 13 percent of Algeria's 17.5 million urban population increases since 1960. By 2000, there were 34 cities with populations over 100,000 in Algeria and 22 in Morocco.

Tunisia's population of 10.4 million is growing at a rate of 1.1 percent. The country is 66 percent urban, and urban areas are growing at a rate of 1.7 percent. In 2004, Tunis had a population of 728,453, and Sfax, the second largest city, had a population of 265,131.

## Mauritania and Sudan: Demographic Outliers


Mauritania and Sudan have respectively a median age of 17.2 and 18.9, a life expectancy of 53.9 and 50.3, and per capita GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) of US\$1,800

and 2,500. By contrast, the other North African countries have populations with an average median age of 25.5, average life expectancy of 73.9, and an average PPP GDP per capita of US\$7,600. Social and economic indicators for Sudan and Mauritania also have similarities with those of Sub-Saharan African nations.

Mauritania has experienced rapid urbanization since independence in 1960, primarily as the result of desertification and the droughts of 1968, 1972 and 1973 with an ensuing rapid shift away from nomadic lifestyles. The urban population grew exponentially from four percent of the total population in 1962 to 62 percent in 1997, and nearly 66 percent in 2008. This growth has been concentrated primarily in Nouakchott where between one-quarter and one-third of the country's population lives. While the regional capitals have also grown, only Nouhadibou had a 2000 population of over 50,000.

Sudan was 89 percent rural in 1960. Since then, its urbanization rate has quadrupled while its total population more than tripled to about 40 million. Most of this growth has been concentrated in Khartoum, which currently houses twelve percent of Sudan's total population and 29 percent of its urban population. With 4.5 million inhabitants, Khartoum is growing at 2.7 percent annually, adding approximately 130,000 inhabitants per year. Growth rates are projected to remain above two percent into 2025 when its population will reach about eight million, accounting for 15 percent of Sudan's total population. Conflict in southern and western Sudan has helped fuel migration to Khartoum, which has remained relatively stable and prosperous.

FIGURE 2.1.3: PERCENT OF URBAN POPULATION IN LARGEST CITY



Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision

## 2.2

# The Growing Economic Role of Cities

In Morocco, despite the fact that it accounts for only 10 percent of the total population, Casablanca has 60 percent of industrial workers and 55 percent of the national units of production. While Rabat is the administrative capital, Casablanca dominates industry, transportation and employment. In Sudan, three-quarters of all industrial activity is concentrated in Khartoum, the administrative and economic capital. This concentration of economic activities in cities illustrates their role as engines of growth.

Hospitals, schools, universities and cultural amenities are also concentrated in a few major cities. Alexandria has one of the largest universities in Egypt with over 140,000 students and the recently established Bibliotheca Alexandrina. Universities are the main economic base in Blida, Setif, Sidi-bel-Abbès and Tlemcen in Algeria. In Libya, free public hospitals are located in Tripoli and Benghazi.

North African cities are also major migrant destinations, and low-skilled, informal urban jobs account for 27 percent of the region's GDP. In Khartoum, 74 percent of the active labour force was employed in the informal sector in 1996. In Alexandria, North Africa's largest port, 17,400 workshops provide jobs for 74,000 workers and only 18 percent have more than 10 employees. Although North African cities are striving to develop high-tech and service-based jobs in the knowledge economy, it is clear that the informal sector will continue to be an important component of the urban economy.

### Cities and Transportation Infrastructure

World air travel has grown steadily over the last years and is projected to continue growing, despite high fuel prices. Most passenger trips and airfreight go through a limited number of airports in the region's largest cities. For instance, Cairo International Airport had 8.3 million passengers in 2001 and over 12.5 million in 2007. In 2006, 91 percent of airfreight and 5.1 million passengers, almost half of the national total, went through Casablanca's Mohammed V International Airport while the next largest airport, Marrakech, had 2.6 million passengers. Tripoli International and Tunis-Carthage International have approximately 2.5 million and 3.5 million passengers per year. Large industrial zones have grown around these airports and include light industries, offices and services in addition to transport-related enterprises.

Sea traffic is also concentrated in a few ports. Currently, around 60 percent of Egypt's foreign trade passes through Alexandria, which handled 7.4 billion tons of freight in 2006. The city also accounts for a growing share of the country's industrial activities, concentrating 40 percent of manufacturing and 50 percent of the oil refining capacity in a large industrial zone west of the port area. A major expansion of the capacity of the port is planned; with the addition of new wharfs and the construction of a new cruise ship terminal linked to the city centre by a light-rail line. A new industrial zone will be built as a part of a new town to be developed west of Alexandria. In Morocco, Casablanca's current economic predominance is due in part to its two ports that account for 55 percent of the country's foreign trade. The port of Tangiers serves passengers as well as large container ships.

While the capacity and quality of urban streets are not always adequate, major transportation investments have been made including ring roads and radial corridors to improve vehicular circulation in expanding urban areas. The need to provide inter-urban links has led to the construction of high capacity highways – corridors that are ideally suited to new development and large economic activity zones. In Morocco, 50 percent of industrial establishments are located in the Kenitra–Casablanca–el Jadida corridor that is served by the port of Mohammedia. In Egypt, the desert road linking Cairo to Alexandria is attracting foreign and domestic investors. In the two cities, commercial uses, hotels and high-tech parks referred to as 'Smart Villages' are being developed at both ends of the corridor to drive the country's development in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. By the end of 2008, the first 'Smart Village' near the 6<sup>th</sup> of October will host more than 20,000 professionals working with more than 120 global corporations. A new extension to the park is already being studied. The high-tech zone at El Ghazala in Greater Tunis is located on the corridor linking Tunis to Bizerte and has attracted international ICT firms.

Algeria's newest public investment programme plans to finalize the construction of the 1,200 km East-West highway linking coastal cities in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, a project the country began in the 1980s but was forced to postpone due to lack of public funds. This trans-national corridor will provide a competitive atmosphere for the development of industry.

## Urban Productivity and Employment

Despite substantial regional economic growth over the last five years, North Africa still faces severe employment problems. Only two out of ten working age women and three out of ten male youths are employed. At 45.3 percent, the employment-to-population ratio in 2007 (the number of employed persons as a percentage of the population 15 years old and over) was among the lowest in the world, reflecting low rates of participation in the labour force among women and the lack of job opportunities for young men, a major cause of frustration and discouragement.

Unemployment in urban areas tends to be even higher than national rates. In Greater Tunis, the unemployment rate is 35 percent as compared to a national rate of fewer than 15 percent. In Morocco, between 1982 and 2001, urban unemployment increased from 12.3 percent to 19.5 percent, while rural unemployment decreased from 10.5 percent to 4.5 percent. These increases reflect the inability of the economy to provide jobs for the large number of young people who enter the labour force yearly as well as continuing migratory flows from rural to urban areas. Egypt has had a particularly difficult time integrating women and young people into its labour force. In 2006 only 15.7 percent of women and 31.8 percent of men aged 15 to 24 were employed. Algeria has also a high level of youth unemployment, 43.4 percent as compared to only 17 percent in Morocco. Women's low participation in the active labour force is clearly reflected in the statistics.

In urban areas, many have turned to the informal sector, particularly women, selling goods in markets or operating home-based businesses. In 2000, informal employment represented 43 percent of non-agricultural employment in Algeria, 45 percent in Morocco, 50 percent in Tunisia, and 55 percent in Egypt. In Mauritania, the informal sector accounted for 70 percent of people employed in urban areas in 2001. In Cairo, 31.6 percent of employed women worked in the informal jobs in 2005 and 56.6 percent in Rabat in 2004.

Even though employment generation has been a prime component of poverty alleviation strategies in several countries, either as stand-alone policies or coupled with urban interventions to improve housing conditions and eradicate

slums, the number of young people migrating from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria to Western Europe and the Gulf has accelerated in the last decade. The increased demand for low-skilled labourers in agriculture, tourism and construction in Spain and Italy after 1995 has added these countries to such older destinations as France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. An increasing number of migrants have been women employed as domestic workers, in cleaning services or in agriculture and small industries.

## Education

The policy of "free education for all" adopted by the Maghreb countries and Egypt has resulted in significant educational gains. Net enrolment in primary education in the region has increased since 1991, reaching 99 percent in Algeria, 97 percent in Egypt and 98 percent in Tunisia in 2005. Enrolment rates at the secondary level also showed a large jump from 1985 to 2003: from 51.4 percent to 80.7 percent in Algeria, from 61.4 percent to 87.1 percent in Egypt, from 58.8 percent to 103.9 percent in Libya, and from 38.9 percent to 81.3 percent in Tunisia. With the exception of Morocco, there is little difference between urban and rural enrollment.

Libya is clearly the region's leader in terms of improvements in education. Its youth literacy rate for both men and women is one indicator, and its high rate of secondary school enrolment is another. Thanks to a substantial investment, it achieved an outstanding student/teacher ratio of 10.2 in its primary education system in 2001. The average ratio for all Arab States was 21 in 2002/2003; 22 in Tunisia; 28 in Algeria; and 41 in Mauritania.

Mauritania and Morocco saw the largest percentage increases in the number of children enrolled in primary school from 1991 to 2005: from 56.7 percent to 86.3 percent and 35.3 percent to 72.6 percent respectively. Morocco's lower enrolment and completion rates for primary school are improving for both boys and girls, particularly in the larger cities. In Rabat, primary school enrolment increased from 69.6 percent in 1992 to 94.9 percent in 2003 and in Casablanca from 73 percent to 96.7 percent. Primary school enrolment for children from slum households has also

TABLE 2.2.1: EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS FOR SELECTED NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

	Labour force participation ratio (percent) <sup>1</sup>				Unemployment rates (percent) <sup>3</sup>			
	Men 15+	Women 15+	Men 15-24	Women 15-24	Men	Women	Youth (15-24) <sup>4</sup>	Total
Algeria	68.7	30.7	45.8	19.8	17.5	18.1	43.4	17.7
Egypt	68.6	15.7 <sup>2</sup>	31.8	8.5	5.9	25.1	27.1	10.3
Morocco	71.6	23.7	52.5	18.7	10.6	11.4	17.0	10.8
Tunisia	65.4	24.1	34.2	22.7	13.2	17.1	30.7	14.2

Source: ILO database

<sup>1</sup> Figures are all from 2006 except for Women 15+ from Egypt

<sup>2</sup> Latest figures are from 2000.

<sup>3</sup> Unemployment rates are all from 2004 except for those of youth.

<sup>4</sup> Dates for unemployment rates for youth are as follows: Algeria-2004; Egypt-2002; Morocco-2003; Tunisia-2005.

increased. In 2004, 100 percent of primary school age boys and girls in households with two shelter deprivations in Rabat were enrolled in school. Lower enrolment and literacy rates are largely a rural problem that the Government of Morocco is addressing through education reform and programmes focused on rural locations. Sudan, while having an overall enrolment rate of only 46 percent in 2000, has a 74.3 percent rate of completion of primary school as compared to only 39.4 percent in Mauritania, where the high dropout rate reflects the reality that many children still leave school to assist their families in earning income.

Statistics for the major cities of the region indicate a significant increase in youth literacy rates from 1990 to 2003, and that national rates were generally comparable to those in urban areas. The exception to this is Morocco, where literacy rates for young men and women are substantially higher in the major cities than in the country as a whole.

Paradoxically, many North Africans with secondary and higher education degrees are experiencing high rates of unemployment partly as a result of a lack of opportunities, partly because of frustrated expectations and a desire for civil service employment. In Egypt, 80 percent of the unemployed have completed secondary education or above, while in Algeria, those with secondary or higher education represent 20 percent of the labour force but almost 38 percent of the unemployed. This paradox reflects the need to reform the educational and training systems to better fit the needs of their economies particularly in science, mathematics and languages, fields required by the developing high technology sectors.

## Health and Nutrition

North African countries have made substantial inroads in improving the health of their populations over the last 15 years. Programmes targeted at improving living conditions in slums, where illness is even more prevalent than in rural areas, have contributed to the reduction of health-related concerns in the region's cities. Urbanization has therefore played a role

in improving health. According to the World Development Indicators, the average national infant mortality rate in North Africa was 52.2 in 2006. (The highest national rate in the world is around 160. The lowest is 3, while the OECD average is 5.) Libya and Tunisia had the lowest rates at 18.4 and 22.6 respectively. Egypt, Morocco and Algeria ranged from 35.3 to 38, while Mauritania and Sudan had the highest rates at 125 and 88.6.

Infant mortality rates have been reduced substantially in some urban areas. In Cairo, death rates per 1,000 live births for children under five dropped from 78.1 in 1990 to 33.3 in 2003 and from 61.2 to 38.4 in Alexandria. Although longitudinal data is not available in Morocco, Casablanca, Meknes, and Marrakech reported under-five mortality rates of less than 40, and in Rabat the number was as low as 18. Despite these improvements, child mortality rates for lower-income urban households remain high. In Moroccan urban areas, the poorest quintile of the urban population experienced an under-five mortality rate of 120.8 in 2002 while the rate among the wealthiest quintile was only 26.3. Figures for Egypt's urban population were similar: at 111.9 for the lowest quintile and 33.7 for the highest.

In Egypt and Morocco other indicators show a reduction in health inequality between slum and non-slum dwellers. By 2003, only 6.5 percent of children in slums and 6.3 percent of children in non-slum households were underweight. Access to vaccinations for measles and other illnesses are widely available with only small differences to both slum and non-slum dwellers in such major cities as Casablanca, Rabat, Cairo and Alexandria. In Mauritania, however, 26.1 percent of children in slum households in Nouakchott were underweight compared to 16.1 percent in non-slum households in 2000. Only 34.8 percent of children in slum households had received all necessary vaccinations.

North Africa has one of the lowest HIV-prevalence rates in the world. HIV/AIDS rates are highest in males in urban areas and far higher among the high-risk groups. Nevertheless, women are particularly vulnerable as they may contract HIV

TABLE 2.2.2: LITERACY RATES FOR SELECTED NORTH AFRICAN CITIES, 1990 TO 2003 (AGES 15 TO 24)

Country	1990			City	2003					
	male	female	total		male	female	total			
Algeria (2002)	94.1	86.1	90.1	Algiers	86.1	68.1	77.1	94.4	86.7	90.6
Egypt (2005)	90.1	78.9	84.9	Alexandria	84.0	60.4	72.2	90.5	76.6	83.6
				Cairo	85.9	61.8	73.8	90.1	76.2	83.2
Libya (2004)	99.5	96.5	98.0	Tripoli	98.9	82.7	90.8	99.8	94.5	97.2
Morocco (2004)	80.8	60.5	70.5	Casablanca	99.9	64.3	82.1	93.8	75.5	84.7
				Rabat	99.9	64.1	82.0	90.2	72.7	81.5
Tunisia (2004)	96.4	92.2	94.3	Tunis	92.8	75.2	84.0	98.1	91.3	94.7
Sudan (2000)	84.6	71.4	77.2	Khartoum	75.6	54.0	64.8	84.4	75.5	80.0

Source: Country data: UN Millennium Indicators Database. City data: UN-HABITAT Global Urban Observatory (GUO)



from a husband and the number of females with HIV is on the rise. Despite the current low rates, social stigmatization has led to under-reporting of HIV/AIDS and, in some cases, a failure to treat the afflicted. In Algeria, improved testing led to a doubling in the documented cases of HIV from 2002 to 2006. Sudan is an exception as HIV prevalence is endemic in Sudanese cities and also high in rural areas, particularly in the south where an estimated 3.1 percent of the population is HIV positive. High rural HIV prevalence is common in sub-Saharan Africa, but not in North Africa.

## Trans-national Migration

All the countries in the region of North Africa, with the exception of Libya, are experiencing continued out-migration of a working-age population in search of better economic opportunity. Gateway cities are the major transit points. In particular, port cities on the Moroccan coast and from Mauritania through the Canary Islands are key departure points for poorer migrants seeking work in Europe.

Like other oil producing countries, Libya has been a destination for migrants from Egypt and other North African countries. In the 1990s there was a surge in Sub-Saharan African migration following the enactment of a pan-African policy that allowed residents of all African countries to enter without visas. In 1995, the number of non-Libyans in the country doubled and Libyan authorities estimate that each year between 75,000 and 100,000 foreign nationals enter the country. This massive influx has led to a surge of anti-immigration sentiment in recent years prompting authorities to deport hundreds of thousands of primarily Sub-Saharan African migrants. Official estimates of irregular migrants are 750,000 to 1.2 million but experts cite 2.0 to 2.5, of which 1 to 1.5 million are from Sub-Saharan Africa. Libya is also a stepping stone for illegal immigration through Italy into the European Union.

Migrants first came from neighbouring Sudan, Chad and Niger, which have since become transit countries for labourers

from a wider range of Sub-Saharan African countries. In addition to the oil sector, migrants work in agriculture, construction, animal husbandry, repair and maintenance, and the informal economy. They initially settled in the southern border towns but now are spread across the country providing heavy labour in the construction and agricultural sectors, jobs that other North African migrants are less willing to take.

## Synergies Among Cities and With Rural Areas

Despite the fact that the agricultural sector still accounts for 42.7 percent of jobs in North Africa, cities have become the real engines of the region's economic growth. The main cities have the vast majority of formal industrial and service jobs and most referral hospitals and higher education institutions. While agriculture will continue to play an important role in the economy of most North African countries, especially as world food prices rise, urban industrial output per job is on average five times higher than in agriculture. In oil exporting countries, the ratio of GDP output per industrial job is even higher, as the impact of oil wealth is concentrated in the primary cities. The economies of Tunisia and Morocco have become primarily service-based. This is also the case in Egypt and Algeria, where the majority of urban workers are employed in services. Looking to the future, cities will drive North African growth in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as they will in other parts of the world.

Recent increases in the price of oil have benefited the economies of the oil exporting countries in North Africa and provided the resources for social development and infrastructure projects. In Algeria, the share of GDP based on petroleum jumped from 30.6 percent in 2004 to 45.3 percent in 2005. The Libyan economy is almost entirely oil dependent and, in 2006, 74.1 percent of its GDP came from the petroleum sector. In Sudan, where GDP grew at 11.8 percent in 2006, oil has been central to the rapid modernization of Khartoum.

TABLE 2.2.3: NORTH AFRICAN EMPLOYMENT AND GDP BY SECTOR

	Value Added GDP (%)			Employment (%)			Jobs to GDP Ratio		
	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services
Algeria	8.1 (a)	61.0 (a)	30.9 (a)	21.1 (b)	24.0 (b)	54.8 (b)	0.38	2.53	0.56
Egypt	13.8 (a)	41.1 (a)	45.1 (a)	29.9 (b)	19.8 (b)	50.4 (b)	0.46	2.08	0.89
Libya	2.1 (a)	81.7 (a)	16.2 (a)	17.0 (a)	23.0 (a)	59.0 (a)	0.12	3.55	0.27
Morocco	15.0 (a)	38.2 (a)	46.8 (a)	45.6 (b)	19.8 (b)	35.5 (b)	0.33	1.93	1.32
Tunisia	11.5 (a)	30.0 (a)	58.5 (a)	55.0 (a)	23.0 (a)	22.0 (a)	0.21	1.30	2.66
Mauritania	13.0 (b)	48.0 (b)	39.1 (b)	50.0 (a)	10.0 (a)	40.0 (a)	0.26	4.78	0.98
Sudan	31.5 (a)	35.7 (a)	32.8 (a)	80.0 (a)	7.0 (a)	13.0 (a)	0.39	5.10	2.52
Average	13.6	47.9	38.5	42.7	18.1	39.2	0.32	2.65	0.98

Sources: (a) CIA World Factbook and (b) World Bank World Development Indicators

## Travel and Tourism

The economies of the North African countries benefit greatly from their unique cultural heritage, including historical cities and important archaeological sites. They are also endowed with natural assets that have become major tourist attractions. In 2007, 16.4 million tourists went to North Africa and travel and tourism accounted for 13.3 percent of the region's GDP and 12.8 percent of employment. Tourism currently generates 5,744,000 jobs and is projected to generate more than 12 million by 2017. Tourism plays a particularly critical role in the economies of Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt and considerable investments have been made to ensure their continued competitiveness. Egypt has almost half of North Africa's market share, with almost 10 million in 2007. The Ministry of Tourism predicts that it will reach 16 million in 2014. In 2006, the industry generated US\$6.4 billion and provided employment for close to 2.2 million workers directly and indirectly.

Tourism infrastructure and services tend to be concentrated in the region's main cities and they are both gateways and destinations as 46 percent of international tourists arrive by air. In Morocco, 1.3 million tourist-nights were spent in Marrakech, one million in Agadir and 300,000 in Casablanca. Alexandria is Egypt's most popular summer resort area and its population swells by over a million vacationers. In 2006, the Governorate recorded 570,000 visitors and 802,000 hotel nights. Aside from its Greco-Roman heritage that attracts foreign visitors, the Bibliotheca Alexandrina is becoming a major attraction with close to a million visitors in 2006. An ambitious project to establish an underwater archaeological

museum to view the remnants of the Ptolemaic city is bound to spur further growth in tourism. Although there are short term studies that link oil price increases to decreases in air travel, global studies of mobility all point to the strong positive correlation between GDP per capita and air travel. As emerging economies continue to grow, global demand for air travel will increase (barring a major long-lasting global recession, which unfortunately is looking more and more possible each day).

The region's medieval historic cores are, or can become, major tourism attractions. Yet most of these older neighbourhoods suffer from a deterioration of their living environment, dilapidation of their housing stocks, obsolete infrastructure, inadequate public services and difficult vehicular access. Almost all the major cities – Cairo, Tunis, Alexandria, Rabat, Marrakech, Fes and Qairawan – have initiated programmes to rehabilitate and safeguard their historical centres. The most successful to date is Tunis' medina project, which is implemented through a collaborative effort of the municipality of Tunis, the Urban Upgrading and Renewal Agency (ARRU), a para-public development company and the *Association pour la Sauvegarde de la Medina de Tunis* (ASM), an NGO whose mission is to preserve and rehabilitate the medina. The success of this ongoing effort, started in the late 80s to simultaneously restore historic buildings and public spaces and improve the housing conditions of lower-income families through micro-credit, has led the government to expand it and establish local associations on the ASM model in each city with a historic core.



▲  
Smog over Casablanca, Morocco  
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▲  
Tripoli  
©Tobias Helbig/iStockphoto

## 2.3

# Urban Poverty and Housing Conditions

### Urban Poverty and Inequality: The Incidence of Urban Poverty

Poverty in the North African context is different than for Africa as a whole. The proportion of people living below the poverty line (US\$1 per day PPP) in 2004 averaged only 1.4 percent in Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia as compared to 41.1 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the mid-to-late 1990s, the percentage of the urban population living at or below each country's urban poverty line was less than 15 percent in Algeria, below 12 percent in Morocco, and less than 4 percent in Tunisia. In Egypt, about one in five urban residents were below the urban poverty line in 2003. Mauritania and Sudan are exceptions to the low regional poverty levels, with 40 percent of both countries' populations living below the poverty level.

After 30 years of decline, world food prices have risen dramatically, in recent years, particularly such staple grains as wheat, rice and corn. As a result, the purchasing power of the urban poor is dropping and protests against rising food prices erupted in 2007 in Egypt, Mauritania and Sudan.

Income levels are only one indicator measuring poverty and human development; access to employment, healthy living conditions and gender equality are other factors that need to be evaluated. Most North African countries have made good progress in these areas, although unemployment and gender disparities remain problematic issues. Algeria, Libya, and Morocco are on target to meet most of the eight MDGs and Egypt and Tunisia are expected to meet them all due to sustained efforts and economic growth.

### Housing Supply and Affordability

High rates of urbanization and increasing per capita income have fuelled urban housing prices, a trend that has most acutely affected lower and lower-middle income households. In Algeria and Morocco the cost of a market rate dwelling equals eight to nine times the annual earnings of a middle-income family and approximately five times in Egypt and Tunisia. While overall housing supply is sufficient in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, housing prices are too high for most middle-income families and there is a housing shortage for lower-income households.

A major factor affecting affordability is the price and availability of serviced land. The public sector owns more than 30 percent of urban land in Algeria and between 20 percent and 30 percent in Morocco and Egypt. Rigid land development regulations and burdensome registration procedures for land titles have led to a scarcity of legally developable land and have contributed to the country's housing shortage.

The construction of privately financed rental housing has declined in the formal sector as a result of tenant protection laws. It has remained stable in the informal sector where existing regulations are not enforced. Furthermore the condition of the existing stock of formal rental units has deteriorated. Despite laws exempting newly built units from rent regulations in Egypt, more than 20 percent of newly constructed apartments in the New Towns around Cairo are purposely kept vacant by owners for future use, rather than rented in the meantime. The gap between supply and demand has led to overpricing of rental units in informally constructed buildings. The rental sector remains underdeveloped and does not benefit from general support in most countries.

Public sector provision of housing has not been sufficient to meet demands of the oil economies of Libya and Algeria. In Libya, the UN economic sanctions of the 1990s, combined with a drop in oil prices, constrained public expenditures while high rates of population growth and urbanization created a pent up demand for housing. In Tripoli, the current shortage of 95,000 units is expected to increase to 300,000 by 2010. As of 2006, government expenditure on housing was 43.5 percent of the state's total development budget. Estimates of the housing shortage in Algeria range from 1.2 to two million dwellings based on an occupancy rate of five persons per unit. The 2001-2004 Economic Recovery Programme, financed largely by oil revenues, included a substantial housing component and resulted in the construction of 750,000 units. A follow up programme from 2005 to 2009 has promised to deliver one million units, bringing the housing stock to a total of 6.9 million units for 34.2 million inhabitants. About 45 percent of these units are

designated as social housing. By June 2007, official estimates indicated that close to 400,000 units had been constructed and were occupied. Algeria's *Agence pour l'Amélioration et le Développement du Logement* (AADL) was created in 1991 as a public sector developer for the construction of affordable lease-purchase housing projects financed by the National Savings and Loans Bank. It secures state-owned lands that it services and resells to developers.

In contrast, housing in Tunisia is largely produced by the private sector. Less than 20 percent of urban land is government-owned and about 95 percent of housing construction is carried out by private companies. Housing is more affordable and the majority of housing needs are being met. By 2003, government programmes had reduced the housing backlog to 24,000 units and the most recent census indicates that the housing stock has reached 5.2 million units for a total population of just over 10 million. However, despite the investment of US\$10 million in the upgrading of informal settlements in 23 low-income neighbourhoods in Tunis, informal housing still represented 25 percent of the city's housing stock. While a continued focus on housing since 2002 has likely reduced that percentage, rising prices of raw materials, labour and land continue to make purchasing a home in the formal sector difficult for lower income groups. To rectify this situation, Tunisia's 11<sup>th</sup> development plan (2007 to 2011) mandates the construction of about 300,000 private-sector housing units, 70 percent of which will be earmarked for families with monthly incomes under US\$500.

An interesting recent development in Egypt is the involvement of international private developers in the construction of mixed-income projects in the Greater Cairo region. Orascom Housing Communities (OHC) is a recently established partnership between Orascom Hotels and Development, Egypt's largest private real estate developer, Blue Ridge Capital and Equity International in the USA and Homex in Mexico. The company's first project is the construction of more than 50,000 subsidized, affordable units in the 6<sup>th</sup> of October New Town in an area of 8.4 million square meters, a total investment of around US\$2.8 billion. The government land is given to the consortium at a subsidized cost on the condition that units are allocated to moderate-income families (earning below £E1,500 per month).

## Housing Finance and Mortgage Markets

In most North African countries, housing finance options have been dominated by state-owned housing banks, often offering subsidized interest rates, and leaving little room for the development of market-based financing. Until the late 1990s, the mortgage market in Algeria was dominated by the *Caisse nationale d'épargne et de prévoyance*, a publicly owned bank. In 2002, Algeria started taking steps to reform its housing finance sector with World Bank assistance. The programme provides technical assistance to public and private banks and training of their operational staff and addresses inefficiencies in the property titling and registration systems, a difficulty facing many North African countries.

Private sector financing in Tunisia dates back to the 1980s and is the most advanced, with Morocco following close behind. Nevertheless private financing in both countries primarily benefits higher and upper-middle income groups. In Tunisia, high interest rates and a minimum down payment of 30 percent of the purchase price inhibit access to private financing for moderate cost housing.

In 2001, the Egyptian parliament enacted a private sector regulatory mortgage finance framework and capitalized the first privately owned housing lending institutions. The law allows banks to provide both government subsidized and regular loans for the purchase or improvement of homes and commercial buildings. However, cumbersome application procedures for land titling and limited property registration in urban areas, in part the result of high registration fees, have inhibited urban residents from taking advantage of these loans. Most households still rely on financing through housing developers or one of the following three options:

- Housing loans from the Housing and Development Bank, which are offered to middle, upper-middle and high income households at lower interest rates than commercial banks;
- The Government Employee Housing Projects Fund that offers civil servants housing subsidies in the form of matching grants;
- Government-subsidized 40-year loans at an interest rate of 5-6 percent to lower-income groups through housing cooperatives, usually for a housing unit priced at about £E15,000. However, these programmes have been scaled back in recent years due to the high subsidy required per unit.

In the absence of long-term financing, families in the informal market finance their homes in stages. First, they purchase the land, then build a small house, and finally extend it as circumstances and resources allow. A typical method of purchasing land and housing in the informal market, common in North Africa and in many developing countries, has been a system of deferred instalment sales contracts offered by small developers which require prospective buyers to pre-finance their building plot and/or house. The contract requires the buyer to pay for the property in a series of instalments that are linked to the progress of construction with the title transferred to the buyer at the completions of the project.

While this approach allows lower- and middle-income households to accede to home ownership, a better-developed mortgage system would allow them to take out longer-term loans and spread out payments over a longer time period, making the housing purchase more affordable.

Traditionally, Islamic financial institutions in North Africa lend to businesses, both small and large. Rather than charging interest, they become partners with borrowers and share in their profits. Developing products that would allow these institutions to finance housing would increase available financing sources and create new opportunities for more families to buy a home.

## Impacts of Micro-Credit Programmes

Housing microfinance is a growing trend in North African countries and, in some cases, provides a good alternative to conventional mortgages and has the potential to create employment and to provide women with income generation options. Egypt and Morocco are leaders in the region. Egypt has the longest history of microfinance and many successful microfinance institutions. Lending increased rapidly after the introduction of group foundations lending to women in the early 1990s. By the end of 2003, the country's microfinance institutions and programmes had an outstanding loan portfolio of more than US\$56 million and 256,000 active borrowers.

The growth of microfinance in Morocco has been remarkable. Two years after the passage of its Microfinance Act in 1999 there were 297,000 active borrowers a loan portfolio of US\$61 million. Two major microfinance institutions, Zakoura and Al Amana, account for 73 percent of the market and focus on women, who represent almost 80 percent of borrowers in Morocco as compared to less than 50 percent in Egypt. The Zakoura Microcredit Foundation has almost doubled loan disbursements every year since its foundation in 1995. The number of borrowers has grown from 3,000 in 1997 to almost 370,000 at the end of 2006. Loans are given not only for the development of income-generating enterprises but also for housing purchase or construction as well as for connections to basic utilities. The repayment rate of Zakoura's clients is very high at 99.7 percent. Tunisia and Mauritania's microfinance sectors are still small and Algeria and Sudan are taking steps to develop this area with the assistance of multilateral organizations.

## Informal Developments and Slum Conditions

In the context of North Africa, it is important to distinguish between slums and informal settlements. As is the case in most developing countries, North African governments are aware of the role informal housing plays in alleviating housing pressure

and supplying affordable shelter to lower-income households and rely to varying degrees on its ability to do so. In Tripoli, for example, with the government's tacit consent, housing demand is being met in part by the construction of housing on land zoned as green belt on the city's master plan.

Informal housing is generally defined as units that are not in compliance with current regulations, including one or more of the following violations: illegal conversion of land to urban use; unauthorized subdivision of land; non-compliance with subdivision regulations; building without a permit; unauthorized construction of rental units; or non-compliance with building codes. Families living in informal settlements may own their land. For the most part, they have well-built homes constructed of durable materials with access to safe water and electricity, although sanitation is often lagging and inadequate. In the majority of cases, property has been legally transferred but titles are often unregistered and buildings may be in violation of existing codes.

In the North African context, slums may involve illegal occupancy of land in addition to one or more of the four primary shelter deprivations defined by UN-HABITAT: lack of access to safe water sources, lack of access to sanitation, a lack of durable housing, or a lack of sufficient living area. The distinction between informal settlements and slums is particularly telling in Alexandria. In 2006, the governorate recorded 1,583,978 persons, or 40.7 percent of Alexandria's total population living in 62 informal areas. By comparison, 2005 UN-HABITAT data indicated that only 7.2 percent of Alexandria's total residents lived in slums, and that almost all of them were experiencing only one shelter deprivation, generally access to sanitation. Slums also include dilapidated remnants of old rural and fringe settlements engulfed by urbanization where fragmented ownership has hindered redevelopment.

The growth in informal settlements varies from city to city. In the Greater Cairo Region, 62 percent of the area's twelve million inhabitants live in 81 informal settlements, either on agricultural land that has been illegally subdivided or encroaching on state-owned desert land. Despite laws enacted to protect agricultural land, 80 percent of informal

TABLE 2.3.1: CHANGES IN THE SLUM POPULATION IN NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

	Slum population in urban areas		Growth	Slum population as a percent of urban pop.	
	1990	2001	%	1990	2001
Algeria	1,507,570	2,100,520	39.3	11.8	11.8
Egypt	14,086,900	11,761,700	-16.5	57.5	39.9
Libya	1,241,860	1,674,060	34.8	35.2	35.2
Mauritania	826,658	1,530,780	85.2	94.3	94.3
Morocco	4,456,960	5,579,170	25.2	37.4	32.7
Sudan	5,707,580	10,106,900	77.1	86.0	86.0
Tunisia	425,340	234,173	44.9	9.0	3.7

Source: UN-HABITAT GUO Data

development in Egypt is on illegally converted agricultural land, which has resulted in a loss of more than 400,000 hectares in 25 years.

In 2001, about 37 percent of the urban population in the seven countries of North Africa lived in slums. With the exception of Tunisia and Egypt, whose slum populations have decreased, the number of slum residents either increased or remained steady between 1990 and 2001. It should be noted that this number is somewhat inflated by the UN-HABITAT shelter deprivation overcrowding criterion (over two persons per room). However, slums in North African cities are very different from those in other areas of Africa, as the majority of their residents tend to suffer from only one of the four shelter deprivations defined by UN-HABITAT. In Egypt, 34.5 percent of the urban population experienced only one shelter deprivation in 2001, while in Morocco it was 29 percent. Shelter deprivation, involving access to water and sewer will be expanded upon in Section 2.4, Urban Environmental Challenges.

The number and type of shelter deprivations experienced by slum dwellers differ from country to country and even city to city. In Morocco, for example, safe sanitation is prevalent but overcrowding occurs. In Casablanca and Rabat, 11.8 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively, of slum households did not have sufficient living area in 2004, a trend reflecting the country's high cost of housing and the necessity of young households to continue living with their parents. Nevertheless overcrowding has been substantially reduced since 1992 when 27.3 percent of households in Casablanca and 20.4 percent in Rabat did not have sufficient living area. Sudan and Mauritania have had the fastest slum growth rates but are also the poorest countries in the region. In Sudan, the slum population grew from under six million in 1990 to more than 10 million in 2001. In Khartoum in 2000, 89.6 percent of the city's population lived in slums and 71.8 percent of slum households were faced with either two or three shelter deprivations as defined by the UN-HABITAT criteria. Only 18 percent of Khartoum's residents had access to improved sanitation in 2000, and only 17.8 percent had homes with

finished floors, an indicator of housing durability. Among the slum population, and particularly in fringe squatter settlements, are an estimated two million southerners displaced by the civil war. In Mauritania, over the same period, the slum population nearly doubled from about 800,000 to about 1,500,000. The capital Nouakchott absorbed much of this increase with 76.9 percent of its population categorized as slum households in 2000; 34.9 percent of Nouakchott's households suffered from all four shelter deprivations, while 28.2 percent dealt with two deprivations. Almost 40 percent lived in makeshift housing while another 40 percent lacked access to sanitation.

### Slum Upgrading and Resettlement Programmes: Cities Without Slums

Only Tunisia and Egypt have seen a reduction in the absolute number of slum dwellers since the early 1990s. In Tunisia, slums as a percentage of the total housing stock decreased from 23.7 percent in 1975 to 2.7 percent in 1994 and the country's urban slum population declined from 425,340 in 1990 to 234,173 in 2001. Egypt's progress is equally remarkable considering its large population and the existence of the region's only megacity, Cairo. The number of people living in slums decreased by almost 2.5 million from 1990 to 2001 and slum households as a percentage of urban households declined from 57.5 percent to 39.9 percent. Progress on slum upgrading is even more marked in the main cities of Cairo and Alexandria, as the percent of the population living in slums in the two cities decreased from 37.9 and 33.5 percent in 1992 to 13.7 and 7.2 percent in 2005, respectively.

Tunisia has an impressive record of successful slum upgrading and prevention. Controlling sprawl, improving housing conditions in the older districts, regularizing substandard fringe settlements and providing the urban population with potable water, sanitation, schools and health facilities have been given priority since the early 1980s. Housing improvements have focused primarily on the informal settlements located

TABLE 2.3.2: LIVING CONDITIONS OF URBAN HOUSEHOLDS (%)

Country	City	Year	Access to safe water	Improved sanitation	Finished main floor material	Sufficient living area
Egypt	Alexandria	2005	99.9	94.3	100.0	98.0
Egypt	Cairo	2005	99.6	89.2	99.6	96.8
Mauritania	Nouakchott	2000	94.4	59.8	62.9	50.3
Morocco	Casablanca	2004	100.0	98.9	100.0	88.2
Morocco	Rabat	2004	99.9	99.7	97.9	93.1
Sudan	Khartoum	2000	96.0	18.0	17.8	54.9

Source: UN-HABITAT State of African Cities 2008, Statistical Annex



▲  
River Nile Panorama, Cairo ©André Klaassen/shutterstock

on the urban periphery. Initially, most public investment for housing improvement programmes targeted the Greater Tunis Region. The Urban Upgrading and Renovation Agency (ARRU) implements upgrading policies and controls all stages of project execution including resolving land ownership issues, undertaking project studies, and monitoring projects implemented jointly with the concerned local authorities. ARRU's 2007-2009 rehabilitation programme allocated 60 percent of programme expenditures for upgrading 14 settlements in Greater Tunis' urban periphery affecting close to 100,000 inhabitants. The remaining 40 percent were divided among 11 provinces. Seventy percent of expenditures go to financing infrastructure and public facilities and 30 percent to fostering small and microenterprises. The success of Tunisia's slum upgrading efforts is largely related to its well-structured institutional framework comprising a range of key stakeholders, including public lending institutions, municipalities, government agencies, NGOs and CBOs whose interventions are coordinated by ARRU. One of the strengths of ARRU was its ability to adapt to the greater role given to local governments by decentralization and to incorporate their input in the elaboration of its interventions.

Egypt's 1993 National Slum Upgrading Policy focused on improving living standards in informal settlements and providing slums with basic infrastructure. It has led to a substantial improvement of housing conditions. Informal settlements are categorized into those that can be serviced and improved and those that cannot be upgraded *in situ* either because of their location within strategic sectors or due to their advanced state of dilapidation. During the first phase of the policy from 1993 to 2003, 904 areas in 16 governorates were upgraded at a cost of E£4 billion. In a number of cases upgrading projects were implemented through NGOs and with local community participation. The Cairo Governorate has prepared upgrading plans for 81 informal settlements

located on government owned land and privately owned agricultural land. Services are being extended to another 68 settlements. When upgrading was not possible, the inhabitants were relocated to new public housing projects and the smaller cleared sites (mostly located in dense neighbourhoods lacking public amenities) were converted into public gardens.

Slum upgrading has been a priority in Morocco since the 1980s, when it established the *Agence Nationale de la Lutte contre l'Habitat Insalubre* (ANHI), a parastatal organization that took on the role of a public land developer to resettle slum dwellers in new mixed-income housing projects. Considerable progress has been made in spite of rapid urbanization. In 2003, 900,000 households, one-third of urban dwellers, lived in substandard housing. Of those, 212,000 urban households resided in 885 slum settlements in 70 urban areas, the highest concentration being in the Casablanca-Fes-Tangier triangle.

In 2004 the Government launched an aggressive slum upgrading programme with the goal of providing all slum households with improved units by 2010 and meeting the needs of family formation. This ambitious programme involves the private sector in the development of 100,000 affordable housing units and serviced lots per year. A survey of slum dwellers found that only one third of residents were able to afford new subsidized apartments. As a result, four housing options are provided: on site upgrading (29 percent), partially serviced lots (15 percent), fully serviced lots (35 percent), and apartment units (21 percent).

Up to 2006, 693 projects involving 560,800 units were launched. Completion has been slower than expected and only 24,500 units had been allocated by the end of September 2005 and another 11,000 remained unsold to eligible slum dwellers unable or unwilling to buy. A Housing Solidarity Fund has been created, financed by transfers from the state budget and receipts on the tax on cement, to subsidize access to the housing options offered. The government guarantees





## Land Tenure, Property Rights and Titling

up to 70 percent of housing loans, encourages micro-finance for housing, and subsidizes housing savings programmes. As a result, there has been a rapid decrease in the percentage of slum households from 1992 to 2004. In Casablanca and Rabat, the proportions fell from 32.9 percent to 12.9 percent and 28 percent to 9 percent respectively. By 2004, no household had more than two shelter deprivations and the vast majority had only one, largely related to overcrowding. Access to water, sanitation and durable housing is now almost universal in these cities. For 2008, the government's priorities are to demolish an additional 50,000 slum units, provide another 150,000 social units and declare 14 new cities as *Cities without Slums*.

Mauritania's urbanization took place for the most part in squatter settlements on the fringe of the capital city of Nouakchott and in the other main cities – Nouhadibou, Kiffa, Kaédi, Rosso and Atar – resulting in a sharp increase in urban poverty. The government's initial attempts to legalise squatter settlements and provide services at highly subsidized prices were overwhelmed as Mauritania became one of the fastest urbanizing countries in the world. Since 1996, slum upgrading has become part of the government's poverty reduction strategy. Slum upgrading objectives are supported by key performance indicators and well-defined targets related to regularizing land titles and providing access to subsidized housing, services and microcredit. Funding has been allocated to meet these targets. Construction contracts for 149 projects were allocated for the most part to small construction firms whose activities were managed by the National Executive Agency for Public Works (AMEXTIP). By the time of its completion in 2001, the project had provided 46,281 work months of temporary construction jobs. The neighbourhood upgrading programme has been continued as a priority government intervention with an annual average expenditure of US\$6.45 million.

Land regulation in North Africa has a substantially different context than in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. As in other Arab countries, land tenure laws derive from the traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Changes during the colonial period privatized state-owned agricultural land held under usufruct rights and mandated the registration of titles but did not alter property tenure rights. In the postcolonial period, tenant protection laws, including rent regulation, have discouraged the construction of privately financed rental units. Prescription rights and the protection of inhabited dwellings have provided the legal foundation for the regularization of informal housing and mandated the resettlement of slum dwellers displaced by upgrading and renewal projects with compensation of property owners even when titles are unregistered. As a result, informal settlements in the region have varying degrees of security and, in general, the violation of building codes does not affect security of tenure. In the case of informal development on privately owned land, whether involving illegal conversion of agricultural land to urban use or illegal subdivisions, occupants almost always possess a sales contract certifying the transaction which upholds their tenure rights in spite of the fact that they do not have a registered land title.

Squatters on state-owned land face different challenges, but generally have a greater security of tenure than in other countries, except in the case of encroachment on land designated for public services such as utilities, roads, and open space and community facilities. In these cases, the inhabitants are usually relocated.

Sudan is an exception to the higher levels of security of tenure in the region as tenure laws did not grant prescription rights on government owned land. Khartoum's 2002 census indicated that while 80 percent of residents of inner city slums had secure tenure, only 10 percent of those living in squatter settlements did. These residents can be evicted by the authorities and have no incentive to improve their dwellings.

## 2.4

# Urban Environmental Challenges

### Water and Sanitation

All North African countries, with the exception of Sudan, have been making significant improvements to their urban water distribution and sanitation systems since 1990. In Sudan, the percent of urban households with access to improved drinking water declined from 85 percent in 1990 to 78 percent in 2004. Despite an 85 percent improvement in Mauritania since 1990, only 59 percent of urban households had access to improved drinking water in 2004. It is estimated that some 30 percent of the urban population lived in substandard neighbourhoods lacking both urban infrastructure and services in 2005. In both Mauritania and Sudan, household sanitation connections are quite rare and fewer than half of urban households have water connections.

In the other North African countries, an average 84 percent and 70 percent of urban households had individual connections to improved water and sanitation respectively. In Egypt, access to safe water is practically universal in urban areas and more than 98 percent of households in Cairo and Alexandria had piped water in 2005. In smaller cities, fewer urban households have access to sanitation: 79.3 percent in Beni Suef, 68.6 percent in Aswan and 62.7 percent in Asyut in 2003.

While water connections have become common throughout North African cities, greater improvements are needed in delivering high quality sanitation systems. In all but Algeria, at least one quarter of urban households do not have individual sanitation connections.

### Water Shortages

Primarily arid, North Africa suffers from limited supplies of fresh water. Population increase, agriculture, and increasing wealth are putting higher demands on water resources. Egypt only has 25 cubic meters of renewable internal fresh water per capita compared to 9,443 in the United States. In addition, experts have raised concerns about the future of the Nile which, because of high usage, is almost drained dry before it reaches the Mediterranean Sea. Given that, on average, 84 percent of freshwater consumption in North African countries goes to agriculture, aggressive policies to rationalize consumption and reuse grey-water must be implemented to reduce agricultural water use. Water shortages have led to North African countries becoming some of the world's fastest growing grain import

TABLE 2.4.1: PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH ACCESS TO IMPROVED DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION IN 2004

	Improved Water Access			Water: Household Connection			Improved Sanitation Access			Sanitation: Household Connection		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
Algeria	85	88	80	74	85	58	92	99	82	68	84	45
Egypt	98	99	97	85	99	74	70	86	58	36	68	13
Libya (2000)	71	72	68	54	54	55	97	97	96	54	54	55
Mauritania	53	59	44	25	32	13	34	49	8	5	7	2
Morocco	81	99	56	57	86	17	73	88	52	42	70	4
Sudan	70	78	64	26	46	13	34	50	24	0	1	0
Tunisia	93	99	82	74	94	38	85	96	65	49	75	4
Average	79	85	70	56	71	38	69	81	55	36	51	18

Source: World Health Organization



▲  
Marrakech, Morocco  
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markets, a circumstance that has led to outbreaks of urban violence in relation to the current world high food prices.

Water conservation is of critical importance to ensure that cities have the water supply that they need to remain engines of economic growth. Growing urban demand for water has necessitated the shift of water use from irrigation toward urban water supply. Increased water and sewer connections, although positive in their own right, have led to increased water use. While pricing may be an effective means of rationing consumption, access to fresh water is widely viewed in the area as a basic human right. Therefore, basic minimum water requirements must be provided at reasonable rates, while the supply must be increased rapidly to meet average per capita consumption requirements. In urban areas, water system losses should be remedied and household grey-water and storm-water need to be collected, treated, and reused for industrial or agricultural purposes.

## Energy

North African nations generally consume more energy per capita than the rest of Africa but less than Europe or North America. Libya is the greatest per capita consumer of fuel and energy but its consumption is still only about half that of France or Germany. The majority of the region's energy consumption comes from fossil fuels, although Sudan, which relies heavily on combustible renewables for cooking, is the exception. Equivalent data for Mauritania were not available. In 2003, over 96 percent of households had access to electricity in Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said, Casablanca, Fes, Meknes Marrakech, and Rabat. In Tangier and Khartoum, 89.4 and 54.2 percent had connections.

In Casablanca and Rabat in 2004, over 99 percent of households relied on electricity to light their homes. Gas provided fuel for 99.8 percent of households in Casablanca and 98.4 percent in Rabat. In Cairo and Alexandria, households relied almost exclusively on liquefied petroleum

TABLE 2.4.2: 2004 ENERGY CONSUMPTION

	Kwh per Capita Electricity Consumption	Energy Use (kg of Oil Equivalent per Capita)	Fossil Fuels (% of Energy Consumption)	GDP per Unit of Energy
Algeria	899	1,058	100	\$5.73
Egypt	1,245	841	96	\$5.44
Libya	3,299	3,218	99	\$3.38
Tunisia	1,194	843	87	\$7.57
Morocco	644	458	95	\$7.76
Mauritania	..	..	..	..
Sudan	94	499	20	\$3.43

Source: World Development Indicators

and natural gas in 2005. Slum households were more likely to rely on kerosene. Sub-Saharan African cities rely much more extensively on firewood, charcoal and kerosene for both cooking and lighting.

## Urban Transport

Worsening congestion and gridlocked traffic undermine the functional efficiency of cities, impeding their ability to attract and retain economic activities and adversely affecting their ability to act as engines of growth. Hence the recent importance placed by all North African cities on investment in transport infrastructure.

Rapid urbanization and increases in private automobile ownership and use are creating a transportation management crisis across many of the world's cities. North African cities are no exception. Larger urban areas, in particular, tend to have higher rates of auto ownership and greater levels of congestion. Mega-cities such as Cairo are hard pressed to keep up with the rising number of vehicles, lack of parking space and endemic congestion.

The long, linear transport networks in the coastal cities are prone to inefficiency and congestion. This situation also affects the environmentally sensitive wetlands, brackish water bodies and fragile ecologic systems that surround them. Tunis has reclaimed land around the lake to create waterfront sites for urban expansion. Alexandria, stretching along 30 kilometres wedged between the Mediterranean coast and brackish lakes, seeks to expand southwards around the lakes. The lakes are heavily polluted by industrial waste discharge and encroachments by formal and informal builders. They will require extensive treatment and vigilant protection to restore their ecology.

While nearly all North African cities face challenges in urban transportation management, there is great variety in the transportation systems. In Mauritania and Sudan, transport is dominated by informal operators. Both countries have road fatality rates well above the North African average and also the Sub-Saharan African average of 28.3 fatalities per 100,000 people. At 31.3, Tunisia has an unusually high road fatality rate for North Africa. Vehicle ownership rates increased 38 percent from 60 vehicles per 1,000 people in 2002 to 83 vehicles in 2004. Road traffic in Tunisia's major cities has been growing steadily since the 1970s and has reached high levels of congestion. Unlike many other African and Asian cities, however, Tunis has managed to maintain a strong formal public transportation network, 100 percent of mass transportation in 2000, compared to only 6 percent in Algiers in 2004, 48 percent in Cairo in 1998 and 72 percent in Casablanca in 1997.

With one million cars in 2005, Casablanca's vehicle ownership rate of 120 per 1000 persons is two and a half times the national average. In spite of the fact that 54 percent of trips were made on foot, there has been a significant rise in traffic congestion. Other Moroccan cities have yet to reach Casablanca's high levels of congestion and private car use.

Tangiers, for example, has only 26 vehicles per thousand persons. Nevertheless, as Morocco's other cities continue to grow they will face the same challenges as Casablanca.

Like Mexico City, Jakarta and Bangkok, Cairo has become famous for its traffic congestion, noise and pollution. Between 1971 and 1998 car ownership per household increased by 220 percent, the number of trips taken jumped 213 percent, and the mode share for cars and taxis doubled from 13 percent to 26 percent. From 1990 to 1995, Cairo's informal minibus fleet skyrocketed from 15,000 to 95,000 replacing many trips formerly taken by trolley. The metro, which absorbed 17 percent of trips in 1998, has helped offset these trends and reduce much potential road congestion. The city has responded to the challenge with major road infrastructure projects including the network of major arterials and ring roads and extension of the metro lines. The highway system of radials and ring roads has allowed the expansion of the urbanized area along the corridors and supported the development of the new towns. The success of these new settlements and the commercial and industrial activities they attracted, worsened congestion to the central business district (CBD), and created a situation in which roads and viaducts over the Nile cannot be built fast enough to absorb new traffic.

Other North African cities face similar problems, although at a smaller scale. Population growth, rising automobile ownership and the expansion of urbanized areas all bode poorly for congestion and air pollution in the coming years. North African countries, however, have three strengths when it comes to managing urban transport: high frequency of walking trips, high public transport use, and low automobile ownership rates, although the last has been rapidly increasing in some countries. Three dominant urban environments, each having different but interrelated transportation needs, exist in most North African cities:

- Reclaiming sidewalks and travel lanes from illegally parked vehicles is essential to promoting business and tourism and to allowing the free flow of people and shipments in the historic centres and the central business districts. This will require additional off-street parking solutions combined with pricing or other measures to manage parking and transportation demand. Most city centres already have public transportation options, but service and capacity improvements are needed to maintain the functionality in fast growing North African cities.
- High-density residential districts and informal settlements house the majority of the limited-income families but often lack sufficient public transportation and taxis, instead relying on privately operated service vehicles (mostly mini-vans and pick-up trucks). Efficient public transport starting with cost-effective rapid bus systems on dedicated lanes with feeder bus routes can improve access to the city and reduce road congestion. Improved sidewalks, streetscapes and bicycle paths/lanes will ensure that non-motorized modes remain dominant for short shopping and recreation trips.

- Middle and upper class suburban developments rely more on personal automobiles for mobility. It is essential to ensure adequate access to the jobs located in these areas to workers from other neighbourhoods. A combination of public transportation and company vehicles is needed to service these districts, depending on existing infrastructure, job concentration and distance from the city centre. Policies to promote mixed-income housing could also be employed to improve the integration of these developments with the rest of the city.

As cities expand, wealth grows, and the cost of automobiles declines, roads become more congested, despite the pace of highway construction. Although demand management programmes to reduce driving have been applied effectively in other world cities they have not been tested extensively in North African cities where they could be effective. Outside of demand management, improved traffic signalization and enforcement of vehicle standards could reduce pollution and traffic fatalities.

## Waste Management

North African countries generate low amounts of per capita solid waste, but cities often create more total waste than they can dispose of effectively. Rapid urban growth and rising incomes have led to a rapid increase in the production of waste that is set to continue. As a result, trash piles up in empty lots and street sides in some cities, particularly in informal neighbourhoods that lack municipal services. In Tunisia, which produces two million metric tons of solid waste per year, waste generation is growing at three percent per year and is predicted to reach 4.9 million tons per year in 2030. Sixty percent of waste goes to 400 dump sites that lack sanitary infrastructure. The largest, the Greater Tunis Djebel Chekir landfill, opened in 1999 with a capacity of 700,000 metric tons per year and is already at capacity. In Morocco, which generates 4.7 million metric tons of waste per year, the cost of poor waste management is estimated at 0.5% of GDP.

In Cairo and Alexandria in 2005, 19 and 11 percent of slum households respectively disposed of their trash in empty lots or in the street compared to less than three percent of non-slum households. In Casablanca, 12 percent of slum households disposed of waste in the street compared to five percent of non-slum households. In Rabat, however, the situation is reversed with under two percent of slum households but over four percent of non-slum households disposing of waste in the street. Nevertheless a UN-HABITAT report indicates that waste dumping in shantytowns is highly problematic in the city. In Cairo, annual municipal solid waste generated per capita is higher than the national average at 237 kilograms compared to 201. The majority of this waste is organic.

Given the high percentage of organic materials in municipal waste and low recycling rates, North African cities have a lot of room to improve waste management and reduce environmental and economic costs.

## Pollution

Outside of Libya and Algeria, oil-producing nations, each North African country has lower per capita annual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions than the global average of 4.3 metric tons. In total, North Africa emitted 1.7 percent of world CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 2004, less than the 2.3 percent for the rest of Africa. In terms of particulate matter PM<sub>10</sub>, however, North African countries, with the exception of Morocco (22) and Tunisia (32), are well above the global average of 53 micrograms per cubic meter. The most polluted countries are Sudan (173) and Egypt (128), although desert sands may contribute to PM<sub>10</sub> counts. In terms of methane and nitrous oxide emissions, there is a great variety in the sources of pollution across North Africa. Industrial activities account for a far higher percentage of methane emissions in Algeria and Libya than the other countries, which, outside of Morocco, are close to the global average.

Outside of agriculture-related emissions, pollution tends to concentrate in cities where the most people, vehicles and jobs are located. Mega-cities such as Cairo suffer particularly from high levels of noise and air pollution.



▲ Local girls near rubbish dumped on the streets, Manshiet Nasser, Cairo, Egypt. Narrow streets and a lack of amenities mean rubbish from households accumulates in unhealthy heaps.

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TABLE 2.4.3: 2005 NATIONAL EMISSIONS


	Methane			Nitrous Oxide			CO <sub>2</sub> (2004)		Other GHG	
	Total (kt)	Percent Agriculture	Percent Industry	Total (kt)	Percent Agriculture	Percent Industry	Total (kt)	Per Capita (t)	Percent Solid Fuel	Total (kt CO <sub>2</sub> Equivalent)
Algeria	24,310	15.3	66.3	10,330	89.1	7.2	193,828	6.0	1.0	110
Egypt	32,960	44.2	31.2	27,810	85.6	11.5	158,095	2.2	2.1	1,820
Libya	8,540	8.9	77.6	2,050	91.7	0.0	59,861	10.3	0.0	290
Mauritania	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,553	0.9	0.7	..
Morocco	13,240	41.6	2.6	15,510	75.2	0.0	41,132	1.4	35.3	..
Sudan	67,310	73.3	21.5	59,750	96.2	0.0	10,363	0.3	0.0	..
Tunisia	4,390	34.2	32.1	7,230	94.2	4.1	22,864	2.3	0.0	30
Sub-Saharan Africa	..	49.4	24.4	..	54.4	78.5	673,223	0.9	79.2	..
World	6,607,490	43.1	34.8	3,787,800	47.9	82.6	28,974,330	4.3	35.9	601,890

Source: World Development Indicators

## Climate Change and Sea Level Rise

Climate change is expected to affect North African cities through increased vulnerability to flooding in some coastal areas and desertification in others. A loss of agricultural and grazing land has already led to increased conflict throughout the Sahara and Sahel. Eighteen percent of North African urban dwellers live in the low elevation coastal zones that may experience flooding on account of climate change. Alexandria, Algiers, Casablanca, and Tunis are particularly vulnerable to increases in sea levels. Without human intervention to prevent catastrophe, a 50cm increase is predicted to displace over two million people, destroy 214,000 jobs and cost over \$35 billion in the coastal area between Alexandria and Port-Said. The more immediate threat, however, may come from rising water tables, the consequences of which are poorly understood and may require massive infrastructure investments and population displacement. A recent example of new vulnerability and risk is the Algerian oasis town Ghardaïda - a UN World Heritage site some 600 km south of Algiers - which experienced flash floods on 03 October 2008, killing at least 29 people.

Governments can prepare for climate change through disaster preparedness and mitigation, and insurance plans. First and foremost, national and local planning agencies must avoid locating new development in highly vulnerable areas. Where they already exist and relocation is not an option, governments should mitigate the effects of disaster by developing emergency relief and evacuation plans and by providing better drainage systems, levees, and emergency warning systems. Disaster insurance can be used to spread risk and provide disaster recovery funding while avoiding encouraging further development in risk-prone areas. However, given the timeframe of climate change forecasts, the events they predict are not considered priority issues. Problems that will occur in one hundred or two hundred years are all but ignored by central and local governments having to cope with a situation of perpetual crisis management in such urban sectors as housing, infrastructure, transport, etc. Nor are they considered an issue by private developers who seek profits above 30 percent and recovery periods of three to five years for their investments.



▲ With 800,000 residents in just 7.25 km<sup>2</sup>, Manshiet Nasser, an informal settlement on the edge of Cairo, is one of the most densely populated areas in Africa.  
© Jeff Black/IRIN



▲  
Tunis street  
©Danijela Pavlovic Markovic/iStockphoto

## 2.5

# Urban Governance Systems

### National Urban Policy

Urban policy in all North African countries is formulated at the ministerial level and has focused on addressing the results of rapid urban growth that started in the 1950s in the case of Egypt and following independence for the other countries in the region. Most countries have taken a sectoral approach in allocating public investment for the development of designated urban areas and regions. For example, Egypt is divided into seven economic regions for development planning purposes. The Ministry of Planning formulates economic development strategy and the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development prepares the spatial development plans that provide the framework for the governorate and city level plans and projects. However, the regions do not constitute an administrative jurisdiction.

Some countries have taken a multi-sectoral approach. Algeria's 2001 Economic Recovery Programme combines the goals of reducing poverty and creating employment through public investment in infrastructure, support to agricultural production and the promotion of small and medium sized enterprises. From 2001 to 2004 about US\$7 billion of oil revenue was allocated to 16,000 projects of which 2,500 were focused on housing and urban development, the development of telecommunications, strengthening of industry, the improvement of education and the provision of youth facilities. According to the government, the programme generated almost 730,000 jobs, at least half of which were in urban areas improving the quality of life for at least 13 million urban residents. US\$114 billion has been allocated to its next phase bringing the country's public investment ratio to 10% of GDP, among the highest in the world. As a result, the national unemployment rate fell from 27% in 2001 to 15.3% in 2005 (14.8% in urban centres) and to 12.3% in 2006. In Mauritania, the development of economic activities and access to secure land tenure and home ownership has been combined in an integrated poverty reduction strategy since 2001. National policy has focused on improving the quality of life of the urban population through interventions combining poverty reduction and urban improvements, including access to small housing loans, for an annual

investment of US\$38.7 million. The *Twizé* Programme is administered by the national Commission on Human Rights, Poverty Alleviation and Social Integration.

### Decentralization and Local Governance Systems

Even though North African countries enacted decentralization laws in the 1980s, political and fiscal decentralization has lagged far behind functional devolution. The greater responsibility granted to local governments has not been matched by a commensurate transfer of financial resources. Despite the growing powers of governors and mayors of large cities, important local-level decisions are still taken at the ministerial and cabinet level and have to be approved by the president or the king, in the case of Morocco.

The local administration law of 1979 (43/1979) and its subsequent amendments define Egypt's multiple levels of decentralized local administration: governorates, counties (*markaz*), cities and towns, urban districts (*hay*) and villages. The administrative framework consists of parallel and interlinked hierarchies of appointed officials and elected popular councils. Urban governorates and cities are further divided into districts whose head is selected by the members of an elected popular council.

In addition to the delivery of public services, governorates are responsible for the functions of line ministries which are represented within the governorate administration by officials who participate in the planning, implementation and monitoring of national sectoral plans. The objective is to ensure coordination of investments cross-sectorally at the governorate and city level. The governorate and city popular councils have to approve local economic and social development plans and the annual budget proposal submitted to the Ministries of Planning and Finance as well as the final financial results. They also approve projects including urban development projects and can propose new projects and new local taxes and fees.



## Greater Cairo Region

In mid-April 2008, the Greater Cairo Region was reorganised into five governorates with the creation of two new governorates. The region now encompasses a total population of 17.6 million. The redefined Cairo Governorate proper, on the east bank of the Nile, is limited to the area within the ring road with a total population of 6.6 million. To the south and east of the ring road, a new jurisdiction has been created, Helwan Governorate, with a population of 1.7 million. To the northeast, the new town of Al Obour has been integrated into Qaliubiya Governorate, with an urbanized area of 3.5 million people. On the west bank of the Nile, Giza Governorate has been reduced to the area within the ring road with a population of 3.15 million. A new jurisdiction, the 6th of October Governorate, with a population of 2.6 million includes all of the area north and west of the ring road. This reorganization integrates the new towns, formerly managed by special authorities under the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, in the local administration framework. Whether this reform will make the mega-city more manageable is debatable. On the one hand, redistricting will divide the urbanized area into less spatially and socio-economically heterogeneous districts; on the other, it may reduce cooperation and coordination in the delivery of services. Urban and transportation planning will remain centralized. (See also section 2.6)

Morocco's local governance is quite complex. Administrative responsibilities at the municipal level are shared by an appointed prefect, responsible for the police powers in the municipality, and the president of the elected municipal council who is responsible for day-to-day management, including the issuance of building permits. The appointed governor of the Province within which the municipality is located exercises authority over areas which lie outside the prefecture. In cases where the urbanized area has spilled over multiple communal jurisdictions, another level of governance is established for the urban agglomeration with an elected council and a mayor. None of these major actors has authority over any of the other as they all report to the Minister of the Interior. This organizational structure is extremely vulnerable to national and local politics. It accounts for the difficulty experienced in initiating and sustaining action programmes at the local level.

Sudan's size, under-developed infrastructure and multiple ethnic groups have complicated decentralization and local governance. In 1991, the country adopted a federal system of governance with 26 provinces (*wilayat*), 120 governorates (*muhafaza*) and over 600 localities. In principle, local authority rests with the appointed governors and a council elected by the localities. In practice, the central government has maintained legislative and financial control. It provides short slates of candidates, maintains the power to dissolve provincial assemblies and controls the bulk of revenues and expenditures.

Civil war and ethnic violence have undermined the stability of central/local relations in Southern Sudan. The tribal structure of society and the traditional territoriality

of different ethnicities as well as ambiguous central/local, authority and rights contribute to tensions over land rights and tenure. In Northern Sudan, a pilot programme has been initiated to foster decentralization of development decisions in 16 localities. A Community Development Fund provided by the Northern Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund will be used to finance community development and local infrastructure projects and to provide capacity building and support for local governments. In order to obtain funding localities must meet criteria related to planning, budgeting, management and transparency and develop Community Action Plans identifying local needs requiring development funds. Meeting performance criteria releases additional funding. Although none of the localities has yet met the minimum requirements for funding, an institutional assessment concluded that all localities have the capacity to take on devolved responsibility.

In Tunisia, since the adoption of the 1979 national planning law, the central government has played a key role in selecting and financing urban improvement projects, including the eradication of slums, the construction of affordable housing and the promotion of local economic development. The key agencies involved are the Ministry of Public Facilities, Housing and Regional Planning; the Ministry of Economic Development and International Cooperation that acts as a channel for bi- and multi-lateral loans; and the public utilities companies responsible for the planning, construction, operation and maintenance of urban utilities. The basic local administrative unit is the commune governed by an elected mayor and municipal council. It is theoretically endowed with considerable powers, including the preparation of a master plan, a capital improvement programme and development regulations. However, their lack of independent financial resources has generally limited their activities to managing public services – street maintenance, refuse collection, parks and playgrounds, social and cultural clubs – and undertaking modest projects with the participation of national agencies. The Local Communities Support Fund (*Caisse des prêts et de soutien des collectivités locales*) gives low-interest long-term loans to local governments to finance public projects.

Algeria is divided into 48 provinces (*wilaya*). Each of these is governed by a *wali*, a provincial governor appointed by the president who reports to the Ministry of the Interior. The legislative entity for the provinces is a 35 to 55-member executive council, directly elected every four years. The provinces are subdivided into districts led by district chiefs, also appointed by the president. The districts are then subdivided into 1,541 communes that are led by an elected assembly and an elected mayor, but are generally under the authority of provincial leadership. The capital, Algiers, has the statute of a province itself and is divided into districts and communes.

Planning in Mauritania is still largely centralised with no intermediate structure between the State and the communes and with limited powers vested in the governorates, whose function is primarily administrative. The formulation of a national spatial development strategy and its regional

components as well as the preparation of specific urban plans is the responsibility of the Ministry of Equipment and Transportation, which is also responsible for land reform. The Directorate of Buildings, Housing and Urbanism (DBHU) is charged with urban planning, the preparation and enforcement of building regulations, and for the overall management of the regularisation of informal settlements and the allocation of state land to individuals. Specifically, DBHU is responsible for the preparation of urban master plans that include a capital improvement programme, a land use plan, subdivision plans in urban areas, and the designation of areas set aside for future development. It identifies priority projects to be developed as public-private partnerships. AMEXTIP and the Directorate for National Planning and Regional Development are the principal public agencies responsible for the implementation of plans and programmes.

### **Modernization of Municipal Administration Processes**

All of the major cities in North Africa have taken measures to streamline the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures that discourage investors and frustrate citizens. Cairo, Alexandria and Tunis have created Internet portals and instituted one-stop counters to serve investors and citizens. In Egypt, the Ministry of Administrative Development collaborates with governorates in using information and communication technology to expedite the delivery of services, improve performance and build the geographic, statistical and information databases needed to coordinate among the different departments and support decision-making processes. Alexandria governorate has managed to streamline a permitting process that required 38 steps and 25 signatures into a five-hour procedure using digitized databases and the one-stop counter. Cairo governorate is establishing branches to facilitate interaction with district residents and respond to their needs. Direct citizen participation is now possible through the use of interactive pages on web portals to post opinions, complaints and requests, and receive responses without incurring the cost and time necessary to meet with municipal employees.

As a result, the participation of civil society and the activities of non-governmental organizations have expanded throughout the past decade. Community development associations at the neighbourhood level are emerging and becoming more important partners with municipalities in developing and implementing community-based initiatives, often with the support of NGOs operating at the national and city level.

### **Local Government Finance**

In North Africa, central governments have an extensive oversight over municipal finances and control high yield tax bases including property taxation, and only 10 percent of public expenditures are channelled through local authorities. Property taxes, based on a rent equivalent valuation rather than a capital valuation, are assessed and collected centrally. User fees and permits make up a large portion of municipal

budgets, the bulk of which are expended on salaries and other operational expenses. Capital investments are usually financed by the central government, either through a local submission of a project or as part of a national programme.

The rapid growth of urban areas has created major challenges for the provision of adequate housing, open space, public transport and other infrastructure and services. The mismatch between municipal budgets and the demand for public services has created a situation in which most municipalities lack the means to maintain existing levels of service or finance capital investments. A lack of institutional capacity and the fast growth of informal housing and economic activities have further undermined their ability to collect revenue. Assessors have difficulty keeping up with new development and revaluating existing areas, while the large informal sector evades taxation. As a result, actual collections are much lower than potential revenue and formal businesses and registered property owners bear a disproportionate burden of taxation. In Morocco, for example, government transfers and shared taxes cover close to 70 percent of local revenue, the balance coming from a variety of small local taxes and fees. Nearly all municipalities have operating deficits that are covered by periodic government transfers. Servicing the municipal debt, often close to the maximum of 40 percent of recurring revenues allowed by the Municipal Development Bank, causes recurring deficits and further erodes the ability of local government to expand infrastructure and services. Capital investments come from the central government, international development organizations, donors and investors and are often omitted from budgets submitted to the Ministries of Interior and Finance.

Given prevalent household incomes and the importance of providing universal access to potable water and sanitation, the rates that can realistically be charged are often not sufficient to cover the operation, maintenance and replacement costs of public utilities. While there has been considerable progress in providing water, sanitation and education, public transportation is generally inadequate as is the provision of public open space.

### **Urban Planning and Spatial Development**

All North African countries rely heavily on centralized agencies to prepare urban and regional development plans, structural plans for urban agglomerations and plans for large-scale urban projects. In Egypt, the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) under the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, undertakes all of these functions and prepares the master plan for Greater Cairo, and the plans for governorates and cities. It benefits from UN-HABITAT technical support.

Local authorities are responsible for the preparation of detailed plans and land subdivisions for new projects, the regularization of informal settlements and the relocation of inhabitants in settlements that cannot be upgraded. Plans and projects developed by the GOPP and other agencies must be approved by the governorate, popular council and the



▲  
Tunisia  
© Gautier Willaume/iStockphoto

Governor. The Cairo Governorate urban development plan includes the delineation of physically and environmentally deteriorated areas and informal housing areas; the relocation of polluting industries to planned industrial zones along the outer ring road and beyond the urbanized zone, and the reuse of vacated industrial sites as workshop zones for craftsmen. Lately there has been an emphasis on improving municipal management, particularly the lax enforcement of development regulations and building codes.

In the late 1990s, Libya developed a 2000-2025 national physical plan that is currently being revised by the central Urban Planning Agency (UPA) with the support of UN-HABITAT. It aims to create a new spatial planning strategy to 2030. The country has been divided into four planning regions for which spatial development plans at the regional, sub-regional and local levels are being prepared by National Consultancy Offices (NCOs). The plans will provide guidance to local decision-makers, including city councils, planning commissions and the development community. It provides a framework for the coordination of sectoral plans in transport, agriculture, housing, tourism and environmental management. Final regional plans were submitted to the UPA in 2007 and sub-regional plans are scheduled for completion by late 2008. The next step will be to prepare detailed plans for all cities and settlements in the region. A new national Urban Development Programme has been created to coordinate capital investments in infrastructure and urban projects.

In Morocco, the three national agencies involved in urban development activities were merged in 2004 under one holding company, the Al Omrane Group, which is now responsible for all aspects of urban and regional development. The purpose of the reform was to coordinate their activities within a coherent strategy framework and action plan. In 2001, the capitalization of Al Omrane Group and its subsidiaries stood at MAD 2.04 billion and it employed 1,050 persons.

From 2003 to 2007 Al Omrane completed 421,000 housing units, of which 187,000 were in upgrading projects, for a cumulative investment of US\$2.9 billion. It has embarked on

the development of two new towns, played a major role in the poverty reduction effort, and helped generate employment by creating spaces in its projects for small and medium-sized enterprises. It has also managed to attract multilateral and bilateral funding as well as technical assistance and training, notably from the French Development Agency, the US Agency for International Development, the European Investment Bank, the Saudi Development Fund, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, and the European Union's European – Mediterranean Partnership Programme (MEDA).

In Tunisia, responsibility for planning and implementation of urban programmes and projects is primarily vested in the Ministry of Public Facilities, Housing and National Planning (MEHAT). The Ministry is responsible for the preparation of the Five-Year National Plan, regional physical plans and large-scale urban interventions. It supervises the activities of specialized agencies involved in urban improvements and housing:

- The Urban Upgrading and Renewal Agency (ARRU);
- The National Fund for Housing Improvement;
- The Housing Fund for salaried employees that provides flexible, low-interest loans to salaried employees.

The implementation of large development and redevelopment projects is commonly structured as private-public partnerships. One of the key actors is the National Real Estate Development Company an independent company owned by the State.

With the exception of Tunis, Sfax and Sousse, the participation of local governments in the determination of urban strategies is primarily consultative. Responsibility for the preparation of the plan and the financing of capital improvements lies with the Ministry of Public Facilities, Housing and National Planning (MEHAT) and its agencies. Urban plans are approved by the minister and the concerned local government, which also assumes responsibility for the delivery of subdivision and building permits and the enforcement of the development regulations prescribed by the plan. The National Federation of Tunisian Cities assists cities in coordinating projects and programmes and in local capacity building.


# 2.6 Emerging Urban Corridors

## The Greater Cairo Region and the North Delta Region

The North Delta Region (NDR) of Egypt is not a legal entity as such but is used by planners and institutions to analyze the role of the Greater Cairo Region (GCR) - the largest metropolitan region in Africa - in a national context. Despite its own social, economic and cultural strengths, the GCR cannot be viewed as separate from a wider functional region (the NDR) that includes the cities of Alexandria,

Ismailia-Port Said and Suez. Alexandria is Egypt's second cultural capital with major maritime, industrial and tourism functions. Suez and Port Said also have important port facilities in addition to industrial facilities. Such individual economic strengths, however, depend upon transport corridors that connect these urban centres.

FIGURE 2.6.1: THE METROPOLITAN URBAN REGIONS OF THE NDR AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE GCR



Source: JICA and GOPP.

## The NDR and GCR in Figures

The 2007, NDR population was estimated at 55 million – 76 percent of the total Egyptian population, with the GCR accounting for one-third of the total NDR. The NDR is host to almost all of Egypt’s industrial activity and, as a result of high quality infrastructure, more than 50 percent of this industry is found in zones along the GCR-Alexandria and the GCR-Ismailia corridors of the NDR. The remainder is located along the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Suez coasts.

The NDR also contains more than 70 percent of Egypt’s agricultural land, and the urban corridors connecting the GCR, Alexandria, Port Said and Suez have been purposely positioned so as not to infringe on farmlands essential for national food production. These urban development corridors are the result of concerted desert land reclamation by the government.


In Egypt over the past four decades, 22 sites have been identified for new towns, or New Urban Communities (NUCs), to help relieve population pressure and spread economic

activity. The NDR has been assigned 14 of these NUCs. Seven of the eight sites closest to the GCR have now been built. Due to good accessibility along the Cairo-Alexandria, Cairo-Ismailia-Port Said and Cairo-Suez highways, these new towns are serving their intended functions effectively.

## Emerging Urban Corridors in the GCR

Figure 2.6.2 below shows the historical development of the GCR agglomeration along the corridors towards Alexandria and Port Said/Suez. The ribbon development that took place along these inter-city highways was originally intended as desert reclamation for agriculture. But with very fast-increasing GCR land values and equally quick growth of services trade and real estate developments, these land reclamation efforts soon became threatened by the unforeseen and rapid urban spillover from metropolitan Cairo’s peri-urban areas.

FIGURE 2.6.2: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GCR AGGLOMERATION



Source: Adapted from David Sims and Marion Séjourné, 2006, *Understanding Cairo - Informality and the Internal Logic of a Metropolis out of Control*, Power Point Presentation (Unpublished)

## The Cairo-Suez Corridor

The Cairo-Suez highway is the spine of the urban development corridor radiating from the eastern perimeter of the GCR. It has become the key road connecting the eastern NUCs of New Cairo, Shourouq City and Badr City. It leads also to the ring road around the GCR and is expected to link in the near future with a regional ring road currently under construction.

The section of the Cairo-Suez highway within the GCR is about 45 km long and runs parallel to the Cairo-Ismailia urban corridor. The first part of the 62,500 ha land between these corridors is dominated by military functions, while the second part (from the ring road towards Badr City) provides land for residential purposes. Sizable portions of land along both sides of these two highways are now being subdivided among real estate developers to accommodate some of the largest western-style compounds in Egypt, with a total investment exceeding US\$20 billion. This section is characterized by low densities (28 to 75 inhabitants/ha). The area is still under-populated with the total current population not exceeding 140,000 residents. Transportation and other infrastructures are quite adequate for current densities. Infrastructure may have to be upgraded to meet planned population densities.

The main potentials of the Cairo-Suez corridor are economic and demographic with huge investments going into real estate development, recreation and services to accommodate a large portion of the GCR's population growth.

## The Cairo-Alexandria Corridor

The Cairo-Alexandria highway links the GCR from its northwestern side with Alexandria. The 225 km long corridor passes through an officially planned area of 105,000 ha of which 75 percent is designated 'agricultural'. The remaining 25 percent is vacant desert land with an area allocated for a future office park development ('Smart Village') on government-owned land.

A recent study evaluating the economic value of the first 50 km of the GCR-Alexandria corridor revealed that its potentials are much higher than those of the Cairo-Suez Corridor because the development of land unlocked by the corridor is expected to facilitate trade and export activities between the GCR, the Western Giza Airport (under construction) and the maritime port of Alexandria. It also connects the three key governorates of the GCR with the southern gateway, passing through Sadat City - one of the first tiers of NUCs constructed in the 1970s and planned to accommodate one million inhabitants over the next 20 years. An estimated 382,000 new jobs are expected to be generated along this corridor. The Cairo-Alexandria corridor further passes through an area designated for land reclamation, where agricultural production already represents more than 37 percent of total Egyptian agri-exports during the period 1982-2006. About 42,000 ha (40 percent of the total area) is allocated to agri-export activities.


However, the envisaged developments also raise some adverse challenges, including:

- Urban sprawl associated with the construction of 16 large residential compounds occupying 12 percent of the total area, with their specific local traffic needs, further contributes to the already heavy traffic volumes on the main road corridor. To address this issue, it will be necessary to allocate more space for local bypass roads;
- Social segregation resulting from spatial separation of very expensive land recently converted from agriculture to residential from the still affordable NUC, 6<sup>th</sup> of October. Rapid increasing land values block opportunities for the poorer households and communities to work and settle in the area. This has led to socially unsustainable spatial outcomes.
- The combined use of the road corridor for trade, agricultural and residential logistics and mobility has quadrupled traffic volumes from 6,576 car/day in 1985 to 26,726 car/day in 2005.
- Increased risk of groundwater pollution due to lack of adequate management of wastewater, and aquifer depletion through wasteful private compound green area irrigation.



▲ Cairo street  
©Wael Hamdan/iStockphoto

FIGURE 2.6.3: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AROUND CAIRO-ALEXANDRIA URBAN CORRIDOR



Source: Adapted from GOPP 2007.

Clearly, there is great need for rethinking some of the development aspects of the area to address the challenges and to increase and strengthen the positive potentials.

At the northern termination of the corridor, a new development plan for metropolitan Alexandria has been submitted to the government for approval. It seeks to address a number of the challenges outlined above, including the need for diversifying the social fabric of metropolitan Alexandria through pro-poor policies as well as steps to combat urban sprawl and unsustainable infrastructure costs. It also attempts to address transportation issues, proposing connection to a new regional ring road to increase metropolitan Alexandria's accessibility and to ensure more efficient economic networking with the wider NDR.

### The Cairo-Ismailia-Port Said Corridor

A northeastern corridor extends from the GCR along the highway to Ismailia and Port Said. It also constitutes one of the main gateways to the new towns of 10<sup>th</sup> of Ramadan, Obour and Shourouq City. This corridor links with the ring road and is expected to link with the new regional ring road under construction. Controlling development in the areas unlocked by this corridor is a key strategic factor in Egypt's macro-economy.

The corridor connects the GCR to Port Said, envisaged as Egypt's link to Southeast Asian manufacturing, and the Suez Canal Region of Ismailia that hosts important free trade zones. The 30,000 hectares of unutilized, developable lands along the corridor, designated by the Egyptian Government for agricultural purposes, educational facilities, industrial and office parks, and other uses, needs to be safeguarded against encroachment by urban sprawl.



▲  
Cairo, Egypt  
© Vladimir Korostyshevskiy/shutterstock

Urban sprawl has already begun to spread quickly along and perpendicular to the corridor, while transport issues are rapidly emerging due to uncontrolled and conflicting traffic demands. These traffic issues need to be addressed through new transportation solutions, including an express railway system between the GCR and Port Said.

### Economic and Population Scenarios

To project continued dispersion of population and economic activity and the role of urban development corridors in this process, it is important to understand the vision for the future of the GCR/NDR and the impacts these corridors are likely to generate.

The current strategy for the GCR until 2027 incorporates a number of scenarios, among them, 'Providing Cairo with a well-balanced urban structure'. This and other scenarios were developed through consultation with academic and professional associations and by working with various teams while bringing in the views of some civil society groups through opinion surveys. The emerging vision was built on a foundation of consistent assumptions and priorities.

Different population growth scenarios up to 2027 were developed for the GCR governorates of Cairo, Giza, and Qualiobiya. The moderate scenario, an initial average annual growth rate of around 2 percent, slowing to 1.5 percent has been agreed upon for the model and is supported by the Egyptian government. The model has in-built flexibility for adjustment to the lower and higher population and economic growth scenarios, if required.

The envisioned planning improvements are based on the diversity of the economic base of the GCR. The main assumption is that the GCR will expand to include the seven new satellite cities; and that these NUCs will be inter-linked through well-functioning transportation systems along the Cairo-Alexandria; Cairo-Suez and Cairo-Ismailia-Port Said corridors.

### GCR Slum Incidence

Informal housing, in the form of illegal subdivisions for low- and middle-income classes, is mostly developed on the peri-urban fringes of the GCR. Such housing typically occurs on privately owned agricultural land. The outcome is unplanned, high-density urban development lacking sewerage and community facilities. While squatting is less common, it does occur at the urban fringes, in and around the tombs of the City of the Dead, and on rooftops, particularly in areas adjacent to the medieval historic core of Cairo.

The GCR slums can be grouped in four main categories:

- (1) Informal settlements on former agricultural land – characterized by private residential buildings constructed on agricultural land purchased from farmers in areas neither with an approved subdivision plan nor with building permits. This group contains over half the population of the GCR.
- (2) Informal areas on former desert state land – characterized by private residential buildings constructed on vacant state land by squatters through 'hand claim' processes (an informal community-based process without legal paperwork relying on trust and, when necessary, mediated by the community). This is similar to the land squatting occupation found throughout the developing world.
- (3) Deteriorated historic core - mostly within the confines of the historic city of Cairo, consisting of neighbourhoods with a high percentage of old, crowded and deteriorated structures within the medieval urban fabric. The deteriorated state of the buildings is due to severe outstanding maintenance resulting from confused or contested ownership (mostly inheritance quarrels) or maintenance neglect in the wake of rent control.
- (4) Deteriorated urban pockets – mostly found in various inner-city areas of Cairo, especially those developed around the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and consisting of small pockets of very dilapidated one- to three-storey structures, which accommodate poor families.



## Problems and Issues

The different planning approaches that GCR has passed through since the 1970s attempted to achieve sustainable urban development. Although these processes have yielded some good practices, including first steps towards an institutional setup for area-wide management of the metropolitan region, they are neither a showcase for achieving sustainable urban development nor region-wide urban management. Moreover, good practices do not always sustain their success over time as they often cannot deal with all external threats and overcome their inherent internal weaknesses in the longer term. Political and economic 'tradeoffs' have often been necessary. Housing for the wealthy and subsidized commercial land and infrastructure were the winners. Effectively addressing social and environmental

challenges and reduction of institutional fragmentation are among the most obvious issues that lost out.

The GCR is suffering from huge and complex social challenges, including continued spatial segregation of the urban poor. The emerging urban development corridors, although functioning in many ways as hoped, have also revealed many new challenges, including private real estate interests shaping most new developments around the GCR, rather than holistic and equitable socio-economic development considerations. GCR's environmental challenges are manifold and pervasive too. Unless addressed on short notice, these will become overriding problems and perhaps may become irreversible. Finally, overcoming current institutional fragmentation in GCR is an issue that can no longer be neglected.



▲ Manshiet Nasser sits on the rocks where Egypt's Eastern Desert Plateau meets the Nile Valley, Cairo, Egypt. Residents urgently need more water, sewage and refuse facilities.  
© Jeff Black/IRIN

## The Way Forward

Planning for the future of the GCR is fraught with uncertainties due to the rapid pace of change and the seeming inability of both government institutions and the formal sector to cope with this change. At the NDR level, planning efforts should aim at:

- effectively managing horizontal spatial expansion;
- articulating the internal urban structures into identifiable local communities with viable business sub-centres;
- empowering peripheral communities to restructure themselves into economically and socially viable and spatially identifiable settlements; and
- promoting area-wide differentiation of functions and specialization of settlements.

Adequate responses would need to be based on:

- Decentralization and greater citizen participation. Paradoxical as this action may seem in view of the need for area-wide governance, regional management can be effective only if it is accompanied by greater local autonomy and home rule as an integral part of the broader area-wide vision development.
- Growth of intermediate urban centres away from the metropolitan cores, along and perpendicular to corridors of interaction. Policies for the area-wide development and management of the NDR should give particular attention to growth potentials along transportation corridors linking the region's urban centres and promote attractive secondary and tertiary-city alternatives for both basic and services industries.
- A balanced multi-nucleated regional urban development pattern based on the two-pronged strategy of increasing the supply of accessible urban land in planned locations and tightening land development and land preservation

controls. New urban developments should be separated by open land, either as green belts or reserves, and independent communities should be established to expand the urban land market with a broad range of affordability options.

- There is also need for an overarching NDR authority for land use planning and management and implementation of these recommendations or for repairing whatever authority exists within the GCR for taking corrective action.

The restructuring of peripheral urban developments is currently on-going in many of Egypt's settlements but unfortunately not where it is most needed – in the GCR. Informal settlement upgrading in the GCR remains mainly focused on renewal in the most deeply deteriorated urban areas but typically bypasses many peri-urban areas. As valuable time goes by, Egyptian authorities will learn how costly unregulated spontaneous dispersal truly is, while it is also extremely wasteful in its indiscriminate use of Egypt's valuable land resources.

The New Vision for the GCR must put emphasis on better geographic dispersal of popular, cultural, historical, political and industrial agglomerations. To even start making inroads into achieving the above development directions, Egypt will have to come to terms with the critically urgent need for drastic de-concentration of population and economic activity. With so much concentration in the metropolitan centres of the comparatively small NDR, national efforts to distribute the benefits of development equitably can only be effective if it takes the route of consistent and coherent long-term, area-wide spatial planning that takes into account the spatial consequences and needs of all macro-economic, political, social and environmental components.

In sum, despite major successes in saving critical agricultural lands from urban sprawl, the approaches to the NDR clearly suffer from inadequate governance, inequitable use of public funds, and insufficient political will. So far, Egypt has missed the opportunity to turn a potentially highly effective region-wide spatial planning and management approach into a national tool for the integration of spatial policy with economic and social policies. The winner in the NDR is the Egyptian private sector, making money from major projects subsidized from Egypt's public resources.

The shortfalls are evident from the very key issues that have remained unaddressed:

- continued significant social segregation;
- lack of advanced planning in the peripheral areas and lack of nationwide spatial planning;
- lack of foresight with regard to transportation-demand management and infrastructure requirements;
- overarching NDR authority not yet established; and
- further fragmentation of the GCR administrative authority.



▲ Modernity and tradition go together in Egypt  
©Manoocher Deghati/IRIN

## The Kenitra-El Jadida Corridor, Morocco

The 230 km coastal urban corridor of Kenitra-El Jadida comprises the metropolitan cores of Casablanca (3.2 million inhabitants) and Rabat (1.7 million inhabitants) – the Moroccan economic and administrative capitals respectively. The entire corridor has 7.5 million inhabitants which constitutes 25 percent of the total Moroccan population and 38 percent of its urban population. It produces more than half of the national GDP.

With transversal branches at places stretching 80 km inland, the main corridor is structured along a coastal inter-city highway and railway network. These transport networks connect the corridor's urban cores and functions, including Casablanca's two harbours, two international airports, and six institutions of higher education. The average annual population growth rates of the settlements within the corridor are only slightly differentiated. They are low for Casablanca (one percent) and Rabat (two percent), but a moderate 2.5 percent for the urban areas in between. It is projected that, by 2025, the Kenitra-El Jadida corridor will host 10 million inhabitants.

There are considerable economic disparities within this corridor. In Casablanca, annual household incomes vary from US\$2,720 to US\$4,080. The monthly minimum wage in Morocco is US\$260. Communal resources vary from US\$124 per capita in Rabat to US\$56 in the suburban city of Salé.

The Casablanca-Rabat metropolitan region is being developed through the Functional Organization and Development Chart focused on the two main metropolitan cores, Casablanca and Rabat. The aim is to trigger synergies, complementarity and integration within the urban region and promote global competitiveness with Casablanca the gateway city to Europe, Africa and maritime transportation over the Atlantic Ocean.

To achieve this, it is important to give precedence to promoting national solidarity, based on: (i) capacity building, training, employment; (ii) achievement of economic, social and spatial balance within the urban region; (iii) social and economic integration of the corridor and urban development poles outside the urban region, and (iv) integration of the bipolar Casablanca-Rabat metropolitan region.



▲ Old Town in Fez, Morocco  
©Natsuo Ito


## Chapter Three

# 03

The West and Central Africa region occupies more than 10.2 million km<sup>2</sup>, approximately one-third of the African continent. It hosts a diversity of geographical settings with coastal and landlocked countries and desert to humid tropical forest environments. The Atlantic Ocean forms the western border of the region. The northern border is the Sahara Desert, with the Niger Bend as the northernmost limit. The majority of the land surface is plain, lying less than 300m above sea level. Isolated high points exist along the southern shore of the West Africa sub-region which are the sources of the major rivers, like the Niger, the Benue, the Volta and the Gambia among others.

The climate is mostly tropical with the mean annual temperature about 27°C. However, in the north temperatures can be as high as 45°C. They can be as low as 22°C in the coastal areas and around 17°C in highland areas. Rainfall varies geographically and temporally with annual averages above 3,000mm in Calabar, Nigeria, to less than 500mm in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. This climate produced two distinct vegetation types: forest and savannah. The forests are

## THE STATE OF WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN CITIES




A crowded beach with a market and fishing boats in Accra, Ghana.  
© Steve Heap/Shutterstock

mainly found in the coastal areas, except for Ghana which is subject to a humid maritime wind and has savannah-like coastal vegetation, as well as in the lush rain forests of the Central African nations. The northern parts of the region are mostly savannah with agriculture one of the chief economic activities.

For the purposes of this report, the region comprises the following nations: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,

Mali, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Some localized areas within the region are known for low-moderate seismic and volcanic activity. Extensive low-lying coastal areas that contain a significant share of the region's large cities, and therefore millions of urban dwellers, make parts of the region vulnerable to the impacts of sea level rise. Rising global temperatures as a result of climate change may affect the expansion of arid areas, threatening the agricultural and nomadic animal husbandry life-styles and livelihoods of millions in the savannah areas of the region.



# 3.1

## Population and Urbanization


West and Central Africa is, after East Africa, the most rapidly urbanizing region of the continent. The proportion of the West and Central Africa region's population living in urban areas has increased considerably and rapidly over the past half-century. Urbanization in the region's nations increased from 1950 low and high national urbanization levels of 3.8 percent in Burkina Faso and 24.9 percent in the Republic of Congo, to 2007 low and high rates of 16.4 percent in Niger and 84.7 percent in Gabon. In the foreseeable future the trend of the region's rapid transition to urban majorities will continue. Of the 25 nations in the West and Central Africa region, seven had more than half of their population living in urban areas in 2007. In 2010 there will be nine, by 2020 there will be 12 and in 2030 14 of the region's nations will have urban majorities.

In 2007, the estimated population for West and Central Africa was 388.3 million, divided over 162.1 urban and 226.2 million rural dwellers – an overall urbanization rate of 41.7 percent. The lowest figure was found in Niger (16.4 percent) and the highest in Gabon (84.7 percent). It is projected that the West Africa sub-region will have a majority of its population living in cities just before 2020, while Central Africa may reach that stage less than half a decade later.

Projections for 2030 indicate a total West and Central Africa region population of 646.0 million, with urban and rural shares of 358 and 288 million, respectively. The projected near tripling of the 2007 urban population in absolute terms and the commensurate shift from the current urbanization rate of 41.7 percent to 55.4 percent in 2030 is a momentous demographic shift that will have significant impacts. If not carefully managed, the ongoing rapid urbanization of the region may have seriously adverse consequences for the environment, regional and national economies and social stability. With its fertile agricultural lands increasingly threatened by population growth and physical urban expansion, future urban food security requires early attention, as do urban water and energy security.

The eight largest countries in West and Central Africa are the D.R. of Congo (2.34m km<sup>2</sup>), Chad (1.28m km<sup>2</sup>), Niger (1.26m km<sup>2</sup>), Mali (1.24m km<sup>2</sup>), Nigeria (0.92m km<sup>2</sup>), Central African Republic 0.62m km<sup>2</sup>, Cameroon (0.47m km<sup>2</sup>) and Rep. of Congo (0.34m km<sup>2</sup>). In these large countries, the 2007 levels of urbanization varied from a high of 60.9 percent in the Republic of Congo to a low of 16.4 percent in Niger. In 2005, there were 21 cities exceeding one million inhabitants,

FIGURE 3.1.1: POPULATION PERCENTAGE BY AGE GROUP – WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA



Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision



▲ Senegalese children run as locusts spread in the capital Dakar.  
©IRIN

six of these were in Nigeria and three in the DRC. In 2010, there will be 25 such cities, with nine in Nigeria.

Persistently very high urban growth rates between 2000 and 2030 are foreseen for Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger, the region's least urbanized nations. Ouagadougou is projected to more than double its 2005 population of 1.0 million to 2.11 million by 2020. Other very rapidly growing large cities include Kinshasa, Lubumbashi and Mbuji-Mayi in the DRC which all three will also see a doubling of their 2005 populations by 2020. Kinshasa's incredibly rapid projected growth is nothing less than worrisome: from 7.7 million to a projected 13.8 million by 2020. In merely 15 years the urban agglomeration will have to cater for urban housing, services and livelihoods for an additional 6.1m urban dwellers. Kinshasa will see a stellar rise to a 14<sup>th</sup> position among the world's largest urban agglomerations, further rising to 11<sup>th</sup> largest by 2025, by which time it will have surpassed the population size of even such African urban giants as Cairo and Lagos.

The total national populations and the population densities among the Francophone African countries are mostly lower than the African average. Besides the DRC with over 62.6 million inhabitants in 2007, Cameroon (18.5 m) and Côte d'Ivoire (19.2 m), all Francophone African countries have less than 16 million inhabitants – the mean population of all African nations. The region's only Francophone country

with a population density exceeding the African average of 82.4 inh/km<sup>2</sup> is Togo with 97.5 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>. Among the coastal West African nations of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Togo, population concentrations in the 100 km wide maritime zone are higher than the African average, whereas they are lower in the Central African coastal nations of Cameroon, Congo, and the DRC. Gabon's 63 percent is the exception. Landlocked nations, particularly French-speaking ones, have both lower population densities and urbanization rates than the coastal nations. However, Burkina Faso, with 51 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup> and the CAR with a 38.4 percent urbanization rate are close to the African average in these respects. Although urbanization and population density are often linked, this correlation can be weak. For instance, despite high urbanization rates in Congo and Gabon, their population densities are among the lowest with 10 and five inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>, respectively.

The issue with the region's urbanization is not so much the level but rather the overwhelmingly rapid rate of change. The speed with which the urban transition is taking place exceeds the response capabilities of most of its nation's urban managers and those of the larger cities in particular. Inadequate capacities, resources and capabilities assure that the region's cities fall further and further behind the growing demands for effective urban governance, housing, infrastructure, services

and jobs. Rapid urban growth in West Africa reflects still substantial rural-urban migration but also natural population increases. Between 1960 and 1990, up to 40 percent of the region's urban growth resulted from rural-urban migration and the expansion of urban boundaries, while the remaining 60 percent was due to natural increase.

Current demographic trends reveal that:

- West and Central Africa's demography is marked by an uneven distribution of human settlements and socio-economic development;
- West Africa's population is the most mobile in Africa and there is a growing trend of migration southwards towards the coasts, owing to declining access to agricultural or pastoral land and other resources in the Sahelo-Saharan belt of the region;
- Coastal areas and southern urban centres have high densities of population (to as much as 124 inhabitants/

km<sup>2</sup>) and with continuing migration these densities are likely to increase further;

- Although fertility rates have been declining since the 1970s due to higher average marriage ages and rural-urban migration that results in better access to family planning, the regional fertility is still among the highest in the world. The world's 2006 total average fertility rate of 2.58 children per woman of child-bearing age, compares to a West African average of 5.50;
- With the prevailing average annual population growth rates, today's West and Central Africa population may double by 2040;
- Persons, under the age of 30 constitute about 60 percent of the region's population; and
- Nigeria's 2007 population constitutes approximately half of the 2007 total West African and 38.1 percent of the total West and Central African population.

TABLE 3.1.1: WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN URBAN POPULATIONS, % URBAN, RATE OF CHANGE 1980-2030

West and Central African Countries	Urban Population (000)					Urban as % of total population					Annual Urban Growth Rate (%)		
	1980	2000	2010	2020	2030	1980	2000	2010	2020	2030	2000-2010	2010-2020	2020-2030
Benin	1,014	2,770	4,151	6,081	8,639	27.3	38.3	42.0	47.2	53.7	4.39	3.75	2.90
Burkina Faso	601	1,971	3,286	5,424	8,640	8.8	16.6	20.4	25.8	32.6	5.29	5.54	5.00
Cameroon	2,898	7,908	11,482	15,288	19,090	31.9	49.9	58.4	65.5	71.0	3.73	2.86	2.22
Cape Verde	68	241	346	465	586	23.5	53.4	61.1	67.4	72.5	3.42	2.01	2.00
C.A.R.	789	1,454	1,788	2,308	3,010	33.9	37.6	38.9	42.5	48.4	2.07	2.54	2.66
Chad	866	1,979	3,236	5,203	8,165	18.8	23.4	27.6	33.9	41.2	4.92	4.75	4.51
Congo	863	1,868	2,492	3,256	4,128	47.9	58.3	62.1	66.3	70.9	2.88	2.67	2.37
Côte d'Ivoire	3,081	7,423	10,217	13,771	17,632	36.9	43.5	50.1	56.6	62.8	3.04	2.81	2.10
D.R.C	8,062	15,126	24,304	39,244	60,333	28.7	29.8	35.2	42.0	49.2	4.74	4.30	4.79
Equatorial Guinea	59	167	216	300	422	27.9	38.8	39.7	43.3	49.4	2.59	3.26	3.25
Gabon	373	948	1,196	1,310	1,524	54.7	80.1	86.0	88.8	90.6	2.32	1.70	1.34
Gambia	191	680	1,073	1,496	1,967	28.4	49.1	58.1	65.0	71.0	4.13	3.37	3.24
Ghana	3,550	8,856	12,811	17,336	22,145	31.2	44.0	51.5	58.4	64.7	3.15	3.11	2.20
Guinea	1,080	2,547	3,546	5,373	7,865	23.6	31.0	35.4	41.4	48.6	3.72	4.09	3.20
Guinea Bissau	140	407	556	825	1,297	17.6	29.7	30.0	32.8	38.6	4.67	3.98	4.10
Liberia	657	1,666	2,652	3,972	5,746	35.2	54.3	61.5	67.9	73.7	6.00	4.4	3.40
Mali	1,122	2,787	4,503	7,207	11,022	18.5	27.9	33.3	39.9	47.4	5.03	4.63	4.40
Mauritania	411	1,026	1,393	1,887	2,557	27.4	40.0	41.4	45.5	51.7	4.82	3.73	2.50
Niger	778	1,801	2,633	4,208	7,301	13.4	16.2	16.7	18.9	23.7	5.99	5.56	5.40
Nigeria	20,311	53,048	78,845	109,772	144,246	28.6	42.5	49.8	56.8	63.6	4.23	3.39	2.50
St Helena	2	2	3	3	4	44.0	39.2	39.5	43.4	49.8	1.96	1.17	4.10
São Tomé & Príncipe	32	75	103	136	173	33.5	53.4	62.2	69.0	74.0	3.19	2.81	2.38
Senegal	2,100	4,200	5,710	7,743	10,403	35.8	40.6	42.9	47.1	53.2	3.82	3.22	2.5
Sierra Leone	942	1,605	2,375	3,318	4,702	29.1	35.5	38.4	42.8	49.0	5.25	3.84	3.0
Togo	687	1,974	3,094	4,534	6,220	24.7	36.5	43.4	50.5	57.3	4.17	3.92	3.0


Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision






▲ A girl buys water from a private well in Timbuktu, Mali. Each small bucket of water costs the equivalent of 10 US cents but is a daily necessity in this hot and dry city on the southern edge of the Sahara where annual rainfall is as low as 200mm.  
 ©Tugela Riddley/IRIN

FIGURE 3.1.2: PERCENTAGE OF URBAN POPULATION 1980-2030



Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision

FIGURE 3.1.3: PERCENTAGE OF URBAN POPULATION IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA, 1980-2030



Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision

It is important to emphasize the exceptional character of Lagos – Sub-Saharan Africa’s most populous city. Although Lagos constitutes less than one percent of Nigeria’s land area, its 2007 metropolitan agglomeration accounted for 6.5 percent of the Nigerian population and 13.7 percent of the nation’s urban population while hosting about 70.0 percent of all Nigerian industries.

Nigeria experiences severe problems associated with unbalanced population distribution and increasingly rapid urbanization in the absence of well-articulated and comprehensive physical planning, development control and urban social policy. Lagos is the classic example of a developing country mega-city, combining haphazard, uncontrolled and unrestrained population and spatial growth with little corresponding expansion in housing, infrastructures, services and livelihood opportunities. Lagos growth relative to the

growth of the world’s other largest urban agglomerations is revealing and significant. Lagos did not appear among the world’s 30 largest urban agglomerations until 1995 when it occupied a modest 30<sup>th</sup> position. By 2000, Lagos had risen to 26<sup>th</sup> and by 2005 it was the 24<sup>th</sup> largest. Lagos is now projected to become the world’s 18<sup>th</sup> largest urban agglomeration by 2010, 17<sup>th</sup> by 2015 and 12<sup>th</sup> largest by 2020. By 2025 it will have surpassed Cairo – now the largest urban conglomeration in Africa and Lagos will then be the world’s 12<sup>th</sup> largest metropolitan region with an estimated 15.8m inhabitants, within Africa, second only to Kinshasa.

The rapidly growing cities of West Africa are mostly unplanned and haphazard contraptions of slums and mega-slums. These grim woes are compounded by worsening national and regional macro-economic performances and the impacts of global environmental change. The moral and political responsibilities lie with the region’s governments – individually and as a regional group. With appalling poverty extending to more than 50 percent of their urban populations, politicians at all levels should demonstrate the will to redress these urban, urban-economic and urban-social trends. There is need to provide better living environments for the millions of poor urban dwellers and to confront the pervasive problems of run-away corruption in particular. Corrupt practices have entrenched in the societal fabric of many countries and are now, possibly, the single-most important blockage to equitable social, economic and political development.

TABLE 3.1.2: SIZE OF WEST AFRICAN CITIES (2010)

Size	>10M	5-10M	1-5M	½-1M	<½M
Number	1	0	17	25	?
Population (M)	10,572	0	32,966	16,835	76,821
% of urban population	7.7	0	24.0	12.3	56.0
Trend for 2025	stable	2	Stable 28	9 %	stable



▲ Children wade through water on their way to school after flooding in the Kroo Bay slum, Freetown, Sierra Leone. ©Save the Children UK/IRIN

## Synergies with rural areas: the case of urban-to-rural migration

Various case studies have shown that return migrations are important in some West and Central African nations. Job market degradation and deterioration in urban living standards have created new relationships between migration, employment and education. Before the 1980s, people tended to move to town for educational or income purposes. Today, rising numbers of urban inhabitants who lost their jobs return to their villages. Most first try to create their own (often informal) job in cities or towns, sometimes using their 'golden handshake' - a strategy observed in both Francophone nations like Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Niger and in Anglophone nations like Ghana and Tanzania in East Africa. If they fail (as many do) the village is their last resort and return migration the preferred survival strategy. Facing higher cost of living, even employed urban residents at times choose to return to rural areas where incomes may be lower but where food and housing are almost free.

Another strategy is adjustment of domestic arrangements as observed in Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Benin and Niger. Some households relocate wife/wives and children to the village while the man remains in town. Incomes are thus diversified, expenses reduced and the family can better face the hard times. In other households, children are sent back to villages to attend school. Similarly, young people who failed school and graduates unable to find jobs may return to villages by their own choice or be sent home by urban relatives who fostered them, as shown in Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire. A reversal of the traditional direction of migration that started as early as in the 1980s is at play in West and Central Africa.

Côte d'Ivoire, in comparison with other West African countries, is an interesting case to study the impacts of economic effects on migration and urbanization. Surveys conducted in seven West African countries in 1993 show that the negative migratory balance of rural areas is mostly due to international migration. In 1988-92, net international migration rates from rural areas range from -1.5 percent to -0.4 percent per year and are much higher than internal migration rates (-0.2 to 0 percent). Thus, migrations toward urban areas within West African countries were not responsible for a large migratory deficit in rural areas. At the opposite, during that period, only Côte d'Ivoire had a positive rural migratory



▲ A young mother, carrying her baby, stands in the doorway of her home made of corrugated iron sheeting, beside the Lome Lagoon, Lome, Togo. Conditions in Togo have deteriorated since the European Union cut off aid 14 years ago. However, after successful legislative elections in October 2007, the EU resumed support.  
©Tugela Ridley/IRIN

growth rate of almost +2 percent per year, of which +1 percent from internal migrations, i.e. domestic migration from urban to rural areas. Abidjan, for instance, lost more than 12,000 people per year to rural areas in the period from 1988 to 1992, as confirmed by the Côte d'Ivoire's 1988 and 1998 censuses.

Economic crises may increase circular migration between towns and villages, especially for young people seeking employment. But urban out-migration in Côte d'Ivoire is not only the result of circular migration. Primary migrants born in urban areas form a significant 25 percent of urban emigrants in 1993, who therefore cannot be considered as return migrants. Qualitative research on urban migrants' integration in rural areas shows that some migrants chose to stay in villages as they perceive better employment opportunities and lower cost of living there. Decentralization policies and the liberalization of

the urban land markets may have exacerbated intra-city economic inequalities that may in turn cause out-migration. For instance, the price of land in Abidjan increased and the rehabilitation and management of urban infrastructures were privatized in the 1990s. The resultant upward economic pressure on urban households may have led many to migrate out of Abidjan. Since 2000, civil war may also have accelerated internal migrations, although data are insufficient to make hard conclusions on the direction of these migrations.

Whereas in the past return migrants were mostly old or retired persons, today, they are mostly young people. In Cameroon in 1992, three quarters were between 15 and 45 years old. In Côte d'Ivoire in 1993, three quarters were less than 30 years old and, in the late 1990s, the chances of a 20-24 year old male leaving a city for a village were twice those of a man 50 or older.

## 3.2

# The Growing Economic Role of Cities



▲ The Banjul to Barra Ferry Service is one of the vital economic lifelines of Banjul, Gambia's capital, and an essential river crossing to Dakar, Senegal.  
©Emily Hagen/Shutterstock

Cities can be seen as useful tools for humankind in the pursuit of social, economic and cultural goals in space and over time. Historically, cities have developed and evolved as potent implements for socio-economic interaction, growth and social change. The lives and livelihoods of millions of people is affected by what is done (or not done) in cities. Cities and towns have always been centres of opportunity. Cities are the most important engines of economic growth and centres of innovation for the national economies of West Africa.

Urbanization and city growth do not automatically bring affluence and prosperity. Neither do they necessarily create sufficient employment, as West and Central African cities amply demonstrate. Urban development and growth in the region is proceeding in a different cultural and economic

milieu than that experienced by today's advanced economies. The term 'over urbanization' has been used to capture the problems associated with urbanization in most developing countries in the sense that the process is primarily driven by demographic forces and perceived job availability, including rural-urban migration and natural increases, rather than by solid urban-based economic and industrialization processes.

Despite the relative expansion of manufacturing in major West African cities, unemployment and underemployment continue to increase. Burdened with many of the problems associated with growth, cities in the region are increasingly dysfunctional in areas ranging from the environment, urban services and infrastructures, housing, access to key resource and livelihood opportunities to urban insecurity and violence.

From this context and in the conceptual formal-informal dichotomy of developing regions' urban economies, it is the informal sector that is most available to unskilled migrants and other new entrants in urban labour markets.

In spite of low incomes, low capital intensity and the unregulated nature of informal sector activities, there is growing evidence in Ghana and Nigeria that informal activities are important contributors to the urban economy and urban development. Dynamic linkages exist between the informal and formal sectors with reliable labour supply at low to very low cost. Studies have shown that informal sector incomes and productivity are at least equal to, if not exceeding those of the formal sector.

Urbanization or city creation predates colonialism in many African countries. Apart from Egypt, where urban civilization dates back 5,000 years, several cities in other African regions have centuries old histories. Early urban development has been recorded during the Sudanese Empire of 800AD, the Mali Empire of 1500 AD and Songhai Empire of 1800AD. These important historical artefacts – the cities – flourished as a result of their location along the trans-Sahara trade routes, emphasizing their importance as catalysts in socio-economic inter-relationships. Powerful local rulers enhanced the evolution of these early cities into effective nodes of human development and as engines of economic and social growth. Some of the prominent ancient pre-colonial cities of the region

include Bamako, Gao, Timbuktu, Ouagadougou, Agades, Begho, Benin, Ibadan, Ile-Ife, Ilorin, Kumasi and Oyo.

By the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, a second-generation of cities started to emerge in Africa: colonial cities. The construction of railways and roads, coupled with new economic activity and improvements in agricultural methodologies introduced by colonial administrations helped create many new urban centres that served as administrative, commercial, industrial, mining and transport nodes. They included seaports and railway nodes and terminals, essential to the export of produce from the hinterlands. Examples of these second generation cities include: Lagos, Jos, Port Harcourt, Kaduna, Jebba, Lokoja, Dakar, Conakry, Accra, Niamey and Monrovia.

Independence and social change in the West and Central African region led, by the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, to the emergence of a third generation of cities: the post-independence cities. New urban developments took place largely in response to political decisions, the promotion of national integration and designated growth poles. Administrative decentralization often gave additional impetus to these third-generation cities that include Abuja, Akure, Birnin Kebbi, Makurdi, Owerri Bobo Dioulasso and Parakou.

The evolution of cities in the West and Central Africa region is therefore the result of 'cause and effect' of societal dynamics that underscore the role of cities as engines of growth and development.



▲ A street vendor in Abuja, Nigeria.  
© Lydia Kruger/Shutterstock

## 3.3

# Urban Poverty and Housing Conditions

Under the impacts of globalization, global economic restructuring and developments in information and communication technologies, new urban configurations have started to emerge worldwide. The traditional city-based urbanization processes are increasingly shifting to region-based spatial patterns. These new urban models do not only account for much larger urban geographies, they also cast patterns of sharply increasing inequality, social fragmentation and socio-spatial segregation.

With rapid urban growth in the absence of strong urban economies and urban livelihood-generation, large shares of the region's urban population are becoming poorer. Since urban equality dichotomies define individual or group status, societal position and powers, intra-urban differentials are becoming more pronounced. Because people

with similar characteristics tend to settle in similar urban areas, this process has distinct spatial dimensions. Urban neighbourhoods become more polarized and separated from their surroundings in a process of self-perpetuating urban fragmentation. This not only expresses socio-economic differences but it generates irreconcilable spatial, social, economic and political contradictions and inequalities, leading to what is now known as 'fragmented cities'. In these fragmented cities, public urban spaces are increasingly abandoned to the destitute and homeless, while the spaces for the better-off turn inwards and the fragmented city becomes a place where urban neighbourhoods and their residents appear to live and function autonomously, with the urban poor subsisting on what they are able to grab in their daily survival.

TABLE 3.3.1: WELL-BEING AND GDP INDICATORS FOR A SELECTION OF FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Country	Percent Urban 2005	Human Well-being Index 2001	GDP 2004 (million)	GDP per capita 2004	% Aid in GNP 2000
Benin	40.0	27	2,678	328	9.2
Burkina Faso	18.3	17	3,182	248	15.6
Cameroon	54.3	15	10,670	665	5.1
Central African. Rep.	38.1	16	915	230	11.6
Chad	25.3	13	2,448	259	9.9
Congo	60.2	15	3,686	949	3.9
Côte d'Ivoire	46.8	20	9,990	559	7.8
D. R. of Congo	30.0	7	4,901	88	2.0
Gabon	83.6	28	5,301	3,891	0.9
Guinea	33.0	15	3,495	380	10.3
Mali	30.5	21	3,105	237	13.2
Niger	16.3	11	2,108	156	15.0
Senegal	41.6	20	5,267	463	10.6
Togo	39.9	21	1,461	244	8.6
Africa Mean	37.9	21	12,953	1,131	8.1

Source: WUP 2007 Revision; SEDAC-CIESIN. GDP in US\$ 2000.

The phenomenon of the fragmented city is becoming increasingly evident, if not prevalent, in West and Central African cities. Growing inequality and socio-spatial fragmentation of urban life reflects a widening gap between the rich and the poor that translates into urban division between the enabled and the disfranchised. While the majority of the poor inhabit informal settlements and slums, the upper and the emerging African middle-classes retreat into the voluntary segregation of residential gated communities, surrounded by high, spiked or barbed fences and protected by armed private guards. Although this social and physical fragmentation is more visible in large cities like Lagos and Kano (Nigeria), Accra and Kumasi (Ghana), Freetown (Liberia) or Monrovia (Sierra Leone), it is nevertheless a pervasive urban phenomenon found in urban centres of all sizes and in towns that have seen significant growth over the past two decades.

Urban fragmentation typically creates two cities within the city, as clearly illustrated with the satellite image of Maputo, Mozambique, on the cover of the present report. The urban poor live in high urban densities, with unplanned urban spatial layout and mostly deprived of access to adequate housing, residential land, municipal services and other urban benefits. The better off tend to reside in the ordered, formally planned and structured higher-income areas that enjoy municipal services. To correct this precarious situation faced by cities in Africa, there is need for politicians and city managers to look inward, towards improving affordable and adequate housing

and basic facilities and services delivery. The modalities most likely to achieve these aims are political inclusiveness and citizen participation in urban governance decisions, because citizen participation has shown to be conducive to better governance, local prioritization according to needs and more responsive interventions by the authorities.

## Social Development and Urban Poverty

In the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, poverty will remain a major issue for West and Central Africa and it should be of primary concern to politicians, as poverty could become a leading political problem because of the sheer numbers of people affected in the region. Up to the 1980s, developing nations' poverty was mostly associated with rural areas. With Africa now approaching its urban age, the weight of poverty is shifting from rural to urban areas and is increasingly becoming an urban phenomenon in a process that has often been referred to as the 'urbanization of poverty'. In West Africa, more than 50 percent of all urban dwellers live in poverty, with its expressions of impeded access to adequate shelter, suitably located urban land, basic urban services and social amenities. The rapid growth rates of urban agglomerations and the lagging response by governments have been associated with increasing urban poverty, problematic urban environments, and more complex urban management issues. Public control over urban areas has largely been lost.

TABLE 3.3.2: PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS EXPERIENCING SHELTER DEPRIVATIONS, 2003

Countries	Percentage of urban households without							Slum Dwellers (%)
	Improved Water (a)	Improved Sanitation (b)	Sufficient Living Area (c)	Durability of Housing (d)	(a) or (b)	(a), (b) or (c)	(a), (b), (c) or (d)	
Benin	26.0	66.1	17.8	20.3	74.9	79.4	83.6	83.6
Burkina Faso	16.0	64.1	15.5	7.6	69.8	74.5	76.5	76.5
Cape Verde	36.0	52.5	-	-	69.6	-	-	69.6
Côte d'Ivoire	10.0	53.5	22.6	0.8	58.2	67.6	67.9	67.9
Gambia	20.0	58.8	-	-	67.0	-	-	67.0
Ghana	13.0	55.2	21.2	0.9	61.0	69.3	69.6	69.6
Guinea	28.0	44.7	24.0	8.5	60.0	69.7	72.3	72.3
Guinea-Bissau	71.0	77.4	-	-	93.4	-	-	93.4
Liberia	2.0	54.8	-	-	55.7	-	-	55.7
Mali	26.0	81.2	21.7	37.6	86.1	89.1	93.2	93.2
Niger	30.0	88.1	30.2	35.4	91.7	94.2	96.2	96.2
Nigeria	19.0	60.6	26.5	11.2	68.1	76.5	79.2	79.2
Saint Helena	1.0	1.0	-	-	2.0	-	-	-
Senegal	8.0	62.3	27.3	6.4	65.3	74.8	76.4	76.4
Sierra-Leone	77.0	81.7	-	-	95.8	-	-	95.8
Togo	15.0	70.2	19.7	4.8	74.7	79.7	80.6	80.6

Source: HABITAT (2003) *Slums of the World*.

## Housing in a mortgage-unfriendly environment

Mortgage finance is mostly unaffordable to the poor anywhere in the world. Housing development does not come easy as it concerns a capital-intensive venture full of risks. In Nigeria, housing development is a particularly difficult process. The World Bank report *Doing Business in Nigeria in 2008* showed that Nigeria is one of the world's most difficult places to register property. Besides other realities that make housing development and delivery hard in Nigeria, the mortgage environment is most unfriendly.

The contribution of mortgage finance to Nigeria's GDP is close to negligible with real estate contribution at less than five percent, while mortgage loans and advances were put at 0.5 percent, contrasting sharply with contributions of 30 to 40 percent in other emerging economies

and 60-80 percent in advanced economies.

With its population of 140 million people, Nigeria has only 90 primary mortgage institutions (PMIs). Almost all of these concentrated in Lagos and Abuja, with only 43 meeting the statutory minimum paid-up capital requirement of N100 million (US\$850,000). Only 15 PMIs meet the 30 percent minimum mortgage assets-to-total-assets ratio.

In recent times, many of Nigerian banks have ventured more into mortgage operations, but they either just mortgage refinancing or offer high-interest consumptive loans as mortgage financing, rather than low-interest, long-term loans. Nigerians high-interest mortgages run up to 18 and sometimes even 20 percent annual interest rates for loan periods from 12 to 24

months. This unfriendly mortgage environment is a major challenge to housing delivery. Borrowers are simply not able to repay two-digit interest rates and the loan principal in such unrealistically short lending periods. Moreover, the land use act and the legal environment for recovery (foreclosure) are also mortgage hostile.

Even if all these issues could be overcome, developing housing serving as the collateral for the mortgage poses another level of challenge because infrastructures are not there. A developer will have to invest in the provision of roads, water, electricity, etc. These costs are passed on to the purchaser of the housing unit and the 'affordable' unit simply becomes utterly unaffordable.

Source: [http://www.businessdayonline.com/housing\\_in\\_nigeria/11815.html](http://www.businessdayonline.com/housing_in_nigeria/11815.html)

Today's key problem areas include very rapid uncontrolled growth of urban informal settlements, prevalence of substandard and overcrowded urban housing, inadequate basic urban services and infrastructure provision, declining urban livelihood options, incessant civil unrest and infectious diseases and crime. West and Central African cities and urban agglomerations have become 'centres of aggravated poverty, squalor and human misery.

In West and Central Africa, two types of slum exist: (a) the traditional city centre slums of decayed and dilapidated structures built with semi-durable material (adobe) and lacking physical planning standards; and (b) spontaneous and often illegal informal settlement developments at the urban periphery on squatted land. Both are defined as 'slum' because their inhabitants suffer one or more shelter deprivations. These two generic slum types generally result from a combination of poverty, failing urban governance and inflexible formal urban land and housing markets that do not cater for the urban poor. Slum proliferation in the region is aggravated by the cumulative effects of economic stagnation, increasing inequality and the sheer rapidity of urban population growth.

Slums and poverty are related and mutually reinforcing, although this relationship is not always direct and simple. The share of poor urban dwellers in the region has been steadily increasing for some decades. This poverty is expressed, among others, in shelter deprivation. High to very high shelter deprivation percentages have been recorded:

Niger 96.2 percent, Sierra Leone 95.8 percent, Guinea Bissau 93.4 percent, Mali 93.2 percent, Benin 83.6 percent and Togo 80.6 percent. Liberia stands out regionally as the 'best performer' but still has a significant 55.7 percent of its households suffering slum conditions.

## Housing Conditions and Access to land

With limited resources, West and Central African nations are attempting to provide dwelling units in the shortest possible time. The process involves bringing together labour, land, finance, construction materials and governance processes in partnerships that include the private sector and at times the community sector as well. The trend is an increasing interest by the private sector in housing production. In Nigeria, this is an outcome of the 2002 National Housing Policy coupled with re-invigoration of housing finance systems, access to the National Housing Fund by primary mortgage institution and the advent of a new democratic system. The market-driven housing delivery system, however, unequivocally favours the interest of higher-income groups in up-market neighbourhoods. Few, if any of the housing units provided across the region are tenement housing, the type an average Ghanaian, Nigerian or Sierra Leonean or Congolese would readily rent. The increased number of housing units produced by the private sector, therefore, did little for average households.





▲ Young children fish in front of toilet shacks along the shore of West Point, a slum area in Liberia's capital Monrovia. West Point is home to over 75,000 people. The West Point peninsula is threatened by erosion on both sides and most of the structures are built without any solid foundation. Half of them are simply erected on top of compact piles of garbage. With the land eroding and the population growing, houses battle for space with the garbage that covers the peninsula while any open space is used as a toilet.  
©Tugela Ridley/IRIN

While the average annual rate of urban growth and slum proliferation in sub-Saharan Africa and Africa as a whole are 4.48 and 4.53 percent respectively, Nigeria has higher slum proliferation rates than most African nations, while Lagos has urban and slum growth rates which are about 2.5 times higher than the Nigerian average population growth rate of 2.27 percent for the 2005-2010 half decade. The unprecedented expansion of urban populations causes rapid increases in the demand for urban land. But urban land is location-specific and urban plots cannot easily be reproduced and the demand met by converting rural land at the urban periphery. Tenure systems largely determine the ease or difficulty of land acquisition and assembly. In the case of Nigeria, they make expansion of urban area difficult and raise transfer cost to levels that are not attainable by the poor.

As with other production factors, the value of land is determined by the market – whether overtly in a free and open market or covertly as the latent value of a controlled commodity. Urban land markets, with their relatively fixed supply and the often defective and imperfect nature of both the commodity and the market, distribute the scarce land supply among competing users. They assign land to its most profitable use according to the references of consumers and society. But due to the strategic importance of land, the prevailing land tenure systems and the market prices within each country, land allocation is perhaps too efficient and not serving urban society's needs. The outcome is predictable and the same throughout the region: land prices rise rapidly and become unaffordable to the poor urban majorities.

This is why governmental interventions - both directly and indirectly – often take place and are critical to broadening access to land beyond those who can afford the open market prices. The nature of such interventions closely reflects the governmental ideology as often expressed in the national land policy. Land policy, therefore, is an important tool for modifying market-driven land tenure in the interest of national development objectives, as an instrument for responding to urban societies' needs and for achieving greater equity and social justice.

The region has noteworthy land policy interventions aiming at broadening access to urban land. The Nigerian Land Use Act was enacted in March 1979 and intended to make land available to competing users. In 2003, the Ghanaian government launched the Land Administrative Project (LAP) to transform land into a convertible asset. These public sector interventions were geared towards moderating land market allocation mechanism, to minimize land market imperfections, and to assist in ensuring allocation of land to preferential areas – particularly to those who cannot secure well-situated land on their own.

Likewise, local authorities, within their ideological and political confines, can also moderate the land market to achieve specific planning and spatial aims or improve accessibility to urban land for residential and commercial purposes for a broad range of stakeholders, including low-income households and slum dwellers.

High urban land values are often also accentuated by lengthy and costly transfer and title acquisition procedures, bearing relatively heavily on the small plots for low-income groups. Moreover, the prevalent forms of land tenure have a profound effect on the physical urban development patterns, as well as on the flexibility of adapting to the pressure of rapid urban population growth.

Urbanization in West and Central Africa is influenced by large numbers of relatively low-income migrants. Their limited financial capacities force them to solve their shelter and livelihood problems informally and on their own terms. Given their vast numbers, poor urban dwellers are now the dominant market sector for urban land demand. In many cases, they transform the city to meet their needs in manners that are often in conflict with laws and urban development plans. The resultant 'self-help urbanization' creates immense frictions between the city administration and the inhabitants of informal housing developments. In response, many central and local governments reverted to forced eviction and demolition of buildings, citing non-compliance with planning standards and development plans and lack of documentation as proof of illegal tenure status. But the resultant evictions are counter-productive because these poor dwellers will simply shift to another urban location.

To adequately house the poor urban majorities in West and Central Africa, granting secure tenure is important but this will by itself not lead to any resolution of housing crises. Local governments should recognize the urban poor as an asset rather than a problem and devise policies and programmes that empower the urban poor to solve their own problems. This includes discouraging central and local governments from getting further locked in futile eviction attempts. The urban poor cannot simply be bulldozed away. Providing security of tenure (unless absolutely overriding matter in the public interest would command differently), followed by *in-situ* slum upgrading programmes is often not only the cheaper solution but in many cases the sole approach that provides significant and more sustainable inroads into addressing the plight of the inevitable millions and millions of poor urban citizens. It is also considerably more humane than reverting to slum clearance operations that, time and again, have shown to be ineffective exercises in shifting around town the problems associated with slums. The urban poor should not be punished for systemic urban governance failures. Governance systems and approaches - rather than urban informality – are in need of review and change.

## Spatial Distribution of Shelter Deprivation

Inequalities within cities, as measured by shelter-deprivation, are high throughout Africa. Around the year 2000, only 31 percent of all urban households in Africa were non-slum households. Moreover, cities tend to express social inequality with spatial emphasis and concentration of inequalities, if not outright segregation. Water, sanitation, spacious and safe housing can either be evenly distributed over the city or only serve its affluent areas. To verify this, we define cluster of households (the census enumeration areas) to be 'slum areas' when more than 50 percent of their households are shelter deprived households, and 'non-slum areas' otherwise. Using this definition, we form four categories of households by crossing the two categories of slum and non-slum households with the two categories of slum and non-slum areas. On the average, in urban Africa, 26 percent of non-slum households are found in slum areas, while 8 percent of slum households occur in non-slum areas. Also, 20 percent of households living in non-slum areas are slum households, while 11 percent of households living in slum areas are non-slum households.

In Francophone West and Central African countries, slum households are generally more equally scattered over urban areas


than the African average. This difference might be the imprint of colonial history, as French administration imposed less stringent spatial segregation than the English. Although segregation was enforced between the colonial and native population groups under both administrations, it went beyond this dichotomy in the English colonies where more complex spatial segregation systems were imposed with a hierarchy of ethnic and gender groups depending on their social and economic role. However, the Francophone-Anglophone divide does not always hold. In West Africa, Ghana and Nigeria show a striking difference with slum distribution in Ghana among the less unequal in West Africa (close to that of neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire or to Gabon and Cameroon), while Nigeria shows a more unequal pattern (close to that observed in the Francophone Sahelian countries).

In land-locked West and Central African nations, urban households' living conditions are noticeably worse than those in coastal countries (N'djamena remaining the worst case in point), while households residing in port cities, especially in West Africa, are clearly better off. This follows the observation that port cities play a key role in African countries' economies and developmental progress. But if it were the

only factor determining urban living conditions, we would expect countries with access to the sea like Nigeria, Cameroon and Congo to have done better than they actually did, particularly considering the importance of these countries in the production of natural resources. Therefore, other factors must be influencing conditions in these port cities.

Analysis of the spatial concentration of slum households shows that there is more than a simple divide between coastal and landlocked countries. Burkina Faso and Mali, both landlocked, have similar shares of slum households but their spatial distribution is much more even in Burkina Faso than in Mali. Data appear to indicate no evidence of effectiveness of urban policy in making cities more egalitarian or the opposite. The same difference is observed with Côte d'Ivoire and Benin, both coastal countries. The same holds for Ghana and Nigeria. The political history may be part of the explanation. Urban policy as part of the decentralization policy adopted in Burkina Faso may have indirectly played an egalitarian effect on the internal distribution of the population within cities. Whether the same mechanisms are at play for Côte d'Ivoire or other countries remains to be verified.

FIGURE 3.3.1: SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF SLUM AND NON SLUM HOUSEHOLDS



## 3.4

# Urban Environmental Challenges



▲ Two boys search for anything usable in a dumpsite, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. Residents complained of symptoms they feared were linked to the dumping of 528,000 litres of liquid toxic waste and many people sought medical advice, anxious about the potential long-term health consequences.

©Candace Feit/IRIN

Every state in the West and Central Africa region suffers from one environmental ill or another. Wind erosion aggravated by deforestation, droughts and over-grazing blows away the fertile top soils of the northern Savannah. The southern coastal soils wash away into the ocean. Other environmental problems include floods, untreated sewage, bush burning, oil spillages, air pollution and irresponsible municipal waste disposal. There is hardly a city in West and Central Africa where waste is appropriately disposed off, where water and electricity supply are dependable. Scientific and empirical evidence have shown that local environmental problems have regional and global consequences as manifest in the global climate change that is increasingly making itself felt.

Environmentally conscious and aware cities should be proactive rather than reactive to the environmental problems they generate over time and space. The environmental challenges of sustainable development and globalization require concerted action. But, there can be no enduring development unless there is sustainable urbanization. Cities provide great economic challenges, opportunities and wealth but they also concentrate environmental impacts in positive or negative terms. There can be no socio-economic development and sustainability in any situation where a majority of the urban population lives in poverty levels as in the West and Central African cities.

Conversely, if the provision of basic goods remains the yardstick for measuring infrastructural development, cities are where their efficiencies can be properly evaluated. Infrastructure provision in city development is the key component and major determinant of convergence and dispersion across regions. However, the overwhelming pace of urbanization in West and Central Africa by far exceeds the speed with which urban managers are able to respond to city dynamics in terms of infrastructure provisions. The World Health Organization's ranking of leading risks include unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene and these account for about six percent of the disease burden in the region. In terms of adequacy of housing and basic services delivery at the city level, Lagos, Kano and Ibadan rank among the most deficient. Ibadan, a city with 2.67 million inhabitants in 2007, supplies piped water to only three percent of its residents, while Greater Lagos, with some 10 million people, offers nine percent access. These are abysmally low rates not only in absolute terms, but also relatively if compared with Accra's 51.6 and Abidjan's 70.9 percent of the urban population served with piped water.

Access to improved water supply is defined as at least 20 litres of water per person per day from a household connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected dug well, protected spring or rain water collected within one km from the user's dwelling. In most West African cities, standpipes or other publicly available water sources within one km are usually shared by several thousands of people. There are often serious deficiencies in the quality of water and the regularity of the supply. This notwithstanding, the primate cities are provided with improved water services. Cities like Banjul,


Accra and Lagos have appallingly low levels of access to improved water if compared to Egyptian, South African and Congolese, cities with 100, 85 and 77.7 percents access to water provision respectively.

Poverty is more central than ever to the human settlement sector as decent housing and basic services for the urban poor are basically no more provided by the public sector. They have effectively become a market commodity, with people's ability to pay market prices determining access. Since piped water is seen as an economic rather than social good, it has ceased to be a social responsibility of the urban managers. The urban poor are limited to a large extent on water obtained from shallow wells and or the exorbitantly high prices of water peddled by itinerant hawkers. It is a regular occurrence to see young boys and girls looking for water before going to school and to return from school only to continue their search for water. Urban poverty, when combined with rapid population growth as witnessed in West and Central African cities is closely associated with unsafe water. The situation with sanitation is little different. In many urban settings in the region, access to improved sanitation is an issue. Countless urban households are forced to share latrines with hundreds of others, making access and maintenance difficult. Large informal areas are known to have high levels of water and sanitation deprivation with significant health implications. The prevalence of diseases resulting from faecal-oral contacts presents a formidable challenge to urban informal settlements residents.

## Urban Transport, Energy and Urban Productivity

Many governments in the region have shown much concern for transport planning and development if judged by the sizeable amount of allocations (in the West African sub-region averaging 20 percent of the annual budget to the transport sector). Over the years, the road network in Ghana, for instance, has increased to 60,000 km. This increment notwithstanding, transport is in poor state due largely to insufficient maintenance. In Nigeria, the state of public owned intra- and inter-urban transportation infrastructure remains a major constraint to economic development. Less than one-fifth of the 80,500 kilometres of roads is tarred and the remainder is in poor condition. Among the multitude of transportation challenges is acute over-concentration on road-based transportation to the detriment of rail, air and the inland water-based transport. Particular in view of recent fuel cost increases, road-based transportation modes may become less and less competitive for some mass commodity logistics.

In 2007, mining and hydrocarbon industries accounted for well over 75 percent of the Nigerian economy and the necessary economic diversification into manufacturing industries remains a long-term issue. The economy is overly dependent on the capital-intensive oil sector which provides 20 percent of the GDP, 95 percent of foreign exchange



▲ Fishing harbor in Ghana.  
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## Eco Atlantic City Lagos, Nigeria

Over the years, the Bar Beach in Lagos, Nigeria, has been steadily eroded until it was almost completely lost to the Atlantic Ocean. Efforts by the Federal Government to stop the erosion along the beachfront were not successful. Thus Victoria Island was continually threatened by flooding arising from surges of the ocean waters so much that part of Ahmadu Bello Way, a dual

carriage road that runs parallel to the beach was eaten up. Faced with imminent loss of Victoria Island to the sea the Lagos State Government embarked on a massive reclamation effort to salvage and stabilize what has been lost to the sea and turn the beach into a viable economic development. Eco Atlantic City is a new, mixed-use development project planned on the Bar

Beach. This project involves the reclamation of a total of 820 hectares of beachfront 6.5 kilometres long and 1.3 kilometres wide (about 1.5 times the size of Victoria Island). At present, an area of beach about 1.5 kilometres long and 15 metres wide has been reclaimed and stabilized. The project is financed by foreign private sector investment and Lagos State Government.

earning and about 65 percent of government revenues. Poor corporate relations with indigenous communities, vandalized oil installations and infrastructure, severe ecological damage and personal security problems throughout the oil-producing Niger Delta continue to plague Nigeria's oil and energy sector. As a result, a paradoxical situation has emerged with Nigerians unable to obtain petrol at the pumps. All forms of road-based transportation and by extension the economy suffer under this incredible anomaly.

In terms of electricity supply in the region, Ghanaians have the highest access (55 percent). For Nigeria, only 36 percent of the population (mostly in urban areas) are served with electric power supply albeit highly intermittent. The lack of electricity supply obviously has significant impacts on nearly all of the region's development goals. Frequent power outages affect the viability of existing Nigerian industries and the development of new ones. Expensive privately owned generators are the recourse for meeting individual and corporate energy needs. Some US\$16 billion governmental spending went to improving the performance of the power sector, but it has recently been discovered that a large share of these funds was diverted to private pockets.

## West African Cities and Climate Change

Accra, Banjul, Freetown, Lagos, Monrovia and other major cities along the Gulf of Guinea have many residential neighbourhoods, commercial interests and infrastructures at risk from sea-level rise and flood surges. The vulnerabilities are heightened by the poor quality of the housing and infrastructure, lack of drainage and sea defences and low levels of disaster preparation among city managers and the citizenry. The case of Lagos where the Atlantic Ocean overflows its shore at the Bar Beach is an example to show that West African cities are among the least prepared for the impacts of climate change. This increases the vulnerability of these cities to high losses of human lives if calamities strike. In several West African cities flooding has noticeably become more frequent, intense and occurring in locations previously not at risk.

Human activities have started to assume recognition as the cause of flooding. As urbanization intensifies, natural surfaces are replaced by buildings, paved roads, and concrete surfaces. These will not allow water to easily percolate into the ground. The effect is that a large proportion of the rainfall which would normally have filtered into the soil, or absorbed by vegetation is turned into surface run-off, often feeding streams and rivers beyond their natural capacities and resulting in flooding.

An impact of climate change, although perhaps less dramatic in the short run but nonetheless serious, especially for low-income groups, is the fact that many cities and their hinterlands will receive less precipitation feeding their water supply sources. Water supply insecurity, especially for large cities is now looming large. At least 14 African nations are already facing water stress or scarcity and many more are likely to join this list over the next decades. For instance, the Lake Chad is gradually drying up due to droughts and desertification within the Sudan-Sahellian region of West and Central African regions. Also, cities will experience more heat waves and more problems with pollutants. For larger, denser cities the temperature in central heat islands can be several degrees higher than in the surrounding areas. The touristic attraction of many coastal cities will be damaged because of floods and ocean surges that damage coastal reefs and result in the loss of beaches. Higher average temperatures will also expand the area of tropical diseases including malaria, dengue fever and filariasis.

Slower increases in population, especially in the face of rising per capita demand for natural resources that are inherent to urban life styles, can take pressure off the environment. As population and demand for natural resources continue to grow, the environmental limit will become increasingly apparent. West and Central African States could reduce environment-related crises if steps are taken now to conserve and better manage resource supply and demand, while slowing population growth by providing families and individual with information and services needed to make informed choices about reproductive health.

## 3.5

# Urban Governance Systems



▲ A young woman leaps over a river of rubbish flowing through the Freetown slum of Kroo Bay after a tropical downpour. More than 6,000 people live in Kroo Bay in unsanitary conditions, with little access to clean water and no electricity. In the rainy season, life becomes even worse as rubbish from the surrounding hills flows into the slum.  
©Tugela Ridley/IRIN

Urban management responsibility in cities straddles urban physical planning, urban administration, and social services provision. The main stakeholders in urban management include central government, local government,

non-governmental agencies, private sector business, urban households, and segments of civil society. These groups have interests in the way towns and cities are managed and create a dynamic environment of both competing and complementary



## Urban Governance: Trust in Urban Institutions

The shortfalls of urban institutions can be measured through analysis of institutions. It is, however, difficult to come up with a comparative analysis of institutions across cities without applying the same analytical tools in a systematic way. Quantitative indicators on the performance of these institutions are rarely available and may also lack the objectivity of external audits.

An alternative method for institutional analysis is through surveys conducted among their users. In West and Central Africa, this type of evaluation has been undertaken through Governance and Democracy questionnaires administered through representative samples of city dwellers aged 18 and above. The 123 Surveys on employment and poverty had a specific questionnaire to this effect and were conducted in 2001-2002 in several West African Economic and Monetary Union cities. Unfortunately, these questionnaires were not administered in Central African countries. Five public institutions of particular relevance to the urban management and planning were selected for review, i.e. health, education, the police and judiciary, as well as urban infrastructures (roads, sanitation, etc).

In Senegal, urban governance is based on devolution of responsibilities to parastatals. Dakar is the city where public institutions are the most trusted by the city dwellers (64 percent), while Lomé is where they are the least trusted (32 percent), followed by Cotonou (42 percent). Niamey (54 percent), Bamako (56 percent) and Abidjan (58 percent) score 'average' levels of citizens' trust. The faith citizens have in their institutions varies both among the type of institution and the city. The judiciary is particularly mistrusted in Lomé (with only 18 percent of the citizenry expressing confidence in it), but ranks also poorly in Cotonou (36 percent), Niamey (41 percent), Abidjan (42 percent) and Bamako (46 percent) compared to an 'average' trust in other public institutions in these cities. Apart from Lomé (35 percent), Abidjan is the city where the police are the most mistrusted (38 percent, i.e. 20 percentage points below the average trust for public institutions in Abidjan).

A striking result is that trust in public institutions hardly depends on shelter deprivation. The differences by city and by institution depicted above are almost the same for slum and non-slum dwellers, and we cannot see significant

variations (other than due to small numbers) by shelter deprivation categories. One conclusion could be that perceived shortcomings of public institutions affect all city dwellers alike. Slum dwellers may be personally deprived of services like water and sanitation but it does not affect their judgment on the capacity of public institutions to provide for these services for the whole city. City dwellers make clear distinction between their access or lack of access to public services and shortcomings of the public institutions. Another interpretation could be that slum dwellers do not perceive an inequality of access to public services. However, the variation of trust by type of institutions in some cities, and the relation to indicators of the quality of the services they provide (e.g. health and education), also shows that responses to the questionnaire are reasoned: not all institutions are trusted the same way as the average public institution, and city dwellers seem perfectly conscious that these institutions are accountable to the people. This should maybe inspire policy-makers to implement evaluation procedures that include not only the collection of objective indicators but also of opinions of the very citizens that are supposed to benefit from the public policies.

interests. Like central government, local authorities aim to ensure that public interest is maintained through regulation to protect all interest groups in society.

Urban governance in Nigeria cannot be fully understood without reference to the three principal levels of power created since the 1950s: the local, the state and the federal government. Each of these levels intervenes more or less directly in urban management. The local governments, although saddled with urban governance responsibilities, never really had urban autonomy during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The native authority could not apply adequate measures without reference to the states and federal governments.

More generally, the budgets of local governments are controlled by the states. Since 1976, reforms aimed at according a measure of local autonomy were initiated but the states still maintained their financial and other holds on local authorities. From the 1980s, ten per cent of the federal budget was transferred directly to the local governments. Nevertheless, the ability of the local governments to generate internal revenue has collapsed, increasing their dependence on income from federal sources. The financial difficulties of the country had obvious repercussions at the level of states and municipalities. Under these circumstances, most of the local governments could not face the challenges created by run-away urbanization. From

the beginning of the 1990s, public services administered by the local governments (health centres, primary and secondary schools, water distribution, road repairs) and the management of public spaces (markets, stations, garages, parks, cemeteries) were seen as economic goods and, to a large extent, passed to the hands of the private sector.

The general increase in the number of local governments in Nigeria (from 301 in 1976 to 776 in 1996) corresponds to the demands of the urban population. A big city like Lagos, which had eight local governments in 1988, had 16 by 1991. Ibadan had five new local governments within the city and eleven in the metropolitan area by 1991. The lack of timely co-ordination among these local governments increases the difficulties of urban management.

Due to a widely perceived failure of 'state-only' and 'market-only' approaches to urban management in recent times, there is paradigm shift towards participatory management that seeks to create ownership in decision-making and daily management practices. Participation is necessary to seek the multiple perspectives of the stakeholders, encourage involvement and action, and resolve conflicts for the common and future good. Thus, change cannot be effected without the full involvement of all stakeholders and adequate representation of their views and perspectives.

## 3.6

# Emerging Urban Corridor: The Greater Ibadan-Lagos-Accra Urban Corridor

The Greater Ibadan-Lagos-Accra (GILA) urban corridor is a development pathway that spans key cities in four West African countries: Ibadan and Lagos in Nigeria; Cotonou in Benin; Lomé in Togo; and Accra in Ghana, see Map 3.6.1 below. Of these four West African coastal nations, Nigeria and Ghana with a combined GDP of US\$127,592,000 are among the largest national economies in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The countries spanned by the GILA corridor and the cities it contains are of great economic significance to the region. The GILA corridor is, indeed, the engine of the regional economy and this potential is recognized by the relevant countries. The realization of

this potential, however, needs to be further and proactively facilitated not only by the four GILA countries but also by the other ECOWAS countries in the interest of the ECOWAS region as a whole.

The corridor is mushrooming with clustered settlements over a distance of about 600 km. The major cities in the corridor are almost equidistant at about 150 to 200 km from one another. It is arguably the most clustered urban corridor in Sub-Saharan Africa and the GILA is often cited in the literature. Lagos metropolis is the hub of what is becoming a massive regional metropolitan landscape with urban corridors in different directions. One runs from Lagos through

FIG 3.6.1: THE GILA URBAN CORRIDOR



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Abeokuta and Ibadan to Ilorin as the northern boundary and from Ibadan through Ile-Ife, Ilesa and Akure to Owo as the eastern limit within Nigeria, making southwest Nigeria the most urbanized sub-region in Africa. The other major extension is transnational in scope, and runs west of Lagos through Cotonou, Porto Novo, and Lomé to Accra.

Urban corridors typically develop along intra-city transportation arteries connecting cities with one another and unlocking the peri-urban and rural areas between them. The GILA corridor is no exception. The Lagos-Accra extension is connected by the Trans-African Highway (Figure 3.6.2), while the Lagos-Ilorin extension by both road and railway. The major cities in the GILA urban corridor are linked by substantial traffic flows. There are significant passenger and goods movement between these cities, especially by road. Some of the cities in the transnational arm of the corridor west of Lagos are also linked by air. For instance, there are daily air services between Lagos and Accra, mostly by Nigerian owned airlines. However, as noted earlier, the urban corridor is fragmented between four sovereign states whose borders act as barriers to movement thereby vitiating the economic advantages derivable from conurbation clusters. However, this problem is mitigated somewhat by the West African regional integration project, ECOWAS, which is meant to promote freer movement of people, goods and services.


The GILA corridor is also significant demographically. As of 2007, the population of the largest GILA cities were as follows: Accra 2.12 million; Cotonou 0.76m; Ibadan 2.67m, Lagos 9.67m and Lomé 1.45m (see Table 3.6.1). Lagos is by far the largest urban agglomeration in the corridor and, indeed,

in the ECOWAS region. The emerging GILA urban corridor will have a combined population of 18.25 million by the year 2010 if we only count the population of the main urban agglomeration, with Lagos accounting for over 50 percent of this total. In addition, there will be an unknown number of residents in the smaller cities, towns and settlements between these large cities and the total population in the GILA corridor can only be guessed. Conservative estimates could put the total GILA population around 25 million.

With the exception of the Nigerian cities in the corridor, the cities account for substantial shares of the urban populations of their respective countries. For example, Lomé accommodates 58 percent of the total urban population of Togo, while Cotonou accounts for 22.4 percent of all urbanites in Benin. Accra's share of Ghana's urban population is 19.7 percent. These figures are indicative of the degree of the importance of these cities in their national urban systems, especially so in the case of Togo. They also show a wide variation in urban primacy. In 2007 there was no urban primacy in Ghana, with Accra 1.2 times the size of the second-largest city Kumasi. Cotonou in Benin had trice the 2007 population size of Porto Novo and has a mild degree of urban primacy. Lagos, despite the significant size of Nigeria's second-largest city Kano (3.19m in 2007) also had a mild degree of urban primacy of 3.0. Lomé, however, has a colossal 12.9 times the population of Togo's second-largest city Sokodé.

Urban primacy can affect regional development as it draws human, financial and other resources away from the remainder of the country and creates localized development at the expense of other national areas. On the other hand,

FIG. 3.6.2: THE TRANS-AFRICAN HIGHWAY



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once a certain level of development is reached, primate cities are often the only localities able to concentrate the critical mass of intellectual and financial resources required to support the tertiary and quaternary sectors. It may be a wise strategy to encourage primacy in the earlier phases of development so that scarce resources can be made more efficient. Cities like Accra and Cotonou lack primacy and therefore do not dominate their national urban systems to the same extent as Lomé and Lagos. Due to its sheer enormity, Lagos dominates not only the Nigerian economy but also that of the GILA urban corridor.

Lagos accounts for 26.2 percent of Nigeria's GDP, making its economy larger (triple or more, in fact) than the economy of any of the other ECOWAS countries, including that of Côte d'Ivoire. This is indicative of the scale of economic impacts that urban primacy carries in the GILA urban corridor. More than half of Nigeria's industrial capacity is located in the mainland suburbs of Lagos. In 1990, these establishments accounted for at least 50 percent of Nigeria's manufacturing value added. Lagos has also greatly benefited from Nigeria's natural resources, especially oil and natural gas, whose revenues fuelled the urban economy's expansion as it did in the remainder of the country generally.

Except Ibadan, which is located in the hinterland of Nigeria, the major cities and smaller settlements in the GILA urban corridor are located along the coast. The maritime port cities have comparative advantages as transport hubs to their hinterland and as gateways to the global economy. Unfortunately, most of these coastal cities are developing and physically expanding with neither the corresponding investments nor holistic regional and urban planning that will enable them to better face the spatial, demographic, housing, services, infrastructure and economic challenges ahead.

For example, Accra is the capital and most populous city of Ghana with 2.1 million inhabitants as of 2007. The city forms not only the core of the Accra metropolitan area, but is also the administrative, communications, and economic centre of the country. Over 70 percent of Ghana's manufacturing capacity is located within the metropolitan agglomeration of Accra. Originally established around the port, the city, its suburbs and satellite towns now stretch in both directions along the coast and north into the interior of Ghana. Accra's rapidly expanding population is mostly absorbed by informal settlements at the urban fringes and around the port area.

With the spatial growth of the urban agglomeration these informal settlements become part and parcel of the urban fabric. Informal settlements like James Town are mazes of muddy lanes where goats, chickens and dogs scramble for food.

Accra is a major transport hub, home to the Kotoka International Airport, and lies on railway lines to Tema, Takoradi and Kumasi. The main harbour city, Tema, is connected to one of Ghana's highways. Public transit in the city is provided by a mix of privately owned mini-vans, taxis and buses. In 2002, the city introduced a metro bus service which was initially met with scepticism by commuters but which has increased in popularity since.

Cotonou is the largest city of Benin and its economic capital. Its official 2007 population count was 761,137 inhabitants, tenfold its 1960 population of 73,000. Other estimates claim that its population may now be as high as 1.2 million (the 2007 revision of the UN's *World Urbanization Prospects* puts the 2007 population at around 780,000). The urban area continues to expand, notably towards the Nigerian border at the western periphery of the city. As Benin's largest city it houses many of its government and diplomatic services, making it Benin's *de facto* capital, even though the official political capital is Porto-Novo with a 2007 population of 257,000. Cotonou has a major port, while it is also home to an airport and the terminus and an important link in the Benin-Niger railway to the city of Parakou in the north of Benin and beyond.

Ibadan, located at the interface of savannah and forest and the capital of Oyo State, is the third largest city in Nigeria by population after Lagos and Kano. Ibadan is, however, Nigeria's largest city in geographical area with eleven administratively separate local government areas. In 1960, Ibadan was the second-most populous city in Nigeria and the tenth largest in Africa after Alexandria, Algiers, Cairo, Cape Town, Casablanca, Durban, East Rand, Johannesburg and Lagos. It is located in south-western Nigeria, 140 kilometres inland from Lagos and constitutes a prominent transit point between the coastal region and the Nigerian hinterland to the north. Its population was 2.55 million according to the Nigeria 2006 census and 2.67 million in 2007 (based on extrapolation of data in *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*). Ibadan had been the centre of administration of Nigeria's old Western Region since the days of British colonial rule when

TABLE 3.6.1: GILA LARGE CITIES' POPULATION TRENDS (THOUSANDS)

City	1970	1980	1990	2000	2007	2010	2020	2030
Accra	631	863	1,197	1,674	2,121	2,332	2688	3,757
Cotonou	163	337	504	642	761	841	1,196	1,660
Ibadan	809	1,186	1,739	2,236	2,672	2,835	3,752	4,769
Lagos	1,414	2,572	4,764	7,233	9,669	10,572	14,134	17,628
Lomé	192	344	619	1,023	1,452	1,669	2,410	3,224

Source: *World urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*.

Ibadan grew into an impressive and sprawling urban centre.

Ibadan has an international airport and is served by the Ibadan Railway Station on the Lagos-Kano railway line. Primary routes go from Ibadan to the northern parts of Nigeria and to Lagos. In the 1980s, the Ibadan-Lagos expressway generated the greatest urban sprawl (to the east and north of the city). Since then, Ibadan city has spread further into the administrative area of neighbouring local governments. The building of the Ibadan-Lagos expressway has encouraged Lagos and Ibadan residents to resettle along Ibadan-Lagos corridor where accommodation is cheaper.

Another driving force is the establishment of religion-based permanent camps along the Ibadan-Lagos expressway (Islamic and Pentecostal Ministries) with some of these camps now developing into substantial settlements. The Redemption Camp is a case in point as it provides a primary school, a secondary school and the Redeemers University. It has a complement of urban services, including a bank and a petrol station, among others. In addition to the religious establishments, some enterprises (both manufacturing and commercial) are springing up along the Lagos-Ibadan corridor and the Lagos-Abeokuta corridor which are filling in significant employment opportunity. These developments are creating the very livelihoods that in turn attract people to the corridor in increasing numbers. The distance from Lagos is partly responsible for the low cost of land and accommodation, even if commuting costs increase. In addition, being predominantly rural, the demand for land and accommodation is not sufficiently high to drive prices beyond the reach of many.

With its strategic location on the Lagos-Kano railway and the interface of the savannah and forest environments, the city of Ibadan is a major centre for trade. Since the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes in 1980s, informal economic activity has contributed significantly to the economic development of the city as a major means of livelihood and survival of its inhabitants. The informal sector is increasingly replacing formal employment as the economic mainstay, due to a significantly downsized demand for formal labour in both public and private sectors. Most of the workers who have lost their jobs entered the urban informal sector. This is a phenomenon common to many Nigerian cities, although Lagos has managed to retain notably more formal sector work opportunities than Ibadan.

The establishment of Lagos dates back to the 15<sup>th</sup> century when it was a Portuguese trading post exporting ivory, peppers, and slaves. Today, the name 'Lagos' most often refers to the 300 km<sup>2</sup> urban agglomeration of Greater Metropolitan Lagos, which includes Lagos Island, Victoria Island, Ikoyi, Lekki and the mainland suburbs. All of these are part of Lagos State, which now comprises 20 Local Government Areas (LGAs). Lagos is the most populous conurbation in Sub-Saharan Africa with 7,937,932 inhabitants at the 2006 census and an estimated urban agglomeration population of 9.67 million in 2007, based on *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007*

*Revision*. It is the second-most populous urban agglomeration in Africa after Cairo, Egypt, but projected to overtake Cairo in size by 2025 when Lagos is expected to reach 15.8 million inhabitants. In absolute terms, Lagos is believed to be the second fastest growing large urban agglomeration in Africa after Kinshasa (7.85 m inhabitants in 2007).

In administrative terms, Lagos is not a municipality and it has no overall city administration. The metropolis is split into 16 LGAs. This is one of the key reasons that the outlying towns and settlements developed without uniform planning regulations or significant local authority guidance. It also created difficulties for solving citywide problems such as waste collection and disposal. Instead, State government assumed these responsibilities. In addition to the problem of urban waste, access to housing, energy, water, sanitation, sewerage and transportation has all been adversely affected by the haphazard development of a geographically and administratively highly disjointed city.

Mobility is affected by the island topography and bridge bottle-necks that make sure that traffic congestion is a daily reality with an average of two to three hours to cover a distance of 10-20 km. To improve urban mobility, the Bus Rapid Transit BRT (Lagbus) scheme was launched in June 2006. The first phase of the Lagos BRT, from Mile 12 through Ikorodu Road and Funsho Williams Avenue up to CMS, started operation in March 2008 following six months of delays and two weeks of test runs. It is projected that the system will carry up to 10,000 passengers/hour per direction at peak travel times.

The Port of Lagos is Nigeria's leading port and one of the largest in Africa. It is administered by the Nigerian Port Authority and is split into three main sections: Lagos port in the main channel next to Lagos Island, Apapa Port the site of the container terminal and Tin Can Port. The latter two are located on the Badagry Creek.

The Lagos-Ibadan expressway and the Lagos-Abeokuta expressway are the major arterial roads in the north of Lagos city and serve as inter-state highways to Oyo State and Ogun State respectively. To the west, the congested Badagry Expressway serves outlying suburbs such as Festac Town, Satellite Town and Ojo, as well as being an international highway. Traffic congestion is a common feature of Lagos, and it occurs across the length and breadth of the metropolis. The road network in Lagos covers no more than 650 km, and whereas in Nigeria there are 11 motor vehicles/road kilometre, in Lagos metropolis, there are 222. Add to this the fact that Lagos is the end-point of both national and international highways owing to the city's port and manufacturing functions, and the poor state of urban roads. Little wonder that increasing traffic congestion is one of the major transportation issues in the metropolis.

The importance of Lagos as a commercial centre and port and its strategic location have led to it being the end-point of three Trans-African Highway routes using Nigeria's national roads (see Figure 3.6.2):



▲  
Nima, Accra, Ghana  
©Peeter Viisimaa/iStockphoto

- the Trans-West African Coastal Highway leaves the city as the Badagry Expressway to Benin and beyond as far as Dakar and Nouakchott;
- the Trans-Sahara Highway to Algiers, which is close to completion, leaves the city as the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway; and
- the Lagos-Mombasa Highway also leaves the city as the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway, but the route is far from completion between East Africa and West Africa and is practical only for travel to neighbouring Cameroon.

By the history of their growth and the nature and pattern of their development, the key nodal cities along the GILA corridor Ibadan, Lagos, Cotonou, Lomé and Accra have exhibited incongruous physical development, absence of a resilient tax base and a general lack of sustainable economic development patterns. All of these shortfalls have been reinforced by an unfortunate lack of policies and interventions, as well as by the Structural Adjustment Programmes. In addition, the transnational character of the corridor adversely affects the movement of people, goods and services because of the effect of national borders on movement. This is in spite of ECOWAS and some of its protocols which are designed to facilitate movement. These protocols provide a framework for the facilitation of trans-boundary flows. The protocols on transport and communication are a case in point, and they require Member States to:

- Evolve common transport and communications policies, laws and regulation,
- Develop an extensive network of all-weather highways

within the Community, priority being given to inter-State highways,

- Formulate programmes for the improvement of coastal shipping services and inter-State inland waterways and the harmonization of policies on maritime transport and services, and
- Promote the development of regional air transportation services.

On paper these protocols should bring about unimpeded movement of people, goods and services in the GILA urban corridor; but the reality is different as compliance is not necessarily ensured. There is some evidence that movements are not as easy as they should be. For example, the 650 km journey from Lagos to Accra on a luxury coach service takes about ten hours or more. This long travel time is due largely to red tape in trans-boundary movements. Clearly, this situation hampers the corridor from realizing its potentials and diminishes the knock-on effect it can have on the countries concerned and on the rest of the sub-region.

The major cities in the GILA corridor are linked by regular transport services, especially road and air transport. The framework thus exists for the facilitation of the movement of people, goods and services within both the corridor and the ECOWAS sub-region. However, a plethora of bureaucratic and administrative bottlenecks stands in the way of efficiently implementing the ECOWAS transportation aims, thereby detracting from the benefits of the urban corridor. The protocols on transport and communications are meant to ensure the harmonious integration of the physical

infrastructures of Member States and the promotion and facilitation of movement within the Community.

## Issues to be Resolved

From the foregoing, a number of problems and issues stand out. These include the jurisdictional fragmentation of the GILA corridor, bureaucratic bottlenecks that impede trans-boundary movements, the tendency towards primacy and its implication for balanced regional development, internal transport issues in some cities, and unplanned development along sections of the corridor. The corridor is transnational in nature, and is therefore not under the jurisdiction of any one country. The corridor is fragmented in a spatial and managerial sense, and is therefore not quite one economic unit at a time when less complicated, area-wide planning would be desirable and feasible. In spite of ECOWAS protocols meant to facilitate and ease trans-boundary movements, these movements are not as free as they should and could be.

The currently debilitating barrier effect of national boundaries and the related problem of economic insularity of the individual GILA countries stand in the way of economies of scale. Bureaucratic bottlenecks are largely responsible for this situation, and are detracting from the economic advantages which the corridor could bestow on the countries concerned in particular and the ECOWAS sub-region in general. These issues can only be resolved at the regional level and require transnational initiatives within the framework of ECOWAS. At the level of some individual cities, metropolitan fragmentation is also a problem. Cities such as Lagos and Ibadan do not fall under a single jurisdiction. This implies that the management of some cities is divided between different local authorities. Yet many urban problems do not recognize political boundaries, and therefore straddle them.

The issue of urban primacy is particularly noteworthy because of its impact on regional development. The large cities in the corridor, especially Lagos, currently have disproportionate shares of economic development in both their respective countries and in the urban corridor, and the dynamics of economic development will ensure that this trend will continue in the absence of deliberate interventions by governments.

There is evidence of unplanned development along sections of the corridor. This is particularly evident in the Lagos–Ibadan and the Lagos–Badagry sections. One consequence of this is the occurrence of acute traffic congestion on major highways, not just in the streets of the Lagos metropolis. This is partly a result of the location of activities with high traffic generation along these highways. On the Lagos–Ibadan highway, the recent emergence of religious settlements is an example of these activities. The traffic situation in the cities is another dimension of this problem. Lagos is particularly notorious for traffic congestion, and the expansion of the

road network over the years does not seem to solve the problem. The economic costs of the traffic congestion are next to incalculable.

## The Way Forward

There is every need to put in place a coordinated approach to the management and development of the GILA urban corridor as a whole as any further delays in region-wide initiatives are likely to lead to far more expensive future urban retrofitting. Therefore, there is need for the establishment of effective supra-national structures or institutions specifically designed to manage and provide area-wide governance for the emerging Gulf of Guinea Mega Urban Region which has the potential to extend to Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire. In the interest of the development of ECOWAS, the currently debilitating barrier effect of national boundaries needs to be addressed by faithfully implementing the protocols designed to facilitate the movement of people, goods and services so that the urban corridor and the sub-region can reap the benefits of economies of scale. In addition, development control and functional specialization should be put in place in the corridor to ensure its orderly development.

Transnational governance is difficult and is fraught with complex political and financial issues; but not as expensive as the costs of inaction and of redressing massive urban problems through retrofitting at a later date. At the city level, the problem of metropolitan fragmentation requires that metropolitan-wide governance (institution) be established so that cities can have one spokesperson or institution empowered to address citywide problems. A situation where a city like Lagos does not have a Mayor or City Council is problematic and undesirable. Concerning the internal transport problems of the city, more than lip service needs to be paid to urban mass transit based on a light rail system. The solution to the traffic problems does not seem to lie in the expansion of the road network in the city.

The way forward for the issue of urban primacy is the well-known prescription of designing regional development policies that integrate peripheral areas into national and regional economies by improving the flow of development investment and infrastructural development. The main thrust of this policy is well articulated by Stanley D. Brunn and colleagues who stress in *Cities of the World: World Regional Urban Development*, that development poles, satellite towns, and rural service centres can be identified from the existing system of central places and made to receive higher shares of the development investment than has been the case up to now. The new system of investment and settlement planning should aim at making the primate city yield those services and activities that can be effectively handled by smaller and more accessible centres. This policy can help reduce the pressure on individual cities in the GILA corridor and mitigate current and future transport, housing, environmental and other problems in its cities.

# Chapter Four

# THE STATE OF EAST AFRICAN CITIES

# 04

The East Africa region is an expansive, ecologically and environmentally fragile landmass of more than six million km<sup>2</sup> of which 65 percent is classified as semi-arid. Some areas experience desert-like conditions with less than 250 mm rainfall annually and recurrent droughts. East African rainfall distribution and intensity vary considerably, both spatially and temporally. Frequent drought-related disasters include famines, crop failures and lack of pasture. Due to its predominantly rural population, droughts often result in human calamities such as mass migration, starvation or death. Due to their slow onset, many of these events are ignored until their impacts have reached devastating levels.

The region is split north-south by a major geological fault line known as the 'Great Rift Valley', making it vulnerable to seismic and volcanic risk. The region hosts good seaports, large cities like Addis Ababa, Antananarivo, Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Mogadishu and Nairobi and has much economic potential. It is an important contributor to the world's tea and coffee production and is well endowed with tourist attractions, including renowned game parks and tropical beaches.







# 4.1

## Population and Urbanization

For the purposes of this report, East Africa comprises Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda, and Tanzania. National statistics are drawn from *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*.


Between 1950 and 2007, the total East Africa population increased nearly five-fold from 50.5 to 247.2 million. It is projected to reach 268 million in 2010 and 422.3 million people by 2030. The 2007 population was overwhelmingly concentrated in five of the region's 14 nations: Ethiopia (36 percent), Tanzania (17.6 percent), Kenya (15.2 percent), Uganda (13.4 percent) and Madagascar (8.6 percent). Although Eritrea, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia have low total populations, they have projected high average annual population growth rates for 2005-2010: Eritrea (3.24 percent), Burundi (3.9 percent), Somalia (2.9 percent) and Rwanda (2.8 percent). With the exception of Somalia, these high national population growth rates can largely be attributed to refugees returning after political instability. Eritrea's growth rate has now started to decline and is projected at 2.49 percent for 2010-2015. Fertility rates are the highest in Uganda, Burundi and Somalia.

Except for Tanzania's 4.51 fertility rate, in 2007 all East African nations had total fertility rates higher than the Africa average of 4.71. Infant mortality rates vary significantly from country to country but are generally high throughout the region. The under 5-year mortality rates are particularly high in Rwanda (204/178, for male and female, respectively), Somalia (192/182), Burundi (185/162), Ethiopia (164/149) and Tanzania (169/153), compared to the East African (153/138) and Africa-wide (155/143) figures. Maternal mortality ratios are very high in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia and Tanzania with ratios of 1,000 and above. These have translated in significantly lower East African life expectancy (46.8 years for males and 47.4 years for females) than the African averages (49.1 years for males and 50.4 years for females).

### Urbanization Rates (1980-2030)

East Africa is the least urbanized region of Africa. The urban population amounted to only 15.3 million (or 13.4 percent) in 1980 and but grew rapidly to 52.6 million (20.5 percent) by 2007. It is expected to further increase to 74.6 million

FIG 4.1.1: POPULATION PERCENTAGE BY AGE GROUP – EAST AFRICA



Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*.



▲ School children in Kibera, Nairobi  
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(21.4 percent) by 2015 and 131.5 million (30.5 percent) in 2030, closing the region's urbanization gap if compared with Africa as a whole. In the decades to come, East Africa is projected to maintain a fairly steady urban growth rate with forecasts that by 2030 the region may have as many as 2.5 times the 2007 number of urban dwellers.

Until recently, urbanization (associated with industrialization and modernization) was not considered an issue in East Africa. But whereas the worldwide 2007 urban population is projected to double only by 2050, i.e. a period of 42 years, the East Africa region is likely to double its 2007 urban population around 2025 – in merely 17 years. With this rapidly increasing number of urban dwellers, urban growth has started to generate social, economic and spatial problems that now need to be addressed as the region's key development issues.

In the foreseeable future, East Africa will experience total and urban population growth rates significantly higher than the Africa average and, whereas the total population growth will over the coming decades slowly decrease towards the Africa average, the differences in urban growth rates between the region and Africa as a whole are inching from the current 0.61 percent to nearly 1.0 percent by 2030. Clearly, the region has started to make up for its lagging urbanization and is doing so with increasing speed. The macro-level demographic changes will generate many new social, economic and spatial pressures in the region. Governments are advised to integrate these changes in all their macro-level interventions through strategic positioning based on forward-looking vision that goes beyond short-term political and financial gains. It may include painful and politically unfavourable actions that can be undesirable in the shorter term but critical to longer-term developments.

TABLE 4.1.1: DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS

Country	Total fertility rate (2007)	Under-5 mortality Male/Female	Infant mortality total/1,000	Life expectancy at birth	Maternal mortality ratio
Burundi	6.81	185/162	100	44.3/46.3	1,000
Eritrea	5.10	84/78	58	53.8/57.3	630
Ethiopia	5.47	164/149	92	47.5/49.3	850
Kenya	4.97	115/99	64	50.5/48.7	1,000
Rwanda	5.25	204/178	113	43.3/46.2	1,400
Somalia	6.09	192/182	44	47.3/49.8	1,100
Tanzania	4.51	169/153	104	46.1/46.6	1,500
Uganda	7.11	135/121	77	50.7/52.3	880
East Africa	5.28	153/138	87	46.8/47.4	n.a.
Africa	4.71	155/143	89	49.1/50.4	n.a.

Source: United Nations Population Fund, 2007.

## City Size and Population Distribution

Like its overall population, East Africa's 2007 total urban population was unevenly divided among the region's countries: Ethiopia 26.2 percent, Uganda 19.2 percent, Tanzania 16.4 percent, Kenya 15.2 percent, Madagascar 10.9 percent, Somalia 5.9 percent, Rwanda 3.3 percent, Eritrea 1.8 percent, Burundi 1.5 percent, Djibouti 1.4 percent, Réunion 1.3 percent, Comoros 0.4 percent, Mauritius 0.1 percent and Seychelles 0.1 percent.

Addis Ababa with 3.45 million inhabitants, Nairobi 3.36 million, Dar es Salaam 3.31 million, Antananarivo 1.69 million, Kampala 1.59 million and Mogadishu with 1.50 million in 2007 will remain the region's largest cities in the foreseeable future. The capital cities smaller than one million in 2007 are Kigali 852,000, Asmara 600,000, Djibouti 583,000, Bujumbura 430,000, Port Louis 150,000, Moroni 46,000 and Victoria, 26,000. Small if compared with the most populous cities of the region, they are nevertheless large in the national sense and urban primacy clearly remains high all over East Africa, with capital and port cities disproportionately large.

## Urban Primacy

In 2007, 22.5 percent of Ethiopia's urban population lived in the capital Addis Ababa and this city was more than ten times larger than the second largest city, Dire Dawa (300,000) and 13 times larger than Oromia (240,000), the nation's third largest city. Nairobi holds 37.7 percent of the total Kenyan urban population and is 3.7 times the size of the second largest city, Mombasa (820,000). Antananarivo had a 2007 population of 1.69 million, 8.5 times Madagascar's second largest city Toamasina (200,000). Other primate cities in 2007 were Mogadishu with 46.2 percent of the total Somali urban population, Kampala 35.9 percent, Dar es Salaam, 29 percent, Asmara with a near incredible 64.0 percent and Kigali with 48.6 percent of their respective total urban populations. Apart from Eritrea, Rwanda and the region's small-island states, all main cities of the East African nations are in the 1-5 million inhabitants category and show undesirably imbalanced national hierarchies of city and town size distributions.

Besides a lack of balanced national urban hierarchies, there is also clear regional urban imbalance with the six largest

TABLE 4.1.2: TOTAL AND URBAN POPULATION IN EAST AFRICA (1980-2030)

	1980	1990	2000	2007	2010	2020	2030
East Africa Total Pop.	114,366	155,635	204,370	257,267	268,050	343,372	432,359
East Africa Urban Pop.	15,338	25,159	38,111	52,628	57,343	87,347	131,765
East Africa Urban Pop. (%)	13.4	16.2	18.4	20.5	21.4	25.4	30.5
Africa Urban Population (%)	27.9	32.0	35.9	38.7	39.9	44.6	50.0

Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.

TABLE 4.1.3: TOTAL AND URBAN POPULATION GROWTH RATES IN AFRICA AND EAST AFRICA COMPARED

	1980-1985	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025	2025-2030
<b>Total population growth rates</b>										
Africa	2.89	2.79	2.61	2.45	2.32	2.25	2.15	2.01	1.85	1.71
East Africa	2.98	3.04	2.57	2.75	2.57	2.54	2.43	2.26	2.06	1.89
<b>Urban population growth rates</b>										
Africa	4.30	4.16	3.87	3.52	3.38	3.31	3.23	3.12	3.00	2.87
East Africa	4.98	4.97	4.23	4.01	3.87	3.92	3.98	3.97	3.91	3.81

Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.

TABLE 4.1.4: EAST AFRICAN CITIES SIZE DISTRIBUTION (2005)

Number	1 - 5 million		500,000 - 1 million			<500,000	
	Population ('000)	% of urban pop.	Number	Population ('000)	% of urban pop.	Population ('000)	% of urban pop.
6	15,110	26.3	6	4,345	7.6	37,889	66.1

Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.



▲  
The city streets of Kigali, Rwanda.  
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East African cities holding a combined population almost 3.5 times the population of cities between one million and 500,000 inhabitants. The fact that 66.1 percent of the region's urban dwellers live in the cities with less than 500,000 inhabitants, however, theoretically bodes well for East Africa, as intermediate size cities now generally account for a majority of the total urban population rather than the primate urban cores. These region-wide data, however, hide significant urban primacy among the smaller capitals.

It is recommended that the East Africa governments further and strongly promote urbanization in the region's intermediate cities (<500,000) and, by doing so, help divert population, food, energy and economic pressures away from the region's primate cores.

Despite (some might say, because of) being the least urbanized African region, East Africa is experiencing a high rate of annual urban growth, projected to average 3.92 percent between 2005 and 2010, further rising to 3.98 percent (2010-2015). But urban growth projections indicate a steady decline in the average annual growth rate starting with the 2015-2020 half decade. In the past, rural-to-urban migration was the major contributor to urban growth in East

Africa. Today, the main growth factors are natural growth (more urban births than deaths), *in-situ* urbanization (the absorption of rural and peri-urban settlements in the spatial growth of a larger adjacent city) and, in some East African countries, post-disaster returnee flows.


If we exclude the small island states, the highest urban growth rate during 2000-2005 was Rwanda with 9.16 percent while the lowest was Djibouti with 2.59 percent. Very high urban growth rates were also recorded in Burundi (6.10 percent) and Eritrea (5.88 percent). These figures translate in very short urban population doubling times of 7.5, 11.4 and 11.7 years respectively. The high urban growth rates of these three nations were heavily influenced by international returnee migration after periods of instability. They indicate that significant numbers of returnees opted for settling in urban areas rather than returning to their pre-conflict rural origins. Urban growth rates in Rwanda and Eritrea are expected to steadily decline over the coming years, with only Burundi projected to increase its urban growth rates over the 2010-2015 period before commencing a steady, longer-term decline in the rate of growth.

## Urban Growth and Slum Incidence

The fundamental problem with East Africa is that urbanization is not driven by economic growth. Rather, urbanization has become a widespread poverty-driven economic survival strategy. But with urban populations growing faster than the urban economies, the wisdom of seeking economic survival in the largest cities has become doubtful. The phenomenon of urban population growth significantly outstripping urban economic growth is often referred to as 'over-urbanization'. For the region's city managers the rapid urban growth with mostly impoverished individuals and households created difficulties in managing or guiding urban spatial growth, while at the same time supporting increasing urban populations with livelihoods, shelter and services. This inevitably led to rising urban poverty, increased urban slum incidence and overall declines in the quality of urban life.

Based on UN-HABITAT's shelter deprivation factors, between one-third and two-thirds of the urban populations in the large East African cities experience at least one shelter deprivation. Sixty-nine percent of the households in Addis Ababa and 65 percent in Dar es Salaam should be considered slum households under the UN-HABITAT definition. In Kigali and Kampala the proportion is about half, while Nairobi has a relatively lower proportion of 50 percent. This

FIG 4.1.2: EAST AFRICA URBAN SLUM INCIDENCE



Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.

TABLE 4.1.5: POPULATION DYNAMICS OF THE LARGER EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Country	2007 Total population (in '000s)	2000-2005 Total population growth rate (%)	2007 Urban population (in '000s)	2000-2005 Urban population growth rate (%)
Burundi	8,508	3.03	858	6.09
Eritrea	4,851	4.26	980	6.02
Ethiopia	83,099	2.44	13,813	3.83
Kenya	37,538	2.20	7,982	3.20
Madagascar	19,683	2.83	5,733	3.82
Rwanda	9,725	2.38	1,753	9.16
Somalia	30,884	3.20	3,136	4.33
Tanzania	40,454	1.95	10,128	3.58
Uganda	30,884	3.40	3,955	4.18

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2007 Revision.

TABLE 4.1.6: SLUM CONCENTRATION AND SHELTER DEPRIVATION IN SELECTED EAST AFRICA CITIES

City	% of urban population (2007)	% slum h'hold	% of slum household by number of shelter deprivations			
			One	Two	Three	Four
Addis Ababa	22.5	69.1	45.1	20.9	3.1	N/A
Nairobi	37.7	38.5	26.9	8.1	3.3	0.1
Kigali	48.6	52.4	28.9	17.5	6.0	N/A
Dar es Salaam	28.9	64.9	46.4	15.1	3.5	N/A
Kampala	35.5	49.3	40.7	7.8	0.9	N/A

Source: Data from Global Urban Observatory, UN-HABITAT

can be attributed to the fact that Nairobi, the host city of UN-HABITAT headquarters, has been the focus of more effective slum improvement interventions than other cities in the region. Slum conditions in Nairobi, however, are aggravated by extreme densities that are the highest among all Africa's slums.

### Age Structure and Access to Land


Persistently high levels of fertility maintain a young population for East Africa that feeds rapid population growth. This means that in successive generations there are growing numbers of young people and a commensurate, continuously rising household formation and commensurate demand for housing, services, livelihoods, land and food. Even maintaining current standards of living will require more and more supply efforts, while improved standards of living will require even more effort and investments.

With the majority of the East Africans still based in rural areas, availability of additional agricultural lands is a matter of survival. When population growth was slow and land abundantly available, additional demand for agricultural land was satisfied through mobility (shifting and long-fallow cultivation). But under conditions of rapid population growth, land supply soon became severely strained. Individual farmland holdings decreased with increasingly lower options, even for only subsistence farming. Moreover, levels of soil fertility fell, watersheds degraded and loss of forest areas limited bringing virgin lands under cultivation.

Land scarcity and unsustainably high population growth are a dangerous combination, often leading to the politicization


of access to land and subsequent tribal tensions, as the recent history of the region has clearly shown. Land scarcity has become a particularly important social and economic (and therefore political) issue in Burundi, Rwanda and Western/Central Kenya and has already shown to be a vector in civil conflict incidence. The 2008 post-election violence in Kenya, for instance, saw tensions over national election results rapidly turned into land-based tribal conflicts with forceful and violent expulsion of farming households from western and central Kenya on the basis of their tribal ethnicity.

FIG 4.1.3B: EAST AFRICA POPULATION IN AGE GROUP 15-24



Source: World Population Prospects: The 2007 Revision.

FIG 4.1.3A: EAST AFRICA POPULATION IN AGE GROUPS



Sources: World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.

## Informal Urban Land Delivery in East Africa

The rapid growth of East African cities occurs in a legal environment of formal land administration and adjudication processes inherited from the colonial era. These colonial land administration systems were perhaps effective in the 1960, but they often proved far too cumbersome, costly and lengthy for urban land demand in the post-independence period. Given the systemic inability to deliver affordable urban land in a timely manner and in sufficient quantities for predominantly low-income households, it should perhaps not come as a surprise that informal land markets now provide more urban land transactions than the formal sector.

The prevalence of informal urban land processes is often explained as the result of three factors: (a) failure of formal tenure systems to meet the demands for affordable urban land; (b) persistence of outdated and costly procedures and adjudication practices; and (c) resultant high incidence of organic (and often unauthorized) human settlements' spatial growth. These factors still carry much validity as the key causes of dysfunction in formal urban land markets because the greatest demand for urban land is generated by limited-income and low-income households.

At face value, it is surprising that the rapid post-independence growth of informal urban land markets did not trigger major modifications of formal land allocation procedures to reflect these changing circumstances. The underlying cause is that governance institutions persist in considering informal land markets operations as illegal. The poor's 'illegality' in urban land markets must have suited the interests of other actors as changes would otherwise have been introduced.

Two examples from East Africa, one in Tanzania and one in Uganda, may shed light on how informal urban land delivery works when formal urban land markets are not accessible to the lower-income urban majorities. As always, where governance fails or falls short, the market will find a way to satisfy the demand.

### *Tanzania*

Land tenure in Tanzania is governed by the Land Ordinance of 1923, under which all land is publicly owned and vested in the President. As national property, any Tanzanian national, including the poor, is in principle entitled to this commodity. Charges are very low and often bear little relation to actual costs to the government for land adjudication or to the value of the land. Formal access to land is by way of 'right of occupancy' on the basis of long-term or short-term leases. The past decades, however, have witnessed poor performance of the formal land management system in providing urban residential land, registration and transfer of titles, and regulating access to urban land. Less than ten percent of the land demand for housing is provided by the formal land delivery system. This demand gap is filled through the informal sector, often in a semi-legal and socially regularized procedure.

Access to urban land can be secured through occupation

without permit (land invasion). Although land invasions do take place, the scale is limited. In such cases, a makeshift structure is erected before the occupant reverts to more permanent materials claiming 'ownership' on the basis of previous length of land occupancy.

Land can also be obtained through allocation by local leaders, acknowledged owners or local elders against a token fee. Land inheritance is more applicable to the older inner-city areas.

More often, land is purchased in unplanned areas from the acknowledged owner. The seller and buyer strike a deal and register the transaction with a local leader or in the local branch of a political party in the presence of witnesses. If it concerns government-owned and/or planned land it can change hands through land officials who sell unallocated, abandoned or revoked land or add 'new' plots to an approved land use scheme. Alternatively, an owner can sell his/her allotted plot undeveloped (an illegal loophole unspokenly allowed). A legal variant is for the owner of an allotted plot to sell the development(s) on the land.

Although the Tanzanian government has long claimed that its land policy is aimed at the poor, the poor are rarely the beneficiaries of official land allocation and administration. This tends to drive the poor to the informal transactions outlined above. The decisions and transactions are witnessed by relatives, friends and community leaders and a significant 'legitimacy' is based on social recognition. Ward offices maintain a land transfer register ledger that authenticates the ownership of the land by the seller before the transaction can be registered. Most land disputes are settled at the grass-roots level by community leaders. Since the ward officials and dispute resolution committees are part of the formal governance system and linked with the formal judicial system, these informal land access systems have emerged as recognized land regularization sub-systems with linkages to the formal land registration systems.

Because all procedures are voluntarily entered into and while local leaders have no explicit statutory powers or legal mandate in land development or management, this socially regularized land allocation and management system basically remains informal in its core. Informal as it may be, it is guided by norms and procedures agreed upon among the communities and has a definite role in overcoming the failures of formal urban land markets experienced by the lower income strata. Commonly agreed and respected, the grass-roots institutions and procedures allow for highly decentralized access to urban land in a manner that not only offers a significant degree of security of tenure, but that also allows for redress and arbitration in the case of disputes.

Awareness of the potential of socially regulated settlement development and its role in facilitating access to urban land is still much underestimated by the public sector. The procedures and outcomes are often considered illegal and ineffective. The case of informal urban land markets in Tanzania, however,





▲  
Downtown Moshi, Tanzania.  
©Maciej Dakowicz

shows that community-based land management is capable of filling significant governance voids and overcoming the inability of formal land markets to serve the urban poor.

### ***Uganda***

Informal urban land supply mechanisms are slowly being recognized as neither a chaotic nor an unregulated phenomenon. Given their sheer size, informal urban land markets should no longer be the subject of state hostility or simply shrugged off as ‘inevitable’. They have proven that they can provide sophisticated forms of social ordering, as shown by the Tanzanian context above, and provide alleviation for the urban poor from the failures of the formal land markets.

A first step towards better utilizing informal land markets in urban land provision would be to get an understanding of how informal urban land markets function. As a delivery system whose costs, delivery times and security of tenure suit the urban poor, they may show local authorities where governance and regulatory solutions can be found that do not only alleviate municipal land adjudication burdens but which, through guidance from the formal sector, may lead to self-regulation of urban land markets. There is little threat of

informal markets undermining local authorities’ existing land management roles, because East African urban managers’ influence over land for the urban poor and guiding low-income settlement development could hardly be less than it is today.

The processes underpinning urban land access for the poor are often categorized as informal, illegal and irregular or unproductive as it trivializes an existing and thriving market only because it is not subject to public sector regulation and control. Informal land markets are, for millions of East African urban dwellers, the *only* way to access residential urban lands. An indifferent or rejecting attitude to their operations is closing one’s eyes to the daily realities and foreclosing options for public sector interventions and regulation that could be in the interest of all.

The example of case studies in informal settlements in Kampala, Uganda, has shown that informal markets are quite structured and internally regulated. There are typically four phases to informal land acquisition:

- (a) Obtaining information on an available plot and/or potential buyer (depending on the initiator of the action). To minimize costs, social networks are engaged to identify a suitably priced plot or a buyer who can



▲  
Kampala, Uganda.  
© Frank van den Bergh/iStockphoto

raise the funds. A land broker may be involved, but more often friends and relatives bring seller and buyer together. The seller pays a negotiated fee for this service. Not only is this a low-cost approach, it also is more likely to provide a buyer with suitable social norms. These norms can be preferred ethnic or tribal affiliation, blood relationships or existing social ties between the parties. The social norms are particularly important if the sale concerns part of a family plot, as the sellers would prefer a person or household with whom they feel comfortable in close proximity.

(b) The second step, negotiating the price and mode of payment, is normally conducted by the prospective sellers and buyers themselves; keeping the result under close wraps until the sales agreement has been made. This process may take several meetings, as the parties may have to look at alternatives or consult family. Clan identity tends to play a crucial part in pricing with any price discrimination determined by the parties' affinities or lack thereof. Other factors that influence the price in this Kampala example are 'titled' or 'untitled' plot and given Kampala's topography, 'wet' or 'dry' land.

Price differences between titled and untitled land vary between 60 and 75 percent. Poorer people tend to opt for untitled wet land as the cheapest option. Prices are further affected by social and physical infrastructure availability nearby.

- (c) Adjudication and plot demarcation in Kampala's informal settlements are carried out by a variety of actors and can be done by the original holder, a professional land surveyor or by a member of the local council (LC), the lowest rung in Uganda's decentralized structure of local government. Using the services of a registered surveyor will add to the costs, but will lead to the placement of beacons or plantings that are a prerequisite for a formally registered land title. Many do not wish to incur the further expense and trouble of formally processing the land title, as the placement of beacons or plantings by a surveyor is considered sufficient security. A formally registered title is pursued by a minority who wish to protect their children against future dispute and dispossession.
- (d) Obtaining documentary evidence is the conclusion of the land transaction with the transfer affirmed in a written form as proof of possession. Most common are letters of agreement (*endagaano*), some of which are endorsed by LC stamps. *Endagaano* is also frequently used over and above the transfer of titled deeds. A sketch map of the plot is the informal cadastral deed plan, supplemented with measurements and physical description of the plot.

Social recognition of the procedure and supporting documents by the community are the foundation of the operation of the informal urban land market in Kampala because many titled land transactions are not reflected in the land registry. Registering the title would allow for using the land as collateral for loans, for obtaining planning permission, or for securing the rights of future generations. Few would enter the transaction in the registers due to costs, whereas using the title as a collateral is seen as the sure way of losing your property in view of the excessive interest rates on loans. Moreover, many plots are below the legislated minimum size and accessibility standards which would complicate their formal registration.

The examples from Tanzania and Uganda show that in situations where people are unable to deploy the steps in planning, surveying or registration in formal urban land acquisition, informal approaches more responsive to the local context were developed as an alternative. Drawing on combinations of formal rules and customary practice, local councils, local leaders and community representatives play a crucial role in providing community-accepted legitimacy (and implied approval by formal authorities) to informal regulation of urban land transactions.

Key in the success of informal and community-based land regulation is that the processes are simple, well understood and low-cost. The main driving force, however, remains the sheer lack of alternatives dictated by the prohibitive disincentives of formal system of urban land allocation.



▲ Stone Town, Zanzibar.  
© Adrian Assaive/iStockphoto

## 4.2

# The Growing Economic Role of Cities

African economic growth in 2007 was widely shared across the continent. East Africa, although not a significant oil-producing region and with only limited minerals exports, was a leading economic performer in Africa. Strong global commodity demand and persistently high commodity prices boosted economic activity in the agricultural, industrial and services sectors in most of East Africa.

Ethiopia led the region with a 9.5 percent real GDP growth rate in 2007, followed by Tanzania with 7.0 percent, Madagascar 6.4 percent, Kenya 6.1, Uganda 6.0, and Seychelles 5.8 percent. Other growth supporting factors in the region include rising foreign and governmental investments in infrastructure, policies encouraging private sector development, investments in manufacturing, rising foreign direct investments (FDI) and tourism receipts. However, post-election violence in Kenya during the first months of 2008 is likely to have adverse impacts on East Africa's economic growth. Severe logistical disruptions in the wake of political instability not only affected Kenya but also the landlocked Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda, as well as Southern Sudan and the eastern regions of the DR of Congo who depend on road-based imports from Kenya. Regional tourism receipts dropped steeply and immediately in the wake of Kenyan instability, causing widespread lay-offs in the tourism sector.

The region's three least-performing countries continued to suffer from the constraints of previous years: civil conflict in Somalia (3.5 percent decline), political instability and excessive economic control in Eritrea (2.0 percent growth) and disappointing export and tourism receipts in Comoros (1.0 percent growth). Despite overall progress, East Africa is still underperforming in economic terms because the region remains hindered by inadequate road and power supply infrastructures. The lack of such adequate infrastructure raises the costs of doing business and, consequently, undermines global competitiveness.

The cities of East Africa are, like elsewhere in the world, the national engines of modernization, industrialization, economic growth and development. Concentrating much of the physical, financial and intellectual capital, urban centres provide the production efficiencies that support non-agricultural employment. They are also the principal sites for processing and marketing of the region's agricultural products.

This is what makes effective infrastructures so important to the economic well being of the region.

While urban centres do make major contributions to East African development goals, the positive impact of the major East African cities, due to historic reasons, is not as great as it could be.

After independence, the capital cities in East Africa attracted flows of rural-to-urban migration. As the urban primacy levels of the capital cities soared, these large cities started to increasingly dominate and concentrate national economic and social development. As the prime attracters of economic activity and human talent, they prevented secondary cities' development because regional perspectives of national development mostly remained under explored and lacking. However, in recent years, the role and importance of small and intermediate size urban centres in urban and regional planning have started to increase. This is partly the outcome of deliberate policy and partly due to declining rates of rural-urban migration.

Some of the region's smaller settlements are becoming more important as nodes of rural and regional development; as cores of administrative, service and trading functions; and as employment- and income-generators. The intermediate-size cities (<500,000 inhabitants) are now experiencing fairly rapid-growing populations and with the associated increasing urban economic demands of these intermediate cities, they are now gradually taking on more important roles in their respective national economic and spatial systems. This is a trend that the region's governments need to proactively encourage to break through the historic patterns of persistent and significant urban primacy and geographically uneven social and economic development. To promote more balanced growth and to reduce poverty in the largest cities, much more attention should be spent unblocking the productivity and welfare-enhancing potential of *all* the region's human settlements through deliberate allocation of decentralized national functions to smaller towns.

Recent experience throughout the region has shown that small and intermediate-size urban centres *can* be viable development cores if they are endowed with efficient physical, social and organizational infrastructures. Examples in East Africa include Eldoret and Kisii in Kenya, Arusha and Mwanza

in Tanzania, Entebbe and Jinja in Uganda, and Tamatave and Majunga in Madagascar. These smaller cities have shown to be capable of attracting noteworthy private sector economic activity through industrial and commercial developments if public investments (and infrastructural investments in particular) help create the right environment. By serving as localized focal points of production, distribution, trade, services and livelihoods, small and intermediate-size towns can contribute greatly towards the achievement of geographically more balanced national urban development, stimulating the national and regional economies in the process. By building enhanced capacities among local authorities, small and intermediate-size towns can also play a greater role in efficient services provision to increasing urban populations; assist in poverty reduction; contribute to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); and secure more equitable and geographically balanced economic and social development.

### Infrastructure and Urban-Rural Synergies

The flow of people, goods and services within and between cities and other parts of any country is facilitated by transportation networks. Intra- and inter-urban transport are important catalysts as they provide the linkages between nearly all sectors of life. They are also major determinants of urban growth and spatial development patterns. The cities of Mombasa, Nairobi, Kampala, Mogadishu, Dar es Salaam and Tanga, for example, all derived their establishment and successive growth from their role as urban nodes along major national and regional transport systems.

Unfortunately, most cities in East Africa are not well served by their current transport networks. To a large extent, existing transport infrastructures date back to the colonial era and have not been significantly improved or expanded since. That is not only applicable to road infrastructures but also to the railways connecting the cores of urban economic activity with the wider region and through East Africa's maritime ports with the world. Well-developed and efficient intra- and inter-urban transportation systems and infrastructures will facilitate the movement of people, goods and services throughout the region and are critical to its land-locked nations.

Urban-rural linkages have always been an important part of urbanization processes. While East Africa is still mostly rural, paying more attention to rural-urban synergies is essential to take better advantage of urban growth.

Many urban migrants still maintain close relations with their rural homes. They return to visit, invest in rural housing and social amenities, and urban-rural remittances are an important component of rural households' incomes. Seemingly paradoxical, reverse flows, whereby urban households receive money from rural areas, are now also taking place, albeit still at modest scales. The rapidly rising costs of urban living - and the cost of urban food in particular - may be behind this. As already discussed in Chapter 1,

urban food security is starting to become an important topic. There are indications that urban households in East Africa do no longer exclusively rely on the traditional urban food supply lines, but that family-produced rural food is taking on an increasing role in urban food supplies as well.

Small and intermediate-sized towns ensure continuous traditional and new flows of benefits from cities to rural areas and *vice versa* through the economic, service, socio-cultural, political, demographic, environmental and administrative synergies. Urban-rural linkages provide an avenue for and contribute further to the integration of rural population in the national and wider regional economy and promote growth of small and intermediate-size towns. They help spread the benefits of development to smaller cities and reduce the need for seeking survival strategies in the primate cities. Both return and circular migration patterns are becoming more important than in the past, with members of urban household returning to their rural home as a cost-cutting measure. Better local access to services, including education and health care, may be a factor in return decisions, as is the increasing cost of urban living. Maintaining both an urban and a rural socio-economic base provides a safety net in times of economic hardships or unemployment, especially for the urban poor.



▲ Men loading taxi-brousse in Fianarantsoa, Madagascar.  
©Muriel Lasure/Shutterstock

## 4.3

# Urban Poverty and Housing Conditions

### Urban Poverty and Inequality

Global changes over the past two decades have resulted in deepening social differentiation and increasing poverty in most developing regions. The East Africa region is no exception. The negative impact of economic crises and reforms under structural adjustment has been felt more severely in urban centres and is a major cause of urban poverty. With increasing urban poverty, self-employment through informal sector activities and multiple sourcing of livelihood, including urban

farming, are now common in the region. Whereas in the past rural poverty outstripped urban poverty, their incidence rates in Kenya and Ethiopia are now quite similar. With continued rates of urbanization and assuming no change in rural and urban poverty incidence, by 2030 about half of the region's poor will reside in urban centres.

In East Africa, urban poverty is not primarily a function of urban expansion or a sign of the failure of urban economies.



▲ A photo of the condensed living conditions in Nairobi, Kibera, Africa. Showing metal roofing and mud walls where many people are cramped into a small area.  
© Josh Webb/iStockphoto

Much of the deprivation and the emerging urban public health problems relates to *systemic* institutional failure that perpetuate social exclusion and inequalities between the urban poor and rich. Significant gaps exist between rich and the poor urban dwellers in terms of access to land as well as trunk and social infrastructures. This is an area where urban agglomerations of scale have clearly not been optimally utilized in East African cities.

Informal settlements house a majority of the inhabitants in most East African cities. Between one-third and two-thirds of the populations in East African cities experience at least one slum-defining shelter deprivation. But the living conditions of the urban poor appear to be of little concern to many of the region's governments. Scarce political will in East Africa is today's main obstacle to reducing urban poverty. Some East Africa nations are doing better in this respect than others. Addis Ababa's programme to house 500,000 people in condominium housing, for instance, is a clear example of positive action to address the housing plight of some of its slum dwellers.

### Informal Developments and Slum Conditions

The term 'housing conditions' refers not only to dwelling unit conditions but encompasses the wider set of living conditions and environment, including facilities and services such as water, sanitation, education and employment. All these are basic components that together define the adequacy of the housing condition.

The rapid post-independence influx of people in the cities of East Africa, coupled with the high demand for affordable shelter that could not be timely catered for by city managers has led to proliferation of informal, unregulated and unplanned settlements. East African urban slums are, more often than not, associated by the government and city authorities with illegality and social ills. They are viewed as breeding grounds for crime, prostitution, drug trafficking and disease. While the social and economic aspects of slums are undeniable and significant, effectively addressing these societal ills is not only a moral duty for the region's governments, it is also their duty to the electorate that put them in place, and an aspect of good governance. It is also an economic necessity if cities are to be allowed to fulfil their roles of being engines of growth and human development. Marginalization of large sections of the urban population has, time and again, proven to be a brake on overall economic and human development progress. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals will, to a significant extent, be dictated by the degree to which urban poverty in the region can be effectively and sustainably reduced.

Several factors explain the growth, proliferation and persistence of urban slums in East Africa:

- Inadequate supply of affordable urban residential land;

- The population of Addis Ababa grew extremely rapidly from 392,000 in 1950 to 3.1 million in 2007. The corresponding figures for Antananarivo are 177,000 and 1.7 million; Dar es Salaam 76,000 and 2.9 million; Kampala 95,000 and 1.4 million; Kigali 18,000 and 852,000; and Nairobi 94,000 and 3.0 million;
- Unrealistically high construction standards and regulations, often a remnant of colonial legislation;
- Private sector housing only caters for the high- and middle-income groups favoured by lending institutions;
- Lack of strategic positioning by governments and local authorities led to unfortunate policy decisions and subsequent systemic policy failure, inadequate institutional capacities of local authorities and a severe lack of social policies and urban social housing delivery.
- Lack of political will to address issues of informal settlements and housing in general; and
- Efforts to address issues of informal settlements and housing are often politicized in party lines, current in election years and forgotten as soon as the ballot count is complete.

Nevertheless, limited slum settlement prevention and upgrading strategies and interventions continue to be undertaken by the governments and city authorities with the support of donors, community-based organizations (CBOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Currently, slum settlement upgrading efforts seem to be starting in East African cities, replacing the inhumane and ineffective slum clearance operations of past decades.

A study of slum settlements in Nairobi revealed that interventions addressing slum settlements have had mixed results. The main positive effects include increased housing stock, expanded opportunities for communities and at times more involvement of slum communities in priority-setting and applications for funds. On the other hand, negative effects include proliferation of new slum settlements, exclusion of target groups, failure to consider low-income households' ability and willingness to pay, untargeted subsidies, housing down-raiding, frequent persistence of non-participatory approaches, gentrification, lack of focus on the well-being of target households, upgrading non replicability, top-down and unsustainable approaches and inadequate partnerships, networking and coordination

Shelter problems cannot be seen in isolation from broad issues of economic and social development and decentralized governance and local level democracy. Poor shelter, like poor nutrition, health and education has its roots in poverty and political exclusion while the processes that give rise to it also sustain poverty. Strategies aimed at improving shelter conditions, especially for the lower-income groups, cannot, therefore, be divorced from overall poverty alleviation and social and political inclusion.

## 4.4

# Urban Environmental Challenges

The concentration of human population in East African urban centres invariably impacts the environment either in the form of over-exploitation of natural resources or through environmental degradation. In addition, some cities in the region, depending on their location, are vulnerable to natural hazards and increasingly so to the impacts of climate change. Cities located in and along the Great Rift Valley are vulnerable to earthquakes and volcanic activity, while those located in coastal areas or near large rivers are especially vulnerable to flooding resulting from sea level rise and other effects of climate change. Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam face “low-moderate” to “high-moderate” seismic risks. Moderate to severe seismic risk applies to a number of smaller towns located inside the Great Rift Valley and in Kenya include the intermediate-size towns of Nakuru and Naivasha. With increasing city sizes, the numbers of people exposed to these threats is rising rapidly but there appears to be little priority given to post-disaster management in urban areas despite the rapidly growing number of citizens at risk.

Increased drying linked to higher global temperatures and disturbed precipitation patterns will contribute to East Africa’s already significant vulnerability to droughts and famines. In addition, the risk of death, diseases and injuries related to climate variability will be also felt in the region’s urban centres. Reduced yields from rain-fed agriculture could result in urban food insecurity in both the large and smaller urban centres. Droughts and famines are likely to result in environmental refugee migration flows to urban

areas, further increasing urban primacy and contributing to worsening urban environmental conditions. Climate change and precipitation variability are likely to impose additional pressures on satisfying urban water demand, and availability. Nairobi residents already experience frequent water rationing. Lack of access to sufficient water may very well become the most important urban growth- and urban liveability-limiting factor in the region.

Cities have a positive environmental impact on rural areas by alleviating population pressures on fragile eco-systems. There is need for governments in East Africa to review the relationships between demographic growth, urbanization, the changing climate and the spatial factors for economic development and for peace and security in the region. Urban water security in particular is rapidly becoming a theme that may dictate the feasibility of some of its large and small cities in the very near future.

### Water and Sanitation

Table 4.4.1 shows that, except for Kampala, the main East Africa cities have two-thirds of their households or more connected to piped water. However, these statistics hide the fact that a water connection does not necessarily imply that the taps also supply water. Most cities in East Africa suffer from irregular but frequent supply interruptions. Kampala is deeply lagging in piped water connections. In Addis Ababa and Nairobi, piped water is mostly provided by

TABLE 4.4.1: URBAN HOUSEHOLD ACCESS TO SAFE WATER AND IMPROVED SANITATION

	% of households connected to:		% of households with access to:	
	Piped water	Sewerage	Safe water	Improved sanitation
Addis Ababa	99.9	2.0	99.9	55.4
Nairobi	91.6	66.5	93.3	82.1
Kigali	65.6	7.8	68.9	81.6
Dar es Salaam	68.5	10.0	81.1	53.9
Kampala	14.6	11.6	94.2	60.8

Source: Data from Global Urban Observatory, UN-HABITAT.





▲ Water and sanitation in Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya.  
©MJS

the local authority with varying quality of service delivery. Recent water sector reforms in Kenya and better governance structures in Addis Ababa are contributing to recent better supply conditions but overall water shortages continue to plague these cities.

Although the hydro-climatic balance of the East Africa region as a whole is theoretically comfortable with annual rainfall still sufficiently replenishing freshwater resources, there are localized severe constraints in satisfying urban

water demand in particular. It is important for the region's governments to start planning for future water security for its rapidly growing urban areas and the long-range supply networks that may be required.

Connection to main sewer lines is evident only in Nairobi. The other cities only have two percent (Addis Ababa) and 12 percent (Kampala) of their households connected to main sewerage systems. This is an indication that Addis Ababa, Kigali, Dar es Salaam and Kampala are using other methods of sewage disposal, i.e. septic tanks, that may be considered "improved sanitation" but which are no longer environmentally sustainable in their densely populated urban areas in the near future. Design and implementation of appropriate urban sewerage systems in line with urban demands and human waste generation is a matter of some urgency.

## Energy

Energy use is another important aspect of urban environmental sustainability, and environmental burdens are associated with specifically urban energy consumption patterns – whether for cooking, lighting, transport or industry. Since gas and electricity are too expensive for many households, many of the East African city dwellers use different sources of energy. The main energy source for cooking in Addis Ababa and Nairobi is kerosene. It is charcoal in Kigali and Kampala. Electricity is mainly used for lighting and cooking by some of the higher-income strata. The use of alternative energy sources, including charcoal, firewood and kerosene, has led to environmental implications that with increasing numbers of urban dwellers will only increase.

## Urban Transport

East African cities and their hinterlands are not well serviced by their inter- and intra-urban transport systems. Most cities in East Africa suffer from lack of or severely limited mobility, or mobility at high social and economic costs. Only recently has more attention been given to urban transport in mainstream national policy. Economic liberalization has encouraged external (particularly Chinese) assistance for improving transport infrastructures in Kenya,

TABLE 4.4.2: SOURCE OF COOKING FUEL IN EAST AFRICA CITIES (% HOUSEHOLD)

	Addis Ababa (2005)	Nairobi (2003)	Kigali (2005)	Kampala (2001)
Electricity	1.3	1.8	0.2	6.9
LP, natural gas	2.2	19.8	0.3	0.2
Kerosene	68.9	68.3	0.6	13.2
Charcoal	9.5	7.4	63	72
Firewood	12.6	0.1	29.5	4.1
Solid fuel	24	9.2	98.8	79

Source: Data from Global Urban Observatory, UN-HABITAT

Tanzania and Uganda. The region has of late also witnessed some investments in public and private modes of urban transport, but this has not been sufficient.

In an environment of high demand for mobility, combined with the general failure to provide affordable, timely and sufficient public mass-transportations options, the private sector has taken over public transport in East Africa. An example are the *matatus* (shared 14-seater taxis) in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Though they are associated with all the transport woes such as congestion, flouting of traffic rules, pollution and accidents, they are playing an essential role in not only urban, but indeed urban-rural and sub-regional transportation. Increasing traffic volumes, even as some roads have been improved, continue to worsen travel conditions because road improvements do not keep track with rising private vehicle ownership.

As long as there are no concerted and effective efforts to improve affordable, timely and sufficient alternative in public mass-transportation, the larger cities in East Africa will be stranded in traffic congestion, pollution and rising traffic fatalities. It would be timely for the large East African cities to start considering measures that will reduce the necessity of the citizenry to almost exclusively rely on private car ownership and low-capacity public service vehicles to satisfy

urban and inter-urban mobility demands. This includes, for instance, making urban travel in private cars less desirable through pricing mechanisms (user charges, increased urban parking fees, private vehicle taxation, etc) and by creating more and affordable options for public mass transportation. Urban bus fleets need to be expanded, routes increased and dedicated urban lanes designated for public mass-transport at the expense of road space for private vehicles. Inter- and intra-urban light rail systems, although requiring high front-end investments are also desirable options for managing urban mobility demand.

Even with close monitoring and control, *matatus* and similar low-capacity public service vehicles have only a limited potential in meeting current and future urban transport demand. Although *matatus* have filled a needed gap in mobility, close to full reliance on *matatus* in urban mobility policy is undesirable since they are difficult to control with market forces alone determining their provision and routes. *Matatus* therefore do not easily facilitate comprehensive transportation planning. Urban mobility management that seeks to reduce urban private vehicle dependency needs to also capture the urban transportation demands of the middle- and higher-income groups because it are predominantly these economic strata that generate high urban private vehicle use.

## Cesspit of Filth and Carbon: Isn't It a Miracle Anybody Lives Here?

On the face of it, Nairobi residents are a hard-working lot. They wake up early to go work and go home late ... very late. For many, the working day starts between 4 and 5 a.m. At this time, the city's estates erupt in pandemonium. At the bus stops, touts shout for passengers and *matatus* hoot incessantly. Children sleepwalk to the bus stop and adults either catch a *matatu* or go to work in their private car.

This early start is driven by the reality that on any weekday morning it will take an average of two hours to cover a distance of 10 km. And the noose is tightening by the day. Clearly, for Nairobi-bians the nights are getting shorter and the days longer. One has to wake up earlier and earlier with each passing year and gets home later than ever before, with close to four hours of this long day spent on the road.

By 5.30 a.m. traffic is still flowing with relative ease but at six, traffic is bumper-to-bumper and any starting commuter will be very lucky to get to work by 8 a.m. While road congestion eases somewhat after 9 a.m., life is pretty tough for people whose jobs entail moving around Nairobi.

On the weekends, when most people are free, traffic snarl-ups are rapidly becoming permanent features too. A short drive to a neighbouring residential estate can turn into an endless nightmare. With ever more vehicles joining the over-stretched road network, the situation can only get worse. Experts are estimating traffic jams cost upward of KSh50 million a day and things are bound to get worse unless radical measures are taken.

Last year, the Architectural Association of Kenya predicted that Nairobi would come to a grinding halt in the next few years and everything on the ground indicates a relentless build-up to that day. Over the years, various ways of decongesting the city have been suggested, but to no avail. Brilliant master plans have been gathering dust at City Hall, the Nairobi City Council headquarters, and at local government offices. Some plans have been overtaken by events, including physical developments on road reserves.

Way back in 1973, the then Town Clerk and City Engineer drew up the Nairobi Metropolitan

Growth Strategy proposal that advised, among other things, expanding the limits of the city to accommodate the growing population. The plan sought to discourage the growth of a single commercial centre in the CBD. Instead, it envisioned growth of sub-centres in different parts of the city; less use of private vehicles; stringent tax measures to discourage car imports; expansion of public transport systems; more car parking; and improved traffic controls. Had the strategy been implemented, it would have included footpaths for pedestrians. The plan could not be implemented due to lack of external donor funding.

The council has now started traffic decongestion experiments. *Matatus* plying certain routes can no longer enter the CBD. While this has noticeably reduced congestion, commuters are in uproar, as some now have to walk 3 km to their offices. The shuttle services supplied to solve the issue are largely shunned as it adds 40 percent to the cost of the trip. But City Hall officials say that similar restrictions will shortly apply to other *matatu* routes as well.

Source: Story by G. Weru published in *The Nation*, Kenya, 4 June 08.



▲ Open sewer system in Kampala, Uganda.  
© Frank van den Bergh/iStockphoto

## Waste management

Urban waste management is a growing concern, as the consequences of inadequate collection and disposal impact on the ecosystems of cities, contribute to the degradation of the urban environment and pose a health hazard to urban populations at large. Urban households will continue to generate solid waste, which, if its disposal is not adequately catered for, will pose further environmental risk in the urban centres of East Africa. Table 4.4.3 compares solid waste disposal in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, showing that less than six percent of Nairobi's household wastes are collected

by the municipality, compared to 45.5 percent in Addis Ababa. Waste collection in Nairobi is mostly catered for by private companies for non-slum households and for close to 30 percent of the slum households. But the cost of privately collected wastes in Nairobi is double that of Addis Ababa. The total urban figure for poorly disposed urban wastes is 1.2 percent for Addis Ababa and 10.2 percent for Nairobi – a fairly good performance for both. No data on urban waste collection and management for other major East Africa cities could be found.

TABLE 4.4.3: SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL IN ADDIS ABABA AND NAIROBI (% HOUSEHOLD)

Solid waste disposal method	Addis Ababa			Nairobi		
	Urban	Non-slum household	Slum household	Urban	Non-slum household	Slum household
Collected by municipality	45.5	49.5	44.8	5.8	5.9	5.6
Pays for private collection	23.2	33.4	19.3	51.9	65.4	29.5
Dumped, burned or buried	30.1	16.5	34.4	32.1	22.8	47.6

Source: Data from Global Urban Observatory, UN-HABITAT

## Urban Air Pollution

According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), urban outdoor pollution in Africa is responsible for an estimated 49,000 premature deaths annually, while indoor use of solid fuels is responsible for eight times this figure. Rapid urbanization means increased motorization and economic activity, which may lead to increased air pollution. African urban air pollution is aggravated by rapidly expanding vehicle fleets, old and/or poorly maintained vehicles without emissions control, lack of cleaner fuels, poor regulatory frameworks specific to vehicular emissions or poor enforcement where laws and regulations exist. Air pollution in African cities is on the increase in respect of many of the key pollutants. The main cause is the use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) in transportation, power generation, industry and the domestic sectors. The burning of firewood, agricultural and animal waste also contributes to air pollution.

There is a growing need to determine the state of urban air quality and to establish urban air quality management (AQM). A first step towards rational AQM would be to strengthen the political will of governments and local authorities to address urban air pollution and raise public awareness about the adverse effects of air pollution on human health and the environment. When Sub-Saharan African governments were invited to contribute to and attend the *Better Air Quality in Sub-Saharan Africa 2006* conference, only 25 countries replied (Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda from the east Africa region).

Burundi is in an early stage of AQM, with only the phasing out of leaded fuel initiated. Public awareness and media involvement is limited. Ethiopian AQM is limited to Addis Ababa where air pollution screening showed low to moderate levels of pollution. A badly maintained and ageing vehicle fleet and industrial activity in cement plants, breweries, waste incineration, power generation as well as mineral mining and processing are key polluters. After the successful phasing-out of leaded fuels, the relatively high one percent sulphur content (10,000 ppm) in Addis Ababa should be the next target.

Emissions in Kenya, especially Nairobi and Mombasa, originate mostly from an ageing fleet of poorly maintained vehicles and open air burning of household wastes, wood and charcoal. Industrial emissions, such as agro-processing manufactures, power generation and refinery are less important contributors. AQM is not yet introduced in Kenya and a continuous monitoring programme does not exist. The Ministry of Transport recently launched monitoring of emissions from private service vehicles. Apart from fuel specifications for unleaded petrol other fuel standards have not been promulgated.

Key pollutants in Madagascar are monitored by the National Institute of Sciences and Nuclear Technology

(INSNT). The vehicle fleet constitutes to be the major source of air pollution. Madagascar is developing a full-fledged AQM system addressing revision of legislation, emissions, control measures, impacts and cost-benefit analyses. If the extension of public mass transportation, cleaner technologies, efficient energy and land planning use are also incorporated in the planned projects in addition to improved traffic flows, Madagascar will have developed an integrated approach to solve its transport challenge.

The major air pollution problem in Mauritius is the strongly increasing emission from vehicles and diesel driven trucks in particular. Vehicles are generally old and poorly maintained. With the absence of heavy industry, industrial emissions are low. Emission standards are set for stationary sources of all industries, power plants and industrial boilers and the government is actively promoting cleaner production technologies. Unleaded fuel was introduced in 2002 and lead concentrations in the ambient air decreased to trace levels only. Mauritius should now start monitoring urban air quality in its cities, especially Port Louis and Valentina, and in the longer run a permanent air quality monitoring network should be implemented.

## Climate Change and Sea Level Rise

Both the rates and the nature of urban consumption make cities a significant contributor to climate change and global warming. Although Africa has contributed least to climate change trends because of its low per capita energy use and low greenhouse gas emissions, it is the most vulnerable to climate change impacts because of the greater vulnerability of its ecosystems, widespread poverty and the limited capacity to adapt. As such, the ultimate socio-economic impacts of climate change in East Africa will depend on the relative resilience and adaptation abilities of different social groups. Just like the rest of Africa, East Africa is at the receiving end of climate change, with all the consequences of increases in extreme events such as floods, droughts, cyclones and high winds, which have the capacity to damage national and sub-regional economies in the region. Many of the region's slums are experiencing regular floodings.

The low lying coastal areas and the Great Lakes Region are East Africa's areas most vulnerable to flooding due to lack of adequate drainage, poor embankments and sheer lack of preparedness of calamities of this nature. The major coastal cities in East Africa most vulnerable to sea level rise and storm surges comprise Dar es Salaam, Mombasa and Massawa. It is estimated that 17 percent of Mombasa's area (4,600 hectares) could be submerged by a sea level rise of only 30 cm, with a larger area rendered uninhabitable or unstable for agriculture because of water logging and salt stress. Sandy beaches, historic and cultural monuments, hotels, industries and port facilities will also be negatively affected.



▲ A woman buys firewood at a market in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Almost 85 percent of the people in the capital use wood for cooking.  
©Manoocher Deghati/IRIN

# 4.5

## Urban Governance Systems

Good governance embraces the rule of law, human rights, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency. It can assure that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad societal consensus and that the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable are also heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources. It is argued that poor governance is the leading cause of poverty in most developing countries. When the distance between government and the governed is too wide, abuse of power and resources is a likely outcome and a breeding ground for poverty.

Although varied in nature, extent and degree, poor governance continues to cause suffering among many East African citizens. Some of the most common causes of poor governance in the region include:

- Lack of local authority resources (insufficient central government allocations and/or lack of local resource-generating authority).
- Misuse of public funds, corrupt practices, management inefficiencies and lack of transparency in fund allocation by local authorities and central government alike.
- Undue influence by higher level authorities over local affairs.
- Inexperienced institutional and human resources, low wages and limited investment and training in capacity-building.

### National Urban Policy: Colonial Inheritance and Post-Independence Policy Shortfalls

The location, size and distribution of the major urban centres in East Africa is almost entirely the product of colonial decisions in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries in terms of setting of administrative headquarters; routing of transport lines; and identification of areas of colonial strategic and economic importance. Seaports were the basing points for colonial penetration and became the centres of import-export activity, whereas urban centres in the hinterland were the outcome of establishment of administration, trade nodes or 'collection centres' linking primary producers and export-import traders. A hierarchy of four layers of colonial political economy (primary production, product handling

and processing, export-import activities and political administrative officialdom) was focused around the first city. In this way, colonial spatial policy created a primate urban core as the political capital, specialized secondary cities based on a combination of trade and administration - such as Mombasa in Kenya and Tanga in Tanzania - and an array of small administrative centres throughout the region that represented local colonial officialdom. The network of urban nodes inherited upon independence was one that had served colonial needs and most East African nations started off with the post-colonial status quo without formulating a national urban policy serving the needs of the emerging new nation state.

The rapid post-independence urban growth rates in the region and the associated challenges in urban growth were addressed using various city specific master plans and strategies, often without spatial planning in a wider national context, to generate a balanced hierarchy of cities with dedicated specialized functions. For example, Kampala saw local planning interventions in 1912, 1930, 1948, 1968, 1972 and 1994 that by and large only took into consideration local needs without significant focus on the broader national context. Even the 1994 Kampala structure plan envisaged expansion and intensification of development within the already developed areas only. As the city influence extended, it became obvious that the localized spatial planning is insufficient and Kampala is currently working on a metropolitan planning strategy that hopefully better reflects the Uganda-wide spatial aspects of national macro-policies.

Likewise, over the years Nairobi was subjected to several master plans but with little implementation or impact locally, let alone nationally. These plans include the 1892 Nairobi Plan, the 1948 Nairobi Master Plan, the 1973 Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy and the 1993 Nairobi City Convention. All these plans failed to predict accurately the speed and direction of peri-urban growth even in the face of the actual realities on the ground as they emerged over time. Investment decisions on urban infrastructure, social housing and the spatial aspects of urban economic development soon started to contradict the spatial realities of actual urban growth. But it would appear that few lessons have been learned from these mistakes of the past.

For instance, the Kenyan Government, together with the Nairobi City Council, is entangled in the political fall-out of its attempts to implement a ring road designed thirty-seven years ago. The location of the proposed traffic management intervention suffers from some deeply inconvenient facts. The plan would appear to have been drawn up without taking into account the local topography and the proposed road cuts across steep riverine valleys that would make it entirely unsuitable for the road-based heavy transportation it was intended to take outside the town, or alternatively requiring huge investments in fly-overs and long bridges. Besides the thirty-seven years of delay in plan implementation, the original plan had not foreseen the massive and rapid urban growth that has taken place. The plan was originally intended as a key measure to improve local, national and regional traffic flows while defining the urban boundaries. The government now finds itself in a situation whereby the envisaged ring road cuts through existing settlements, requiring demolition of housing units and the displacements of informal settlements that have since been erected on land reserved for this major traffic management intervention. This example, once more, emphasizes the need for long-term vision and practical approaches of spatial planning and that narrow local thinking in the longer run can become counterproductive and costly.

## Decentralization and Local Governance systems

Under rapidly increasing demand for more local voice in decision-making, brought about by the spread of multi-party political systems, most of the region's central governments and local authorities have stated that they embrace the concept of good governance and that they support public participation and public-private partnerships. Nevertheless, true decentralization of powers and resources to the local authorities and participatory urban decision-making is not yet put into effect. As mentioned in and confirmed by experiences in the Southern Africa region, national governments' fear of strong, opposition-controlled local authorities has a long, decentralization undermining history of excessive control of central authorities over local governments.

### *Nairobi City Council*

Like other Kenyan local authorities, the Nairobi City Council (NCC) operates a system of representative democracy. Local elections take place every five years, concurrent with presidential and parliamentary polls. Fifty-five councillors are elected from Nairobi's 55 wards, while 19 councillors are nominated by the Minister for Local Government. Councillors serve for five years and elect the mayor and deputy-mayor who both serve for two years.

Many Nairobi residents do not appear to take local elections seriously as voter participation basically ends at the ballot box and because elected local leaders are not accountable. Councillors are frequently accused of inefficiency and of only addressing issues in which they have a personal stake,

rather than focusing on the residents' interests. Likewise, the appointment of the Mayor leaves him/her heavily exposed to political intrigue, forcing the incumbent to pursue political alliances instead of addressing residents' concerns. Local politics has lost further credibility because the NCC entirely depends on the central government which controls and distributes the resources via a system of patronage. Nairobi is an East African example of tensions between central government and opposition-controlled local authorities limiting the political feasibility of full decentralization.

Although the NCC and other local authorities in Kenya clearly do not meet the basic tenets of participatory governance, the Ministry for Local Government has taken steps to improve the functional linkages between city councils and residents through the Local Government Reform Plan (LGRP) and its subsidiary Local Authority Service Development Action Plans (LASDAPs). The LGRP makes civic engagement a precondition for accessing the central government's Local Authority Transfer Fund (see textbox overleaf). Mandatory stakeholder engagement has forced the city authorities to better involve the citizens, but the process remains in its infancy, top-heavy, and mostly 'informative' rather than 'consultative'. The limited consultations that take place are often more lip service to this concept than true participation. Nevertheless, the process has led to the launch of participatory initiatives that have recently begun to foster some degree of transparent and consultative budgeting. Moreover, it is easily overlooked that local government reform takes a long time to achieve. Given the relatively young age of multi-party democracy in East Africa, it should come as no surprise that the actors are yet to meet the expectations. Mistakes and setbacks are inevitable and the challenge is to use failures as learning opportunities, rather than excuses for abolishing reforms.

To achieve more efficient operations of Kenyan city councils, a number of deep reforms are still required: (a) local autonomy from central government; (b) institutionalization of real citizen participation; (c) capacity-building among councillors and chief officers; and (d) direct election of the Mayor by residents to make him/her less vulnerable to political manipulation from councillors and central government.

## Municipal Finance and Administration

Municipal finance and administration are presently being reviewed in some East Africa nations and a number of positive changes have taken place. Although it is perhaps too early to come with conclusions on the effectiveness of these changes, progress is being made.

### *Nairobi, Kenya*

In the past, the Nairobi City Council (NCC) budgetary process was an internal matter entirely driven by council officers. Residents were not allowed to scrutinize the budget before its approval at the Full Council meeting, while the document further remained classified after passing

through the Council. This contributed to poor management and abuse of resources. Legal provisions now allow residents to purchase a copy of the Council's annual budget, but few are aware of this and even fewer can afford to do so.

The Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) has introduced budgeting decentralized to the ward level to ensure better civic society participation options. Since the 2002-2003 financial year, when the Ministry of Local Government required more transparent and consultative NCC budgeting procedures, budget proposals prepared by NCC departments are compiled by the treasurer for discussion in workshops by the councillors and other stakeholders. A refined budget is presented to the Finance, Staff and General Purposes Committee, while the Full Council ensures that activities budgeted for are implemented during the relevant financial year.

Still in its infancy, the system has already shown some constraints, including tardy approval procedures by the Ministry of Local Government. This forces municipal treasurers to operate 'shadow budgets' before the Ministry approves the budget retroactively. Whereas the Ministry stipulates that chief officers should not direct LASDAP processes, poor councillor performance often results in flouting of this regulation. Informing and notifying the general public of consultations is also neither always comprehensive nor effective.

## Urban Planning and Spatial Development

The national urban and spatial development policies of various countries in the East Africa region have some broad similarities as well as major differences. Despite common historic and geographical experiences, urban and spatial development policies started to diverge in the post colonial

era mainly owing to different national socio-cultural and political parameters. Apart from Ethiopia and Eritrea, the countries in the region used British, French, or German planning policies. While Kenya initially pursued a capitalistic top-down economic growth strategy in the post-colonial era she later adopted a growth-centre strategy which focused to some extent on intermediate size cities at the district level as a means of administratively organizing its space while promoting national development.

Madagascar and Tanzania have drifted away from the growth-pole approach in urban and spatial development and adopted radical agro-polity oriented policies that advocated bottom-up approaches and endorsed the supremacy of territorial integration and endogenous development with a system of selective spatial closure. This socialistic development is well perfected in Tanzania. Using this policy, Tanzania created Dodoma as her new capital so that the strategy could be evaluated as a means of achieving decentralization and stimulation of development in the intermediate hinterland of the new capital.

Uganda's urban and spatial development policy has been somewhere between the Kenyan and Tanzanian models. The urban and spatial development policy of Uganda adopted regional disaggregation of national development plans, paying particular attention to availability of local resources over time and space. Burundi and Rwanda have used combinations of adaptive centre-down as well as bottom-up approaches. In most cases they have adopted regional aggregation of local policies, plans and sector programmes. This method represents more of a bottom-up strategy in spatial development, as opposed to a top-down approach. The same policy has been used in the island states of Seychelles, Comoros and Réunion. Somalia, because of current political problems, does not have any urban or spatial policy at all.

### Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF)

LATF, introduced in 1999/2000 through an Act of the Kenyan parliament, is a grant from the central government to equip local authorities with means to provide their citizens with basic services. At the time of its inception, most local authorities were faced with increasing unresolved debts, reliance on the central government for capital investments, poor leadership and economic governance and poor services delivery. To address these problems, the Kenya Local Government Reform Programme embarked on policy and legal framework changes aimed at decentralization and local authority empowerment. The LATF was created as part of this reform strategy with the key objectives of: (a) enabling local authorities

to improve and extend service delivery; (b) resolving municipal debts; and (c) improving local revenue mobilization, accountability and financial management.

According to the Act, five percent of income tax is transferred to the 175 local authorities of Kenya following a distribution system based on the previous year's budget and the number of residents in the urban units. The funds are divided along three main lines: financial (for debt settlement), administrative (for payment of salaries), and technical (for various development projects). Municipal councillors are expected to use the funds for developing their wards. The

government requires local authorities to direct at least 50 per cent of the funds towards access to basic services. Half of this should be channelled through the Local Authorities Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP).

Introduced in 2001, LASDAP compels local authorities to submit to the government a plan identifying and defining local priority needs. In addition, municipal staff remuneration should not be above 60 per cent of the total sum of the funds. Attaining the sum of €50 billion per year, LATF is supplementary to the local authority budget aimed at encouraging access to basic services and improving infrastructure.

Source: Owuor et al (2006: 38).



Ethiopia and Eritrea did not experience a long history of colonialism. Their current urban and spatial development strategy is heavily top-down. This resulted in a very high rate of urban primacy whereby Addis Ababa, for example, dominates among the urban centres in Ethiopia while close to two-thirds of Eritrea's urban population lives in the capital Asmara. All the countries in the region are officially committed to policies for better planning the urban informal housing sector by providing or enabling housing for low-income groups. However, this development policy seems to rather serve the lower middle-income groups through housing down-raiding. Over the years, development planning has been urban-biased but presently the policy of decentralized planning programs to the rural areas has helped to develop spatial planning as a policy. Urban planning policies are still oriented towards the rural and urban formal sectors, albeit that spatial planning of the rural informal sector is now receiving some attention.

The urban planning and spatial development ideologies are based on each country's respective socio-political structures and attitudes. East African countries have adopted urban policies that redistribute resources to various parts of their countries while reinforcing the linkages between urban and rural areas. Although this is stated policy, the effectiveness of these policies and the political will to implement them consistently is not always evident.

## Governance in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations

East Africa has been, and to some extent still is, a region with political instability. The past decades have seen civil strife in Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia and northern Uganda. Somalia, except for 'Somaliland', is still in an extremely unstable situation facing continued humanitarian disasters as the result of persistent outbreaks of civic strife.

In conflict and post-conflict situations, central authority is typically weak, if existing at all. But a functioning centre is crucial to the effectiveness of local governance, with the nature of central-local political relations determining local governance outcomes. Local authorities too are institutionally weak in conflict and post-conflict situations, while the societies they govern are often socially fragmented, psychologically damaged and physically devastated. As a result of systemic governance failure, insecurity of access to basic services is a very common circumstance of conflict-affected communities because local authorities, as the lowest level of government and providers of most of the essential services, are often literally in the front line of conflict and the first to cease functioning. Service provision to the citizenry during conflict and in post-conflict situations is therefore often minimal, with communities left with little or no access to safe water, food, livelihoods, sanitation, waste collection, education and personal security. It then falls on the shoulders of other local institutions and individuals, including traditional leaders, to serve as the hub for localized initiatives.



▲ Displaced people wait to be given food during a distribution organised by the UN World Food Programme, USAID and other local and international NGOs, in Mogadishu, Somalia.  
©Jamal Osman/IRIN

Under peacetime conditions, decentralized governance ideally secures that the concerns and voices of people are heard in the design, implementation and monitoring of government policies and strategies. It would enable the citizenry to exercise choices for human development. At the local level the latter is particularly significant for policy formulation and implementation related to service delivery, livelihood- and income-generation and resource management.

In post-conflict and conflict situations, decentralized networks of local institutions and individuals, including community mobilization, are often the best option to re-establish failed government functions and services. Restoration of service delivery as a first step towards normal functions frequently occurs in the framework of humanitarian operations. But such post-conflict and conflict humanitarian interventions imply allocation of power and resources, which in turn can (and often does) generate, reignite or intensify power struggles, creating renewed conflict and chaos. Without appropriate accountability mechanisms, corruption, capture of power by elites and the frequently ensuing abuse and marginalization of large sections of the citizenry are known risks. These risks can, however, be minimized if decentralized

initiatives and capacity-building development make efforts to fit within and become part of overall peace building and reconstruction strategies. The modalities vary to the specific circumstances and no blanket approaches should be prescribed.

Renewed or enhanced service delivery is among the first desires of communities in the aftermath of conflict. Decentralized governance initiatives can go far in achieving this, even if there is no established or recognized centre. This can be conducive to setting standards for further and future development of participatory modalities within local level politics. But post-conflict situations are normally not characterized by smooth democratic approaches. Local leaders or elites often tend to capture power and then exercise ruthless authority over the citizenry. Local governance efforts during post-conflict and in conflict situations nevertheless needs to make concerted efforts towards promoting effective participation mechanisms by mobilizing individuals and communities around the provision of common and basic services, such as water, sanitation, food, healthcare, shelter, land, education and personal security.

The effectiveness of local institutions and the political relationships between tiers of the administration will determine emerging patterns of participation and the extent to which local authorities or other local institutions can reach out, among others with basic service provision. The current situation in Somalia is illustrative of the above in the East Africa context.

The three regions of Somalia exemplify the above with a sliding scale from elected and functional local authorities in Somaliland, to appointed, weak and unstable ones in Puntland. South and Central Somalia are mostly in chaos with the daily realities including militias fighting for control of towns and communities. As the result, an extremely dire humanitarian situation persists and is aggravated daily.

Somaliland's elected local authorities attempt to maintain their political legitimacy by providing at least some governance and services to their communities. United Nations and donors are focusing on local authority capacity-building and support toward service delivery. They are also involved in stabilizing local councils and institution building at the centre through strengthening of legal frameworks and governance as well as policy formulation capacity-building.

Puntland authorities are nominated and therefore comparatively weak and unstable. Service delivery capacities are low and access to services is unpredictable. The impacts of international assistance are low and decidedly less sustainable than in Somaliland.

In the South and Centre of Somalia, local authority and governance are exercised by often short-lived, militia-nominated bodies or by civil society initiatives. In some instances even these minimal structures do not exist. In the absence of reliable parameters that would help define political

legitimacy, public acceptance and service delivery capacity, it has become extremely difficult to find valid entry points for promoting sustained and sustainable local governance or service delivery. Governance and services therefore largely remain a humanitarian undertaking without any transition to development.

It is generally agreed that state-building should be pursued from the grassroots level to achieve growing sustainability. The political impetus of supporting a failing central government tends to undermine the credibility of the international community, rather than serve the governance needs of the Somali people. If there is a lesson to be learned from Somalia, it is that the critical importance of home-grown contributions to establishing or re-establishing governance systems should not be underestimated. Only when a relatively stable centre has been established as the political foundation can external assistance build and support the transition from humanitarian assistance to development programming.

## Metropolitan Governance

With the larger East African cities increasingly spilling over their municipal boundaries and encroaching on the territories of neighbouring municipalities and counties, the need for area-wide governance of the metropolitan regions is becoming a matter of concern. Area-wide governance is highly desirable to coordinate and align the economic, social and spatial agendas of the local authorities that co-exist within the greater metropolitan region. Although establishing a satisfactory governance system that can equitably and efficiently steer regional urban issues will in most cases prove a difficult administrative and political process, the new regional character of the larger East African cities leaves little sustainable alternative. Clearly, the administratively most difficult component of establishing area-wide governance is devising the full cooperation of all the local authorities in the metropolitan region, despite the unavoidable limits area-wide governance implies for the smaller towns' local autonomy and territorial authority.

In Kenya, the government recently created a Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development charged with the development of the Nairobi Metropolitan Region, aiming at area-wide governance interventions. Specifically, the Ministry is in-charge of roads, bus and rail infrastructure; creating an efficient transport system; replacing slums with affordable low-cost and rental housing; enforcing planning and zoning regulations; facilitating efficient water supply and waste management infrastructures; and promoting, developing and investing in sufficient public utilities, public services and infrastructure. This political development is a first in the East Africa region and the experiences of this new Ministry will be closely followed. See also section 4.6.



▲ New buildings are constructed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Situated in the foothills of the Entoto Mountains and standing 2,400 metres above sea level, Addis Ababa is the third highest capital in the world. The city has a population of about two million.

©Manoocher Deghati/IRIN

## Addis Ababa: The Impact of Good leadership

Regular visitors to Addis Ababa may have noticed major physical and administrative changes since the appointment of Executive Mayor Arkebe Qubay. Addis Ababa, with a population of 3.1 million and eight percent annual growth, is a cosmopolitan metropolitan city that is now not only surprisingly clean but also has an extremely low crime rate. It has the status of both a city and a state under a charter endorsed by the national government. The Executive Mayor has broader responsibilities than most of his counterparts elsewhere, including health and educational services, policing, water supply and infrastructure. The city council, elected directly every five years, assists the Mayor in decision-making.

Since early 2003, Mayor Qubay has overhauled the city administrative system, making it leaner and less centralized. The four tiers of administration have been halved and the civil service thinned out with redundant staff reassigned to new urban institutions. Metropolitan Addis Ababa now comprises 10 municipalities with significant delegated authority, including the budget and with 90 percent of services devolved to the municipal or lower levels. Governance primarily focuses on the 10 *kebele* of 40,000 to 50,000

inhabitants. This two-tier system is leaner and more democratic with elected municipal councils taking most decisions. The *kebele* also have their councils who decide where to focus efforts and how to tailor budgets. *Kebele* councils are an important modality for involving civil society. Within six months of Mr. Qubay taking office, the restructuring was complete.

Among the priorities is delivering services to residents and local businesses. The waiting time for birth and marriage certificates has been cut from three weeks to 30 minutes in a one-stop service; tax registration from six months to one hour; land registration from three years to eight days. Administrative bribery is being eradicated and over 1,000 corrupt civil servants have been fired. Shorter waiting times have been achieved by introducing new management practices and tools, including outsourcing. Revenue and tax are collected through banks and post offices, while car technical inspections are being conducted by private businesses. City Government transparency in government is enhanced through regular media statements and swift handling of complaints.

Unemployment, currently at 42 percent, and 60

percent of employment classified as 'informal', remains a challenge. The Mayor aims to tackle this by encouraging micro and small enterprises in five core areas: food processing; textile and garment industry; metalwork, woodwork and furniture production; small construction; and municipal facilities. The new Micro & Small Enterprises Development Agency provides credit, training and assistance to new businesses which created 63,000 new jobs. Establishment of 45 private parking lots has brought revenue exceeding ETB 7m (approx US\$730,000). Another challenge is the 300,000 housing units deficit and the hopelessly old and overcrowded existing housing stock. People willing and able to construct their own homes are offered a land gift of up to 50 m<sup>2</sup> to become owner-occupiers, enabling them to use their property as collateral to secure business loans. Incentives are also offered to property developers who want to construct low-income housing.

Since the metropolis does not receive subsidies or grants from central government and banks, the Mayor hopes to treble revenue by making it easier to pay taxes, and through automated tax collection and training of staff. Tax revenue has risen from \$100m to \$200m.

Source: [http://www.citymayors.com/mayors/addis\\_mayor.html](http://www.citymayors.com/mayors/addis_mayor.html)

## 4.6

# Emerging East African Urban Corridors

In 1899, Nairobi was established along a small river at the heart of the Masai grazing lands in the southern areas of today's Kenya. The initial tented camp for the Mombasa-Kampala railway under construction became a railway depot, shunting yard and water intake point for the locomotives. The name 'Nairobi' came from the Masai words *Ewaso Nyirobe* – 'cool waters'. The status of capital city was moved from Mombasa to Nairobi in 1905 and from that point onward Nairobi became an important East African colonial settler city. Situated on a plateau 1,660 m above sea level, adjacent to fertile highlands and traversed by rail (and later

also road), the town developed into an international, regional, national and local hub for commerce, transport, regional cooperation and economic development. Nairobi hosts the country's largest international airport, an important regional airport and with its location along the Mombasa-Kampala highway, the city is an important logistics hub for Kenya's central, northern and western provinces but also landlocked Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.

Notably since independence in 1963, Nairobi has been overwhelmed with population growth. Nairobi's urban primacy – almost four times the size of the nation's second-



▲ Greater Nairobi - Kenya.  
©Google Earth



▲ Capital of Kenya - Nairobi.  
©Charlie Grieves-Cook

## VISION FOR A METROPOLIS - NAIROBI METRO 2030

Since 1963, the population of Nairobi, Kenya, has grown from 350,000 to an estimated 3.05 million in 2007. The total current Nairobi Metropolitan Region (NMR) population is about 4.73 million, equivalent to 21 percent of the total urban population, while growth projections indicate that the NMR may very well reach a total population of 8 million by 2030.

Responding to urban growth projections and in an attempt to address current and future NMR challenges, the Government of Kenya is preparing an ambitious *Nairobi Metro 2030* vision to spatially redefine the NMR and create a world class city region envisaged to generate sustainable wealth and quality of life for its residents, investors and visitors. The plan's elaboration and implementation falls under the responsibilities of a newly-established Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development.

The **vision** is to create the 'best managed metropolis in Africa' providing a dynamic and internationally competitive and inclusive economy supported by world class infrastructure and a skilled labour force. Based on the **core values** of innovation, enterprise, sustainability, co-responsibility, self-help and excellence, the **strategy** is to optimize the role of the NMR in national development by building on existing strengths, including Nairobi's hub function in

air transportation, the large number of regional and international bodies already present, and its educational and research institutions.

Although this new approach to institute area-wide planning for the NMR is a most laudable initiative, the realization of any vision depends on the practicality and realism of the underlying details and assumptions. Whereas *Nairobi Metro 2030* is not short of admirable aims, priority should now be given to developing the critical details of a sound governance structure, a comprehensive spatial and investment plan and a realistic strategy for mobilizing the required funding.

The proposed NMR covers the 3,000 km<sup>2</sup> that depend on Nairobi's regional core functions for employment and social facilities. Planning will initially involve a 40 km radius, despite Nairobi's functional outreach covering 100 km or more. This could be a serious flaw.

Apart from Nairobi Municipality itself, the NMR vision affects 12 adjacent independent local authorities. Without defining up front the NMR governance structure, authority hierarchy and regulatory arrangements, it shall prove difficult to generate vision 'ownership' among the affected local authorities. *Nairobi Metro 2030* is still unclear on whether it advocates for central control or decentralization, seeking both integration of

all metropolitan local authorities and a multi-nuclei decentralized structure. Moreover, further participation by all key actors, including the residents of the affected municipalities and counties, is likely to inform and broaden the vision.

*Nairobi Metro 2030* will require the integration of economic policy, infrastructure policy, spatial policy, social policy, governance policy, environmental policy and labour policy for institutional capacity building. Kenya's local authorities have a generally poor governance track record, partly because of a history of incessant higher level interference in local issues and centralized control may not necessarily be in the vision's implementation interests.

A deeply informalized metropolitan economy, combined with poor services delivery, hopelessly congested urban roads and about half of Nairobi's population impoverished and living in urban slums explains why *Nairobi Metro 2030* is a timely initiative. UN-HABITAT is committed to assisting the Government of Kenya with elaborating the details of the plan. The entire Africa Region will closely follow the new developments in Nairobi, hoping for a best practice to emerge. Meanwhile, the Government of Kenya is taking a critical look at how it can facilitate the supply of a projected 8 million NMR inhabitants in 2030 with food, energy, water and jobs.

Source: *Nairobi Metro 2030: A Vision for a World Class Metropolis, First and Foremost in Africa*, Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development, May 2008.

largest city, Mombasa – became very pronounced. Nairobi now employs 25 percent of all Kenyan labour and 43 percent of all urban workers, generating 45 percent of the national GDP.

By the mid-1980s, Nairobi's growth had reached the municipality's territorial boundaries. Although urban fill-in and densification occurred, the urban fabric also started to flow over its administrative boundaries into the territories of neighbouring municipalities and counties. This occurred mainly along the main road arteries - southeast along the Nairobi-Mombasa highway, northwest along the Nairobi-Naivasha highway, and in the northerly direction towards Thika.

Outlying rural settlements Limuru (manufacturing and tea production), Thika (agriculture) and Athi River (industrial settlement) started to receive lower-middle to upper-middle class groups from Nairobi seeking cheap peri-urban and rural lands in Nairobi's vicinity.

From the mid-1980s onwards, the fringes of the Nairobi-Mombasa highway (between the city proper and the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport) became the location of choice for medium-size industrial and manufacturing enterprises. Likewise, the Nairobi-Thika highway guided urban sprawl in the northern direction led by the establishment of educational, services, and small-size manufacturing activities. The northwestern sprawl of Nairobi was spurred mainly by the city's emerging international functions, including two United Nations global headquarters and associated UN regional offices, international research institutions and, as of lately,

international diplomatic functions. Some urban development took off in a southern direction towards Ngong, but the location of the Nairobi National Park and the topography of the Great Rift Valley, the precipitous southwestern termination of the Nairobi plateau, did not encourage wholesale growth.

Each of these peri-urban expansions and their economic activities drew in specific socio-economic groups. The southeastern industrial developments caused rapid inflows of unskilled and low-skilled migrants from all over Kenya. Athi River and Mavoko along the Nairobi-Mombasa highway experienced a combination of formal upper-middle class and high-income residential developments together with rapid emergence of informal settlements, land squatting and slum proliferation. Over the period 1988-1998, the Municipality of Mavoko was Kenya's fastest growing town, mostly through informal settlement by low-skilled people attracted by the perceived income opportunities among rapidly expanding local industries. By 1998, there were 25 well-established slums in Mavoko. Some slum residents found work in the surrounding industrial establishments, others engaged in informal sector activities, including food preparation services (or commercial sex) for the truck drivers awaiting their turn for axle-load inspections at the local (now former) weighing bridge.

The services and smaller-sized manufacturing activities along the Nairobi-Thika road predominantly saw lower-middle and middle class residential growth on (mostly) formally subdivided plots. The internationally-oriented northeast of Nairobi attracted many expatriate and high-income Kenyan households.

## DAR ES SALAAM


The Tanzanian port city Dar es Salaam was first established in 1857. Formerly known as Mzizima(zi), Kiswahili for 'healthy town', Dar es Salaam received its current name 'House of Peace' from the Sultan of Zanzibar. The city's growth was fostered by the establishment of the German East Africa Company for which Dar es Salaam served as the colonial administrative and commercial centre. The Company had originally established its capital in the city of Bagamoyo but quickly moved to Dar es Salaam. In 1996, Dar es Salaam lost its status as capital city and the capital was moved inland to Dodoma. Despite this re-classification, Dar es Salaam remained Tanzania's commercial and economic center, while Dodoma is the political capital and the seat of the Government.

Since 1980, Dar es Salaam's population has almost quadrupled from 836,000 to about 3 million in 2007. This growth magnitude is almost identical to Tanzania's overall urban population increase from 2.7 million in 1980 to 10.4 million by 2007. By 2010 the urban population is expected

to reach 11.4 million with around 50 percent of these living in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania's urban population will again double to 21 million by 2025 and double once more to a projected 46 million by 2050.

Over the past century, the growing population of Dar es Salaam has steadily spread over its surrounding land. In 1891, the city had about 4,000 inhabitants and extended only to two kilometers from the Indian Ocean to the hinterland. In 1980, the city had expanded to 14 kilometers. By 2001, the city had grown to a radius of 30 km and was recorded as accommodating a population of about 2.2 million.

Both central and local government have been unable to control the rapid growth of Dar es Salaam. The challenge is to steer urban growth in a sustainable manner so that its benefits reach all sectors of society, including the urban poor. With 84.2 percent of Tanzania's urban population living in slums, the spatial planning of Dar es Salaam and other key urban areas within a 100-200 km



radius need to be addressed on an urban regional basis. A slum upgrading strategy has recently been elaborated but needs to be implemented. Political will is required at all levels.

Sources: Surveys by IRPUD, Dortmund; Data by ITC Enschede and DCC 2000.

## Urban Growth and Peri-Urban Land Use

There are a number of factors that influence or should influence the geographical sprawl of Greater Nairobi. On its southern side, urban developments are restricted due to the topography of the Great Rift Valley and the Nairobi National Park, a wildlife sanctuary that is slowly being encircled and encroached upon by industrial developments at its northern and eastern border and residential developments at the western and southern border. At its western and northwestern boundaries, further growth of Nairobi is perhaps undesirable as it converts into residential and subsistence functions the very agricultural lands that feed the city and that produce profitable export produce like tea and coffee. The formerly small rural settlements Kikuyu, Banana Hill, Kiambu, Tigoni and Limuru mainly supplied labour to these agricultural functions and to medium-size industrial activity. These settlements along the northwestern leg of the Mombasa-Kampala highway are now rapidly and often informally growing with low- and lower-middle income households' residential and commercial functions.

Nairobi's spatial growth in northerly direction towards and beyond Thika also encroaches on agricultural lands essential to economic productivity and the feeding of Nairobi.

Significant room is available in the southeastern direction along the Nairobi-Mombasa highway towards the towns of Athi River, Mavoko and Machakos. The territory of Mavoko Municipality is almost equal to the area of the entire Nairobi Municipality and largely empty due to its semi-arid conditions. Currently, much of the urban growth of Nairobi is being directed there.

But rather than increasing Nairobi's already significant

primacy through unrestricted growth in its peri-urban areas and along its infrastructural life lines, holistic *regional* planning and economic decentralization away from the peri-urban areas would be highly advisable. Utilizing the already spontaneously occurring linear growth along the logistical life lines of Nairobi to create urban corridors that create economic, spatial and infrastructural synergies with outlying settlements is the desirable approach, rather than simply allowing Greater Nairobi to grow bigger and more primate.

Clearly, there is need to critically review the desirability of the current spatial growth of the greater Nairobi metropolitan area in a holistic context of forward-looking economic, social, industrial, and spatial policy. Indeed, in 2008, the Government of Kenya made the first moves to an area-wide approach when it established a Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development and issued the ambitious *Nairobi Metro 2030*, as elaborated upon in the text box.

The proposed creation of a Nairobi Metropolitan Region (NMR) offers a prime opportunity for guided interventions that can help preserve open lands around the sprawling city where any further developments will be subject to strict regulation. The proposed NMR also offers prospects for directing economic activity to a ring of satellite settlements between 60 and 100 km away from the NMR, but linked to the core through high-speed infrastructure connections (intra-urban highways, light rail etc). Spreading population away from the NMR will be helpful in not further increasing Nairobi's primacy and reducing vulnerability to natural disasters (seismic and volcanic activity). It will also help in reducing traffic congestion. Taking a wide regional approach to decentralizing economic activity and urban population growth is the sole credible way forward.



▲ Playing dominoes in Stone Town, Zanzibar.  
©Maciej Dakowicz

## KAMPALA – ENTEBBE CORRIDOR

Land-locked Uganda borders Kenya, Sudan, the DR of Congo, Rwanda and Tanzania. The capital Kampala is the largest city along Lake Victoria. As the terminal station of the Mombasa-Kampala railways and with the Entebbe international airport nearby, the city is an important sub-regional transportation hub. Uganda depends on the maritime ports of Mombasa, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and subsequent overland trucking for its bulk commodity imports. At the same time Kampala/Entebbe is a distribution gateway for Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and South Sudan.

The 39.7 km Kampala-Entebbe highway is rapidly emerging as a linear development corridor, connecting a key regional logistics hub with the

capital city, which in turn serves as a transit point for onward logistics. Urban growth pressures now present a planning, service provision, housing and social challenges that is best addressed through a regional planning process that introduces an area-wide approach for strategic joint-decisions among the three administrative areas concerned: Kampala City, Wakiso District and Entebbe Municipality. Key areas for regional decision-making are transportation networks, waste management, trunk services provision and the development of light industrial, commercial and residential functions within the area of the corridor.

Continued growth of Kampala and Entebbe

Municipalities and the rapid development of the territory between them can result in greater economic efficiency and productivity if spatial, economic and social interventions are planned, coordinated and implemented as an area-wide initiative. Administrative and legal instruments can be introduced now to assure continued close cooperation between the local authorities of Kampala, Wakiso District and Entebbe. But, perhaps the most important short-term goal would be to develop a medium-term regional vision through broad participatory processes, followed by a commensurate governmental resources mobilization strategy towards financial and other partnerships.



▲  
Rush hour in Kampala, Uganda  
©Pichugin Dmitry/Shutterstock






▲ The city of Kampala, Uganda as seen from the balcony of a hotel in Kampala.  
© Klaas Lingbeek- van Kranen/iStockphoto

# Chapter Five

# 05

## THE STATE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN CITIES

The focus of this section is on selected major cities in the region: Luanda (Angola), Gaborone (Botswana), Lilongwe (Malawi), Maputo (Mozambique), Cape Town, Durban [eThekweni], Johannesburg and Pretoria [Tshwane], (South Africa: the latter two within the Gauteng Urban Region of some 9 million inhabitants), Windhoek (Namibia), Lusaka (Zambia) and Harare (Zimbabwe). These cities either have a population of over 750,000 or are capital cities, centres of significant economic, service, political, diplomatic, cultural and manufacturing activity. The smaller cities of Windhoek and Gaborone have population sizes of below 750,000. They nevertheless have primacy roles in their respective countries. All the other cities have populations exceeding one million. Cape Town, Durban, Luanda and Maputo are coastal cities with origins as trading ports. Their economies remain bound to maritime commerce. The others are located in productive mining and agricultural savannah and semi arid regions.





# 5.1

## Population and Urbanization

### Urbanization Rates (1980-2030)


The region has varied urbanization and demographic trends. Urban annual population growth rates for 1990 to 2005 were 4.13 percent and are projected to drop to 2.7 percent for 2005-2010. They are expected to drop further to 1.89 percent for 2020 to 2050. Urban annual growth rates have been high for primate cities in smaller countries (Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland) or those emerging from conflict (Angola, Mozambique). Other than Luanda, rates of growth are higher in smaller urban settlements relative to the large cities of Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. Cities of the region play different roles at national levels and have varying shares of the national and urban population. Luanda is a typical primate city whose share of the population in Angola is about half the total and is more than double that of the next largest city. Angola's other major cities are Huambo (population 300,000 in 2000), Lobito (population 600,000 in 1995), Benguela (population 355,000 in 1995) and Lubango (population 400,000 in 2000). If the Johannesburg-centred Gauteng Urban Region is considered as the largest urban area

in South Africa, then the general pattern is one where the largest city in any country has between 18 percent and 30 percent of the national urban population.

Except for Luanda, the smaller urban agglomerations are growing at a faster rate than the already larger settlements. However, in terms of absolute population growth the larger cities have a greater share of the increase. Luanda has unique socio-political conditions created from a war situation and the impact of natural growth as the population adjusts to post-conflict conditions will remain for some time.

Recent urban annual growth rates have been higher in smaller economies (Malawi, Lesotho with 5.09 to 3.5 percent) and in countries emerging from conflict and experiencing rapid economic growth (Angola and Mozambique, with rates in the range 7.61 – 4.11 percent in the post-conflict years). Urbanization levels are high in Angola, South Africa and Botswana. Angola's urbanization was driven by the search for security in Luanda, Huambo and other coastal cities that people perceived as safer than the countryside during the

FIGURE 5.1.1: POPULATION PERCENTAGE BY AGE GROUP – SOUTHERN AFRICA



Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*



▲ Residents of the Boa Vista informal settlement in Luanda queue for water. Water is precious in Luanda and many families must make-do with a 20 litre jerry can for their daily requirements.

©Jaspreet Kindra/IRIN

TABLE 5.1.1: SOUTHERN AFRICAN CITIES: SIZE, SHARE OF POPULATION AND GROWTH RATES

	City	2007 city population	City pop. as percent of total population	City pop. as percent of total urban population	Average Urban Growth 2005-2010
Angola	Luanda	4,000,000	23.5	42.1	5.79
Botswana	Gaborone	300,000	12.0	30.0	3.5
Madagascar	Antananarivo	1,697,000	8.6	29.6	3.3
Malawi	Lilongwe	750,000	4.8	4.4	5.0
Mozambique	Maputo	1,446,000	6.8	18.7	3.90
Namibia	Windhoek	300,000	15.0	50.0	5.4
South Africa	Cape Town	3,245,000	6.6	11.0	1.68
South Africa	Durban	2,729,000	5.6	9.3	1.49
South Africa	Johannesburg	3,435,000	7.1	11.7	2.10
South Africa	Pretoria	1,338,000	2.8	4.6	2.04
South Africa	Ekurhuleni	2,986,000	6.1	10.2	2.26
Zambia	Lusaka	1,328,000	11.1	31.6	3.23
Zimbabwe	Harare	1,572,000	11.8	32.0	1.87

Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision

decades of civil war that ended in 2002. Angola's urbanization levels are the ones least associated with economic development in the cities.

Urbanization levels hide social and gender variations. For example in South Africa, Indians are most urbanized at (97.5 percent). Whites are second most urbanized at 89.9 percent. Coloureds (or mixed race) are third at 86.8 percent and the majority black Africans are the least urbanized at 47.5 percent. Variations also exist at the city level. Based on census data, 46 percent of Cape Town's population would be classified as Coloured, 31 percent as Black African and 21 percent as White. It is the only city in the region where Black Africans are not the majority.

Urban policies in Southern Africa are informed by a persistent view of Black Africans as sojourners in the city whose identity and citizenship remains rural. It is this view that led the post-colonial government in Botswana to expect that workers and labourers in Gaborone would commute daily to the city. Following the end of conflict in Angola in 2002, and with the countryside safer, the government has expected that the internally displaced persons now constituting Luanda's peri-urban dwellers would return to the rural areas. In Zimbabwe, those without jobs and houses are urged and even forced to return to the rural areas. In practice, households consider themselves as both rural and urban and allocate their resources in both domains to maximise opportunity and

survival chances. Dealing with the emerging rural-urban and urban-rural linkages is a challenge policy has yet to master.

### Migration Dynamics and Urbanization

Rural-to-urban migration has been a dominant feature in the Southern Africa region. However, the bulk of movements are circular and not permanent with people still maintaining a rural identity. Even in South Africa, the region's most-urbanized country, up to 67 percent of migratory movements are of a temporary or circular nature. There is generally increased female net rural-urban migration in the post-apartheid era (Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia). In these countries, colonial labour laws until recently restricted women and children to rural areas. With the advent of majority rule, relaxation of laws has enabled women and children to settle in cities. Combined with the huge education invested in women in recent years, a favourable legal environment has encouraged young single women to migrate to urban areas when in the past they would have been restricted to rural lands. The denial of urban citizenship to women remains a mental construct in the minds of older generation men.

The predominance of natural urban growth and intra-urban population movements over rural-to-urban migration are also evident in post-conflict Luanda where research shows that 42 percent of the population increase did not arrive from



▲ A family moves house using an oxen drawn cart, Kenya.  
©Charlie Grieves-Cook

other municipalities or provinces. Even migrants to the city are more established in the city with over half the immigrants reporting to have been in the city for over five years.


Luanda is one of the few cities in the region where international immigrants are not a key feature of urban communities. Estimates based on UN data show that international immigrants in Southern Africa constituted 0.6 percent of the 2000 population. The distribution is displayed in Figure 5.1.2. This figure, based on documented immigrants only, is likely to be far lower than the actual figure (probably

between two and five percent). Regional and international migration has enduring and new features. Enduring is the dominant attraction of immigrants to industrial, commercial centres, mining towns of all countries in the region and to commercial farming areas of South Africa. In colonial times, official schemes to provide migrant labour to Zimbabwean (then Rhodesia) and South African mines were in place between these countries and Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. A key feature was the dominance of young male labour migrants who returned to home countries following a stint working in the mines and cities. Culturally, working as a labour migrant became a 'rite of passage' into manhood that generated resources to start up a family to support the household, and produced huge foreign currency remissions. South Africa remains the major destination of regional and international migrants in the region, attracted by economic and employment prospects, and most continue to be concentrated in the major cities while domestic or national migrants appear to settle in smaller urban settlements.

Migrants from distant countries do not always come directly to South African cities. For example, Somali, Tanzanian, Congolese (DRC), Nigerian and Ghanaian migrants may settle first in Zimbabwe before moving on to South Africa, while Zimbabweans travel first to Gaborone (Botswana) and Polokwane or border farming areas before they move on to Gauteng and Cape Town, or from as far afield as Windhoek. Further to note is the replication of step-wise migration once in South Africa: only eight percent had come directly to Durban with four percent having lived in the Gauteng region before moving to Durban.

A second major feature of migration in the region is the dominance of mobility and circular migration especially

FIGURE 5.1.2: LUANDA URBAN GROWTH BY SOURCE



Source: Data from TERRA (2005:110)

TABLE 5.1.2: URBAN POPULATION AND URBANIZATION TRENDS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

	Urban Population (percent)							Rate of Urban Growth (%)			
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2020	2050	1990-2000	2000-2010	2010-2020	2020-2050
Angola	37.1	44.0	49.0	54.0	58.5	66.0	80.5	5.56	4.61	3.89	2.70
Botswana	41.9	49.0	53.0	57.3	61.1	67.6	81.1	4.74	2.61	2.04	1.35
Lesotho	14.0	17.0	20.0	23.3	26.9	34.5	58.1	5.21	3.78	3.08	2.01
Malawi	11.6	13.3	15.2	17.3	19.8	25.5	48.5	4.80	5.22	4.97	3.19
Mozambique	21.1	26.2	30.7	34.5	38.4	46.3	67.4	6.70	4.44	3.55	2.51
Namibia	27.7	29.8	32.4	35.1	38.0	44.4	65.3	4.40	2.98	2.75	2.04
South Africa	52.0	54.5	56.9	59.3	61.7	66.6	79.6	3.01	1.63	1.16	0.86
Swaziland	22.9	23.0	23.3	24.1	25.5	30.3	51.9	2.20	1.82	2.20	2.17
Zambia	39.4	37.1	34.8	35.0	35.7	38.9	58.4	1.28	2.15	2.71	2.71
Zimbabwe	29.0	31.7	33.8	35.9	38.3	43.9	64.3	3.40	1.09	2.92	2.02
SA Region	29.7	32.6	34.9	37.6	40.4	46.4	66.45	4.13	2.87	2.93	1.89

Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision




▲ Doing laundry in an informal settlement.  
©Shutterstock

to and back from South Africa for citizens from Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe. The decade long economic crisis in Zimbabwe following soon after the debilitating structural adjustment programmes of the 1990s has made circular migration a key livelihood strategy for the poor and rich alike, not only to South African cities but also to Lusaka, Lilongwe, Mozambique's Beira Corridor cities, Gaborone, Francistown and Windhoek. Related to this circulatory movement is the feminisation of migration with cross-border women traders and workers (domestic workers, health workers and teachers) a more dominant group. Feminisation of migration is also significant at the national levels.

In part, this is linked to globalization and informalization of economies that have reduced manufacturing jobs (traditional 'men-jobs') and increased service, care and informal economy jobs where women tend to outperform and out-compete men. Families make conscious decisions to send out their womenfolk to seek income opportunities. Rising numbers of woman-headed households has put pressures on women to seek income opportunities far beyond their local environments.


The policies on migration in Southern Africa (and South Africa in particular) are characterised by conflicting and contradictory trends with a desire to build a dynamic Southern African Development Community (SADC) region that promotes investment, economic growth and free movement of people, versus another nationally oriented exclusive tendency that stigmatizes migrants as people who undermine the country's development. High unemployment, increasing poverty and inadequate housing and services for the majority

FIGURE 5.1.3: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF RESIDENT INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS BY ORIGIN (MID-YEAR 2000)



Source: UN Population Division, 2004

FIGURE 5.1.4: MIGRANTS' REASONS FOR COMING TO DURBAN CITY, SOUTH AFRICA



Source: Plotted Using Data from Maharaj and Moodley (2000:153)



of the population, high levels of crime and violence all fuel anti-immigrant sentiments and xenophobia in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia and most acutely in South Africa. SADC countries signed a 2005 Protocol for Free Movement of Goods and People. In practice, exclusionary institutional barriers and behaviours criminalise all immigrants. Only Mozambique appears to have taken the Protocol seriously and has relaxed barriers to movement of Zimbabwean traders into and out of the Beira Corridor economic region.

No comprehensive policy has been formulated to integrate international migrants in cities of Southern Africa. Migrants are perceived as temporary residents but many of them stay or keep moving in the host country. They inhabit both inner city and peri-urban settlements. Policies such as South Africa's Immigration Act (2002) put emphasis on identification, detention and deportation of 'illegal'

immigrants. Decentralising the implementation of this policy to local and community level has only fuelled stigmatization, victimization and violence against immigrants.

City authorities appear unable to deal with the socio-economic exclusion faced by immigrants or to design programmes that can fully tap into the cultural, political and economic resources immigrants bring along. Although rural-urban migration may have slowed down as a contributor to urban growth, urban growth will continue due to the inbuilt growth momentum: growth due to the region's young population and high fertility rates. More accurate and updating of information and 'planning for population change' should be central to all aspects of local governance and programmes of stakeholders operating in the cities. Involving youth (half the region's population is below 17 years of age) is a key aspect missing in existing programmes.



▲ Angolan ladies in the market.  
© Nathan Holland /Shutterstock

## 5.2

# The Growing Economic Role of Cities



▲ A woman sells vegetables at a food market in Harare, Zimbabwe. Since government launched “Operation Reduce Prices”, compelling businesses to slash prices by fifty percent in a bid to combat rampant inflation (and imprisoning businesspeople who did not comply) basic commodities have fast disappeared from shop shelves.  
© Antony Kaminju/IRIN

South Africa (and the Gauteng Urban Region in particular) dominates the Southern Africa region’s economy. South Africa’s claim to advanced democratic institutions and practices offers a backdrop against which to analyse the growth policies this region has put in place in a relatively resource rich organizational context and the advantage of experiences in neighbouring countries. Cities are home to a large share of the total population. They are also centres

of government command and economic control where the bulk of national economic activity takes place. South Africa’s five major urban centres, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and Ekurhuleni, for example, hold 28 percent of the national population but generate 55.7 percent of the nation’s manufacturing gross value added, 68 percent of value added in transport, storage and communications and 75.3 percent of its insurance, real estate and business.

Only Johannesburg together with the surrounding Gauteng Urban Region has a significant global standing. However, in view of their origins as international trading posts (Maputo, Cape Town, Luanda, Lilongwe, Windhoek) or nodes of global expansion in Africa (Johannesburg, Harare, Pretoria and Lusaka), cities in Southern Africa should be considered intrinsically global; only that they play different roles at different historical times.

Since the 1980s, urban economies in Southern Africa have undergone fundamental transformations to achieve re-integration or deeper entrenchment in the global economy. In tandem with neo-liberal economic reforms at the national levels, cities have pursued global-oriented pro-growth strategies to attract investment and compete at the global level. Local economic development has become intertwined with proactive city marketing and restructuring of local governments. Major consequences of economic reform have been withdrawal of government subsidies, dilution of the power of labour unions and the loss of jobs in Southern African cities. Cape Town, Buffalo City and Durban lost more than 50,000 textile industry jobs due to trade liberalization and subsequent competition from cheap imports. As illustrated in the South Africa's cities, the growth rate and share of gross value added and employment in manufacturing has declined since the 1980s.

The vision of city authorities (Cape Town) is to enhance their positions as global players in high value adding activities in the service sector; a position shared in Johannesburg's Vision 2030 that declares, "...the city's economy rests firmly with the service sectors rather than the productive sectors of the economy" in which a global outward orientation is considered the best way to generate growth. Matching or surpassing cities in Brazil, Malaysia and Canada is a key target. For example, the National Spatial Development Perspective developed by South Africa's Presidency is modelled on the lines of the European Development Programme but unfortunately there is little conscious effort to integrate South Africa's economy with, or learn from, that of SADC and cities north of the Limpopo.

While requisite information communication technology and other communication systems hardware may be close to the appropriate level for Johannesburg and Cape Town to succeed in these objectives, the local skills and experience (in the majority Black South Africans) have been lacking with 76 percent of employers in Johannesburg reporting a lack of appropriately skilled staff especially in managerial and technical skills. This has forced the economies to draw heavily on skilled labour from wider Africa and beyond. Skilled African migrant labour, the bulk from Zimbabwe, has filled construction, finance, IT, energy, transportation and higher education posts, while also closing the gaps left by emigrated White South Africans. The current situation of Black South Africans is variable. Whilst a large number are worse off in some material respects, the majority is better off and a large proportion very much better off over the past decade and a half. Between 1992 and 2003, the human development index for the Gauteng Urban Region, however, declined from

81.3 to 73.5 percent while inequality increased as shown by a national Gini-coefficient of 0.635 for 2001 and 0.596 for 1995. As witnessed in May 2008, policies that promote Cape Town and Johannesburg more as part of the globe and less as part of Africa fuel xenophobic sentiments against African immigrants in an environment already pregnant with violence and crime.

For South Africa, the first national pro-poor agenda of local government (Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1994) was superseded by the Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy (1996) that is reflected in most local economic development (LED) initiatives. The pro-poor and redistributive elements of these LED strategies are either patchy or in conflict with pro-global growth agendas and have thus failed to integrate a society that remains largely as divided as during the apartheid years. Despite intentions to be both pro-poor and pro-growth, Cape Town's policies, including the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) have generated inequitable growth. Spatial, economic and social polarisation has been entrenched with Gini-coefficients of over 0.7 for the South African cities on average.

However, the Cape Town IDP (2004) and Johannesburg IDP (2003/4) have to be applauded for their efforts to consider economics, resources and budgeting when compared to the Lusaka Integrated Development Plan (2000). The Harare Combination Master Plan and the Lilongwe Master Plan, however, are basically land-use strategy plans devoid of economic and financial content. Region-wide, far greater integration is needed between spatial and economic planning. Even in South African cities that appear better able to address this disjuncture, few resources are dedicated to economic development programmes and municipal economic development units often consist of only one or two officials.

The debate on pro-global growth versus pro-poor growth remains contentious in the Southern African region. It could yield more practical outcomes if cities seek growth from *within* the region rather than from global spheres alone. For many South African cities the economic, social and political opportunities that would arise from a city vision based on integration with 'North of the Limpopo' have to be fully explored. There is need to think regionally and improve trans-boundary multi-nodal multi agency planning, while, at the same time, integrating spatial planning, utilities and economic planning.

## Urban Productivity and Employment

The informal economy remains the major source of Southern African livelihoods for the poor with women and youth dominating. In Harare, formal employment levels have shrunk leaving unemployment of up to 80 percent while census returns show that Windhoek had 26 percent unemployment at 2001 (other estimates put this at 46 percent). As shown in Figure 5.2.1, self-employment is the dominant source of income for Luanda. Inflation erodes incomes and chances for capital accumulation, while there is little access to formal



▲  
A man transports produce to the market in Malawi.  
©Uros/Shutterstock

credit even for those with land as collateral. Officials take a prohibitive attitude towards informal economies and their practitioners are excluded from prime sites and areas of potential income. For cities like Luanda, there is a low fiscal base due to poverty of the majority of urban inhabitants, a weak taxation regime and a weak economic base for the urban area as a whole. In other words, the contradiction is that while the informal economy provides jobs and livelihoods, cities have not come up with mechanisms to capture revenue from the informal economy.

### Harare


The region and perhaps the continent may learn from Harare's 1994-2004 policies of recognizing that the informal and formal economy have mutually reinforcing relationships and that the informal economy is not just a domain of the poor. Abandoning its prohibitive approach and supported by deregulation policies, Harare promoted home industries and small-scale enterprises in traditionally 'white' urban spaces. The local authority created workspaces, market areas for vendors and flea markets, coordinated infrastructure provision (water, toilets, electricity, telephones and roads to these spaces) and provided skills training and business support. Stakeholder participation at the micro-level was promoted through vendor and trader associations. The policies created jobs for many unemployed youths, retrenched workers and women while goods and services became cheaper and more

accessible to the poor. Ironically, the operation *Murambatsvina* (OPM) clearances of 2005 obliterated all these advances and livelihoods. The government pursued indigenization of the economy and it may also have had some reasonable arguments for wanting to control informal economy activities. However, both the introduction of deregulation of urban environments in 1994 as well as the OPM failed dismally to involve the people; the former with good outcomes, but the latter with disastrous consequences. Despite the possible underlying use of urban land as a tool for patronage by a politically weakened regime, Harare city and all its SADC neighbours have a lot to learn from this mid 1990s experience and its opposite of 2005 – in particular the need to involve communities and give them ownership of the policy making process.

### Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban

The retail and services sectors dominate informal urban economies and nation-wide the informal economy accounts for 25 percent of employment (three million people) in South Africa although incomes are low for most workers. General policy views the informal economy as a problem and municipalities' engagement with urban informality is a rather new phenomenon. For example, since 2000, Durban has pioneered approaches to collaborate with street traders using an 'Informal Economy Policy' framework that recognises the right of informal enterprises to exist and encourages participation of informal traders in planning, budgeting and conflict resolution activities of the city (SACN, 2006: 2-26). Data on informal economies is not readily available or comparable across cities, but given the increasing role of this sector for employment and livelihoods, cities need to invest more in understanding how policy can enhance and not hinder these economies.

FIGURE 5.2.1: INFORMAL ECONOMY AS DOMINANT SOURCE OF LIVELIHOODS, LUANDA



Source: Statistics from Cain (2007)

### Changing the Skills and Knowledge Base

Planning challenges arising from population change, economic decline and climate change demand that urban planners, administrators and managers throughout the region develop their knowledge base and skills in:

- Technical and commercial aspects of managing cities (all cities).
- Technology, IT, research and development (especially Johannesburg and Cape Town).
- Climate change adaptation (all cities), for example regarding water use.
- Planning for population change (all cities) including migration – remembering that Southern African cities are cities of migrants.
- Citizen participation and rights in the development process (all cities).

## 5.3

# Urban Poverty and Housing Conditions

### Urban Poverty, Inequality and Basic Needs

Data from UN-HABITAT show there is huge variation in the level of social development and provision of basic services in the cities of Southern Africa. Land and property grabbing is a concern and neither customary rights nor title deeds have provided full security for orphans and widows in all circumstances.

The provision of piped water to residents of Luanda, Lusaka and Gaborone, for example, is very low when compared to the rest of Southern Africa. Lack of both piped water and waterborne sewage is most acute in Luanda, Maputo and Lusaka (see Table 5.3.1) due to lack of investment in urban infrastructure during the years of economic decline (1970s-1980s for Lusaka) and civil wars (Maputo, up to late 1980s and Luanda up to 2002).

TABLE 5.3.1: BASIC NEEDS DEPRIVATION IN CITIES

	No Piped Water (%)	No Sewage (%)	No electricity (%)
Luanda	75.0	90.0	n.a.
Gaborone	56.5	60.0	n.a.
Lilongwe	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Maputo	4.9	79.9	47.9
Windhoek	3.1	23.1	28.1
Lusaka	74.1	81.7	55.8
Harare	7.9	9.1	18.1
Cape Town	0.4	2.7	5.8
Durban	4.9	25.6	12.9
Johannesburg	2.9	34.2	16.3
Pretoria	2.9	14.0	28.2
Ekurhuleni	2.9	34.2	16.3

Source: UN-HABITAT – GUO Data 2003

In South Africa, progress has been made since 1996 in providing households with water connections. However, of those households without access to onsite water connection, 37 percent are in Durban. Up to 40 percent of households in all cities do not have water in their dwellings. Huge disparities remain with ‘islands of prosperity in a sea of poverty’. For instance, water use in Sandton at 550 litres/person, day compared to 50 litres/person, day in neighbouring Alexandra.

In Luanda, only 25 percent of the population has access to piped water, while the poor depend on informal providers for water. Peri-urban settlements depend on water brought by tankers to water sellers and who re-sell the water to households at up to US\$16.90/m<sup>3</sup>. In some cases, the poor in Luanda pay 10,000 times more for water from private sellers than the well-to-do pay for treated water supplied by water companies. Infrastructure for water-borne sewage serves only about 10 percent of the population with 16 percent dependent on septic tanks and 56 percent using pit latrines. Solid waste management is available to only 30 percent of the population.

In Zambia, the Lusaka Integrated Development Plan figures show only 30 percent level of sewerage provision in the city. Areas without access to the sewer network utilise septic tanks or pit latrines (90 percent of informal settlements dwellers) with sharing between several households common. Figures for Gaborone show that only 34.4 percent of the residents had flush toilets while 60 percent depended on pit latrines. These estimates were based on the 1991 census and conditions are likely to have improved as the economy has performed exceedingly well. The provision of reticulated water and sewage remains a major area for investments. Governments appear to be addressing this challenge in Lusaka, Maputo and Gaborone. Mobilising resources for housing development is the most challenging aspect in addressing urban poverty compared to basic needs, while land availability remains the major obstacle to alleviating housing poverty, frustrating the work of the few NGOs seeking to contribute to the housing delivery process.



▲ Refugees mostly from Zimbabwe and Mozambique at the Germiston city hall, east of Johannesburg, South Africa. They have been sheltered in the hall after recent xenophobic attacks on foreigners.  
©Tebogo Letsie/IRIN

### HIV/AIDS Impacts and Security of Land Tenure in Urban Areas

HIV/AIDS and related deaths have caused particular stress with regards to security of tenure for widows and orphans. Comprehensive studies in South Africa's Kwa-Zulu Natal reported that women encountered problems with levirate inheritance. Research in Gaborone shows that HIV/AIDS deaths have exacerbated an existing inheritance problem in patriarchal Southern Africa where formal and informal rules may not permit children and certain widows to inherit land or protect them from land grabbing. HIV/AIDS reduces the quality and quantity of labour, erodes household resources that would have been invested in welfare and increased productivity. The impacts may force households into land, housing and property sales. While comprehensive studies have been conducted on the impacts of HIV/AIDS on agricultural productivity, there is limited empirical data relating to the impacts on the urban poor's access to land and security of tenure. Land and property grabbing is a concern and neither customary rights nor title deeds have provided full security for orphans and widows in all circumstances. Cities should continue to promote sharing of experiences at national/regional levels, especially on housing, service provision (health, education and transport), livelihoods (access to land, employment) to/for vulnerable groups. Information on the severity of the epidemic should be fully utilised and expanded

to capture strategies that the victims and communities would wish to pursue themselves. In most instances, municipalities need to enable and encourage others to take innovative actions. Cities could use their local authority dividend to do business with firms/institutions that have HIV/AIDS adaptation strategies for their workforces. There is no evidence on how local governments have responded to these challenges and no comprehensive research information to describe the housing fates of households in these predicaments. Further partnerships between local governments, researchers and civil society working with affected communities are needed to build our knowledge base on shelter and services needs for families and individuals affected by HIV/AIDS in cities of Southern Africa and to build awareness among municipal and business leaders to help de-stigmatize HIV/AIDS.

### Housing Supply, Affordability and Housing Finance

Lack of finance for housing and broader urban development processes is central to the housing crisis in Southern Africa where the housing backlog is as much as three million units for urban South Africa. At the peak of its programmes in the late 1990s, Zimbabwe was producing only 18,000 houses annually against a total urban backlog of 84,000 units. Production has since plummeted. National policies to finance delivery of affordable housing have to be understood in the context of broader political processes and historical legacies.

The majority Black Africans in many cities of Southern Africa had, until recently, been legally prohibited from owning property in urban areas (e.g. till 1979/1980 for Zimbabwe and late 1980s for South Africa). At independence, governments sought to provide affordable housing first by promoting home ownership and transfer of public and local authority houses to sitting tenants (Zimbabwe), participating in construction of houses for delivery to low income residents, promoting sites-and-services schemes, upgrading of slums and squatter areas (Zambia) and making land available to the poor so they can construct their own houses. Traditional finance institutions had no experience of lending to low-income groups whom they considered a high-risk and continue to bar them from funding programs to this day. In South Africa mortgage defaults and politically motivated boycotts between 1987 and 1994 left an enduring stigma towards this sector among financiers and a high level of ambivalence between lenders, government and potential home owners in the low-income sector. A key policy objective in all countries has therefore been to encourage these institutions to lend to the poor.

### Battling the Mortgage Lenders – South Africa

Between 1995 and 2005, South Africa has injected subsidies worth R29.5 billion (US\$3.5 billion) in households earning less than R3,500 (US\$580 per month) to encourage mortgage lenders to participate in the low-income market. Although this was a good initiative for which the government should be praised, the subsidy scheme has been bedevilled by several problems. First, the subsidies have to be topped up with bonds and recipients of the modern houses have to pay rates and service charges. For poor households the subsidy does not necessarily improve their ability to afford a house. Considering that most of the subsidy houses have been located

in peripheral areas, the economic utilisation costs to the poor are high. Second, 70 percent of the houses constructed in the 1994 - 1999 phase were substandard in terms of space, damp proofing, heating qualities, location and design. Third and most crucially, lenders continue to have problems giving loans to low-income households, due to lack of understanding of processes, needs and behaviours of different actors in the housing markets. Even with government support, mortgage lenders have found the low-income market (unemployed, informally employed, low incomes) unviable for using traditional mortgage finance instruments. Equally, households have struggled to understand the finance conditions or have found them risky and expensive. The failure to unlock mortgage finance via banks has led to a shift to use micro-finance for housing through non-bank lenders, creating an era where emerging competition may yield new innovative ways of funding housing in South Africa.

### Mortgage lending in Zimbabwe: Sector Wide Approaches, Donors and Black Empowerment

Zimbabwe experienced similar challenges. Soon after independence, the government established a National Housing Fund to offer loans to local authorities and individuals at a subsidised rate of 11.25 percent and payable over 30 years. Before the fund tapered off in the mid 1990s, Z\$2,466.8 million had been allocated for the construction of close to 50,000 houses (90 percent for owner-occupation) while local authorities had made available 106,003 serviced plots. Just before the economic crisis of the late 1990s, Zimbabwe appeared to have unlocked the mortgage quagmire for low-income groups through encouraging private participation in the housing sector (often funded in partnership with donors and at times matched by government funds). A key difference

TABLE 5.3.2: SLUM PREVALENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN CITIES BY NUMBER OF SHELTER DEPRIVATIONS

	Percent Slum	One shelter deprivation	Two shelter deprivations	Three shelter deprivations	Four shelter deprivations
Luanda	75.2	37.4	19.2	17.5	1.1
Gaborone	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Lilongwe	78.0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Maputo	65.9	42.9	18.9	3.9	0.2
Windhoek	35.9	22.0	10.3	3.3	0.3
Cape Town	32.8	22.4	8.1	1.0	0.2
Durban	23.1	19.5	3.2	0.4	-
Johannesburg	56.3	37.5	18.8	-	-
Pretoria	56.3	37.5	18.8	-	-
Ekurhuleni	56.3	37.5	18.8	-	-
Lusaka	4.2	39.5	1.6	0.2	-
Harare	6.3	39.5	0.4	-	-

Source: UN-HABITAT – GUO data 2008



## Responding to Housing Poverty – Challenges to Partnerships in Lilongwe

Lilongwe is the small but fast-growing new capital of Malawi with a current population of about 750,000. The city has high slum levels (78 percent) and is in one of the ten poorest countries in the world with up to 53 percent of the population below the national poverty line of US\$0.30 per day. Until recently, Habitat for Humanity (HFH)

was the only NGO directly involved in housing provision and since it started in 1986 has developed up to 6,000 units with toilets nationwide. It operates a revolving fund that provides interest free building materials and home improvement loans. Although it has recorded an 82 percent loan repayment rate, it has had to sometimes

use unsavory methods, like pulling out windows and doors, as a way to enforce repayments. Land allocations from government for housing have been very slow – for instance, while funding was available in 1994, land became available only in 2005.

Source: Habitat for Humanity

in Zimbabwe was that government support and donor subsidies to leverage the private sector did not go direct to households but were targeted at reducing costs in the broader land delivery and housing market.

In particular, from 1987, the Housing Guarantee Loans (USAID/Government of Zimbabwe) and from 1992 the Zimbabwe Private Sector Housing Programme sought to influence sector-wide policy changes in housing supply to eliminate bottlenecks in low-cost housing delivery in areas of land, finance, building materials production and construction equipment and ultimately increase the affordability of low-income housing. It also contributed to increasing the volume of mortgages and serviced land. Where allocation was targeted, this was to support women who turned out to be better performers when it came to servicing mortgages compared to males.

Equally important is that getting housing available to the not-so-poor (as in Zimbabwe) has benefits to all limited-income groups since it increases the volume of available houses in which the poor can rent rooms or occupy backyard shacks with less risks than getting a mortgage that they may soon lose. Crucially in the Zimbabwe case, as the volume of mortgages increased and became cheaper from the early 1990s, more pro-poor Black owned mortgage companies entered the market to challenge traditional finance institutions. Whereas Zimbabwe still has Building Societies, in South Africa these have been merged or transformed into commercial banks as in the United Kingdom.

### Mobilizing Funds from Individuals and Co-operatives: From Loans to Savings

Savings programmes among residents (in Namibia, South Africa, Malawi, Zimbabwe) in which participants save *before* borrowing are proving less risky than mortgage loans. These group savings and lending schemes are promoted by NGOs such as Shack Dwellers Association and Homeless Peoples Federation. Just prior to Zimbabwe's recent economic decline, a study in Harare established that the bulk of funds for housing (61 percent) came from households and family savings (individually or co-operatively) while loans from employers,

building societies and local authorities amounted to only 14 percent. Mobilizing savings and loans from individuals and cooperatives works well in a corruption free, low-inflation environment but has become unviable in Zimbabwe since the late 1990s.

### Pay For Your House Scheme – The Looting of a Grand Idea

In 1995, the Zimbabwean government supported the establishment of the Pay for Your House Scheme to mobilize funds from potential home owners - mainly lower-middle-income formal and informal workers who could not easily get private sector mortgages. Government matched the funds contributed by potential home owners so that a government construction department could build affordable, well-located quality homes against significantly reduced costs. The scheme was very popular and, in Harare, by mid September 1995, there were close to 2,500 subscribers who had contributed about Z\$15.5 million. In other urban centres there were 6,942 subscribers who had contributed Z\$7.6 million. By end of 1996, the programme stalled after senior government officials, politicians and other influential people looted the fund to build houses in the elite suburbs of Harare. Obviously, popular trust was damaged beyond measure and affected subsequent initiatives such as the government's (post-2002) Home Link programme seeking Diaspora capital for urban housing.

### Informal Developments and Slum Conditions

Based on the UN-HABITAT definition of slums, cities in Southern Africa show slums levels below the Sub-Saharan average of 62 percent, with a moderate concentration of slums in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, but with very high levels in Angola and Mozambique. Maputo and Luanda have high slum levels while Lusaka and Harare have the lowest levels. Overcrowding, rather than access to water, sanitation or structural quality is the only significant slum cause in Harare. Low levels of slum concentration in Harare are a result of a continued slums clearance policy. Those without shelter or jobs are encouraged or forced back to the rural areas. Moreover,

what is labelled 'slum' in Southern Africa may be considered good accommodation in Nairobi or some West African cities. In Lusaka, donor-supported upgrading programmes have reduced slum levels. As depicted in Table 5.3.2, the level of deprivation in these cities varies between 35 and 43 percent for the majority of cities. There is variation in the nature and location of slum areas. For cities like Luanda, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, and to some extent Maputo and Gaborone, slums are in peri-urban areas. Reports show that for Luanda overcrowding is as high as 12 to 15 persons per dwelling or 3 persons per room with 14 persons per dwelling for Lilongwe. The same applies to Lusaka's peri-urban settlements, despite these having been the target of upgrading policies for years.

For Harare, where anti-squatting policies are the most ferocious, slum settlements are negligible. However, with limited expansion of Harare's housing stock, backyard shacks and illegal extensions to formal housing units are a dominant feature for the poor and much of the middle class whose incomes do not qualify them for private sector housing. In Windhoek, 60 percent of the population resides in Katutura, the 'African township', northwest of the city on 20 percent of the city's land. With the current housing shortages, the expected doubling of the population by 2010 will mean that 50 percent of the city's housing will be slums.


In the Southern Africa region, thousands of people living in informal housing or participating in informal economic activities have been evicted in recent years. These evictions took place with little or no notice, without compensation and often contrary to national and international law. Environmental health, physical or other risk conditions are used to justify eviction and forced removal of poor land occupants. Clearly, rights-based approaches are marginal to urban development and management in Southern Africa. There is need to craft new, indigenous and culturally grounded ways of making human rights central to managing cities in the region.

## Land Prices and Markets

All countries in the Southern Africa region have initiated land reforms and enacted new land laws in recent years. However, these reforms have a largely rural-agrarian focus, often missing interconnections between urban land, livelihoods, urban economies and continued maintenance of rural land rights. Countries are struggling to implement new policies because of limited technical, financial and institutional capacity and problems with the interpretation of the law. Despite the political will in many countries to address inequitable relationships in land, powerful vested interests have often blocked large scale land redistribution. In many of the countries, dependence on international donors or NGOs to fund and design land policies tends to undermine local popular ownership, leading to designs that look good on paper but that are not implementable in practice.

There is a plurality of tenures within the urban boundaries, as well as informal settlements, many of which are based on customary tenures. Customary and/or leasehold are the common form of tenure in the peri-urban and rural areas of Southern Africa. Formal urban expansion usually converts customary and/or leasehold land (or state land) to freehold tenure. In practice, there is significant and growing informality in most of the customary lands in peri-urban areas. This informality is linked to a growing peri-urban land market despite the fact that customary land is not supposed to be sold. This informal land market is stimulated by a lack of capital for formal urban expansion and the formal market's inability to fund compensation at market rates. For both large and smaller cities, the peri-urban areas have emerged as an area of contentious development with loss of agricultural land to urban development and the commoditization of land, undermining development and livelihoods of the poor as illustrated below.

FIGURE 5.3.1: PERI-URBAN POPULATION GROWTH: GABORONE AND ITS PERI-URBAN VILLAGES



Source: Government of Botswana Census Data Various Dates

## Loss of Quality Peri-urban Land

Between 1986 and 2000, peri-urban expansion in Greater Gaborone more than doubled. Most of this expansion was extra-legal and caused significant loss of quality agricultural land. Further problems registered in Gaborone include inadequate compensation for customary peri-urban land taken over for urban developments, illegal sales and land grabbing. Up to 70 percent of land in peri-urban Gaborone where traditional or tribal authorities still have influence on how citizens relate to their land, is administered by Land Boards. Chiefs in peri-urban Gaborone have discouraged indigenous land occupants from giving up their land for allocation to non-locals or non-tribesmen despite legislation that recognises 'citizens' rather than 'tribe' as the basis for land allocation. Under a market-oriented policy, there is a danger that wealthier citizens of recent immigrant origin may end up holding larger proportions of land than poorer indigenous citizens.

As with the case in Harare, Windhoek and South African cities, Gaborone strives to provide fully serviced new housing plots before anyone can reside in the area. But serviced urban land for housing has become scarce in all cities. Consequently, the poor, migrants and speculators have looked towards the peri-urban traditional villages or agricultural lands to meet land needs. As illustrated in the Figure 5.3.1, in recent years, the population growth in the peri-urban villages of Gaborone has grown at rates of up to 11 percent, more than double the national urban growth rates. Both arable and residential lands in peri-urban Gaborone are traded in the informal sector as land-holding villagers are not eager to make it available to the authorities who would re-allocate it for free. Land rights are still in transition and peri-urban areas are the zones of rapid change and highest levels of conflicts. Policies are needed that protect peri-urban agricultural land and land rights and livelihoods of the poor from globalization and urban expansion.

In Lusaka, recent liberalization of urban land markets and urban densification have been associated with increasing competition for land and land grabbing, involving political activists, bureaucrats and technocrats in ways that reflect the central role of urban land as a new form of patronage and political resources. Similar incidents have occurred in other cities in the region such as Harare and Lilongwe but the degree of documentation and public response is variable.

Like most former colonial settler cities in Southern Africa, Harare's peri-urban lands are freehold private sector farms in contrast to cities in West Africa that are surrounded by

traditional villages (Accra for example) and where urban land can only be allocated by traditional chiefs. For Harare, the procedures and processes of converting peri-urban land to urban uses are highly technical and painstakingly administered involving land feasibility studies, purchase, land transfer, land use planning, cadastral surveying, land servicing and allocation to developers. However, processes are extremely slow due to institutional weaknesses, including the fact that residential layout plans cannot be prepared while land is still in private ownership. Time spans of four or more years between land identification and commencement of construction are the norm in a context where squatting is not tolerated. This inevitably has led to very high land prices, speculation, 'downward raiding' (gentrification and higher-income groups occupying housing and land intended for lower-income groups) and overcrowding of the housing stock. The implication of downward raiding observed in cities like Harare means that local governments cannot achieve meaningful restructuring of the post-apartheid city form. With both markets and state failing to facilitate low-income urban land and housing, squatting and informal land markets have become the norm. Unless addressed, land will remain a highly contentious, politically charged topic in Southern Africa. The experience of downward raiding confirms once again that policies targeted only at the very poor will not work if there are no mechanisms to also help the not-so-poor and middle classes. Land is a highly political issue and policy interventions, including the role of donors, should take a cautious approach sensitive to local cultures and identities.

The Harare situation also prevails in South African cities where land scarcity has led to escalating land prices, albeit that South Africa has done very well to deliver about 1.5 million low-income housing units over the past 12 years and it is in this sense not comparable to Zimbabwe. Urban land scarcity inevitably leads to speculation and leaving valuable urban land undeveloped and idle. Cape Town estimates show up to 27,000 vacant plots of land, translating to R7.2 billion in value. Local authorities lose potential land revenue that is higher for developed than undeveloped properties and housing remains unaffordable for the poor. South Africa has a policy to provide housing subsidies for the poor, but due to rising prices the not-so-poor and middle-classes are squeezed from the market and end up buying the subsidized houses from the poor, who either end up back in the slums or homeless.

## 5.4

# Urban Environmental Challenges



▲ Women sell food stuff next to heap of garbage in Luanda, Angola. In 1994, when Luanda had half its current population, it was estimated that it would take 22,000 dumps trucks to clear away the trash.

©Jaspreet Kindra/IRIN

### Erratic Weather Conditions and Urban Water Supply

Over the last century, Zimbabwean records (and by extension all its neighbours) show that surface temperatures have risen by up to 0.8°C while rainy season precipitation has declined by 10 percent. This appears to be linked to recurrent severe droughts in Southern Africa, which, in turn may be associated to global warming. The outcome

is compounded problems of urban water supply most of which depend on rain-fed dams that also supply water for irrigation. In some instances, agricultural uses have primacy in the water management plans.

Johannesburg, Lesotho and Harare's experience in water management under drought conditions can help develop

climate change adaptation recommendations with an urban water supply focus. Interventions must address both supply and demand for urban water needs, with the supply side looking not just at building more reservoirs but also at alternative sources of water, water recycling, design of reticulation systems and reducing systemic losses (unaccounted for water). Re-use of effluent water to irrigate parks, peri-urban farms and gardens and rooftop water harvesting can be promoted at both household and institutional levels. For coastal cities, desalination and use of sea water can become a mainstream reality after further technological investment. Managing urban water demand should be mainstreamed beyond drought periods. Much of this is a matter of local action. Water pricing policy can be helpful too as long as it does not compromise the health and quality of life of the poorest.

## Urban Transport and Mobility

Cities in Southern Africa were conceived as 'garden cities' with land uses (and socio-ethnic groups) separated by open spaces and with the poor located at the periphery of industrial areas. This spatial layout has been continued and creates long commuter distances and times. Investments in ring roads, commuter rail (Gauteng and Harare) and upgrading of transport infrastructures are a major focus for transportation interventions of many of the region's central and local governments.

Most of the region's urban transport demand is work-related. Harare journeys are dominantly made in taxis and informal sector minibuses. Bus trips, cycling and walking have low shares in transportation. Before the onset of the Zimbabwean economic crisis, only 5 percent of workers cycled to work while 30 percent walked. These figures have probably gone up due to rising fuel and commuter fares costs. In Windhoek, bus trips represent about 8 percent while walking makes up for 16 percent. Lilongwe probably has the highest number of pedestrians with 50-70 percent of low-income workers going by foot to work everyday, while 9 percent use buses and 4 percent use bicycle and almost all children walking to school.

Deregulation and economic liberalization in all countries of the region has often led to elimination state public bus companies' monopolies and various degrees of regularization of informal public transport operations until then often considered illegal. In Lusaka, Harare and Gaborone for instance retrenched transport workers used termination payments to buy Southeast Asian second-hand vehicles and minibuses. The resultant increased competition and volume of public transport to peripheral informal settlements allowed people to commute for longer distances, but also set into motion a vicious cycle of extending city growth. In Harare, public transport vehicles increased at a rate of 43 percent per year for the period 1994 -1998. Availability of

second-hand minibuses has also expanded intercity and cross border commuting and trade. Kombis or minibuses serve routes from Lusaka via Harare and Johannesburg to Durban. It has been demonstrated that there is a link between mobility and livelihoods whereby increased mobility and accessibility creates opportunities for income generation and capacity of individuals to tackle their own poverty situations. Unfortunately such mobility and access is not available to vulnerable groups such as the elderly and disabled of Southern Africa.

Transport and mobility are central to trade, livelihoods and the economies of Southern Africa. They have become major drivers of regional integration. Economic integration could be further enhanced with coordinated resolution of tariff or non tariff barriers between countries. At the city level, the link between transport and land use is the most significant policy area where institutional coordination is needed. Economic crises like in Zimbabwe and critical events like the World 2010 Football World Cup Games in Gauteng create opportunities to introduce regional and intra-city investments and innovations in transportation infrastructure and management. Traffic related accidents and pollution are phenomena not getting the desired attention at policy level. National governments could reduce import duty on new vehicles especially for public transport and increase that for second hand to reduce pollution, increase safety of vehicles and create livelihoods in by encouraging local assembly of vehicles.

## Urban Wastes

Solid waste management is still regarded as a municipal responsibility although commercialized and privatisation experiments have been witnessed in all cities. Collection of household waste is not always adequate and even in South African cities progress is inconsistent. Although the percentage of households without adequate collection of refuse (one collection per week) declined between 1996 and 2001 in the major South African cities, it increased by 13.3 percent between 2001 and 2004. Land fill remains the main form of solid waste disposal with hospital waste segregated and collected separately for incineration. Other than for beverage cans, scrap metal and bottles that are bought by recycling companies from garbage vendors, there is little recycling and composting of urban waste in Southern Africa despite significant scope. Land fill, as shown in many advanced nations, is not a long-term solution as adequate sites close to urban areas soon run out. That is moreover the case as Southern African cities often already face huge pressures for cemetery land arising from high death rates due to HIV/AIDS and related illnesses. The majority of people shun cremation, and burials are the culturally acceptable form of disposing dead bodies in the region.

## Air and Water Pollution

Although air and noise pollution from traffic and industrial processes is present, it appears not a major issue of concern for policy-makers. Rather, it is pollution of water supplies and its health consequences that seem to attract public debate and policy attention in Lusaka, Maputo, Luanda, and Durban. Pollution of water supplies is probably the greatest threat in Harare, located downstream of the catchment areas of the major rivers and reservoirs of Lake Manyame and Lake Chivero. Ordinarily such a location is advantageous as even few showers over the city areas significantly boost water supply. However, over the years, increasing lake water pollution has been recorded due to partially treated sewage, industrial and agricultural operations' effluents. Accumulation has accelerated eutrophication and algae and water hyacinth proliferation causing the water quality to fall below recommended WHO standards and posing health risks to the population. The enormous costs for treating and purifying the water are insurmountable in Zimbabwe given the general economic crisis since the late 1990s. But long-term investments in integrated catchment and wetlands management and upgrading of old sewage and water works are urgently needed.

Maputo and Luanda population increases have led to marine pollution and challenges to keep beaches and water fit for recreational and tourist activities. Similar challenges apply to Durban (industrial effluents) and Cape Town. South African cities, in particular, face major environmental and other risks from industrial failures, including risk associated with nuclear power generation or more 'ordinary' industrial mishaps.

## Climate Change, Flooding, Sea Level Rise and Cities

If the temperature rise and precipitation changes in Southern Africa continue, this could lead to areas previously unaffected by malaria (the high *veld* areas where most urban centres are located) becoming more conducive to malaria transmission. The increase in malaria morbidity and mortality would slow down productivity and economic growth and increase health spending.

Due to global warming, coastal cities Luanda, Cape Town, Durban, Maputo and Beira are at risk of sea level rises that, to date, appear not to have been fully captured in city plans. Mozambique is the most at risk from flooding, cyclones and sea level rise. Almost half of the country is a flood plain with the major rivers Zambezi, Limpopo, Save and Shire draining to the Indian Ocean through Mozambique.

The devastating floods of 2000 hit hardest the Mozambique's rural people and Maputo's and other towns' poor peri-urban slum dwellers. As the Limpopo River broke its banks, the Maputo water supply was contaminated. Ninety percent of

the nation's irrigation systems were damaged. This resulted in dysentery outbreaks and sharply rising urban food costs respectively. Roads and bridges were destroyed, disrupting trade, fishing, tourism, and industrial operations nation-wide, incurring direct losses of US\$273 million and reconstruction costs of US\$428 million. The experience has shown the need to develop plans to mitigate disaster vulnerability. However a programme to relocate and resettle households away from the flood plains has failed as people have returned to the old sites, indicating the huge gap between policy makers' and poor residents' perception of risk. This is an area for policy intervention through central *and* local government awareness building campaigns. Programmes on climate change adaptation in Southern Africa generally focus on rural areas and agriculture and the urban sector is largely invisible in the work of SADC's climate change initiatives. Crafting rural *and* urban community-centred and -owned measures to plan for and mitigate the impacts of climate change and post-disaster management remain serious challenges.

## Climate Change Adaptation

Cities and local governments in Southern Africa have yet to fully engage on climate change. Even in well-resourced and extensively planned cities like Cape Town, adaptation and planning for the impacts of climate do not feature comprehensively at the municipal level. There is need to mobilize resources and decentralize debates for climate change adaptation to the city level.

Climate change has a direct impact on the Southern Africa region's core poverty issues of food, water, health, infrastructure and housing. Consequently, the climate change adaptation agenda should not be in resources competition with development and poverty alleviation programmes. Adaptation interventions should be assessed for their contributions to poverty reduction and be mainstreamed into these programmes. In other words, in the short term, only mainstreamed climate change adaptation activities with a high impact on poverty reduction should be carried forward or financed.

Urban management can contribute through linking spatial planning with water supply management. New development or investment or policy should link approval to actual and potential effects on local water resources and water use. Water use in this case is the link to climate change. Rather than keeping such a regulation as a development control measure only, the impact data should be used by the municipal strategic planning sections for: (a) monitoring; (b) design of adaptation strategies; and (c) management of the water supply chain. Water engineers, urban planners, investors, developers, climatologists, politicians and communities need to forge new partnerships around climate change adaptations especially with regards to urban water security in Southern Africa.



▲ In the absence of a municipal waste management system, garbage and human wastes pile up and flow into streams in informal settlements in Luanda, Angola.  
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# 5.5 Urban Governance Systems

## The Political Context

National and urban politics directly impact on centre-local relations. At independence, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola believed that centralized public administration and planning under a one-party system would provide the most capable structure to deal with apartheid legacies and deliver basic services to a majority of the poor. South Africa, Namibia and Botswana have to an extent been dominated by one-party formations during their recent democratic years.

In the early years, priority was given to rural areas in spatial planning and poverty alleviation programmes (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique) with the large urban areas victimized, ignored or given less long-term policy attention. However, economic stagnation since the 1980s, inadequate capacity to finance the broadening of service delivery and to compete at global levels left countries no option but to accept structural adjustment programmes. This onset of neo-liberal reforms, forcing governments to cut back on subsidized services and introduce user charges or ‘cash-and-carry’ policies, has made the formally marginalized cities worse off.

Weak electoral mandates are more glaring in urban areas where the opposition parties (at the national level) have a majority of the elected urban councillors (Lusaka, Harare, Cape Town). As a result, in Cape Town, Harare and

Lusaka, the national Presidents will be in ‘foreign’ political territory’. This situation can have deep repercussions for revenue allocations unbalancing programme and capital expenditures, urban areas’ infrastructure starvation and continued ignorance of the need for hierarchical national urban development. The opposition urban vote in Harare, for instance, remained consistently high for the presidential as well as for local government elections since the mid-1980s. The tide of opposition has risen in Zimbabwean urban areas to the extent that by year 2002, all key cities were political opposition territory. Opposition parties are generally more strongly represented in the larger cities in South Africa if compared to small towns in rural areas.

In cities where the national ruling party has no political control, local politics and governance are largely subsumed by national politics. Local governance issues are manipulated to reflect national political engagement that may undermine programmes of ‘one-city’ development. Ruling parties’ central government at times deliberately seek to undermine and disable local government.

In Maputo, democracy has not raised the level of voter turnout as in Lusaka, Harare and South African cities. This is a reflection of the extent to which ordinary people see relevance in the formal governance structures over their own informal systems or networks of service provision and governance.

TABLE 5.5.1: THE RISING PROPORTION OF OPPOSITION VOTES IN ZIMBABWE’S MAJOR CITIES

Major City	Approximate Proportion of Opposition Vote (%)					
	1985 General Elections	1990 General Elections	1995 General Elections	2000 Constitutional Referendum	2000 General Elections	2002 Presidential Elections
Harare	30	31 – 50	40 – 60	68 – 80	67 – 82	61 – 85
Bulawayo	30	31 – 50	40 – 60	74 – 81	75 – 87	78 – 83

Source: Compiled from a range of media sources



## Local Government as Resource for Political Patronage

For Lusaka, insights into the improper and illegal allocation of land can be gleaned from a committee set up to investigate this issue in 2000, as well as the draft Lusaka Integrated Development Plan (2000). A vibrant illegal market existed for alienated public land with varying levels of collusion among councillors, members of parliament and city officials, and, in some instances, leaders of local resident development committees and party officials. The transactions defrauded local residents of money while abusing land plans. The committee nevertheless exonerated the majority of persons involved, especially those holding senior political positions. Neither political leaders nor local operatives were even suspended from the party. Thus the investigations led not to appeasement, but to further erosion in trust and confidence in the governance system. Rather, those involved in improper land allocations resorted to formal rules and regulations to legitimize and secure the economic value of their loot. Clearly, what one may consider as ‘corruption’ is viewed by others as a legitimate and expected behaviour to cement relations between the elected officials and those who elected them.

## Economic Governance and Management in the Context of Pro-growth City Policies

Governance in the context of South Africa’s pro-global economic growth policy environment is defined as the quality of triangular relations between government, business and the community. Inclusion of business goes beyond traditional definitions that limit governance to state-citizen relations. In principle, the South African vision is commendable as it implicitly recognises that the three entities should share power, collaborate in problem analysis, policy and project formulation.

However, in Cape Town and Johannesburg (and for different reasons Lusaka, Harare, Luanda and Maputo), the input of citizens is absent in major urban projects. The ruling party appears to believe that its mandate to represent the people’s interest absolves them from further promoting citizen involvement. At the same time, the vibrant civic movements dominant on the eve of majority rule in 1994 have since lost their intellectual leaders who have joined civil service, leaving a weakened people’s movement to confront confident, resourced and powerful global corporations. At the local government level, lack of expertise remains a major problem and not all cities have been financially audited in recent years.



▲ An adult literacy class in Malawi.  
©Maciej Dakowicz

In peri-urban Gaborone, Land Boards and District Councils have the powers and functions to administer and allocate land, but depend very much on state finance and expertise. They are under pressure from globalization and social change resulting from population change. Gaborone, like Cape Town, Johannesburg and Maputo, illustrates the lack of capacity to interpret, control and guide investment processes of global origin and, in the long term, protect workers, create local community skills and protect the environment. There is a clear governance deficit in all Southern African cities due to tense centre-local relations (extreme in Harare), rigid patrimonial institutional cultures (Lusaka, Harare), citizens lacking trust in their authorities (Maputo), lack of capacity within both the local authorities and in civil society (all cities).

The example of the tripartite vision identified in the case of South African cities should be strengthened to raise the involvement of citizens in economic decision-making. The labour unions would be the best placed institutions to represent citizens at the local level. This however is contentious at the global level. The vision should also be extended to become more focused at the regional level with economic dialogues that address the roles of business, city regions (such as Gauteng) and linkages with and among lower level institutions.

## Municipal Finance and Administration

City authorities in Southern Africa have relatively sound administrations with significant autonomy in financial and organizational matters, including power to raise revenues and provide services in their areas of jurisdiction. It can be argued that cities funded by local taxes rather than central-level grants tend to be more responsive to local citizens, more accountable and more transparent. Property taxes and service charges are key sources of local finance, contributing 20 to 40 percent to local revenues with central and provincial government subsidies and grants making up to 10 percent in South African cities.


In Maputo and Harare the significant contribution of property taxes has been eroded by failure to update and administer property valuation rolls and prepare and maintain asset registers. For such cities, this leaves government grants the major source of income. There are also differences

in institutional mandates for housing and trunk and social service provision. For instance, South African city governments supply electricity to households. In Harare it is the *national* electricity company that generates, transmits and provide electricity to households. For the period 2005-2006, South Africa's electricity revenues registered surpluses ranging from 4 to 14 percent, allowing them to cross subsidize other services. Hence cities have continued to resist huge pressures to remove electricity from their control and give it to regional electricity distributors.

Key issues are jurisdiction conflicts and 'unfunded mandates' i.e. where cities perform the functions of provincial or central government spheres and bear the costs from their own revenue without getting the commensurate income from provincial or central government. For South African cities, housing, health, museums, libraries are some of the major themes in this category. Financial planning is made difficult because, while central government grants are predictable, the provincial grants and subsidies are not. This is compounded by unclear and conflicting responsibilities between cities and provincial governments in areas of housing and transport provision. Further, there are also weak institutional mechanisms to facilitate fiscal cooperation across city regions. Urban expenditures are dominated by salaries (30 percent of operating budgets for South Africa's large cities and 60 percent for Harare) and service provision. Expenditure on salaries could be higher if all technical posts were to be filled (in Zimbabwe and South Africa for instance). A key burden for Harare is that it has no system to stop people from rural areas (non rate payers) receiving urban health services. Less than 10 percent of Harare's operating expenditure goes to repair and maintenance of infrastructure. Gaps between services provided by cities and revenue provided by government generally weaken local authorities' capacities.


Citizen involvement in urban policy and management remains a highly contested area and has to be understood as part of broader national and regional political transitions. Decentralisation of power including creating the office of an elected Executive Mayor would be an empowering step in the right direction from which central government should not balk when politically challenged. For stable accountable local government, there is no option but to pursue decentralisation policies.

FIGURE 5.5.1: JOHANNESBURG SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION



Source: Spatial Development Framework.

FIGURE 5.5.2: LUSAKA SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT MAP



Source: Adapted from Lusaka IDP, 2000



▲ A woman working in a stone quarry holding her young baby, Zambia. Women are disadvantaged in both employment and education in Zambia, including in terms of lower remuneration and inferior conditions of employment.

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## Urban Planning and Spatial Development

Some cities in the region have prepared development plans, strategic land use and infrastructure plans that, following the preferred terminology, purport to be integrative (Lusaka, all the South African cities) rather than traditional Master Plans (Harare, Lilongwe, Gaborone). In some instances, 'corridor' plans around key infrastructure as in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town have been initiated. The Lusaka Integrated Development Plan (IDP) anticipates and seeks to promote growth in the belt between the city and airport. Lilongwe has a similar approach to promoting industry in the zone between the city and the airport.

The effectiveness of these plans appears not as comprehensive as anticipated. For cities like Lusaka, the IDP was developed with donor-funded consultants using technocratic approaches with little citizen involvement. Some councillors and key officials were not even aware of either the plan's existence or content while it was awaiting ministerial approval in 2001. Likewise, despite its title of Metropolitan Maputo Structure Plan, the plan lacks a metropolitan outlook. For Harare, Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, strategic plans have been prepared and coordinated internally with only a few tasks sourced out to local consultants for technical advice.

The spatial framework of the Johannesburg IDP 2003/4 identifies relevant growth infrastructure and urban corridors, development opportunity areas and environmental priorities. But the broader Gauteng Urban Region linkages and integration with Pretoria and Ekurhuleni envisioned in provincial government thinking are weakly reflected. As noted by the SACN, planning in the Gauteng Urban Region has "... instances where development corridors along transport routes stopped at municipal boundaries ignoring activities in the neighbouring municipalities. Similarly, there are cases of municipalities promoting development of new or expanded international freight hub airports in isolation, with little consideration for national or provincial air-freight planning."

Analysis of the Cape Town Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework shows a failure to bring about meaningful restructuring of the city, largely due to limited mechanisms for planners to effect change in a market-driven political economy prioritizing selective promotion of growth, rather than redistribution of opportunities and wealth. Both

the Cape Town and (to a lesser extent) the Johannesburg plans have failed to reconcile global competitiveness with domestic socio-economic redistribution. Citizen participation in plan formulating (including in Johannesburg metropolitan region and Cape Town) could have been improved upon. Labour unions were not consulted in the plan preparation process. Strategy formulation remains a negotiated process between local elite groups, privileged pressure groups and international investors – a process encouraged by prevailing privatization and partnership policies (for example in Maputo) and pro-global growth (Cape Town, Pretoria and Johannesburg).

For all Southern African cities, as in the past, planning for the poor entails physical extension of low-income residential areas at the urban periphery or slum upgrading and formalization (Lusaka and Lilongwe). Planning mostly involves replacement of informal economies and settlements by high-value developments, residential gated communities and commercial enclaves at distances beyond the reach of the poor majority of citizens. Thus spatial planning continues to be heavily implicated in urban fragmentation with a city for the rich and foreigners, a city of economically excluded locals and a city of the marginalised ultra-poor (non-citizens, refugees and immigrants). The juxtaposition of these spaces creates tensions as reflected by recent urban violence (over food and fuel in Maputo) and xenophobia (in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Gaborone and Lusaka).

The need to integrate regional economic growth models across borders should be complemented with a shared approach to plan at the city region level to eliminate duplication and prevent mismatches between the plans and programmes of adjacent local authorities. Lack of regional data for urban analysis is a major weakness in urban policy in all Southern African city regions, leading to duplication and failure to identify opportunities. Urgent initiatives are required to promote collaboration and partnerships across local authorities and across borders in the areas of regional resource exploitation, investment, infrastructures (water, hydro-electrical power, roads) data collection/analysis, planning and spatial policy. SADC, DBSA and UN-HABITAT, national and regional development agencies, national statistical offices, city planning department and research institutions should forge alliances towards these objectives.

## 5.6

# The Gauteng Urban Region



▲  
Aerial view of Johannesburg.  
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### Introduction

The Gauteng Urban Region (GUR) is broadly coterminous with Gauteng province. This province has 1.4 percent of South Africa's land area; 19.7 percent of its population; 37 percent of its motor vehicles; and generates approximately 38 percent of the country's GDP. It has a legacy of spatial distortions associated with apartheid that are perhaps most clearly expressed in inefficient land-use and transport patterns. Gauteng, with its population of over ten million

is increasingly recognized as a single, regional urban system. This recognition has led to the adoption of the term 'Gauteng Global City Region' which for the purposes of this report is termed Gauteng Urban Region GUR'.

The GUR is a constellation of urban cores within a radius of about 100 km from Johannesburg, linked through commuting, intense physical interaction, and shared services. The economy is led by commerce, finance and services.

Government and administration have a very large presence since the GUR hosts several large municipalities, the national capital Pretoria, and the provincial capital Johannesburg. Transport, construction and manufacturing are major economic sectors. Mining, the original *raison d'être* of urban development in the region, now takes place largely outside the GUR.

From 1994, Gauteng Province was demarcated primarily by the city region's main elements within one political boundary. The local government system divided the GUR into three metropolitan areas and three district municipalities, with the districts subdivided into eight local municipalities. The 2007 population of Gauteng Province was estimated at 10.5 million people. For the purposes of the following analysis, the GUR is treated for as conterminous with Gauteng province in the context of understanding the linkages beyond the provincial boundaries.

### Brief History of the Gauteng Urban Region

The oldest urban focus in today's GUR is Pretoria, founded in 1855. After the start of gold (1886) and coal mining (1890s), Pretoria's status was eclipsed by Johannesburg's rapid development into a metropolitan urban core (including Pretoria, Mogale City, Ekurhuleni and Emfuleni). The World War II industrial boom in Gauteng saw an enormous wave of urbanization with people flocking to Gauteng from rural South Africa, Lesotho, Mozambique and further afield.

As part of the apartheid policy adopted by the white minority government after 1948, new areas were planned in Gauteng for segregated public housing schemes that became the African townships of Greater Soweto, Mamelodi, Tembisa, Sebokeng, KwaThema and others. As such, the apartheid segregation intent marked South Africa's first area-wide urban

planning approach and has had a profound impact upon the structure and functioning of Gauteng ever since. The 1950s yielded a 'Preliminary Guide Plan for the PWV' (Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging). Three decades later, the notion of a single urban region was developed, while the creation of a provincial government allowed for region-wide urbanization focus. The result was the emergence of the idea of 'Gauteng global city region' as a vehicle of change. Local governance continued to adapt as well and the present institutional structures date from 2000.


### The Extended Metropolitan Region of Johannesburg

Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Pretoria, Mogale City and much of the Sedibeng district including Emfuleni (Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark-Sebokeng) make up most of Gauteng province. (See Figure 5.6.2 below) However, the extended metropolitan region (EMR) extends beyond the Gauteng provincial boundary. Densely populated areas with daily commuting to Ekurhuleni and Pretoria exist in the provinces of Mpumalanga and even into Limpopo province. Areas beyond the western and southern provincial boundaries are in their economic relationships indistinguishable from more centrally situated localities. Moreover, there are also significant centres in rural territories at distances of over 120 km from Johannesburg which are part of the same urban economy, although daily commuting ties are weak. Figure 5.6.2 below indicates areas which form the generally accepted core, roughly coterminous with the province of Gauteng and including the major metropolitan centres and secondary cities within the province. Each adds a layer of complexity to the concept of the extended region.

FIGURE 5.6.1: LOCATION OF GAUTENG PROVINCE



FIGURE 5.6.2: SCHEMATIC MAP OF THE GAUTENG URBAN REGION



The GUR is a domestic, regional urban system that extends across administrative and territorial boundaries. It brings together distinct regimes with a diverse range of administrative, legal or other activities with widely differing agendas, powers and interest. Yet, Gauteng is also a trans-boundary *international* city region central to the economies, finance and social services of a regional area that extends into Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia and beyond. The sea ports serving this vast regional urban system are substantially shaped by their relationships to Gauteng. Durban operates as Gauteng's main domestic seaport while Maputo adds the international dimension. Economic corridors distinctly link these port cities and the GUR. Gauteng-based financial and medical services also link with cities in neighbouring countries, including Mbabane, Gaborone and Maseru. A further linkage, more significant to large numbers of people, is the often circular migration patterns between Gauteng and much of South Africa, Lesotho, southern Mozambique, and in some respects the DRC. The tragic 2008 attacks on foreigners point to the sensitivities of these ties.

## Population and Urbanization Trends

The present estimated Gauteng population is 10.5 million. Growth appears to have been most rapid at the end of the 1990s. Since 2001, a slightly slower growth rate has been observed due to falling fertility rates and rising death rates, the latter linked to HIV/AIDS incidence. Annual population growth fell from 3.8 (1996-2001) to 2.2 percent (2001-2007). The 2011 census and the Gauteng City Region Urban Observatory presently being established may produce more precise estimates of size and change.

Migration is both *substantial* with high rates of movement both in and out of the GUR and *complex* with continuing circular migration. Many migrants maintain more than one place of residence, both within and well beyond the GUR. Numbers exceeding one million 'illegal' and undocumented foreign citizens in the GUR are mentioned, but precise estimates are not available. Rates of entry have certainly risen rapidly over the past two decades, but may well have declined in the very recent past. Net gain from migration according to censuses 1996-2001 was almost exactly 400,000 in the Gauteng province.

Projecting future GUR population growth with unreliable data and population fluidity is extremely difficult. The Gauteng provincial government uses a projected 14.6 million for 2015, a growth rate exceeding four percent per year. Given recently falling growth rates, such a high rate of population growth appears implausible. However, future patterns of migration and disease incidence are critical to population change. A reasonable 2015 GUR population projection would be in the 12.4 million range.

The GUR has about three million households, a number which is growing faster than the population. Thus, even a lower estimated population growth rate of 2.2 percent will mean a continued rapid rate of growth (perhaps four percent)

in the demand for housing and services. A population growth higher than 2.2 percent might mean a six percent or higher rate of demand growth for housing and services.

Population density is generally low in the GUR, although there are very high density areas such as Johannesburg's high-rise apartment zones and intensely settled former townships and informal settlements. While not all land is suitable for settlement, densification of built up areas and urban fill-in would allow for at least twice the present population (assuming services and livelihoods availability).

## The Urban Economy

Economic growth in the GUR was a disappointing annual 3.3 percent between 1996-2004. Thereafter growth accelerated somewhat although it may recently have fallen once more. Employment growth has tended to lag behind economic growth. Table 5.6.1 provides a summary of the descriptive structure of the GUR economy.

The largest economic subsectors are finance and business services and manufacturing, whilst the largest employment subsectors are trade and social services. The GUR economy is vitally dependent on high-level services and employment growth is tied to this sector's expansion. The fastest growing sectors, however, are not labour intensive and the GUR economy has struggled to absorb the available labour. There is significant variation within the GUR in the local structure of the economy and employment. Johannesburg has a specialization in finance, Ekurhuleni in manufacturing and Pretoria in government and related services.

The 2001 population census states that 45.0 percent of the total 6,432,053 working age (15-65 years) population was employed, 25.8 percent was unemployed, and 29.1 percent was not economically active. Of youth aged 15-24, only 18 percent were employed in 2001. The scale of informal economic activity, however, alters the above picture considerably. In 2001, 13 percent of the potential labour market was considered to be informally engaged. Although actual figures may be even higher, the number of informally engaged persons is clearly much lower than in many other African urban regions. Due to lack of data it is not known whether it is growing or shrinking. Whereas higher levels of education almost guarantees employment in Gauteng, low levels of education are closely associated with unemployment. A school leaving certificate is no guarantee of employment.

## The Economic Role of the GUR

Most of the corporate headquarters and financial sector in South Africa are concentrated in the GUR. It has an industrial output share roughly the same as its GDP share, provides the major market for most producers throughout the country, concentrates a large share of trade and is the gateway to the global economy. The two other large city regions in the country, centred on Durban and Cape Town, have economies contributing roughly 10 and 12.5 percent respectively to the



national GDP compared with 38 percent for the GUR. The GUR economy is larger than that of almost every African country and plays a central role not only in all Southern African countries but also many at greater distances. It is a source of continent-wide investment funds and products.

The GUR is the only 'global city region' in Africa, on a second or third tier of global cities following New York, London and Tokyo in the first rank and parallel with São Paulo, the Delta Metropolis (Netherlands), the Flemish Triangle etc. The GUR's global connectivity makes it a key gateway for the Southern Africa region and the economic health of the GUR is vital to the region's economies.

### Recent Trends, Policy and Local Development Practice, Challenges and Potential Directions

Gauteng's economy has several key features related to recent trends:

- High growth during apartheid created an economy of exclusion based on socially dysfunctional policies that weakened the employment capacity of the economy;
- Recent industrial activity does not reveal evidence of major growth in manufactured exports as productivity and competitiveness remain low, while the costs of business remain high;
- The GUR has witnessed a boom in banking and financial sector products and rapidly expanding

information communication. As a consequence, the GUR concentrates on skills, capacities and institutions in the knowledge economy. While the GUR has facilitated global foreign directed investment flows into other parts of Africa, competitors such as Mauritius and Middle East-based centres have outperformed the GUR in recent decades;

- The GUR is increasingly exposed to Indian Ocean, Asian and other African economies, but historical linkages are westward. Adjustment to the new centres of global financial and trade gravity may not be easy. The Asian purchase of a large share in one of South Africa's largest banks, for instance, may indicate that a reorientation is underway with medium-term effects for the GUR.
- The GUR continues to grow strongly as entrepot, key centre of commerce in Africa, and the major global gateway into southern Africa. Significant growth has taken place in tourism but growth is undercut by rising energy prices, crime and safety concerns;
- A recent boom with rapid rise in construction employment related both to preparation for the 2010 FIFA World Cup and major public sector projects like Gautrain may be difficult to maintain after 2010 if national savings rates do not rise; and
- There is a strong desire for and investment in innovation, but returns are not strong, possibly because skills are in short supply and the education situation is weak.

TABLE 5.6.1: CONTRIBUTION OF MAJOR SECTORS TO THE GDP, GAUTENG, 2004

Sector	Rand (million)*	%	Employment by sector (2001) (%)
<b>Primary industries</b>	<b>10,514</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>7</b>
Mining and quarrying	8,073	1.7	4
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	2,441	0.5	3
<b>Secondary industries</b>	<b>115,706</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>22</b>
Manufacturing	94,934	20.5	15
Electricity, gas and water	9,162	2.0	1
Construction	11,610	2.5	6
<b>Tertiary industries</b>	<b>287,883</b>	<b>62.3</b>	<b>71</b>
Wholesale & retail trade; hotels & restaurants	61,823	13.4	19
Transport, storage and communication	37,913	8.2	6
Finance, real estate and business services	98,885	21.4	16
Personal services	18,290	4.0	19
General government services	70,972	15.4	11
<b>All industries at basic prices</b>	<b>414,103</b>	<b>89.6</b>	<b>..</b>
Taxes less subsidies on products	47,941	10.4	..
<b>GDPR at market prices</b>	<b>462,044</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>..</b>

Source: Statistics South Africa, Gross Domestic Product 2004, Population Census 2001  
Note \* Exchange rate in 2004 approximately R7=US\$1

What happens in GUR has major impacts on a large area of Africa, while much of what will shape the economic future of the GUR takes place at national and international scale. Policy and local development practice needs to:

- work at reducing the costs of doing business, especially in highly competitive sectors;
- focus on the possibilities and new directions in manufacturing;
- research the nature and impacts of the financialization of the urban economy;
- be persistent with business tourism promotion strategies; and
- address the vital role of a hospitable and safe environment.

### Social Development

Authorities concur that education in South Africa, including Gauteng, is in a weak state. Although surveys show that 95.1 percent of people above the age of 15 can read and write, higher levels of education remain a matter of concern with weaknesses in secondary educated population. This is not advantageous in the highly competitive situation on the

world scale. Gauteng authorities are attempting to prioritize education. The City of Johannesburg in its long term strategic plan *Joburg 2030* makes skill development one of the two top priorities for development. But little progress has been made. Since education at the secondary level is a provincial competence in South Africa, a huge opportunity exists for the provincial government to contribute to development of the city region through education. At tertiary levels Gauteng concentrates a very substantial number of institutions and students and is a destination for students and faculty from Africa and beyond: a strength upon which the GUR may be able to build.

Unfortunately the GUR is probably best known around the world for its crime rates – a perception usually attached to Johannesburg. High levels of violence and crime are results of a relative lack of social cohesion resulting from the apartheid legacy, as well as growing inequality, high unemployment rates and other factors. There are many projects and policies seeking to address safety; small-scale in communities and larger at the provincial government level. Statistics suggest recent improvements, but crime levels remain high and more work is required to address the long term future of individuals and of the economy.



▲ Protestors on the street in South Africa during the May 2008 xenophobic attacks on foreigners around the country.  
©IRIN

## Area-wide Governance: The Roles of Provincial and Local Authorities

The GUR has a provincial-level government whose jurisdiction more or less covers the urban region. The region's local governments comprise the metropolitan municipalities of Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg and Pretoria and three district municipalities, subdivided into eight local municipalities. Land planning capacity mainly lies with the municipalities, although the provincial government has more funds for major projects. Thus, the provincial government has become an instrument of coordination and integration of local authorities' strategies and plans. The municipal government have experienced severe fiscal difficulties over the past decade. In recent years, public sector-led urban development has therefore become a matter of collaboration and negotiation between levels of government. The Gauteng province engages with neighbouring provinces to negotiate coordinated strategy beyond the reach of individual provincial governments and to integrate their plans for coordination of local and national development.

The GUR's sub-national authority since 2004, gives it the immense advantages of a well-resourced and democratic government seeking region-wide governance and coherence. The result is progress towards the Gauteng Global City Region Strategy that aims at establishing an 'integrated and globally competitive city region and consolidating Gauteng as an economic hub for Africa and an internationally recognized global city-region'. An important element of the strategy is development of the capacity to monitor and assess progress. To that end a city region observatory is in process of establishment.

## The Housing Question Including Land and Slums

The term 'slum' is generally not used in South Africa – the discourse is one of informal versus formal housing. But there is formal housing in poor condition, overcrowded or informalized in terms of tenure. Urban poverty is concentrated in particular areas that tend to overlap with (but are not identical to): a) old 'townships' most of which began as segregated public housing estates 50 or more years ago; b) various inner-city areas with combinations of run-down housing, crowding, and poor services; and c) informal settlements which have emerged over the past 30 years from land invasions, informal housing markets and informal rental.

The Gauteng Department of Housing estimates that over 600,000 households live in informal circumstances. Although many new housing units have been built, the backlog has grown. The number of households in formal homes has grown by more than 705,000 in five years, the number in informal settlements grew by more than 163,000 during the same period.

There are several hundred thousand 'back yard shacks' (structures varying from flimsy quality to more permanent

buildings on the sites of formal units). There are also substantial numbers of settlements which are entirely informal (from illegal to quasi-legal and generally poor or non-existent services). The 2005 Gauteng Informal Settlements study found 405 informal settlements with almost 490,000 structures and the same number of families or household units reported as using them. Numbers have grown since.

Services are very unevenly distributed across Gauteng. Informal areas vary from high levels of water, sanitation and energy supply to a complete lack direct access to such services. Over 80 percent of households use electricity for heating and cooking; 98 percent have access to piped water; 85 percent have waterborne sanitation (although 10 percent only have pit latrines); and 85 percent have weekly municipal refuse removal. It is most likely that these figures are quite inaccurate. Lack of more complete and precise information is a critical contributor to potential disputes over informal settlement policy.

Tenure is varied across GUR settlements, including freehold, formal rental, informal rental, permissions to occupy land and completely irregular tenure. Rental tenure is common: it includes backyard shack and room renting in the formal township areas. Apartments are also important and new rental apartment building is once again beginning to expand after a long period of quiescence. The agencies concerned are non-profit, public support initiatives through agencies such as the Johannesburg Housing Company and private sector developers.

Land prices are relatively low in Gauteng by world standards. Public funds have been used more to build in peripheral locations than central ones due to land price differentials. Although this practice is discouraged by the current national housing policy (which subsidizes units for poorer people) peripheral construction continues. There is some evidence of greater security, both residential and economic, resulting from land titling initiatives for poorer citizens, although there is little evidence of realization of value from title.

Given the number of informal settlements and of their residents, upgrading is a critical issue. Present policy tends to emphasize 'eradication' of informal settlements over their upgrading; this is an area of contest. There is a need to explore more effective means of *in situ* upgrading in informal areas as well as of deteriorated housing conditions in the city region.

## GUR Transport Networks

The relatively sophisticated transport networks of GUR demand renewed attention.

- (a) A network designed for a very different spatial configuration of employment and residence is strained by recent developments. Congestion between the major employment growth zones in the northern parts of Johannesburg metro area, and the major residential areas in the southwest, including Soweto, is serious, and there are other examples.

- (b) There is a lack of mass public transport and lack of connections between the rail network and major areas of growth, as well as a lack of integration between the various modes where they coexist.
- (c) Collective private minibuses are the predominant form of collective transport. The irregular origins of this 'industry' imply huge difficulties in regulation, but at the same time this mode makes a vital contribution to mobility throughout Gauteng.
- (d) Integration of transportation and other forms of planning is limited – although improving. Strategic, land use, economic and other approaches to planning still tend to follow their own logics and trajectories and not to integrate their results and proposals sufficiently.

Bus rapid transport (BRT) has emerged as a favoured approach to the improvement of passenger transport under conditions of congestion.

The largest present construction project in South Africa is a multi-billion dollar new railway system "Gautrain" linking the major CBDs of Johannesburg and Pretoria and to OR Tambo International airport. It is a BOT (Build - Operate - Transfer) project of the provincial Department of Transport, funded by the national treasury with multinational corporations involved in the consortium. Completion of the first major sections is scheduled for 2010. It is likely to have considerable impacts, including on land use and land prices in the vicinity of stations. It is, however, debatable whether it will significantly alleviate current road congestion and/or provide a viable and affordable alternative for most passengers on the routes concerned.

Although the project is an obvious component in Gauteng's international orientation, maintaining and improving on its global city status, attention to the daily transportation realities of the Gauteng population is a matter of great importance. Strengthening the collective taxi or minibus transport industry may be a slow process. It will serve millions and will help address the sometimes violent conflicts over routes.

Also, over the past generation, freight transport within GUR has moved inexorably away from rail as new freeways encouraged freight movement by road and new locations for logistic nodes and industrial activity. These undesirable facets of sub-urbanization, generating more and more road congestion and lowered air qualities, continue in the GUR and are now a major challenge, not only because of steeply rising fuel prices, but also because spatial and transportation planning has been short-sightedly based on parochial local thinking. In the era of city regions, EMRs and urban development corridors, spatial policy, including transportation, should be far more regionally oriented. It should holistically embrace and integrate with social, economic, labour, industrial and agricultural macro policy. More than ever before should spatial planning be a tool for rethinking urbanization and the spatial forms and economic consequences it produces.

## Spatial Development and Development Corridors

Transport is central to planning for the development of key economic and urban corridors. The objective is correction of apartheid geography. Strategies include development of effective linkages, investment in active economic areas for poverty alleviation, and overcoming the inefficiencies of uncoordinated urban sprawl driven by development processes that pay little heed to the longer term. Historically, the key logistics corridor was running east-west along the gold mining belt and associated industrial developments. This corridor remains significant but its future is unclear since it is not well-recognized in policy and planning.

The currently most important development corridor is Johannesburg-Pretoria, with rapid growth of residential, commercial and other economic activity. This corridor is being strengthened by major public infrastructure investments, housing and new economic expansion sites. The corridor offers opportunities for the Gauteng Spatial Development Perspective and for investments in areas of overlap between poverty and economic opportunity.

A second corridor follows the highway between Ekurhuleni and Pretoria, and includes the OR Tambo International Airport. Public investments in road improvements and development of an enterprise zone around the airport strengthens this north-south corridor and links to Johannesburg. Several other GUR corridors are expanding and strengthening. However, the enthusiasm for development corridors from Maputo in Mozambique to Johannesburg and Botswana was probably over-optimistic in relation to real chances of investment and only modest results have been achieved.

## Air, Water and Soil Quality

The GUR faces a range of serious environmental problems with the potential to undercut the development of the city region. Whilst good work has been done in collecting and analysing information in critical areas, a great deal more monitoring and preventative work is required, as well as the development of policy priorities for sustainability in Gauteng.

Poor air quality, particularly indoors in low-income households, is arguably the most serious environmental issue in Gauteng. While air quality meets acceptable levels of ambient pollutants, the perception is that despite the rapid electrification of households, indoor air pollution continues to negatively impact on health and well-being. There is a poor air monitoring network in the province given the concentration of populations and extent of industrialization. In the wider environment, coal burning is another significant issue, adding to greenhouse gas emission from motor vehicles and industry, exacerbated during winter by the

steep temperature inversion that traps pollutants close to the surface. Outside Gauteng and in combination with other sources, these pollutants cause widespread acid rain and have other undesirable impacts.

Many of the natural water systems in Gauteng have been irreversibly degraded, limiting their ecological functionality. Mining and industry have had the greatest impact, along with construction in sensitive areas. Most of Gauteng's water is drawn from the Vaal River, consuming half of its volume. The water of the Vaal is massively supplemented by the Thukela basin in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. Additional water is pumped from the upper reaches of the Thukela into the upper Wilge River, the largest tributary of the Vaal. Thus Gauteng considerably reduces water available in KwaZulu-Natal. Obviously, the long-term water supply security for the GUR remains a source of considerable concern.

Levels of soil contamination are not known due to lack of reliable data. The extent to which urbanization threatens high potential agricultural land has also not been adequately established. In the small but high-value agricultural sector of Gauteng, patterns of cultivation show poor correlation with land capability. Much high-potential agricultural land is underutilized, providing opportunities for agricultural development and food security for the GUR. However, many of these areas have also been identified as important for conservation purposes. More effective evaluation of competing land use is required.

## The Way Forward

How can the GUR achieve greater levels of sustainability, boosting employment, addressing poverty, and building a strong and rewarding city region in which to live over the next generation?

It is clear from data and analysis that the GUR potential for contributing to development in the Southern Africa region is high. There are many threats, including uncertainty in the economic and employment spheres, while there is need to mobilize multiple stakeholders.

The GUR can be strengthened and developed by the following steps:

- (a) Create better systems for monitoring and understanding ongoing and future developments in the GUR by enlisting the Gauteng Urban Observatory, provincial government and academia;
- (b) Conceptualize and work towards complete reorganization and renewal of public transport;
- (c) Reconceptualize local economic development policy in relation to the real needs of industry and of informal business; and
- (d) Create regulations and incentives to radically shift patterns of private urban development away from scattered, fragmented and largely peripheral, unsustainable development.



▲ Informal settlement in Cape Town, South Africa.  
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# Statistical Annex

TABLE 1: **TOTAL POPULATION (1980-2030)**

Country	Total population ('000s)					
	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	<b>388,063</b>	<b>519,391</b>	<b>679,873</b>	<b>866,948</b>	<b>1,081,029</b>	<b>1,308,461</b>
<b>Africa</b>	<b>479,786</b>	<b>637,421</b>	<b>820,959</b>	<b>1,032,013</b>	<b>1,270,528</b>	<b>1,518,310</b>
Eastern Africa	134,008	181,578	237,718	309,279	393,399	480,806
Burundi	4,130	5,692	6,668	9,553	13,062	17,232
Comoros	387	527	699	902	1,112	1,325
Djibouti	340	561	730	877	1,027	1,197
Eritrea	2,469	3,158	3,684	5,323	6,937	8,433
Ethiopia	37,138	51,148	69,388	89,566	112,896	137,052
Kenya	16,282	23,447	31,252	40,645	51,691	62,762
Madagascar	9,059	12,033	16,187	21,299	27,005	32,931
Mauritius	966	1,057	1,186	1,291	1,374	1,430
Réunion	506	604	724	836	926	999
Rwanda	5,197	7,294	8,176	10,601	13,731	16,646
Seychelles	66	72	81	88	92	96
Somalia	6,485	6,717	7,055	9,486	12,291	15,193
Sudan	19,641	25,933	33,349	41,230	50,027	58,446
Uganda	12,661	17,841	24,690	34,040	46,749	61,548
United Republic of Tanzania	18,681	25,494	33,849	43,542	54,479	65,516
Northern Africa	93,226	119,977	143,653	168,428	193,652	214,794
Algeria	18,811	25,283	30,506	35,423	40,630	44,726
Egypt	43,674	55,137	66,529	79,537	92,578	104,070
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	3,063	4,364	5,346	6,530	7,656	8,447
Mauritania	1,503	1,945	2,566	3,363	4,153	4,944
Morocco	19,567	24,808	28,827	32,381	36,200	39,259
Tunisia	6,458	8,219	9,564	10,664	11,712	12,529
Western Sahara	150	221	315	530	723	819
Southern Africa	72,391	93,960	118,804	139,142	159,834	181,605
Angola	7,834	10,534	13,930	18,493	24,169	30,652
Botswana	996	1,367	1,729	1,953	2,165	2,358
Lesotho	1,296	1,601	1,886	2,044	2,163	2,252
Malawi	6,215	9,446	11,623	15,037	19,150	23,550
Mozambique	12,137	13,544	18,194	22,635	26,809	31,117
Namibia	993	1,417	1,879	2,157	2,428	2,678
South Africa	29,074	36,577	45,398	49,278	51,281	53,236
Swaziland	615	865	1,058	1,160	1,218	1,264
Zambia	5,946	8,122	10,451	12,625	15,193	17,870
Zimbabwe	7,285	10,487	12,656	13,760	15,258	16,628

	Percentage Urban (%)						Percentage Rural (%)						Urban growth rate (%)				
	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	1980-1990	1990-2000	2000-2010	2010-2020	2020-2030
	<b>23.9</b>	<b>28.2</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>37.3</b>	<b>42.4</b>	<b>48.2</b>	<b>76.1</b>	<b>71.8</b>	<b>67.2</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>51.8</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>
	<b>27.9</b>	<b>32.0</b>	<b>35.9</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>44.6</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>72.1</b>	<b>68.0</b>	<b>64.1</b>	<b>60.1</b>	<b>55.4</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.1</b>
	14.4	17.7	21.1	24.6	29.0	34.8	85.6	82.3	78.9	75.4	71.0	65.2	2.1	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.8
	4.3	6.3	8.3	11.0	14.8	19.8	95.7	93.7	91.7	89.0	85.2	80.2	3.8	2.8	2.8	3.0	2.9
	23.2	27.9	28.1	28.2	30.8	36.5	76.8	72.1	71.9	71.8	69.2	63.5	1.8	0.1	0.0	0.9	1.7
	72.1	75.7	83.3	88.1	90.6	92.0	27.9	24.4	16.7	11.9	9.4	8.0	0.5	1.0	0.6	0.3	0.2
	14.4	15.8	17.8	21.6	27.5	34.4	85.6	84.2	82.2	78.4	72.5	65.6	0.9	1.2	1.9	2.4	2.2
	10.4	12.6	14.9	17.6	21.6	27.4	89.6	87.4	85.1	82.4	78.4	72.7	1.9	1.7	1.7	2.0	2.4
	15.7	18.2	19.7	22.2	26.6	33.0	84.3	81.8	80.3	77.8	73.4	67.0	1.5	0.8	1.2	1.8	2.2
	18.5	23.6	27.1	30.2	34.9	41.4	81.5	76.4	72.9	69.8	65.1	58.6	2.4	1.4	1.1	1.4	1.7
	42.4	43.9	42.7	42.6	45.4	51.1	57.6	56.1	57.3	57.4	54.6	48.9	0.3	-0.3	-0.0	0.6	1.2
	53.5	81.2	89.9	94.0	95.7	96.3	46.5	18.8	10.1	6.0	4.3	3.7	4.2	1.0	0.4	0.2	0.1
	4.7	5.4	13.8	18.9	22.6	28.3	95.3	94.6	86.2	81.1	77.4	71.7	1.4	9.4	3.1	1.8	2.2
	49.4	49.3	51.0	55.3	61.1	66.6	50.6	50.7	49.0	44.7	38.9	33.4	-0.0	0.3	0.8	1.0	0.9
	26.8	29.7	33.2	37.4	43.0	49.9	73.2	70.3	66.8	62.6	57.0	50.1	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.5
	20.0	26.6	36.1	45.2	53.2	60.7	80.0	73.4	63.9	54.8	46.8	39.3	2.9	3.1	2.2	1.6	1.3
	7.5	11.1	12.1	13.3	15.9	20.6	92.5	88.9	87.9	86.7	84.1	79.4	3.9	0.9	0.9	1.8	2.6
	14.6	18.9	22.3	26.4	31.8	38.7	85.4	81.1	77.7	73.6	68.2	61.3	2.6	1.7	1.7	1.9	2.0
	<b>44.4</b>	<b>48.5</b>	<b>51.1</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>56.8</b>	<b>61.3</b>	<b>55.6</b>	<b>51.5</b>	<b>48.9</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>43.2</b>	<b>38.7</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.8</b>
	43.5	52.1	59.8	66.5	71.9	76.2	56.5	47.9	40.2	33.5	28.1	23.8	1.8	1.4	1.1	0.8	0.6
	43.9	43.5	42.6	42.8	45.0	49.9	56.1	56.5	57.4	57.2	55.0	50.1	-0.1	-0.2	0.0	0.5	1.0
	70.1	75.7	76.4	77.9	80.3	82.9	29.9	24.3	23.6	22.1	19.7	17.1	0.8	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3
	27.4	39.7	40.0	41.4	45.4	51.7	72.6	60.3	60.0	58.6	54.6	48.3	3.7	0.1	0.3	0.9	1.3
	41.2	48.4	53.3	56.7	61.0	65.9	58.8	51.6	46.7	43.3	39.0	34.1	1.6	1.0	0.6	0.7	0.8
	50.6	57.9	63.4	67.3	71.2	75.2	49.4	42.1	36.6	32.7	28.8	24.8	1.3	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.5
	77.4	86.2	83.9	81.8	83.9	85.9	22.6	13.8	16.1	18.2	16.1	14.1	1.1	-0.3	-0.3	0.3	0.2
	<b>31.5</b>	<b>36.7</b>	<b>42.1</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>57.9</b>	<b>68.5</b>	<b>63.3</b>	<b>57.9</b>	<b>52.9</b>	<b>47.7</b>	<b>42.1</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.0</b>
	24.3	37.1	49.0	58.5	66.0	71.6	75.7	62.9	51.0	41.5	34.0	28.4	4.2	2.8	1.8	1.2	0.8
	16.5	41.9	53.2	61.1	67.6	72.7	83.5	58.1	46.8	38.9	32.4	27.3	9.3	2.4	1.4	1.0	0.7
	11.5	14.0	20.0	26.9	34.5	42.4	88.6	86.0	80.0	73.1	65.5	57.6	2.0	3.6	3.0	2.5	2.1
	9.1	11.6	15.2	19.8	25.5	32.4	91.0	88.4	84.8	80.2	74.5	67.6	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.4
	13.1	21.1	30.7	38.4	46.3	53.7	86.9	78.9	69.3	61.6	53.7	46.3	4.8	3.7	2.2	1.9	1.5
	25.1	27.7	32.4	38.0	44.4	51.5	74.9	72.3	67.6	62.0	55.6	48.5	1.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5
	48.4	52.0	56.9	61.7	66.6	71.3	51.6	48.0	43.1	38.3	33.4	28.7	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7
	17.8	22.9	23.3	25.5	30.3	37.0	82.2	77.1	76.7	74.5	69.7	63.0	2.5	0.2	0.9	1.7	2.0
	39.8	39.4	34.8	35.7	38.9	44.7	60.2	60.6	65.2	64.3	61.1	55.3	-0.1	-1.2	0.3	0.9	1.4
	22.4	29.0	33.8	38.3	43.9	50.7	77.6	71.0	66.2	61.7	56.1	49.3	2.6	1.5	1.2	1.4	1.4

Country	Total population ('000s)					
	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
Western Africa	180,161	241,905	320,785	415,163	523,642	641,105
Benin	3,709	5,179	7,227	9,872	12,874	16,076
Burkina Faso	6,827	8,871	11,882	16,097	21,034	26,505
Cameroon	9,078	12,239	15,861	19,662	23,352	26,892
Cape Verde	289	355	451	567	690	808
Central African Republic	2,329	3,008	3,864	4,592	5,434	6,214
Chad	4,611	6,113	8,465	11,715	15,336	19,799
Congo	1,802	2,422	3,203	4,011	4,907	5,824
Côte d'Ivoire	8,344	12,780	17,049	20,375	24,315	28,088
Democratic Republic of the Congo	28,071	37,942	50,689	69,010	93,375	122,734
Equatorial Guinea	213	340	431	545	693	854
Gabon	682	918	1,182	1,390	1,599	1,791
Gambia	671	962	1,384	1,845	2,301	2,770
Ghana	11,390	15,579	20,148	24,890	29,672	34,234
Guinea	4,575	6,033	8,203	10,028	12,966	16,170
Guinea-Bissau	793	1,017	1,370	1,853	2,513	3,358
Liberia	1,868	2,137	3,071	4,311	5,849	7,797
Mali	6,069	7,669	10,004	13,506	18,034	23,250
Niger	5,784	7,822	11,124	15,791	22,222	30,842
Nigeria	71,065	94,454	124,773	158,313	193,099	226,855
Saint Helena	5	5	6	7	7	8
Sao Tome and Principe	95	116	140	165	197	234
Senegal	5,871	7,896	10,334	13,311	16,442	19,554
Sierra Leone	3,236	4,087	4,521	6,185	7,747	9,592
Togo	2,784	3,961	5,403	7,122	8,984	10,856

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*

Note:

Percentage urban: Urban population as a percentage of the total population.

Average annual rate of change of the urban population: Average exponential rate of growth of the urban population over a given period. It is calculated as  $\ln(UPt/UPO)/n$  where  $n$  is the length of the period and  $UP$  is the urban population. It is expressed as a percentage.



	Percentage Urban (%)						Percentage Rural (%)						Urban growth rate (%)				
	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	1980-1990	1990-2000	2000-2010	2010-2020	2020-2030
	29.2	33.0	38.4	44.1	50.1	56.1	76.0	67.0	61.6	55.9	49.9	43.9	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.1
	27.3	34.5	38.3	42.0	47.2	53.7	72.7	65.5	61.7	58.0	52.8	46.3	2.3	1.0	0.9	1.2	1.3
	8.8	13.8	16.6	20.4	25.8	32.6	91.2	86.2	83.4	79.6	74.2	67.4	4.5	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.3
	31.9	40.7	49.9	58.4	65.5	71.0	68.1	59.3	50.1	41.6	34.5	29.0	2.4	2.0	1.6	1.1	0.8
	23.5	44.1	53.4	61.1	67.4	72.5	76.5	55.9	46.6	38.9	32.6	27.5	6.3	1.9	1.3	1.0	0.7
	33.9	36.8	37.6	38.9	42.5	48.4	66.1	63.2	62.4	61.1	57.5	51.6	0.8	0.2	0.3	0.9	1.3
	18.8	20.8	23.4	27.6	33.9	41.2	81.2	79.2	76.6	72.4	66.1	58.8	1.0	1.2	1.7	2.1	2.0
	47.9	54.3	58.3	62.1	66.3	70.9	52.1	45.7	41.7	37.9	33.7	29.1	1.3	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7
	36.9	39.7	43.5	50.1	56.6	62.8	63.1	60.3	56.5	49.9	43.4	37.2	0.7	0.9	1.4	1.2	1.0
	28.7	27.8	29.8	35.2	42.0	49.2	71.3	72.2	70.2	64.8	58.0	50.8	-0.3	0.7	1.7	1.8	1.6
	27.9	34.7	38.8	39.7	43.3	49.4	72.1	65.3	61.2	60.3	56.7	50.6	2.2	1.1	0.2	0.9	1.3
	54.7	69.1	80.1	86.0	88.8	90.6	45.3	30.9	19.9	14.0	11.2	9.4	2.3	1.5	0.7	0.3	0.2
	28.4	38.3	49.1	58.1	65.0	71.0	71.6	61.7	50.9	41.9	35.0	29.0	3.0	2.5	1.7	1.1	0.9
	31.2	36.4	44.0	51.5	58.4	64.7	68.8	63.6	56.0	48.5	41.6	35.3	1.5	1.9	1.6	1.3	1.0
	23.6	28.0	31.0	35.4	41.4	48.6	76.4	72.0	69.0	64.6	58.6	51.4	1.7	1.0	1.3	1.6	1.6
	17.6	28.1	29.7	30.0	32.8	38.6	82.4	71.9	70.3	70.0	67.2	61.4	4.7	0.6	0.1	0.9	1.6
	35.2	45.3	54.3	61.5	67.9	73.7	64.8	54.7	45.8	38.5	32.1	26.3	2.5	1.8	1.2	1.0	0.8
	18.5	23.3	27.9	33.3	40.0	47.4	81.5	76.7	72.1	66.7	60.0	52.6	2.3	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7
	13.4	15.4	16.2	16.7	18.9	23.7	86.6	84.6	83.8	83.3	81.1	76.3	1.4	0.5	0.3	1.2	2.3
	28.6	35.3	42.5	49.8	56.8	63.6	71.4	64.7	57.5	50.2	43.2	36.4	2.1	1.9	1.6	1.3	1.1
	44.0	41.6	39.2	39.5	43.4	49.8	56.0	58.4	60.8	60.5	56.6	50.2	-0.6	-0.6	0.1	0.9	1.4
	33.5	43.6	53.4	62.2	69.0	74.0	66.5	56.4	46.6	37.8	31.0	26.0	2.6	2.0	1.5	1.0	0.7
	35.8	39.0	40.6	42.9	47.1	53.2	64.2	61.0	59.4	57.1	52.9	46.8	0.9	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.2
	29.1	32.9	35.5	38.4	42.8	49.0	70.9	67.1	64.5	61.6	57.2	51.0	1.2	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.4
	24.7	30.1	36.5	43.4	50.5	57.3	75.3	69.9	63.5	56.6	49.5	42.7	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.3

TABLE 2: CITY POPULATION (2000-2025)

Country	City	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2025
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>							
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	1,175	1,791	2,493	3,453	5,083	6,156
Kenya	Mombasa	350	476	686	985	1,453	1,763
Kenya	Nairobi	862	1,380	2,233	3,363	4,881	5,871
Madagascar	Antananarivo	580	948	1,361	1,877	2,642	3,118
Mali	Bamako	489	746	1,110	1,708	2,633	3,214
Rwanda	Kigali	128	219	497	947	1,413	1,715
Somalia	Muqdisho (Mogadishu)	551	1,035	1,201	1,500	2,142	2,529
Sudan	Al-Khartum (Khartoum)	1,164	2,360	3,949	5,185	7,017	7,937
Uganda	Kampala	469	755	1,097	1,597	2,506	3,198
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	836	1,316	2,116	3,319	4,804	5,688
<b>NORTHERN AFRICA</b>							
Algeria	El Djazair (Algiers)	1,621	1,908	2,754	3,574	4,235	4,499
Algeria	Wahran (Oran)	537	647	706	852	1,030	1,105
Egypt	Al-Iskandariyah (Alexandria)	2,519	3,063	3,600	4,421	5,210	5,652
Egypt	Al-Qahirah (Cairo)	7,349	9,061	10,534	12,503	14,451	15,561
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Banghazi	376	612	945	1,271	1,505	1,590
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Tarabulus (Tripoli)	797	1,500	1,877	2,322	2,713	2,855
Morocco	Dar-el-Beida (Casablanca)	2,109	2,682	3,043	3,267	3,716	3,949
Morocco	Fès	510	685	870	1,060	1,243	1,332
Morocco	Marrakech	416	578	755	923	1,085	1,163
Morocco	Rabat	808	1,174	1,507	1,793	2,083	2,222
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>							
Angola	Huambo	153	326	578	1,035	1,567	1,824
Angola	Luanda	962	1,568	2,591	4,775	7,153	8,236
Mozambique	Maputo	550	776	1,096	1,621	2,235	2,560
South Africa	Durban	1,214	1,723	2,370	2,839	3,070	3,173
South Africa	Ekurhuleni (East Rand)	1,107	1,531	2,326	3,157	3,427	3,539
South Africa	Johannesburg	1,656	1,898	2,732	3,618	3,916	4,041
South Africa	Port Elizabeth	590	828	958	1,053	1,150	1,197
South Africa	Pretoria	688	911	1,084	1,409	1,544	1,604
South Africa	Vereeniging	451	743	897	1,127	1,236	1,286
Zambia	Lusaka	533	757	1,073	1,421	1,797	2,047
Zimbabwe	Harare	616	1,047	1,379	1,663	2,037	2,247
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>							
Benin	Cotonou	337	504	642	841	1,196	1,411
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	257	537	828	1,324	2,111	2,632
Cameroon	Douala	571	931	1,432	2,108	2,721	2,996
Cameroon	Yaoundé	415	754	1,192	1,787	2,312	2,549
Chad	N'Djamena	324	477	711	1,127	1,753	2,172
Congo	Brazzaville	446	704	986	1,505	1,938	2,150
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	1,384	2,102	3,032	4,175	5,432	6,031
Dem. Republic Of The Congo	Kananga	330	372	557	879	1,383	1,698
Dem. Republic Of The Congo	Kinshasa	2,053	3,448	5,485	9,052	13,875	16,762

Country	City	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2025
Dem. Republic Of The Congo	Lubumbashi	482	692	1,004	1,544	2,406	2,943
Dem. Republic Of The Congo	Mbuji-Mayi	407	613	932	1,489	2,330	2,851
Ghana	Accra	863	1,197	1,674	2,332	3,041	3,382
Ghana	Kumasi	452	696	1,187	1,826	2,393	2,667
Guinea	Conakry	658	895	1,219	1,645	2,393	2,856
Liberia	Monrovia	325	1,042	836	1,185	1,753	2,083
Niger	Niamey	274	432	680	1,027	1,580	2,028
Nigeria	Abuja	125	330	832	1,994	2,971	3,358
Nigeria	Benin City	335	689	975	1,302	1,755	1,991
Nigeria	Ibadan	1,186	1,739	2,236	2,835	3,752	4,234
Nigeria	Ilorin	389	515	653	835	1,123	1,277
Nigeria	Kaduna	628	961	1,220	1,560	2,083	2,360
Nigeria	Kano	1,350	2,095	2,658	3,393	4,487	5,056
Nigeria	Lagos	2,572	4,764	7,233	10,572	14,134	15,796
Nigeria	Maiduguri	416	598	758	969	1,301	1,479
Nigeria	Ogbomosho	485	622	798	1,031	1,386	1,575
Nigeria	Port Harcourt	482	680	863	1,104	1,479	1,680
Nigeria	Zaria	423	592	752	963	1,293	1,470
Senegal	Dakar	957	1,405	2,029	2,856	3,726	4,225
Sierra Leone	Freetown	361	529	688	894	1,200	1,406
Togo	Lomé	344	619	1,023	1,669	2,410	2,791

SOURCE: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision

TABLE 3: CITY POPULATION AND GROWTH RATE

Country	City*	Total Pop. ('000s) 2008	City Growth Rate**	Total Pop. ('000s) 2020
Algeria	El Djazair (Algiers)	3,428	2.22	4,235
Angola	Luanda	4,252	6.02	7,153
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	1,205	4.75	2,111
Cameroon	Douala	1,975	3.54	2,721
Cameroon	Yaoundé	1,671	3.65	2,312
Chad	N'Djaména	1,033	4.46	1,753
Congo	Brazzaville	1,406	4.26	1,938
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	3,925	3.16	5,432
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Kinshasa	8,232	4.84	13,875
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Lubumbashi	1,412	4.33	2,406
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Mbuji-Mayi	1,356	4.64	2,330
Egypt	Al-Iskandariyah (Alexandria)	4,251	2.03	5,210
Egypt	Al-Qahirah (Cairo)	12,098	1.70	14,451
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	3,210	3.48	5,083
Ghana	Accra	2,191	3.23	3,041
Ghana	Kumasi	1,708	3.69	2,393
Guinea	Conakry	1,541	3.09	2,393
Kenya	Nairobi	3,125	3.76	4,881
Liberia	Monrovia	1,087	0.77	1,753
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Banghazi	1,212	2.65	1,505
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Tarabulus (Tripoli)	2,234	2.04	2,713
Madagascar	Antananarivo	1,754	3.33	2,642
Mali	Bamako	1,562	4.44	2,633
Morocco	Dar-el-Beida (Casablanca)	3,206	0.80	3,716
Morocco	Fès	1,022	1.92	1,243

Country	City*	Total Pop. ('000s) 2008	City Growth Rate**	Total Pop. ('000s) 2020
Morocco	Rabat	1,735	1.70	2,083
Mozambique	Maputo	1,504	3.90	2,235
Nigeria	Abuja	1,716	8.32	2,971
Nigeria	Benin City	1,225	2.94	1,755
Nigeria	Ibadan	2,692	2.45	3,752
Nigeria	Kaduna	1,479	2.53	2,083
Nigeria	Kano	3,219	2.51	4,487
Nigeria	Lagos	9,830	3.74	14,134
Nigeria	Port Harcourt	1,046	2.54	1,479
Senegal	Dakar	2,689	3.20	3,726
Somalia	Muqdisho (Mogadishu)	1,220	2.60	2,142
South Africa	Cape Town	3,269	1.17	3,627
South Africa	Durban	2,770	1.68	3,070
South Africa	Ekurhuleni (East Rand)	3,054	1.49	3,427
South Africa	Johannesburg	3,507	2.26	3,916
South Africa	Port Elizabeth	1,032	2.10	1,150
South Africa	Pretoria	1,365	1.02	1,544
South Africa	Vereeniging	1,094	2.04	1,236
Sudan	Al-Khartoum (Khartoum)	4,886	1.83	7,017
Togo	Lomé	1,523	2.75	2,410
Uganda	Kampala	1,476	4.77	2,506
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	3,058	4.29	4,804
Zambia	Lusaka	1,359	2.39	1,797
Zimbabwe	Harare	1,601	1.87	2,037

SOURCE: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/ Population Division World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.

\*Urban Agglomeration

\*\* Urban Agglomeration and for years 2005-2010

TABLE 4: SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF SLUM- NON SLUM HOUSEHOLDS

Country	Year	Type of household	Percentage	Relative distribution of household by shelter deprivation <sup>1</sup>				Absolute distribution of household by shelter deprivation					Cumulative distribution of household by deprivation			
				Less than 25% of household having at least one deprivation	26-50% of household having at least one deprivation	51-75% of household having at least one deprivation	75%+ of household having at least one deprivation	Less than 25% of household having at least one deprivation	26-50% of household having at least one deprivation	51-75% of household having at least one deprivation	75%+ of household having at least one deprivation	Total	25%+ of household having at least one deprivation	50%+ of household having at least one deprivation	75%+ of household having at least one deprivation	
<b>EASTERN AFRICA</b>																
Comoros	1996	Non-slum	24.9	11.8	13.7	45.3	29.2	2.9	3.4	11.3	7.3	24.9	21.9	18.5	7.3	
	1996	Slum	75.1	2.5	3.5	28.8	65.2	1.9	2.6	21.6	49.0	75.1	73.3	70.6	49.0	
	1996							4.8	6.0	32.9	56.3	100.0	95.2	89.2	56.3	
Ethiopia	2000	Non-slum	1.9			9.1	90.9	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	
	2000	Slum	98.1			0.4	99.6	0.0	0.0	0.4	97.7	98.1	98.1	98.1	97.7	
	2000							0.0	0.0	0.6	99.4	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.4	
Kenya	2003	Non-slum	35.9	44.6	26.6	17.2	11.6	16.0	9.5	6.2	4.2	35.9	19.9	10.3	4.2	
	2003	Slum	64.1	4.5	8.5	20.0	67.0	2.9	5.4	12.8	43.0	64.1	61.2	55.8	43.0	
	2003							18.9	15.0	19.0	47.1	100.0	81.1	66.1	47.1	
Madagascar	1997	Non-slum	6.6	7.8	8.6	15.5	68.1	0.5	0.6	1.0	4.5	6.6	6.1	5.5	4.5	
	1997	Slum	93.4	0.1	0.3	2.4	97.3	0.1	0.3	2.2	90.9	93.4	93.4	93.1	90.9	
	1997							0.6	0.9	3.2	95.4	100.0	99.4	98.6	95.4	
Rwanda*	2000	Non-slum	30.8	12.0	25.7	43.6	18.7	3.7	7.9	13.4	5.8	30.8	27.1	19.2	5.8	
	2000	Slum	69.2	0.9	8.7	35.8	54.6	0.6	6.1	24.8	37.8	69.2	68.7	62.6	37.8	
	2000							4.3	13.9	38.2	43.6	100.0	95.7	81.8	43.6	
Uganda*	2001	Non-slum	15.1	27.0	9.0	25.3	38.8	4.1	1.4	3.8	5.8	15.1	11.0	9.7	5.8	
	2001	Slum	84.9	1.3	0.8	9.3	88.6	1.1	0.7	7.9	75.2	84.9	83.8	83.1	75.2	
	2001							5.2	2.0	11.7	81.1	100.0	94.8	92.8	81.1	
United Republic of Tanzania	2004	Non-slum	15.8	12.6	30.5	15.3	41.7	2.0	4.8	2.4	6.6	15.8	13.8	9.0	6.6	
	2004	Slum	84.2	1.5	3.6	4.9	90.1	1.2	3.0	4.1	75.8	84.2	83.0	79.9	75.8	
	2004							3.2	7.8	6.5	82.4	100.0	96.8	88.9	82.4	
<b>NORTHERN AFRICA</b>																
Egypt	2003	Non-slum	68.4	76.0	13.9	8.3	1.8	52.0	9.5	5.7	1.2	68.4	16.4	6.9	1.2	
	2003	Slum	31.6	18.0	17.4	27.3	37.4	5.7	5.5	8.6	11.8	31.6	25.9	20.4	11.8	
	2003							57.7	15.0	14.3	13.0	100.0	42.3	27.3	13.0	
Morocco	2004	Non-slum	79.9	78.3	20.2	1.5	0.0	62.6	16.1	1.2	0.0	79.9	17.3	1.2	0.0	
	2004	Slum	20.1	40.9	43.2	8.8	7.1	8.2	8.7	1.8	1.4	20.1	11.9	3.2	1.4	
	2004							70.8	24.8	2.9	1.5	100.0	29.2	4.4	1.5	
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>																
Malawi*	2000	Non-slum	17.4	60.9	12.7	6.5	19.8	10.6	2.2	1.1	3.4	17.4	6.8	4.6	3.4	
	2000	Slum	82.6	0.2	2.1	3.5	94.2	0.2	1.7	2.9	77.8	82.6	82.5	80.7	77.8	
	2000							10.8	4.0	4.0	81.3	100.0	89.2	85.3	81.3	
Mozambique	2003	Non-slum	6.4	34.1	16.4	9.1	40.5	2.2	1.0	0.6	2.6	6.4	4.2	3.2	2.6	
	2003	Slum	93.6	0.4	0.7	1.1	97.8	0.4	0.6	1.0	91.5	93.6	93.2	92.6	91.5	
	2003							2.6	1.7	1.6	94.1	100.0	97.4	95.7	94.1	
Namibia	2000	Non-slum	66.1	74.6	18.9	4.0	2.5	49.3	12.5	2.7	1.7	66.1	16.8	4.3	1.7	
	2000	Slum	33.9	16.5	16.9	14.1	52.4	5.6	5.7	4.8	17.8	33.9	28.3	22.6	17.8	
	2000							54.9	18.2	7.5	19.4	100.0	45.1	26.9	19.4	

Country	Year	Type of household	Percentage	Less than 25% of household having at least one deprivation	26-50% of household having at least one deprivation	51-75% of household having at least one deprivation	75%+ of household having at least one deprivation	Less than 25% of household having at least one deprivation	26-50% of household having at least one deprivation	51-75% of household having at least one deprivation	75%+ of household having at least one deprivation	Total	25%+ of household having at least one deprivation	50%+ of household having at least one deprivation	75%+ of household having at least one deprivation
South Africa	1998	Non-slum	68.6	81.7	13.6	3.8	0.9	56.1	9.3	2.6	0.6	68.6	12.5	3.2	0.6
	1998	Slum	31.4	15.3	15.1	12.2	57.4	4.8	4.7	3.8	18.0	31.4	26.6	21.8	18.0
	1998							60.9	14.0	6.4	18.6	100.0	39.1	25.1	18.6
Zambia*	2002	Non-slum	41.6	74.5	9.5	10.5	5.5	31.0	3.9	4.4	2.3	41.6	10.6	6.7	2.3
	2002	Slum	58.4	3.7	3.8	10.5	82.0	2.2	2.2	6.1	47.9	58.4	56.2	54.0	47.9
	2002							33.2	6.2	10.5	50.2	100.0	66.8	60.7	50.2
Zimbabwe*	1999	Non-slum	93.4	93.4	5.1	1.5		87.2	4.7	1.4	0.0	93.4	6.2	1.4	0.0
	1999	Slum	6.6	38.1	35.6	26.3		2.5	2.4	1.7	0.0	6.6	4.1	1.7	0.0
	1999							89.7	7.1	3.2	0.0	100.0	10.3	3.2	0.0
<b>WESTERN AFRICA</b>															
Benin*	2001	Non-slum	34.7	66.5	7.4	18.0	8.1	23.1	2.6	6.2	2.8	34.7	11.6	9.0	2.8
	2001	Slum	65.3	3.9	2.1	18.0	76.0	2.6	1.4	11.7	49.6	65.3	62.7	61.3	49.6
	2001							25.6	4.0	18.0	52.4	100.0	74.4	70.4	52.4
Burkina Faso*	2003	Non-slum	21.1		35.1	39.4	25.4	0.0	7.4	8.3	5.4	21.1	21.1	13.7	5.4
	2003	Slum	78.9		7.6	21.6	70.8	0.0	6.0	17.0	55.9	78.9	78.9	72.9	55.9
	2003							0.0	13.4	25.4	61.3	100.0	100.0	86.6	61.3
Cameroon	2004	Non-slum	42.7	21.8	43.8	27.9	6.5	9.3	18.7	11.9	2.8	42.7	33.4	14.7	2.8
	2004	Slum	57.3	4.6	21.0	32.5	41.8	2.6	12.0	18.6	24.0	57.3	54.6	42.6	24.0
	2004							11.9	30.8	30.5	26.8	100.0	88.1	57.3	26.8
CAR	1994	Non-slum	2.8	40.0			60.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.7	2.8	1.7	1.7	1.7
	1994	Slum	97.2	0.7			99.3	0.7	0.0	0.0	96.6	97.2	96.6	96.6	96.6
	1994							1.8	0.0	0.0	98.2	100.0	98.2	98.2	98.2
Chad	2004	Non-slum	4.7			11.8	88.2	0.0	0.0	0.6	4.2	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.2
	2004	Slum	95.3			1.0	99.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	94.3	95.3	95.3	95.3	94.3
	2004							0.0	0.0	1.5	98.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.5
Côte d'Ivoire	1999	Non-slum	34.9	27.4	27.8	32.4	12.4	9.6	9.7	11.3	4.3	34.9	25.3	15.6	4.3
	1999	Slum	65.1	3.4	8.9	29.5	58.2	2.2	5.8	19.2	37.9	65.1	62.9	57.1	37.9
	1999							11.8	15.5	30.5	42.2	100.0	88.2	72.7	42.2
Gabon	2000	Non-slum	49.3	26.9	41.5	26.7	5.0	13.3	20.5	13.1	2.4	49.3	36.1	15.6	2.4
	2000	Slum	50.7	5.9	23.1	38.2	32.7	3.0	11.7	19.4	16.6	50.7	47.7	36.0	16.6
	2000							16.3	32.2	32.5	19.0	100.0	83.7	51.6	19.0
Ghana	2003	Non-slum	52.7	41.5	35.3	18.9	4.4	21.9	18.6	10.0	2.3	52.7	30.8	12.3	2.3
	2003	Slum	47.3	6.6	23.9	31.4	38.1	3.1	11.3	14.8	18.0	47.3	44.2	32.9	18.0
	2003							25.0	29.9	24.8	20.3	100.0	75.0	45.1	20.3
Guinea	1999	Non-slum	6.0	3.4	9.2	27.6	59.8	0.2	0.6	1.7	3.6	6.0	5.8	5.2	3.6
	1999	Slum	94.0	0.6	0.2	3.7	95.5	0.6	0.2	3.4	89.8	94.0	93.5	93.3	89.8
	1999							0.8	0.8	5.1	93.4	100.0	99.2	98.5	93.4
Mali*	2001	Non-slum	20.4	26.2	27.7	30.1	16.1	5.4	5.6	6.1	3.3	20.4	15.1	9.4	3.3
	2001	Slum	79.6	1.3	5.4	12.7	80.5	1.1	4.3	10.1	64.1	79.6	78.5	74.2	64.1
	2001							6.4	10.0	16.3	67.4	100.0	93.6	83.6	67.4

Country	Year	Type of household	Percentage	Less than 25% of household having at least one deprivation	26-50% of household having at least one deprivation	51-75% of household having at least one deprivation	75%+ of household having at least one deprivation	Less than 25% of household having at least one deprivation	26-50% of household having at least one deprivation	51-75% of household having at least one deprivation	75%+ of household having at least one deprivation	Total	25%+ of household having at least one deprivation	50%+ of household having at least one deprivation	75%+ of household having at least one deprivation
Niger	1998	Non-slum	3.3			36.1	63.9	0.0	0.0	1.2	2.1	3.3	3.3	3.3	2.1
	1998	Slum	96.7			2.0	98.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	94.7	96.7	96.7	96.7	94.7
	1998							0.0	0.0	3.2	96.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	96.8
Nigeria	2003	Non-slum	21.6	27.8	19.8	28.3	24.1	6.0	4.3	6.1	5.2	21.6	15.6	11.3	5.2
	2003	Slum	78.4	1.7	3.1	12.8	82.4	1.3	2.5	10.0	64.6	78.4	77.1	74.6	64.6
	2003							7.3	6.7	16.2	69.8	100.0	92.7	86.0	69.8
Senegal	1997	Non-slum	19.0	48.8	17.0	8.0	26.3	9.3	3.2	1.5	5.0	19.0	9.7	6.5	5.0
	1997	Slum	81.0	1.4	2.0	3.8	92.8	1.1	1.7	3.1	75.2	81.0	79.9	78.3	75.2
	1997							10.4	4.9	4.6	80.2	100.0	89.6	84.8	80.2
Togo	1998	Non-slum	5.8	8.3		11.8	79.9	0.5	0.0	0.7	4.6	5.8	5.3	5.3	4.6
	1998	Slum	94.2	1.6		1.1	97.3	1.5	0.0	1.1	91.7	94.2	92.8	92.8	91.7
	1998							2.0	0.0	1.8	96.3	100.0	98.0	98.0	96.3

\* Data does not include overcrowding

<sup>1</sup> Shelter deprivation: lack of either improved water, improved sanitation, durable housing or sufficient living area.



TABLE 5: SLUM COMPONENTS

Proportion of households with access to improved water, improved sanitation, finished floor material and sufficient living area						
Country	City	Year	Improved water	Improved sanitation	Finished main floor material	Sufficient living area
Angola	Luanda	2000	67.3	68.8	67.6	58.4
Benin	Cotonou	1996	99.0	71.0	98.1	77.7
Benin	Cotonou	2001	100.0	80.9	97.5	
Benin	Cotonou	2006	99.4	59.9	97.3	79.2
Benin	Djougou	1996	84.3	45.1	71.2	79.7
Benin	Djougou	2001	82.9	31.1	79.3	
Benin	Djougou	2006	90.6	52.3	76.5	75.8
Benin	Porto Novo	1996	57.7	52.4	79.4	78.6
Benin	Porto Novo	2001	72.5	50.0	86.7	
Benin	Porto Novo	2006	77.0	69.1	94.3	73.0
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	1992	74.8	49.2	91.1	82.9
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	1999	88.5	46.8	95.0	83.9
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	2003	98.3	67.1	96.5	
Cameroon	Douala	1991	80.5	27.2	93.2	84.2
Cameroon	Douala	1998	77.2	80.8	92.7	91.2
Cameroon	Douala	2004	86.9	75.5	88.1	90.4
Cameroon	Yaounde	1991	86.3	31.6	91.3	82.8
Cameroon	Yaounde	1998	93.7	80.0	92.4	85.4
Cameroon	Yaounde	2004	97.9	81.8	93.2	87.6
Central African Republic	Bangui	1994	74.9	49.4	45.0	83.4
Central African Republic	Bangui	2000	95.0	69.4		
Chad	N'Djamena	1997	30.6	70.5	20.9	69.0
Chad	N'Djamena	2004	60.6	67.5	25.5	71.9
Comoros	Moroni	1996	95.7	67.0	72.4	88.1
Congo	Brazzaville	2005	96.8	68.4	94.4	76.8
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	1994	98.7	84.5	99.3	67.5
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	1998	97.9	78.5	98.9	72.7
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	2005	98.6	77.8	97.9	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Kinshasa	2000	66.4	82.7	84.5	76.4
Egypt	Alexandria	1992	99.5	85.9	99.0	76.3
Egypt	Alexandria	1995	99.7	79.6	95.7	80.5
Egypt	Alexandria	2000	99.7	88.8	98.6	95.2
Egypt	Alexandria	2003	99.8	93.9	98.5	98.1
Egypt	Alexandria	2005	99.9	94.5	100.0	
Egypt	Assiut	1992	92.6	58.1	82.4	64.7
Egypt	Assiut	1995	94.7	63.2	71.2	77.0
Egypt	Assiut	2000	100.0	63.2	87.6	94.0
Egypt	Assiut	2003	100.0	62.0	94.2	95.6
Egypt	Assiut	2005	100.0	70.4	93.9	
Egypt	Aswan	1992	96.7	62.3	77.8	60.4
Egypt	Aswan	1995	95.5	62.3	68.6	71.4
Egypt	Aswan	2000	100.0	73.7	85.0	93.0
Egypt	Aswan	2003	100.0	68.5	83.1	96.2

Country	City	Year	Improved water	Improved sanitation	Finished main floor material	Sufficient living area
Egypt	Aswan	2005	99.9	70.2	90.6	
Egypt	Beni Suef	1992	88.1	51.3	56.9	69.4
Egypt	Beni Suef	1995	88.9	57.6	77.8	68.7
Egypt	Beni Suef	2000	99.1	68.4	90.6	94.9
Egypt	Beni Suef	2003	100.0	80.6	80.6	97.2
Egypt	Beni Suef	2005	100.0	72.3	90.2	
Egypt	Cairo	1992	99.5	78.3	99.1	75.1
Egypt	Cairo	1995	98.6	78.0	98.2	82.9
Egypt	Cairo	2000	100.0	84.7	98.7	94.3
Egypt	Cairo	2003	99.9	89.2	98.9	96.0
Egypt	Cairo	2005	99.6	88.9	99.6	
Egypt	Port Said	1992	96.5	89.5	97.3	80.9
Egypt	Port Said	1995	98.7	90.3	99.6	83.2
Egypt	Port Said	2000	96.5	94.8	98.1	97.4
Egypt	Port Said	2003	100.0	95.3	99.3	98.9
Egypt	Port Said	2005	97.6	95.8	97.0	
Egypt	Suez	1992	99.5	83.9	99.1	79.8
Egypt	Suez	1995	99.1	81.5	98.7	80.4
Egypt	Suez	2000	99.7	87.4	97.8	98.6
Egypt	Suez	2003	100.0	91.6	99.7	99.7
Egypt	Suez	2005	100.0	90.3	99.9	
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	2000	98.4	48.4	66.7	64.1
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	2005	99.9	71.8	83.4	65.0
Ethiopia	Nazret	2000	81.9	41.1	29.8	64.6
Ethiopia	Nazret	2005	99.1	51.1	52.4	67.5
Equatorial Guinea	Malabo	2000	38.4	76.1	85.1	76.6
Gabon	Libreville	2000	99.7	82.2	97.0	85.7
Gambia	Banjul	2000	100.0	96.1	98.0	79.2
Ghana	Accra	1993	99.8	67.5	99.5	77.6
Ghana	Accra	1999	97.7	70.9	99.7	80.3
Ghana	Accra	2003	88.5	81.9	98.8	
Guinea	Conakry	1999	82.7	84.9	98.7	70.7
Guinea	Conakry	2005	96.4	86.5	98.7	
Guinea-Bissau	Bafata	2000	96.1	41.7	36.8	79.4
Guinea-Bissau	Gabu	2000	100.0	47.1	47.7	78.1
Kenya	Mombasa	1993	83.0	70.3	76.0	82.1
Kenya	Mombasa	1998	73.9	61.9	79.8	79.6
Kenya	Mombasa	2003	89.1	66.1	83.3	81.7
Kenya	Nairobi	1993	92.2	75.8	75.2	77.9
Kenya	Nairobi	1998	92.1	84.5	82.9	78.0
Kenya	Nairobi	2003	93.3	81.5	87.4	81.7
Lesotho	Maseru	2000	98.3	69.1	84.9	78.2
Lesotho	Maseru	2004	90.3	73.0	94.8	
Madagascar	Antananarivo	1997	80.1	49.9	53.5	57.7
Madagascar	Antananarivo	2004	85.7	55.5	69.7	
Malawi	Lilongwe	1992	86.3	53.6	54.5	78.0

Country	City	Year	Improved water	Improved sanitation	Finished main floor material	Sufficient living area
Malawi	Lilongwe	2000	92.1	56.9	63.9	
Malawi	Lilongwe	2004	92.9	52.3	65.1	83.1
Mali	Bamako	1996	70.5	61.8	89.0	75.5
Mali	Bamako	2001	89.4	73.6	74.1	
Mauritania	Nouakchott	2001	94.4	56.2	62.9	49.2
Morocco	Casablanca	1992	99.1	93.4	98.8	72.6
Morocco	Casablanca	2004	100.0	98.9	100.0	84.9
Morocco	Fes	1992	100.0	100.0	98.3	67.2
Morocco	Fes	2004	99.6	99.6	99.6	73.8
Morocco	Maknes	1992	99.2	99.2	93.9	61.4
Morocco	Maknes	2004	99.2	97.0	95.4	74.2
Morocco	Marrakech	1992	100.0	94.1	97.3	71.8
Morocco	Marrakech	2004	99.7	99.7	99.5	79.2
Morocco	Rabat	1992	96.5	92.5	95.2	79.6
Morocco	Rabat	2004	99.9	99.7	97.9	88.2
Morocco	Tangier	1992	95.9	100.0	97.1	64.9
Morocco	Tangier	2004	95.5	100.0	99.8	84.3
Mozambique	Maputo	1997	87.4	43.1	83.2	77.3
Mozambique	Maputo	2003	82.8	47.4	88.6	84.6
Namibia	Windhoek	1992	98.0	92.4	94.9	79.9
Namibia	Windhoek	2000	97.0	79.2	86.6	83.3
Niger	Niamey	1992	52.8	78.4	82.1	71.0
Niger	Niamey	1998	63.5	81.6	86.8	72.8
Niger	Niamey	2006	94.7	65.5	72.4	66.2
Nigeria	Abuja	1999	73.9	65.2	100.0	60.9
Nigeria	Abuja	2003	81.8	63.6	100.0	68.2
Nigeria	Akure	1999	94.1	29.4	94.1	88.2
Nigeria	Akure	2003	63.5	44.4	100.0	72.7
Nigeria	Damaturu	1999	61.5	53.8	76.9	61.5
Nigeria	Damaturu	2003	49.9	57.1	42.0	64.5
Nigeria	Efon Alaiye	1999	32.8	35.6	82.3	91.3
Nigeria	Efon Alaiye	2003	18.6	44.1	96.9	70.0
Nigeria	Ibadan	1999	93.3	13.3	66.7	80.0
Nigeria	Ibadan	2003	27.6	72.3	96.9	69.9
Nigeria	Kano	1999	54.8	62.8	76.4	69.7
Nigeria	Kano	2003	65.7	62.3	93.5	80.0
Nigeria	Lagos	1999	88.6	81.7	96.2	60.5
Nigeria	Lagos	2003	88.2	76.9	99.8	60.8
Nigeria	Ogbomosho	1999	62.3	42.0	95.9	79.3
Nigeria	Ogbomosho	2003	68.1	35.2	94.4	84.9
Nigeria	Owo	1999	34.4	78.0	100.0	83.2
Nigeria	Owo	2003	50.0		100.0	100.0
Nigeria	Oyo	1999	35.0	67.7	95.8	84.4
Nigeria	Oyo	2003	82.4	11.8	100.0	94.1
Nigeria	Zaria	1999	74.4	60.4	98.8	59.3
Nigeria	Zaria	2003	78.0	58.0	98.7	66.3

Country	City	Year	Improved water	Improved sanitation	Finished main floor material	Sufficient living area
Rwanda	Kigali	1992	74.5	50.8	64.6	86.0
Rwanda	Kigali	2000	81.8	71.3	71.8	
Rwanda	Kigali	2005	68.9	81.5	67.6	
Senegal	Dakar	1993	95.8	65.1	98.7	65.6
Senegal	Dakar	1997	95.5	70.0	99.8	65.8
Senegal	Dakar	2005	98.3	90.9	95.7	
South Africa	CapeTown	1998	95.8	82.4	93.7	90.9
South Africa	Durban	1998	98.4	90.3	97.1	90.0
South Africa	Port Elizabeth	1998	97.2	70.6	83.4	79.2
South Africa	Pretoria	1998	100.0	68.8	87.5	75.0
South Africa	West Rand	1998	99.4	84.8	83.4	86.9
Swaziland	Manzini	2000	86.3	73.7	96.1	91.5
Swaziland	Manzini	2006	92.8	78.6	99.4	87.1
Togo	Lome	1998	88.6	65.7	98.0	77.0
Togo	Lome	2000	84.2	90.0	93.2	84.7
United Republic of Tanzania	Arusha	1992	92.9	47.1	54.1	66.5
United Republic of Tanzania	Arusha	1996	96.1	45.0	61.2	77.5
United Republic of Tanzania	Arusha	1999	97.8	44.0	51.5	
United Republic of Tanzania	Arusha	2004	94.6	51.5	62.2	77.7
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	1992	90.5	47.8	80.0	77.1
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	1996	85.4	54.1	87.9	83.4
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	1999	90.1	57.5	86.5	
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	2004	81.1	58.5	93.8	84.1
Uganda	Kampala	1995	60.4	57.4	77.2	62.0
Uganda	Kampala	2001	94.2	58.2	86.3	
Uganda	Kampala	2006	92.6	80.2	87.7	
Zambia	Chingola	1992	93.7	91.9	98.0	63.5
Zambia	Chingola	1996	76.6	84.4	98.4	76.6
Zambia	Chingola	2002	89.1	92.6	92.6	
Zambia	Lusaka	1992	97.1	68.2	92.2	69.2
Zambia	Lusaka	1996	93.9	67.6	96.8	75.1
Zambia	Lusaka	2002	97.2	66.4	97.5	
Zambia	Ndola	1992	90.0	77.1	88.2	68.9
Zambia	Ndola	1996	92.3	82.2	92.5	72.6
Zambia	Ndola	2002	88.0	83.2	83.5	
Zimbabwe	Harare	1994	98.7	97.8	94.9	83.8
Zimbabwe	Harare	1999	99.6	97.5	96.5	
Zimbabwe	Harare	2005	99.2	98.4	99.2	82.5

TABLE 6: CONNECTION TO SERVICES

Proportion of households with connection to piped water, sewerage, electricity and telephone						
Country	City	Year	Piped water on premises	Flush or Pour flush toilet/latrine	Telephone	Electricity
Angola	Luanda	2000	18.7	50.5		
Benin	Cotonou	1996	98.1			56.6
Benin	Cotonou	2001	99.7	12.9	12.7	73.7
Benin	Cotonou	2006	97.1	18.9	10.9	82.1
Benin	Djougou	1996	65.4			23.5
Benin	Djougou	2001	43.0	0.5	3.6	40.9
Benin	Djougou	2006	62.6	1.8	3.9	47.4
Benin	Porto Novo	1996	40.3			29.4
Benin	Porto Novo	2001	54.0	8.4	13.6	58.1
Benin	Porto Novo	2006	64.1	11.8	8.1	66.9
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	1992	28.4	5.5		31.5
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	1999	27.1	6.4	13.7	41.3
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	2003	36.4	14.7	25.1	56.7
Cameroon	Douala	1991	27.7	18.9		82.4
Cameroon	Douala	1998	32.2	26.0	7.6	93.8
Cameroon	Douala	2004	45.8	24.2	5.6	95.9
Cameroon	Yaounde	1991	76.8	23.9		87.4
Cameroon	Yaounde	1998	59.9	22.0	11.5	96.3
Cameroon	Yaounde	2004	46.8	20.6	5.6	96.2
Central African Republic	Bangui	1994	9.9	5.5	5.8	15.3
Central African Republic	Bangui	2000	11.3	4.3		
Chad	N'Djamena	1997	21.0	2.1	2.8	17.2
Chad	N'Djamena	2004	27.6	10.3	6.5	29.2
Comoros	Moroni	1996	22.2	11.4	13.0	55.1
Congo	Brazzaville	2005	89.1	9.8	2.6	59.2
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	1994	63.7	40.2		73.5
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	1998	70.9	34.4	13.2	90.6
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	2005	83.3	42.7	49.5	95.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Kinshasa	2000	64.0	55.2		
Egypt	Alexandria	1992	96.3	67.2		98.4
Egypt	Alexandria	1995	94.2	60.7		99.8
Egypt	Alexandria	2000	98.3	77.7	44.0	99.4
Egypt	Alexandria	2003	99.5	87.2	65.7	99.8
Egypt	Alexandria	2005	98.7	88.2	71.5	99.9
Egypt	Assiut	1992	86.8	27.9		96.3
Egypt	Assiut	1995	91.7	24.4		96.1
Egypt	Assiut	2000	95.9	22.2	19.5	98.5
Egypt	Assiut	2003	97.8	29.2	44.5	99.3
Egypt	Assiut	2005	99.5	40.8	63.3	99.5
Egypt	Aswan	1992	84.0	26.4		97.2
Egypt	Aswan	1995	88.6	18.2		98.2
Egypt	Aswan	2000	96.2	39.0	45.5	99.1
Egypt	Aswan	2003	98.5	30.0	56.9	100.0

Country	City	Year	Piped water on premises	Flush or Pour flush toilet/latrine	Telephone	Electricity
Egypt	Aswan	2005	99.0	39.6	63.7	100.0
Egypt	Beni Suef	1992	53.1	12.5		94.4
Egypt	Beni Suef	1995	83.8	24.2		96.0
Egypt	Beni Suef	2000	95.7	45.3	41.9	98.3
Egypt	Beni Suef	2003	91.7	52.8	56.9	100.0
Egypt	Beni Suef	2005	95.1	41.7	62.3	99.3
Egypt	Cairo	1992	94.5	52.1		99.1
Egypt	Cairo	1995	94.8	54.6		99.0
Egypt	Cairo	2000	98.3	66.9	54.1	99.9
Egypt	Cairo	2003	99.2	75.8	73.4	99.9
Egypt	Cairo	2005	98.3	77.7	82.4	99.7
Egypt	Port Said	1992	95.1	77.8		96.7
Egypt	Port Said	1995	96.5	80.4		99.3
Egypt	Port Said	2000	96.1	88.6	63.6	99.8
Egypt	Port Said	2003	100.0	89.9	78.3	100.0
Egypt	Port Said	2005	97.0	87.7	77.0	99.9
Egypt	Suez	1992	96.9	64.4		99.5
Egypt	Suez	1995	94.6	63.3		99.3
Egypt	Suez	2000	99.2	72.5	46.1	99.5
Egypt	Suez	2003	99.1	81.2	66.6	99.7
Egypt	Suez	2005	98.5	79.7	79.0	100.0
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	2000	60.8	4.2	20.6	97.1
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	2005	68.8	8.9	46.1	96.9
Ethiopia	Nazret	2000	31.7		13.8	92.4
Ethiopia	Nazret	2005	43.0	11.0	33.8	95.5
Equatorial Guinea	Malabo	2000	16.9	45.1		
Gabon	Libreville	2000	58.2	35.0	20.4	95.5
Gambia	Banjul	2000	44.4	89.1		
Ghana	Accra	1993	58.9	30.0		90.1
Ghana	Accra	1999	64.4	33.9	12.3	92.0
Ghana	Accra	2003	51.6	41.5	31.9	84.3
Guinea	Conakry	1999	39.2	11.2	7.2	71.4
Guinea	Conakry	2005	45.2	11.1	28.9	94.5
Guinea-Bissau	Bafata	2000	0.5	1.0		
Guinea-Bissau	Gabu	2000	0.6	1.3		
Kenya	Mombasa	1993	26.8	25.9		37.2
Kenya	Mombasa	1998	30.0	29.2	7.4	47.5
Kenya	Mombasa	2003	23.9	22.3	29.6	43.5
Kenya	Nairobi	1993	65.0	53.3		50.8
Kenya	Nairobi	1998	77.6	56.0	11.2	60.1
Kenya	Nairobi	2003	76.6	66.5	44.4	71.4
Lesotho	Maseru	2000	75.2	9.5		
Lesotho	Maseru	2004	42.0	9.7	50.2	33.1
Madagascar	Antananarivo	1997	24.8	14.4	3.6	55.7
Madagascar	Antananarivo	2004	22.0	11.0	21.4	67.8
Malawi	Lilongwe	1992	38.4	14.3		18.5

Country	City	Year	Piped water on premises	Flush or Pour flush toilet/latrine	Telephone	Electricity
Malawi	Lilongwe	2000	40.4	16.1		29.9
Malawi	Lilongwe	2004	29.3	19.3	26.1	32.5
Mali	Bamako	1996	17.3	4.3	3.7	33.7
Mali	Bamako	2001	39.9	22.0	15.7	55.8
Mauritania	Nouakchott	2001	27.8	4.8	7.2	47.2
Morocco	Casablanca	1992	74.1	87.9		78.7
Morocco	Casablanca	2004	83.4	98.9	77.0	99.2
Morocco	Fes	1992	97.4	100.0		100.0
Morocco	Fes	2004	93.8	99.4	57.9	97.7
Morocco	Maknes	1992	89.4	99.2		84.1
Morocco	Maknes	2004	85.6	96.9	68.4	97.3
Morocco	Marrakech	1992	84.0	87.8		90.4
Morocco	Marrakech	2004	88.8	99.7	17.7	98.3
Morocco	Rabat	1992	86.0	91.7		83.9
Morocco	Rabat	2004	89.7	99.7	69.7	99.0
Morocco	Tangier	1992	78.5	99.6		87.6
Morocco	Tangier	2004	84.5	100.0	77.4	89.4
Mozambique	Maputo	1997	83.6	22.4	6.9	39.2
Mozambique	Maputo	2003	66.4	8.0	5.2	28.8
Namibia	Windhoek	1992	93.9	90.2		70.0
Namibia	Windhoek	2000	73.9	76.9	40.5	71.9
Niger	Niamey	1992	30.3	7.8		37.2
Niger	Niamey	1998	33.2	5.0	4.1	51.0
Niger	Niamey	2006	42.3	10.8	6.5	61.1
Nigeria	Abuja	1999	13.0	8.7	8.7	82.6
Nigeria	Abuja	2003	59.1	27.3	22.7	100.0
Nigeria	Akure	1999				76.5
Nigeria	Akure	2003	10.3	11.9	9.1	95.0
Nigeria	Damaturu	1999	23.1	15.4	2.6	64.1
Nigeria	Damaturu	2003	13.8	7.2	2.0	59.8
Nigeria	Efon Alaiye	1999	4.4		2.2	93.3
Nigeria	Efon Alaiye	2003	6.2	12.9		93.7
Nigeria	Ibadan	1999		6.7		33.3
Nigeria	Ibadan	2003	3.0	38.0	14.8	98.9
Nigeria	Kano	1999	27.3	10.7	4.5	82.2
Nigeria	Kano	2003	35.2	17.5	9.8	92.6
Nigeria	Lagos	1999	25.6	54.3	8.2	98.9
Nigeria	Lagos	2003	9.0	49.2	31.8	99.8
Nigeria	Ogbomosho	1999	16.6	33.7	12.6	95.9
Nigeria	Ogbomosho	2003	2.8	19.7	7.7	94.4
Nigeria	Owo	1999	7.4	24.4	9.9	95.3
Nigeria	Owo	2003	50.0			100.0
Nigeria	Oyo	1999	11.0	39.6	3.6	92.1
Nigeria	Oyo	2003				94.1
Nigeria	Zaria	1999	54.6	15.1	4.6	94.2
Nigeria	Zaria	2003	58.6	15.8	12.4	100.0

Country	City	Year	Piped water on premises	Flush or Pour flush toilet/latrine	Telephone	Electricity
Rwanda	Kigali	1992	29.0			36.0
Rwanda	Kigali	2000	33.4	4.5	8.6	44.4
Rwanda	Kigali	2005	20.5	8.4	8.3	40.8
Senegal	Dakar	1993	62.6	34.3		70.0
Senegal	Dakar	1997	77.8	42.4	20.4	80.2
Senegal	Dakar	2005	87.8	76.3		
South Africa	CapeTown	1998	79.7	73.8	49.6	88.0
South Africa	Durban	1998	87.7	86.9	46.3	84.3
South Africa	Port Elizabeth	1998	66.8	55.7	27.0	63.3
South Africa	Pretoria	1998	62.5	62.5	18.8	56.3
South Africa	West Rand	1998	84.2	84.8	47.6	75.0
Swaziland	Manzini	2000	64.0	36.0		
Swaziland	Manzini	2006	68.6	39.8	17.7	60.5
Togo	Lome	1998	67.4			51.2
Togo	Lome	2000	18.8	77.7		
United Republic of Tanzania	Arusha	1992	33.2	3.8		21.1
United Republic of Tanzania	Arusha	1996	24.8	3.1		32.6
United Republic of Tanzania	Arusha	1999	23.7			5.9
United Republic of Tanzania	Arusha	2004	59.3	11.0	35.0	35.0
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	1992	75.4	3.9		31.7
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	1996	33.9	6.6		45.2
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	1999	78.8	3.2		46.9
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	2004	62.1	10.0	43.4	59.8
Uganda	Kampala	1995	13.2	9.5	3.0	49.4
Uganda	Kampala	2001	14.6	11.9	20.3	55.2
Uganda	Kampala	2006	26.0	10.7	5.4	59.0
Zambia	Chingola	1992	89.2	85.7		71.5
Zambia	Chingola	1996	76.6	76.6		78.1
Zambia	Chingola	2002	78.7	84.8	3.0	75.7
Zambia	Lusaka	1992	56.0	36.0		34.5
Zambia	Lusaka	1996	49.8	40.5		50.7
Zambia	Lusaka	2002	26.4	18.3	13.0	44.2
Zambia	Ndola	1992	58.4	55.5		35.4
Zambia	Ndola	1996	59.4	69.3		52.0
Zambia	Ndola	2002	66.8	71.2	16.8	52.8
Zimbabwe	Harare	1994	94.4	96.1		74.5
Zimbabwe	Harare	1999	93.5	92.6	19.9	84.7
Zimbabwe	Harare	2005	92.7	88.4	17.5	86.3



TABLE 7: SHELTER DEPRIVATION AND HOUSEHOLD WASTE DISPOSAL IN CITIES - SOLID WASTE

Percent distribution of household waste disposal in cities by shelter deprivation								
Country	City	Year	Waste Disposal Method	Urban	Non-slum household	Slum household	One shelter deprivation	Two+ shelter deprivations
				%	%	%	%	%
Benin	Cotonou	2001	Public removal	4.4	4.8	2.9	3.1	
			Private removal	43.0	51.4	8.6	9.3	
			Bury it	1.1	1.4			
			Burn it	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	
			In the yard	2.0	1.4	4.3	4.7	
			In the bush/fields	48.8	40.3	83.5	82.2	
Egypt	Alexandria	2005	Collected from home	5.6	6.0	0.8	0.9	
			Collected from container in street	90.8	91.2	86.4	86.9	81.8
			Dumped into street/empty plot	3.3	2.6	11.0	10.3	18.2
			Dumped into cannal/drainage	0.1	0.1			
			Burned	0.2	0.1	1.7	1.9	
Egypt	Cairo	2005	Collected from home	69.1	71.3	54.9	55.1	53.3
			Collected from container in street	25.3	25.4	24.6	24.4	26.7
			Dumped into street/empty plot	5.0	2.8	18.9	18.8	20.0
			Dumped into cannal/drainage	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.9	
			Burned	0.1		0.8	0.9	
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	2005	Collected by municipality	46.2	50.7	42.9	45.5	37.4
			Collected by private establishment	23.5	30.6	18.3	22.2	10.2
			Dumped in street/open space	3.2	1.3	4.6	4.1	5.6
			Dumped in river	16.0	11.1	19.5	16.0	26.7
			Burned	8.9	4.7	11.8	8.9	17.9
			Other	1.2	0.9	1.3	1.4	1.1
			Dump inside hole	1.0	0.3	1.5	1.8	1.0
			Don't know	0.1	0.2			
Ghana	Accra	2003	Collected by government	43.8	55.7	31.8	33.1	16.2
			Collected by community assn	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6	
			Collected by private company	13.7	16.1	11.9	12.3	6.1
			Dumped in compound	1.4	1.0	1.0	0.6	5.2
			Dumped in street/empty plot	26.8	19.6	31.8	33.1	14.5
			Burned	10.8	5.0	18.2	15.4	53.5
			Buried	2.4	1.7	4.5	4.5	4.5
			Other	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.4	
Kenya	Nairobi	2003	Regular collection by Govt.	2.9	3.0	2.8	3.4	1.3
			Infrequent collection by govt	2.9	3.2	2.3	3.3	
			Pays for private collection	51.9	66.4	30.4	40.1	6.5
			Composted	1.7	1.3	2.3	2.5	1.8
			Dump, bury, burn in compound	10.0	7.0	14.4	13.8	15.9
			Dump in street, empty plot	22.1	15.3	32.1	26.9	45.1
			Other	8.5	3.7	15.6	10.0	29.4

Country	City	Year	Waste Disposal Method	Urban	Non-slum household	Slum household	One shelter deprivation	Two + shelter deprivations
				%	%	%	%	%
Morocco	Casablanca	2004	Binman	66.9	64.7	59.3	59.3	
			Special place	28.8	29.6	30.1	30.1	
			Burn	0.3				
			Thrown in the street	4.1	5.7	10.6	10.6	
Morocco	Rabat	2004	Bin man	66.9	65.1	84.8	84.3	
			Special place	28.8	30.3	13.5	14.0	
			Burn	0.3	0.3			
			Thrown in the street	4.1	4.3	1.7	1.8	
Senegal	Dakar	1997	Collection	85.9	89.9	82.4	84.6	76.8
			Buried in ground	3.1	0.4	5.4	3.2	10.9
			Official tip	5.9	6.7	5.3	6.3	2.8
			Unofficial tip	4.0	1.6	6.0	5.9	6.5
			Incineration	0.2	0.5			
			Other	0.9	1.0	0.8		3.0

TABLE 8: SHELTER DEPRIVATION AND ENERGY USE IN CITIES - SOLID FUEL\*

Percent distribution of type of fuel in cities by shelter deprivation								
Country	City	Year	Type of fuel	Urban	Non-slum household	Slum household	One shelter deprivation	Two+ shelter deprivations
				%	%	%	%	%
Benin	Cotonou	2001	LPG, natural gas	5.2	6.4	0.7	0.8	
			Charcoal	65.0	66.7	58.0	61.7	10.0
			Firewood, straw	12.8	9.4	25.9	23.3	60.0
			Gasoline	13.8	14.9	9.1	9.8	
			Other	3.3	2.5	6.3	4.5	30.0
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>81.0</b>	<b>78.6</b>	<b>90.2</b>	<b>89.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	2004	LPG, natural gas	25.2	28.5	7.3	7.4	
			Biogas	0.6	0.7	0.0		
			Kerosene	0.9	0.3	4.3	4.4	
			Coal, lignite	1.7	1.8	1.1	1.1	
			Charcoal	17.2	16.4	21.3	21.8	
			Firewood, straw	50.4	47.9	64.1	63.3	100.0
			Does not cook	3.8	4.2	2.0	2.0	
			Other	0.2	0.2	0.0		
<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>69.2</b>	<b>66.1</b>	<b>86.5</b>	<b>86.2</b>	<b>100.0</b>			
Cameroon	Douala	2004	LPG, natural gas	44.9	56.7	30.0	36.0	13.3
			Kerosene	14.3	14.4	14.1	13.7	15.2
			Charcoal	4.0	2.4	6.0	4.8	9.5
			Firewood, straw	32.8	22.2	46.1	41.4	59.0
			Other	4.0	4.2	3.8	4.1	2.9
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>36.8</b>	<b>24.6</b>	<b>52.1</b>	<b>46.2</b>	<b>68.6</b>
Congo	Brazzaville	2005	Electricity	7.1	7.7	5.4	6.0	4.5
			LPG, natural gas	13.8	15.9	7.0	9.3	3.9
			Kerosene	10.9	11.7	8.4	6.1	11.4
			Charcoal	49.4	46.9	57.6	61.5	52.6
			Firewood, straw	17.0	16.1	19.9	15.7	25.5
			Dung	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.2
			Other	0.5	0.5	0.4		0.8
<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>67.7</b>	<b>64.3</b>	<b>78.9</b>	<b>78.6</b>	<b>79.3</b>			
Egypt	Alexandria	2005	LPG	73.6	73.2	88.2	88.2	
			Natural gas	25.9	26.4	5.9	5.9	
			Kerosene	0.4	0.3	2.9	2.9	
			Straw/Shrubs/Grass	0.1		2.9	2.9	
			No Kitchen	0.1	0.1			
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>0.1</b>		<b>2.9</b>	<b>2.9</b>	

Country	City	Year	Type of fuel	Urban	Non-slum household	Slum household	One shelter deprivation	Two+ shelter deprivations
				%	%	%	%	%
Egypt	Cairo	2005	Electricity	0.1	0.1	0.0		
			LPG	64.8	64.3	77.1	78.0	
			Natural gas	33.9	34.7	15.7	15.9	
			Biogas	0.1	0.1			
			Kerosene	0.9	0.6	6.0	4.9	
			No Kitchen	0.3	0.2	1.2	1.2	
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>					
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	2005	Electricity	1.3	1.7	1.0	1.5	
			LPG, natural gas	2.2	2.8	1.7	2.3	0.6
			Biogas	0.5	1.0	0.1	0.2	
			Kerosene	69.8	74.6	66.4	71.0	56.6
			Charcoal	9.7	6.7	11.8	10.8	13.7
			Firewood, straw	12.3	7.3	15.9	11.5	25.2
			Dung	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.5
			Do not cook	3.1	5.0	1.7	1.6	1.9
			Other	0.8	0.6	1.0	0.8	1.3
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>28.0</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>39.5</b>
Gabon	Libreville	2000	Electricity	0.5	0.7	0.2	0.0	0.9
			Gas cylinder/Butane cylinder	85.8	86.2	85.2	84.4	88.9
			Oil/kerosene	4.9	4.0	6.1	6.5	3.7
			Coal/charcoal	1.6	1.3	1.9	1.9	1.9
			Wood/straw	1.2	0.8	1.8	1.2	4.6
			Other	6.0	6.9	4.9	6.0	
			<b>Solid fuel</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>6.5</b>
Ghana	Accra	2003	Electricity	1.5	2.3			
			LPG, natural gas	28.3	32.4	25.5	27.7	8.2
			Biogas	0.6	0.5	1.1	1.3	
			Kerosene	2.4	2.6	2.7	3.1	
			Coal, lignite	1.6	2.3	0.8	0.9	
			Charcoal	53.6	55.9	61.9	59.8	78.3
			Firewood, straw	9.5	1.7	4.0	2.8	13.5
			Dung	0.1	0.2			
			Other	2.4	2.2	4.0	4.5	
<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>64.7</b>	<b>59.8</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>63.5</b>	<b>91.8</b>			
Guinea	Conakry	2005	Electricity	1.8	1.6	3.0	3.3	
			LPG, natural gas	0.5	0.6			
			Biogas	0.1	0.1			
			Kerosene	0.2	0.2			
			Coal, lignite	85.5	85.9	83.4	83.7	79.7
			Charcoal	5.8	6.1	4.2	3.7	11.1
			Firewood, straw	1.6	1.1	3.5	3.7	
			Other	4.6	4.3	5.8	5.5	9.2
			<b>Solid fuel</b>	<b>97.4</b>	<b>97.5</b>	<b>97.0</b>	<b>96.7</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Country	City	Year	Type of fuel	Urban	Non-slum household	Slum household	One shelter deprivation	Two+ shelter deprivations
				%	%	%	%	%
Kenya	Nairobi	2003	Electricity	1.8	2.4	1.0	1.4	0.0
			LPG, natural gas	19.8	28.3	7.5	9.9	1.1
			Biogas	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.0
			Kerosene	68.3	61.6	78.0	76.5	82.0
			Coal, lignite	0.3	0.1	0.6	0.0	2.3
			Charcoal	7.4	5.4	10.3	9.9	11.5
			Firewood, straw	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0
			Other	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.4	3.1
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>13.8</b>
Madagascar	Antananarivo	2003	Electricity	1.5	2.5	0.9	1.3	0.1
			LPG, natural gas	5.7	11.2	2.0	2.9	0.4
			Biogas	0.7	0.7	0.6	1.0	
			Kerosene	0.4	0.7	0.3	0.4	
			Coal, lignite	0.7	1.2	0.4	0.6	
			Charcoal	68.7	79.2	61.9	76.3	36.0
			Firewood, straw	22.0	4.4	33.5	16.8	63.4
			Dung	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.6	0.1
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>91.7</b>	<b>84.9</b>	<b>96.2</b>	<b>94.4</b>	<b>99.5</b>
Mali	Bamako	2001	Electricity	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
			LPG, natural gas	3.3	4.7	1.9	2.1	1.1
			Biogas	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
			Kerosene	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0
			Coal, lignite	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.0	2.8
			Charcoal	50.0	53.2	46.8	49.8	38.0
			Firewood, straw	43.1	38.6	47.8	44.8	56.4
			Dung	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6
			Other	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.1
<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>94.9</b>	<b>93.4</b>	<b>96.4</b>	<b>95.9</b>	<b>97.8</b>			
Morocco	Casablanca	2004	Firewood	0.2	0.2			
			Electricity	0.1	0.1			
			Gas	99.8	99.7	100.0	100.0	
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>0.2</b>			
Morocco	Rabat	2004	Electricity	0.8	0.9			
			Gas liquid	0.8	0.7	1.7	1.8	
			Gas	98.4	98.4	98.3	98.2	100.0
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>					
Mozambique	Maputo	2003	Electricity	3.1	5.1	2.0	1.5	2.9
			LPG, natural gas	8.9	12.0	7.2	9.0	3.9
			Kerosene	5.2	4.5	5.6	6.3	4.4
			Coal, lignite	48.1	56.4	43.7	47.5	37.0
			Charcoal	0.1	0.3			
			Firewood, straw	34.5	21.7	41.4	35.6	51.7
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>82.8</b>	<b>78.4</b>	<b>85.1</b>	<b>83.1</b>	<b>88.7</b>

Country	City	Year	Type of fuel	Urban	Non-slum household	Slum household	One shelter deprivation	Two+ shelter deprivations
				%	%	%	%	%
Namibia	Windhoek	2000	Electricity	60.9	80.0	26.7	41.1	4.2
			LPG, natural gas	17.1	13.3	23.9	27.4	18.5
			Kerosene	13.7	4.5	30.1	23.6	40.3
			Charcoal	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	
			Firewood, straw	8.2	2.1	19.1	7.7	36.8
			Other			0.1		0.2
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>19.2</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>36.8</b>
Rwanda	Kigali	2005	Electricity	0.2	0.4			
			LPG, natural gas	0.3	0.6			
			Biogas	0.2	0.3			
			Kerosene	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.9	
			Coal, lignite	2.8	4.2	1.4	2.1	0.6
			Charcoal	63.2	80.7	47.2	62.8	28.6
			Firewood, straw	29.2	7.6	49.0	32.9	68.3
			Other	3.5	5.4	1.8	1.3	2.4
<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>98.8</b>	<b>98.0</b>	<b>99.5</b>	<b>99.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>			
South Africa	Cape Town	1998	electricity	57.8	73.2	27.8	40.2	
			gas	4.0	3.8	4.5	5.7	1.9
			Paraffin	36.8	22.7	64.2	52.5	90.7
			Wood	0.8		2.3	0.8	5.6
			other	0.6	0.3	1.1	0.8	1.9
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>0.8</b>		<b>2.3</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>5.6</b>
South Africa	Durban	1998	electricity	69.9	81.8	37.4	45.9	17.6
			gas	5.7	6.3	4.0	4.4	2.9
			Paraffin	20.0	10.8	45.4	41.5	54.4
			Wood	2.5	0.2	8.8	6.3	14.7
			Coal	0.2		0.9	0.6	1.5
			other	1.7	1.0	3.5	1.3	8.8
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>9.7</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>16.2</b>
South Africa	Johannesburg	1998	electricity	57.8	63.8	34.4	37.9	16.1
			gas	4.8	5.9	0.5		3.2
			Paraffin	23.5	17.8	45.8	44.1	54.8
			Wood	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.2	
			Coal	10.0	8.9	14.1	14.9	9.7
			Animal dung	0.1	0.1			
			other	2.8	2.4	4.2	1.9	16.1
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>9.7</b>

Country	City	Year	Type of fuel	Urban	Non-slum household	Slum household	One shelter deprivation	Two+ shelter deprivations
				%	%	%	%	%
South Africa	Johannesburg	1998	electricity	57.8	63.8	34.4	37.9	16.1
			gas	4.8	5.9	0.5		3.2
			Paraffin	23.5	17.8	45.8	44.1	54.8
			Wood	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.2	
			Coal	10.0	8.9	14.1	14.9	9.7
			Animal dung	0.1	0.1			
			other	2.8	2.4	4.2	1.9	16.1
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>9.7</b>
Senegal	Dakar	2005	Electricity	0.6	0.7			
			LPG, natural gas	92.1	92.7	88.1	87.5	100.0
			Charcoal	4.7	4.3	7.2	7.5	
			Firewood, straw	0.3	0.1	1.0	1.0	
			Other	2.4	2.1	3.8	4.0	
						<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.4</b>
Uganda	Kampala	2001	Electricity	6.9	11.2	2.7	3.3	
			LPG, natural gas	0.2		0.3	0.4	
			Biogas	0.5	1.0			
			Kerosene	13.2	12.2	14.2	13.9	15.7
			Charcoal	72.0	71.0	73.0	74.7	64.7
			Firewood, straw	4.1	2.4	5.7	4.5	11.8
			Other	3.1	2.1	4.1	3.3	7.8
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>79.2</b>	<b>75.5</b>	<b>82.8</b>	<b>82.4</b>	<b>84.3</b>
Zambia	Lusaka	2002	Electricity	39.2	46.2	28.7	30.1	6.7
			LPG, natural gas	0.3		0.8	0.8	
			Coal, lignite	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	
			Charcoal	56.1	50.4	64.6	63.6	80.0
			Firewood, straw	4.1	3.2	5.5	5.0	13.3
						<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>60.5</b>	<b>53.8</b>
Zimbabwe	Harare	1999	Electricity	68.6	70.3	42.9	45.0	
			LPG, natural gas	0.6	0.5	2.4	2.5	
			Kerosene	29.8	28.2	54.8	52.5	
			Firewood, straw	1.0	1.1			
			<b>Solid Fuel</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.1</b>			

\* Solid fuel includes firewood, wood, charcoal, coal, lignite, straw, shrub, grass, dung, crop.

TABLE 9: PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE DE FACTO HOUSEHOLD POPULATION BY AGE GROUP ACCORDING TO SEX AND SHELTER DEPRIVATION

Country	City	Year	Sex	Urban					
				0-4	5-12	13-14	15-24	25-49	50+
Benin	Cotonou	2001	Male	13.4	19.6	4.4	23.2	32.7	6.7
Benin	Cotonou	2001	Female	12.8	20.2	5.3	24.7	28.6	8.5
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	2003	Male	12.1	16.0	4.5	26.2	33.9	7.4
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	2003	Female	10.3	18.2	6.9	28.4	27.9	8.3
Cameroon	Douala	2004	Male	12.6	17.8	5.3	26.0	31.3	7.0
Cameroon	Douala	2004	Female	12.5	15.9	5.3	26.7	32.1	7.5
Chad	N'Djamena	1996	Male	16.2	22.5	4.8	20.1	30.0	6.4
Chad	N'Djamena	1996	Female	17.0	25.4	4.8	19.6	26.0	7.2
Congo	Brazzaville	2005	Male	14.8	19.4	5.6	21.3	30.2	8.8
Congo	Brazzaville	2005	Female	13.6	18.5	5.4	22.8	29.7	9.9
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	2005	Male	13.9	15.1	3.5	22.1	39.8	5.6
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	2005	Female	12.2	16.5	6.2	28.7	30.7	5.6
Egypt	Alexandria	2005	Male	9.0	14.8	4.3	21.3	30.8	19.8
Egypt	Alexandria	2005	Female	8.9	13.8	3.3	22.7	33.1	18.1
Egypt	Cairo	2005	Male	9.5	15.4	3.8	20.2	33.0	18.1
Egypt	Cairo	2005	Female	9.6	14.8	3.0	21.6	33.2	17.9
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	2005	Male	6.8	13.8	5.0	27.1	35.6	11.7
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	2005	Female	6.3	14.3	4.9	31.7	31.5	11.3
Ghana	Accra	2003	Male	11.6	20.3	6.3	17.8	32.9	11.1
Ghana	Accra	2003	Female	10.7	15.3	5.3	22.7	32.7	13.2
Kenya	Nairobi	2003	Male	12.4	12.7	2.3	22.5	42.5	7.7
Kenya	Nairobi	2003	Female	12.7	13.6	3.3	29.5	35.8	5.1
Madagascar	Antananarivo	2003/04	Male	12.4	21.7	5.2	19.2	30.6	10.8
Madagascar	Antananarivo	2003/04	Female	13.4	20.4	5.6	17.4	31.1	12.1
Mali	Bamako	2001	Male	15.5	19.9	4.9	22.0	29.8	7.8
Mali	Bamako	2001	Female	13.9	20.7	8.0	25.4	24.5	7.4
Mauritania	Nouakchott	2002	Male	12.8	20.9	4.8	20.8	31.5	9.1
Mauritania	Nouakchott	2002	Female	13.2	22.0	7.1	19.5	29.2	9.0
Morocco	Casablanca	2004	Male	7.7	13.1	3.4	20.4	38.2	17.3
Morocco	Casablanca	2004	Female	7.8	13.1	3.8	19.0	39.4	16.9
Morocco	Rabat	2004	Male	8.6	15.8	4.4	19.9	35.2	16.1
Morocco	Rabat	2004	Female	7.7	15.4	4.5	21.2	37.7	13.5
Mozambique	Maputo	2003	Male	12.6	20.8	4.7	28.4	24.7	8.8
Mozambique	Maputo	2003	Female	13.0	17.4	5.2	26.5	27.6	10.4
Namibia	Windhoek	2000	Male	12.0	16.6	3.1	20.4	39.4	8.5
Namibia	Windhoek	2000	Female	11.4	18.1	3.8	21.4	36.4	9.0
Niger	Niamey	2006	Male	16.4	20.2	4.8	21.6	27.8	9.2
Niger	Niamey	2006	Female	16.4	20.7	5.8	21.6	27.9	7.6
Nigeria	Lagos	2003	Male	14.3	15.9	3.4	20.7	33.5	12.2
Nigeria	Lagos	2003	Female	14.4	17.5	4.2	22.7	30.1	11.0
Nigeria	Abuja	2003	Male	13.3	20.0	6.7	20.0	26.7	13.3
Nigeria	Abuja	2003	Female	23.1	23.1	0.0	23.1	23.1	7.7
Nigeria	Ibadan	2003	Male	12.4	19.7	5.2	18.5	28.5	15.8
Nigeria	Ibadan	2003	Female	10.8	18.4	3.6	20.2	27.1	19.9
Nigeria	Kano	2003	Male	14.4	21.5	4.3	21.7	27.8	10.4
Nigeria	Kano	2003	Female	19.4	21.9	5.7	19.9	24.1	9.0



Non slum						Slum					
0-4	5-12	13-14	15-24	25-49	50+	0-4	5-12	13-14	15-24	25-49	50+
13.4	19.4	4.3	23.2	33.1	6.7	13.6	20.1	4.9	23.3	31.4	6.8
12.3	20.7	5.6	24.4	28.5	8.5	14.8	18.1	3.9	25.6	28.9	8.7
12.8	16.4	4.5	26.2	33.1	7.0	10.7	15.2	4.5	26.1	35.4	8.0
9.2	17.4	7.4	29.2	28.9	7.9	12.4	19.6	6.1	27.0	26.0	9.0
11.3	16.8	5.3	27.2	31.7	7.7	20.5	23.4	5.0	18.7	29.4	3.0
10.4	14.1	5.4	28.3	33.3	8.5	23.3	24.7	4.7	19.2	25.8	2.2
12.8	17.2	4.3	23.6	35.1	7.0	21.3	30.3	5.7	15.0	22.4	5.4
13.8	21.7	4.6	23.4	27.4	9.1	21.0	29.7	5.1	15.1	24.3	4.8
13.6	15.6	5.4	23.1	32.2	10.1	15.7	22.2	5.8	19.9	28.6	7.8
11.2	17.1	4.9	23.4	31.8	11.6	15.3	19.6	5.9	22.4	28.1	8.7
12.3	15.5	3.9	22.1	40.8	5.5	18.8	13.8	2.6	22.0	36.8	6.0
11.7	16.5	6.0	28.6	30.6	6.5	14.8	16.6	7.3	28.9	31.0	1.4
9.0	14.7	4.3	21.3	30.8	19.8	5.9	20.0	3.5	20.0	32.9	17.6
8.8	13.8	3.2	22.4	33.4	18.3	12.2	13.3	5.1	30.6	26.5	12.2
9.5	15.3	3.8	19.9	33.2	18.3	10.2	17.3	3.2	27.5	27.5	14.4
9.5	14.5	2.9	21.3	33.4	18.3	10.4	19.6	5.4	26.6	28.5	9.5
4.6	11.4	4.9	25.8	40.5	12.8	8.0	15.0	5.2	27.8	32.9	11.1
4.6	11.9	3.9	33.2	33.6	12.8	7.2	15.8	5.6	30.8	30.4	10.3
11.3	20.6	6.3	19.0	31.8	11.0	12.7	19.5	5.8	14.3	36.4	11.4
9.8	14.6	5.2	23.9	32.3	14.2	13.6	17.3	5.5	19.1	34.0	10.5
8.6	10.9	2.4	24.6	43.8	9.7	17.1	14.9	2.2	19.8	40.9	5.1
9.2	10.5	3.0	31.3	39.0	7.1	17.7	18.1	3.8	26.8	31.3	2.3
9.0	16.8	4.7	19.1	35.5	14.8	13.1	22.7	5.3	19.3	29.7	9.9
7.6	15.6	5.3	17.1	35.0	19.4	14.5	21.3	5.6	17.4	30.4	10.8
14.4	18.9	5.4	23.9	30.7	6.6	16.8	21.0	4.4	19.8	28.8	9.1
13.6	19.8	8.0	28.2	24.2	6.2	14.2	21.7	8.0	22.4	24.8	8.9
7.7	13.8	3.0	22.9	41.4	11.1	7.7	13.8	3.0	22.9	41.4	11.1
8.1	17.3	7.1	18.8	37.6	11.2	8.1	17.3	7.1	18.8	37.6	11.2
7.6	12.9	3.1	19.7	39.1	17.6	7.8	14.1	4.8	24.0	33.4	15.8
7.6	12.5	3.6	18.3	40.0	18.1	8.6	16.1	4.8	23.0	36.8	10.7
8.9	14.7	4.3	19.0	35.8	17.3	6.6	23.9	5.2	26.3	30.5	7.5
7.1	15.2	4.3	20.7	38.4	14.3	13.0	17.5	6.3	24.7	31.8	6.7
10.0	17.3	3.9	31.5	26.5	10.7	14.0	22.7	5.1	26.6	23.8	7.8
10.8	15.3	4.4	27.2	31.2	11.2	14.3	18.6	5.7	26.0	25.4	10.0
9.3	15.8	3.5	18.6	42.2	10.6	15.7	17.7	2.5	22.7	35.7	5.7
8.4	18.0	4.1	21.4	37.4	10.6	15.2	18.2	3.4	21.5	35.0	6.8
15.1	15.6	3.8	20.7	35.4	9.4	17.1	22.5	5.3	22.1	23.9	9.1
15.1	19.6	5.9	21.6	29.7	8.1	17.0	21.2	5.8	21.5	27.0	7.4
10.8	12.4	1.6	20.9	39.8	14.5	16.0	17.8	4.6	20.5	29.9	11.2
13.0	11.1	5.3	20.3	35.7	14.5	15.0	20.5	3.7	23.8	27.5	9.5
20.0	20.0	0.0	20.0	40.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	10.0	20.0	20.0	10.0
25.0	25.0	0.0	25.0	25.0	0.0	25.0	25.0	0.0	25.0	25.0	0.0
8.8	14.0	3.5	33.3	29.8	10.5	13.6	20.9	5.1	15.4	28.2	16.8
5.5	16.4		36.4	29.1	12.7	11.6	18.8	4.3	17.0	26.8	21.4
16.5	15.6	2.8	21.1	38.5	5.5	13.6	23.7	4.9	22.0	23.7	12.2
23.5	14.3	4.1	25.5	26.5	6.1	18.2	24.4	6.3	17.8	23.4	9.9

Country	City	Year	Sex	Urban					
				0-4	5-12	13-14	15-24	25-49	50+
Rwanda	Kigali	2005	Male	15.2	19.3	4.3	25.1	32.3	3.8
Rwanda	Kigali	2005	Female	14.8	17.4	4.5	28.4	29.2	5.8
Senegal	Dakar	2005	Male	13.4	17.2	4.6	22.3	32.4	9.9
Senegal	Dakar	2005	Female	11.3	18.1	5.3	22.6	31.1	11.6
South Africa	Cape Town	1998	Male	8.6	16.9	5.6	18.3	35.6	15.0
South Africa	Cape Town	1998	Female	8.7	16.2	5.5	17.9	33.0	18.8
South Africa	Durban	1998	Male	7.7	17.9	5.3	22.4	32.4	14.3
South Africa	Durban	1998	Female	7.5	15.6	4.1	18.5	35.3	19.0
South Africa	Johannesburg	1998	Male	9.9	17.9	4.6	18.8	35.5	13.4
South Africa	Johannesburg	1998	Female	9.7	14.8	4.5	17.0	36.9	17.0
South Africa	Pretoria	1998	Male	9.9	17.9	4.6	18.8	35.5	13.4
South Africa	Pretoria	1998	Female	9.7	14.8	4.5	17.0	36.9	17.0
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	2004	Male	13.4	17.4	3.7	23.3	33.1	9.3
United Republic of Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	2004	Female	11.5	14.2	7.1	27.0	32.3	7.8
Uganda	Kampala	2006	Male	16.3	17.0	4.8	25.6	32.5	3.8
Uganda	Kampala	2006	Female	13.7	17.8	5.4	31.4	26.7	5.0
Zambia	Lusaka	2002	Male	15.3	24.9	4.4	20.6	29.7	5.2
Zambia	Lusaka	2002	Female	15.4	24.8	4.7	24.1	26.5	4.5
Zimbabwe	Harare	1999	Male	11.8	17.9	4.2	21.9	33.7	10.7
Zimbabwe	Harare	1999	Female	12.2	17.0	3.4	28.7	30.3	8.4

Non slum						Slum					
0-4	5-12	13-14	15-24	25-49	50+	0-4	5-12	13-14	15-24	25-49	50+
12.7	19.2	3.2	26.5	34.8	3.6	17.8	19.6	5.2	23.6	29.8	4.0
12.0	16.8	4.1	32.7	28.6	5.8	17.4	18.0	4.8	24.3	29.8	5.6
12.1	17.1	3.8	22.9	34.0	10.0	14.3	17.3	5.2	22.0	31.3	9.9
10.3	16.0	5.1	23.1	33.1	12.4	12.0	19.5	5.4	22.2	29.7	11.1
7.8	14.9	5.0	18.6	36.0	17.6	9.8	20.0	6.5	18.0	34.7	11.0
8.1	13.8	6.1	16.9	33.3	21.7	9.9	19.8	4.4	19.1	32.4	14.3
6.5	16.4	4.6	23.1	33.4	16.0	10.4	21.3	6.9	20.8	30.1	10.4
6.0	14.1	3.8	17.5	38.5	20.1	10.8	19.1	4.8	20.8	28.1	16.4
8.3	17.2	4.5	19.0	36.4	14.5	14.9	20.2	4.9	18.0	32.5	9.6
8.6	12.7	4.3	17.7	37.8	18.8	13.0	21.3	5.2	14.7	34.3	11.5
8.3	17.2	4.5	19.0	36.4	14.5	14.9	20.2	4.9	18.0	32.5	9.6
8.6	12.7	4.3	17.7	37.8	18.8	13.0	21.3	5.2	14.7	34.3	11.5
14.3	15.3	4.4	22.9	32.0	11.1	12.5	19.3	3.1	23.5	34.0	7.5
12.1	12.5	7.5	28.9	31.1	7.9	11.0	15.8	6.7	25.3	33.5	7.8
10.5	11.7	4.3	32.2	36.6	4.7	20.1	20.5	5.2	21.4	29.8	3.0
8.0	10.1	6.5	39.2	30.4	5.7	17.0	22.2	4.9	26.8	24.5	4.6
14.6	24.8	5.0	20.5	29.6	5.5	16.2	25.2	3.6	20.5	29.9	4.7
15.3	24.1	5.3	25.2	25.6	4.6	15.6	26.1	3.7	22.4	27.8	4.3
10.0	16.5	4.2	23.4	34.4	11.4	17.5	22.0	4.1	17.0	31.3	8.2
10.3	14.6	3.7	31.0	31.1	9.3	17.9	23.9	2.4	22.1	27.9	5.7

TABLE 10: SHELTER DEPRIVATION BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT OF 15-24 YEAR OLD URBAN MALES

Country	City	Year	Percentage of urban male population aged 15-24 year old who are not employed or going to school by shelter deprivation					Percentage of the employed urban male population whose activity is part of informal sector by shelter deprivation				
			Urban	Non-slum household	Slum household	One shelter deprivation	Two+ shelter deprivations	Urban	Non-slum household	Slum household	One shelter deprivation	Two+ shelter deprivations
Benin	Cotonou	2001	21.6		24.8	40.0	24.2	61.8	42.9	66.7		69.2
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	2003	4.6	5.4	7.9	8.2		19.9	18.2	25.4		
Cameroon	Douala	2004	9.4	10.0	8.7	8.1	11.1	93.2	88.9	97.7	96.9	
Chad	N'Djamena	2004	7.5	1.7	8.6	9.0	8.3	57.3	77.0	53.6	45.7	62.0
Congo	Brazzaville	2005	14.1	10.5	17.5	18.1	13.6	61.4	70.5	56.1	58.5	49.7
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	1998	11.1	3.4	13.8	15.1	12.1	52.3	59.6	49.3	51.3	45.7
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	2005	0.3		0.4	0.5		17.4	19.7	16.9	17.6	14.2
Ghana	Accra	2003	28.4	28.2	28.8	31.4	16.2	35.8	31.3	47.6	62.6	
Kenya	Nairobi	2003	23.0	23.3	22.4	25.9	8.4	2.8	2.9	2.4		9.5
Madagascar	Antananarivo	2003	12.3	6.5	17.3	13.6	23.4	48.8	55.8	43.1	46.7	33.2
Mali	Bamako	2001	3.6	5.5	3.5	5.6	3.4	51.0	59.1	50.5	20.4	52.1
Mozambique	Maputo	2003	11.4	6.4	15.2	14.0	21.9	3.7	6.2	4.5	5.1	
Namibia	Windhoek	2000	15.7	13.7	18.4	18.4		39.7	53.1			
Niger	Niamey	1998	22.1	22.0	22.2	19.4	26.5	54.7	47.4	58.3	53.1	65.6
Nigeria	Abuja	2003	16.7		20.0		25.0	25.0		25.0	50.0	
Nigeria	Ibadan	2003	29.9	25.0	32.1	46.9						
Nigeria	Kano	2003	8.8	14.3	7.0	5.3	10.0					
Nigeria	Lagos	2003	36.5	47.3	29.8	32.7	23.3	11.7		14.6	18.5	43.8
Rwanda	Kigali	2005	17.7	15.3	21.5	14.8	31.6	17.5	17.6	17.3	13.0	23.8
Senegal	Dakar	2005	11.8	16.7	3.5	15.8		16.9	15.1	20.1	23.7	19.2
Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	2004	27.3	29.4	25.7	24.0	64.1					
Uganda	Kampala	2001	5.3	8.8	2.4	3.1		18.9	21.4	17.4	21.4	18.4
Zambia	Lusaka	2002	21.4	24.3	18.2	18.8		6.9	8.3	5.9	8.3	6.3
Zimbabwe	Harare	1999	39.4	40.4	20.0	20.0		84.6	82.6		82.6	



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United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)  
P.O. Box 30030, Nairobi, Kenya  
Tel: +254 20 7621 234  
Fax: +254 20 7623 904

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