

The Final Evaluation Report of The Cities Alliance Grant Project
Upgrading Informal Areas in Ismailia Governorate (Egypt):
Qualitative Analysis of Outputs and Results

June 24, 2004

Report of a Field Evaluation of the
Cities Alliance Grant Activity
Undertaken May 17 to May 24, 2004.

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Executive Summary

Although modest in scope and funding amount, the initiative of Ismailia Governorate to ready itself for upgrading informal settlements is a good example of how Cities Alliance (CA) activities help move the upgrading process and agenda. The grant has performed well in preparing for the upgrading of two key informal settlements. More importantly, the activity produced considerable spin-off benefits: attracting about US\$3 million from a CA partner (Italian Cooperation) and US\$.5 million from the Governorate to carry out the upgrading. It mobilized additional local upgrading funds, forging productive local partnerships and synergies, consolidating participative practices, galvanizing community decision-making, training GOI staff and creating a model for other local authorities in Egypt.

The difficulties experienced by the activity had minor impact on the outcome. These have to do with (i) accurately forecasting an activity's timetable, (ii) problems caused by setting up a special unit and budget item outside of the regular administrative department structure, (iii) cumbersome internal administrative procedures and competing interests within the Governorate's departments, (iv) a lack of clarity about the activity within the Governorate departments, and (v) weak monitoring.

The activity provides several lessons:

- **Political commitment and support for upgrading is imperative, and it needs to be present at all levels.**
- **A well positioned activity can yield substantial benefits.**
- **Upgrading should be institutionalized.**
- **Start-up delays should be minimized – activity launching workshops will help.**
- **Participatory processes need additional time, but yield much greater benefits.**
- **Continuity of efforts makes a difference.**
- **Secure tenure and land markets are critical.**
- **A confluence of partners creates opportunities.**

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Introduction

1. The Cities Alliance (CA) is a partnership of cities and international development agencies that makes small, but strategic grants. One objective is to identify key actions that boost local efforts to improve the lives of slum dwellers. CA grants seek to bring together partners around activities so as to maximize impact and synergies. Importantly the activities help cities attract local and international funds and know-how that will expand upgrading throughout city and, ideally, evolve into national programs. Put more simply, the CA fills an unmet need for cities and international agencies to have the catalytic resources, tools and time to forge concerted efforts at creating cities without slums.

2. The Governorate of Ismailia is a good example. The CA grant helped consolidate a long history of pilot projects and updated the participatory approach to upgrading. The grant allowed the Governorate to build upon earlier UNDP-funded recommendations for environmental actions. It prepared community-driven upgrading plans for two sites which also will help clean up Lake *Timsah*. Importantly, the small (US\$ 130,000) grant funded engineering feasibility studies and training for community participation. This attracted the interest of Italian Cooperation, a CA partner, which is helping to fund the upgrading investments. The Governorate now has a “model” for upgrading of the remaining seven informal settlements in Ismailia. The Governor wants to do the same for the four other cities and districts under his authority. The relatively small CA investment has mobilized local and national funding, it has given impetus for the Governor to develop a comprehensive upgrading program, and it forged synergies among several development agencies operating in Egypt.

The Cities Alliance Evaluation

3. The CA began its upgrading grants 2001. To date the CA has made about 22 activity grants to cities and countries ready to take on large- scale upgrading. The Ismailia activity was one of the first CA grants. Experience is accumulating. Each grant yields many lessons. With ten of these upgrading activities now completed, a portfolio review (desk evaluations) is underway. With a view to gaining deeper insights on the impact, processes and lessons, the Ismailia activity is the subject of this field evaluation. This is not a formal, detailed evaluation as much as it is a review and assessment of the experiences and qualitative outcomes. This report seeks to tell the story rather than document, because the factors of success, the problems experienced along the way, and the resulting effects on the community and government are the useful lessons to pass on to practitioners worldwide. More

importantly the evaluation can help validate the policies and approach taken locally. Finally, the expectation is that this review will help the CA assess how to better help its global partners. Hopefully this story and others coming from future reviews can help the CA and its partners get enhanced results on the ground.

4. This assessment starts with a brief **description of the factors influencing the activity and its evaluation**, and looks more specifically at:

Impact/Effect – on benefiting families and communities, on upgrading practice, on commitment to scale-up, and on improving the coherence of effort amongst partners.

Accomplishments – with respect to planned objectives, local support, attracting and involving funders, and use of the grant.

Results – with respect to anticipated plans, implementing arrangements, and in keeping with the CA mission.

Conclusions, lessons and recommendations - to help local practitioners, policy-makers, and CA partners in other countries.

Influencing Factors

5. Ismailia City, as well as Egypt¹, have a long, solid history of upgrading. Ismailia was the administrative center for the construction of the Suez Canal. Its civilian population of about 170,000 was evacuated as a result of the 1967 war. Residents, returning after the 1973 campaign, found massive destruction and neglect, but also a large reconstruction effort. Highly subsidized apartment units were built, but not nearly as many as needed. Most returnees found few options so they began to squat on vacant land. A Government of Egypt (GOE)/ UNDP-funded master plan (1974-76) proposed a major shift in housing policy away from direct central government provision of highly subsidized social housing to the provision of infrastructure only, allowing for private and owner- builder provision of homes.

6. The plan also urged land subdivisions with urban services in guided development areas, both for new lands and for so-called “informal” or “traditional” settlements, which consisted of a mix of squatters and those with some claim to land. Within the built up city the plan proposed a program of “improvements” or “upgrading.” Given the limited financial and technical capacity of the city, and in view of the rapid pace of projected growth envisioned, the master plan also called for an implementation plan. This would need a new organization to be formed with powers to buy, develop and sell land and manage the development program. A housing implementation agency was also proposed. This signaled the beginning of a progression of interventions to deal with the city’s growth and shelter needs.

¹ From the mid-1970s through the 1980s, major upgrading projects were launched, including: *Helwan* in Cairo, funded by USAID, with a population of over 75,000; *Manshiet Nasser*, and *North Bassateen* in Cairo and *New Nagaa El Arab* in Alexandria, with a total population of over 90,000, all part of the Egypt Urban Development Project funded by the World Bank and the Ismailia Project, funded by ODA (now DFID) which included two sites, *El Hekr* and *Abu Atwa*, with a total population of over 57,000. Other upgrading projects in Ismailia include *Safa*, *Zamzam* and *El Marwa*.

7. The results and impact of the Cities Alliance grant activity (1999- 2002) **Upgrading of Informal Settlements in Ismailia** are better understood if seen as one of a sequence of steps taken by the GOI to address upgrading. The story that emerges is that of an activity which could prove to be pivotal in consolidating lessons and providing institutional continuity. The four steps Ismailia has taken in the past 25 plus years are:

Step 1 – Testing Upgrading -- *El Hekr* Demonstration Project

8. Following from the master plan recommendations, a demonstration project was prepared in 1977 with funding by the Egyptian Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction with the UK's ODA (now DFID). The centerpiece was the *El Hekr* upgrading and sites-and-services project (now called *Hai el Salaam*). The site was a vast unplanned extension of the city to the north. It had a population of 40,000 low-income residents. The objective was to demonstrate that upgrading and developing new sites on which owners could build their houses on was cost-effective and a viable alternative to the highly subsidized social housing program of central government. The project (carried out in 1978-1983) also had the important objective of making technical assistance and training available to the staff of local agencies charged with housing, land and infrastructure.

9. Numerous evaluations of this and the other early projects (see Annex 4: list of reference documents) showed that the approach worked, and that upgrading can, in part, can be self-financing. Most importantly the projects left behind a large number of trained and committed staff. The early efforts also provide:

- Valuable *lessons and methodologies* that were used to design the CA grant activity.
- ***Key staff from these early interventions continued to promote upgrading***, encouraging GOI to continue to work in this direction.

10. The projects did not provide the ***institutionalization of upgrading at the city and Governorate level***. Successive changes in Governors and administrative staff precluded a continuing stream of upgrading activities evolving from the *Hai el Salaam* experience. **Therefore, upgrading and land development for low-income housing has had a start-and-stop history in Ismailia.**

Step 2 – Sustainable Ismailia Governorate Project (SIGP)

11. In the late 1980s UN-Habitat/UNEP launched a Sustainable Cities pilot project with Ismailia. Its first phase introduced participatory approaches to environmental planning, including city profiles which included a focus on pollution of Lake *Timsah* and the need for upgrading. By the mid-1990s the SIGP led to national funding of several projects, including projects that aimed at training and capacity building for low-income women. Several Governorate of Ismailia (GOI) and UNDP staff from the *El Hekr* project were involved. By the late 1990s SIGP created several spin-off NGOs that continued to work with women and youth in poor communities. In addition it responded to the earlier environmental planning proposal that called for the cleaning of Lake *Timsah*, in part through the comprehensive upgrading of two informal settlements near the Lake. To that end SIGP identified the need for

feasibility studies, the proposal for which was submitted to the CA for grant funding in November 1999.

12. The SIGP, while not directly continuing the upgrading of Ismailia, did:
- Build upon the installed capacity and experience of the work done in *Hai el Salaam*.
 - Re-introduce upgrading on the Governor's agenda.
 - Develop a participatory planning methodology successfully used in the CA grant activity.
 - Create NGOs that developed leadership and community organizational skills, women's groups and active communities that were instrumental in conducting the surveys funded by the CA activity.
 - Lead to the idea that the Governorate should take on upgrading at a city-wide scale and in the rest of the Governorate.

Step 3 – The Cities Alliance Grant

13. The proposal was developed jointly by GOI, with the SIGP National Director taking the lead along with support from UNDP and the UN-Habitat Task Manager. The processing and monitoring of the proposal with the Cities Alliance was the responsibility of the UN-Habitat Task Manager based in Nairobi. The proposal was presented on November 28, 1999 and updated (with feedback from CA) on September 1, 2000. The Grant was approved and the Agreement was signed on September 6, 2000. The closing date and final disbursement date of the activity was March 31, 2002 (see Annex 1: Activity Timeline).

14. The CA grant activity of US\$ 130,000 with a GOI counterpart of US\$ 50,000, was used to plan and design the comprehensive upgrading of two settlements – *El Halous* and *El Bahtini* (with a combined total population today of about 17,000 residents) - and to train and ready the communities and the GOI staff that would be part of the preparatory and implementing stages. The activity funded three areas:

- a. The **feasibility studies** (summarized as Annex 3) carried out by consulting firms:
- Physical surveys and mapping (GIS)
 - Socio-economic surveys
 - Preparing upgrading and infrastructure layouts
 - Infrastructure engineering and cost studies
- b. The costs of **planning and setting up the institutional arrangements and training** for carrying out the projects:
- Identifying the needed institutional arrangements and processes
 - Preparing terms of reference and bid documents
 - Estimating costs and human resources needed
 - Capacity building activities with communities
 - Equipment, supplies and transportation
- c. Funds for UNCHS (Habitat) **support and “backstopping” (monitoring)**

15. The activity was completed March 31, 2002. It accomplished the tasks outlined above (see details of impact, accomplishments, and results, below).

16. Feasibility studies are standard to preparing upgrading projects. This activity is noteworthy because its approach is to train and build the capabilities of communities to organize themselves, make choices, and articulate their views and concerns in the feasibility studies and beyond. These are costs and time requirements often ignored or deferred in preparing upgrading projects. Some of the activity delays experienced may be due to underestimating the time it takes to apply the participatory processes. However, experience worldwide shows that participatory practices are critical to successful upgrading. They were included in this activity at the urging of the SIGP National Director, based on her participating in Steps 1. and 2, above. As an add-on to the activity the team organized a widely attended workshop (April 2002), co-sponsored by GTZ, to present the findings of the studies that included the inputs of the two communities and highlighted the participatory methods used. UN-Habitat's Training and Capacity Building Branch provided training materials on local leadership and NGO capacity building, and conducted the training of trainer sessions. ***This underscores the value added of continuity and learning from accumulated knowledge of past lessons. It helps make the activity successful, and is likely to be contributing factors for success of the future project.***

17. The CA activity served to consolidate the strategy of upgrading within the Governorate. The Governor, convinced by the results of the preparatory work, moved quickly to start the physical upgrading. He took the matter to the Ministry of Planning and was instrumental in securing a budgetary allocation for the upgrading in the First National Five Year Plan. The Governor has taken on the role of upgrading advocate for his Governorate and is offering help to others.

Step 4 – The Participatory Slum Upgrading in *El Bahtini* and *El Halous* Project

18. Flowing from the SIGP and the preparatory work of the CA funded activity, the GOI and UNDP have initiated a participatory approach for the physical and social upgrading of the two settlements in the period 2003 - 2005. Italian Cooperation has facilitated a debt-swap arrangement of about US\$3 million for the project, with about US\$ 500,000 equivalent, in Governorate parallel funding. The first year of the Five Year National Plan has allocated £e² 600,000 (approximately US\$97,000) to the project. Parts of the investments have started on the two sites. The Governor has taken the significant and unprecedented step of establishing a High Level Committee for Slum Upgrading for project stakeholder coordination. The emphasis is on participatory processes. The project has components to continue training and capacity building of local staff and communities, and to expand the participation of community groups. This project firmly put upgrading on the Governorate's agenda. Convinced of the approach and strategy, the Governor has indicated his intention to upgrade all informal settlements in the Governorate's jurisdiction.

² At the time of this assessment US\$ 1.00 = £e 6.20.

19. It would not be accurate to say that the CA activity alone prompted the follow-up investment. However it is a fortuitous convergence of having a well-prepared feasibility study, the right methodology, experienced staff, and actively involved CA partners that made it happen. It is an example of how the CA works well in making available timely, catalytic support (financial, staff and technical assistance) through its partners. **It also suggests that programs with single-donor support are at a disadvantage, as they are less likely to capture the opportunities, synergies and specialized capabilities of numerous partners working in consort.**

20. This sequence of Ismailia's upgrading experiences shows the importance of selecting interventions that build upon accumulated knowledge and that can make the connections to transfer learning to future programs. Often institutional memory is lost, so upgrading approaches are reinvented. Fortunately Ismailia has staff with continuity of experience dating from the early demonstration projects through SIGP and on to the Participatory Upgrading Projects. In most places this continuity is missing. Projects should routinely record the upgrading processes with a view to passing on lessons. **This CA activity benefited greatly from the continuity of effort and knowledge. The CA would do well to advise its grantees to include the documenting process in the grant activities so that the knowledge gained can be institutionalized.**

Impact/ Effect on:

Families and communities

21. The activity's surveys conducted with, and by, the communities gave families assurances that the upgrading would bring improvements. However the biggest impact on the families has been the confidence that the upgrading will bring **secure tenure**. This is observable in the large amount of house consolidation that started and continues even as the infrastructure upgrading has just gotten underway. It is a testament to the trust and confidence that the activity team (now the Technical Advisory Unit) has engendered with the community. It is too soon to know if and how the process and the quality of life changes will affect families' income or health, but improvements gained by the work done to date are impressive.

Including the poor in decision-making processes

22. It is clear that the process used by the GOI activity team focused on involving and preparing the community for participation. The efforts have succeeded in identifying leaders, and giving residents a voice and a vested interest in the future of the communities. This is an ongoing process, started before the CA activity and continuing into the project inception and implementation stage. Residents have a strong and persuasive voice in what happens. Clearly their status has changed and their ability to affect decisions has produced self-confidence and a better understanding of factors affecting their lives. This was most evident in the Project Learning Workshop (May 19, 2004) and Inception Workshop (May 22, 2004) that the evaluation team attended. There was no hesitation on the part of community leaders to engage the Governor and his staff in discussion.

Improving coherence of effort amongst CA members

23. The CA activity resulted in a consortium of local (the GOI team and NGOs) and international agencies working together: UNDP, through SIGP and its advisors, including the National Project Director of the activity, with UNCHS (Habitat), Nairobi, providing the Task Management. This is a synergistic partnership, although the reporting and oversight (monitoring of problems during the start-up period by the Task Manger) should have been stronger in flagging issues and facilitating the resolution of delays both at the Governate level, with Habitat headquarters (vis-a- vis its internal MOU requirements) and with the Cities Alliance. Reporting could have been more detailed and timely. Still, the partnership is a fortuitous one that can continue to attract alliances and could become the backbone of larger-scale upgrading in Egypt (see paragraph 52. In fact, the consortium is continuing and possibly expanding (GTZ has expressed interest) to carry out the upgrading in the two sites. Other add-on and spin-off collaborations continue to emerge: UN-Habitat is increasing its support to the implementation phase of the two sites by continuing its training assistance and materials for the local economic development components. It is supporting the National Project Director's participating at an international program on labor-intensive provision of basic services (a UN-Habitat /ILO joint venture). The UN-Habitat Task Manager continues to be involved in the implementation of the upgrading activities, along with the newly appointed, Egypt-based Habitat Programme Manager. Habitat is channeling funds to scale-up SIGP and upgrading efforts in Egypt.

Other possible spin-off benefits

24. While the evaluation team was in Ismailia, word arrived from the Governor of Port Said, who had heard of the CA upgrading activity, asking the team to visit Port Said and meet with him to explore possibilities of CA support for his interest in upgrading projects. The Governor took the team to visit sites and projects. He wants help with a city development strategy which would, in part, focus on upgrading for the city. Similarly when the team visited the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Local Development, and the Ministry of Housing, the discussions around how the Ismailia upgrading activities generated interest in finding national-level support for upgrading. These are examples of how a well-placed and executed activity can influence and stimulate national interests in upgrading.

Accomplishments (*in respect to the Grant Application*)

Objectives

25. The objectives of the activity, within a larger stated perspective of upgrading informal settlements in the five main cities of Ismailia Governorate, according to the Grant Agreement/Application Form, were: "(1) to upgrade pilot areas utilizing local as well as other funding; (2) to build the capacity of the local authorities within the Governorate through adopting transparent participatory processes to handle upgrading activities including the utilization of the fund to guarantee timely recovery of loans." These objectives were not met. These stated objectives likely represent a broader vision of an ultimate goal rather than what the activity was to do. It appears that the application did not accurately state the objectives, nor were they questioned in the review process. The activity as funded and described in the

financing table of the Grant Agreement was to plan, design and prepare the comprehensive upgrading of two settlements – *El Halous* and *Bahtini* - and to train and ready the communities and staff that would be part of the preparatory and implementing stages. The activity funded **feasibility studies and engineering plans** carried out by consulting firms, **planning and setting up the institutional arrangements and training** for carrying out the projects, and the costs of UNCH (Habitat) **support and backstopping**. These objectives were carried out, and their impact was positive, leading to the implementation of the upgrading project and the strengthening off the communities involved.

Local commitment

26. The Governor has strongly supported the initiative, and he stated a goal of upgrading all the informal settlements under his jurisdiction. As the activity proved to have positive and tangible results, commitment strengthened and extended to other departments of the Governorate. The Governor requested follow-up funding from the Ministry of Planning, which it has budgeted in the Five Year Plan. Possibly the strongest local commitment comes from the residents of the communities to be upgraded and from the implementing team.

Attracting local and international funding

27. With the feasibility studies available, it was possible to attract international funding in the form of a debt-swap. The Italian Cooperation pledged about US\$3 million for the upgrading investments. The Governorate of Ismailia leveraged US\$.5M from the First National Five Year Plan budget.

Use of funds

28. The grant funds were well used. The studies and plans were produced by four local consulting firms. The outputs are effective and carried out in a timely way (6 months) once the project got underway. Interestingly the participatory process built into the overall activity created a feedback process among the consulting firms, the communities, the survey teams and the implementing team. It appears to have enhanced the work and cohesion of the product. See Annex 3 for a summary description of the studies' findings and upgrading plans.

Results With Respect to Consistency with Cities Alliance Guidelines (*In Italics*) and Mission

- **Targeting the Objective:** *The activity must aim at promoting pro-poor policies, the reduction of urban poverty including promoting the role of women in city development, and directly support scaling up slum upgrading and/or city development strategies.*

29. This has been a main focus of the activity, and has done so effectively by emphasizing the role of the community in the process and the training and organizing women's groups. The activity prepared two sites for upgrading investments, but went on to place upgrading on a larger scale on the Governor's agenda.

- **Government Commitment and Approval:** *The activity must have government/local authority commitment and approval, to be documented by attachments to the application form.*
30. The letter confirming the Governor's support and approval was presented to the CA. However, it was at lower levels and through the ranks of the Governorate's administration that the commitment (or understanding of the commitment needed) was missing or not as strong as required. This contributed to delays and inefficiencies at start-up of the activity.
- **Linkage to Investment Follow-up:** *Investment partners must be clearly identified and involved from the beginning in the design of the activity so as to increase the prospects for investment follow-up for implementation.*
31. Follow-up investment partners were not pre-identified. Fortunately, with the intervention of UNDP staff, the feasibility studies were presented to Italian Cooperation for funding, which was approved.
- **Partnerships:** *Proposals for City Development Strategies and scaling-up slum urban upgrading must be conceived as a participatory process with local stakeholders including both the private sector and community organizations. They must include appropriate strategies and actions to ensure participation of, and ownership by, resident communities. Cities will need to be able to demonstrate the nature and extent of participation by relevant stakeholders. The Cities Alliance gives priority to proposals with strong demonstrated ownership and buy-in.*
32. This has been one of the activity's strongest and most successful features. During the activities implementation, a collaborative venture of UNDP, UNCHS (Habitat) was forged. GTZ joined in supporting the planning workshop. GTZ has expressed an interest in further working on participatory aspects of the follow-on project.
- **Co-financing:** *All proposals should include co-financing, combining seed funding from the Cities Alliance with a target of at least 20% financing from the cities themselves, as well as from other sources. At least 50% co-financing is needed for all proposals requesting over \$250,000 from Core Funds.*
33. This was readily accomplished, and surpassed. The Governorate contributed with expenditures in-kind (staff and overheads), transport and materials, plus funding for workshops using its own resources.
- **Coherence of Effort:** *Activities should be designed to promote cross-sectoral, inter-divisional and multi-donor coordination, and to maximize collaboration between the World Bank, the UN system, and other Cities Alliance members.*
34. This has evolved into a viable arrangement (see paragraph 23., above). It has the potential to expand into a broader coalition of actors and possibly a national program of upgrading (see paragraph 51 – 53).
- **Scaling-up:** *The focus is on designing city development strategies and citywide and nationwide upgrading rather than on pilot projects.*
35. On its own the activity did not do this. The participatory methodology developed points to better ways for going to scale, but the focus has been on preparing the communities and feasibility studies for the two sites.
- **Institutionalization and replication:** *Activities should contribute to the creation of mechanisms that help cities and their national associations institutionalize support for the formulation of city*

development strategies and citywide and nationwide upgrading so as to facilitate replication in other cities. The Cities Alliance favors proposals that maximize the use of local expertise.

36. Institutionalization is a problem area not addressed by the activity. It is one of the reasons for the long start-and-stop history of upgrading in Ismailia. Importantly it is one of the reasons why the activity got off to such a slow start and needed three completion date extensions (see recommendations). It is a topic that the implementation project should put high on its agenda.

- **Positive Impact on Environment:** *Activities supported by the Cities Alliance are expected to achieve significant environmental improvements. These should be clearly stated in each proposal. Any activity in which negative environmental impacts could be anticipated must include an Environmental Impact Assessment and a Mitigation Plan as prior conditions for consideration.*

37. The activity was identified by the Sustainable Ismailia Program as a key priority for improving the environmental conditions of the city and of Lake Timsah, in particular.

- **Duration:** *Special attention will be given to those activities that promise deliverables within well-defined time frames, and preferably within 24 months.*

38. The activity took 27 months, of which about 10 months were for developing the proposal and its processing, and about 7 months were start-up delays (however GOI decided to proceed with some of the work during that period). Much of this delay should have been avoided (see paragraphs 23. and 40.). One problem was realistically estimating the time needed to carry out the activity. Elections during that time were another factor. Another was a difficulty with finalizing a Memorandum of Understanding between GOI and UNCHS (Habitat) – not a requirement of the Cities Alliance. The major problem that caused delays, however was the lack of understanding among Governorate departments as to the priority and requirements of the activity. For example, there was confusion and overly conflicted administrative delays because financial officers wanted to apply the grant funds to other purposes. See Annex 1: Activity Timeline. Another factor is the amount of time needed to apply participatory methods with communities. To do this type of work properly large investments in time and resources are needed up-front. They are investments that will yield a very high rate of return and benefits.

Conclusions

Activity assessment

39. The grant activity had positive and valuable results. Given Ismailia's history of not institutionalizing upgrading and its tendency to upgrade sporadically, this small infusion of resources came at a point when continuity for consolidating participatory practices was very much needed. The activity proposal did not clearly state the objectives of the work to be done. The project preparation studies that were funded were did not include plans to have GOI scale-up. However the grant did accomplish significant steps in moving the Governorate of Ismailia toward better prepared participatory upgrading activities. The grant allowed for the time, resources and space needed to properly prepare the community and Governorate staff to more effectively implement the upgrading project. The activity was timely in creating bridges for the extensive and relevant capacity building work done by the SIGP and future upgrading programs. Importantly, the activity produced a coalition of agencies working well together.

This attracted about US\$3 million from a CA partner (Italy) to carry out the upgrading. The result is a well-designed **upgrading model** for informal settlements in Ismailia and possibly other Governorates. The initiative has come to the attention of other local and central government officials, and could produce an important spin-off benefit: setting the stage for a National Upgrading Strategy and possibly, a National Upgrading Program.

40. The activity experienced start up difficulties, which did not affect the positive outcomes and products, but did cause preventable delays. While some were unavoidable delays attributable to external factors such as elections, many could have been resolved sooner. These had to do with unrealistic estimates of the time to carry out the activity, the “special” nature of the activity and its budget compared with the Governorate’s regular administrative department structure. Other negative factors were cumbersome internal procedures, a lack of understanding about the activity within the Governorate departments, and weak monitoring of the implementation process, particularly at start up, when external interventions could have helped. The participatory training and community building work took more time than estimated. This is the nature of community involvement, and it cannot be rushed. Still, experience shows that the more time given to preparing upgrading projects carefully, the better they respond to the communities need and to a more efficient implementation. The GOI team was small (possibly understaffed) and often had competing duties to perform for their regular departments. **Monitoring the implementation of a grant activity is extremely important.** It can alert the implementing institution of issues that need speedy attention, and can help CA partners bring problems, such as start-up delays, to the attention of the highest levels responsible for implementing the activity. Monitoring has an additional benefit: it can record the implementation process to highlight lessons to be passed on to other CA activities being designed or approved. **This is how the CA can be a stronger *Learning Alliance*.** It helps to have monitoring be done locally. UN-Habitat has had a full time Egyptian Habitat Programme Manager in place since September 2003 to provide closer monitoring and support during the implementation phase of the upgrading project.

Institutional memory and knowledge

41. An important success factor of the activity is National Director who managed the process. She has the capabilities, understanding, vision and commitment needed to carry out participatory upgrading. Fortunately her base of experience dates back to the *El Hekr* project. Her knowledge, inputs and efforts contributed greatly to what has been accomplished by this small grant. This is an example of how institutional memory is key to upgrading to scale.

42. The activity did help train staff in participatory planning, and on how to prepare upgrading projects. It is important that this installed capacity be institutionalized at the GOI. If Ismailia is going to support a Governorate-wide program of upgrading, it should establish an Upgrading Department that would consolidate procedures and experience. In this way **upgrading would become a core business of the GOI.** If this were accomplished, it would be the most valuable spin-off of the CA support.

43. There was a project completion report, but the required evaluation report was not produced, as required by the CA.

Lessons Learned and recommendations:

Political commitment and support for upgrading is imperative, and it needs to be present at all levels.

44. A key factor of success was the relationship of the Governor, his advisory and administrative staff, the City Council, the activity/project staff and the community representatives. This extended to stakeholders outside the local structure, and to the national and international sponsors and funding agencies. The commitment and dedication to the task must be transmitted throughout these structures. As important as the political support is, it is just as key to avoid blockages in the process to reach the goal. This should be understood by all involved.

Recommendation: Those charged with identifying, preparing and proposing CA grant applications should be asked to make a rigorous effort in realistically assessing these relationships and the extent to which stakeholders at all levels are committed to the task. This calls for examining the existing situation and including recommendations in the proposal that can lead to strengthening local support and commitment.

Estimating activity time needed is difficult.

45. Careful assessments of local practices, institutional procedures and realistic estimates of the time needed for the lengthy process of preparing and implementing participatory upgrading should be done. Forecasting potential external influences such as elections that could disrupt progress must become standard practice.

Recommendation: Proposals should not be influenced by the CA encouraging short-timed interventions. Task managers should monitor how time is estimated while preparing the proposal for CA consideration.

Preventing start-up delays.

46. New or special activities for an implementing institution often are slow to start because the line departments in the institution are not briefed, or staff may misunderstand the stated objectives and procedures.

Recommendation: Activities should include an *Activity Launching Workshop*, or some other means of informing all stakeholders and administrative officers about the activity, its objectives, priorities, timetable, implementing requirements on staff, budget, and procedures. Flow of funds should be reviewed and measures to mitigate problems should be introduced. Task Mangers can, and should, play an important external role in unblocking institutional processing and bureaucratic problems.

A well positioned activity can yield substantial benefits.

47. Even under less than optimal operating conditions (insular intergovernmental structures, stop-and-go funding, cumbersome procedures) good results can happen and progress can be made, if there are some key features in place: a local champion(s) with vision and experience, the legal and administrative framework in place with clearly understood priorities, objectives and a realistic timetable.

Upgrading should be institutionalized.

48. Institutions taking on upgrading should have the right internal structures and clearly defined roles and responsibilities as to where decisions are made. Activities like this one suffer from being “special projects, under the office of the Governor” because that status can lead to uncooperative and obstructive attitudes within a bureaucracy. If local authorities (and National governments) are to move upgrading to scale, they need to make upgrading their core business. Upgrading departments with mandates and budgets and trained full-time staff should be set up along with other line item functions.

Continuity of efforts makes a difference.

49. Ismailia is a good example of the benefits of a long (if not continuous) attempt to deal with housing for the poor. Had the early upgrading projects (which were evaluated as being successful) been replicated over time, it is likely that upgrading would have become a core business and that cost of resolving the problems of informal settlements, illegal agricultural land development, etc., would be minimal. The well- trained upgrading staff has disbanded and now needs to be retrained.

Secure tenure and land markets are critical.

50. In Ismailia, as in most developing countries, land markets are dysfunctional. Historically they are vulnerable to bad practices, corruption, and opaque decisions with regard to land development. This leads to the on-going problem of illegal development of agricultural land, squatting, and irregular subdivisions. Most importantly, lack of secure tenure paralyzes investment in home improvements as well as the official provision of utilities and services. Upgrading policy and strategies should deal with tenure and land markets as well as improving the physical conditions of informal settlements.

A convergence of partners creates opportunities.

51. The Ismailia activity owes much of its success to a broad, well-linked coalition of interested parties that shared a common objective. This is a good example of the term “the total is greater than the sum of its parts.” The Governorate, the SIGP, UNDP, UNCHS (Habitat), and GTZ made specialized contributions that enhanced the quality and effectiveness of the activity. It serves as a model for collaboration that is key to upgrading at a large scale. After thirty years of considerable upgrading investments by the GOE, with support of development agencies such as the World Bank, ODA, UN-Habitat, UNDP, CA, KfW, and GTZ, all acting independently, much has been learned. However, little has been institutionalized nor has it evolved into a coherent national strategy. The overall impact of these efforts ended with the completion of each project. The questions now, as asked by the GTZ Programme Manager advising the Ministry of Planning, is: "How can we all join forces in order to put urban poverty alleviation and urban upgrading on the national policy agenda?"

And [how do we] implement transparent local "tools" country wide ... [to influence] government's will."

52. The Ismailia experience succeeded because of a convergence of interests and organizations, each with a comparative advantage acting together. This is a model for going to scale in upgrading and alleviating poverty. Some key questions for GOE, the CA and the organizations involved, which may guide future actions, are:

- What can the existing partnership of agencies do to build upon the CA-supported experience?
- How can this partnership attract others and share in the tasks of going to a national scale?
- What are each partner's comparative advantages, and how can a plan of concerted action derive from this alliance?
- How can this partnership include and coalesce with the Government of Egypt to take a national program of change and actions to tackle the challenge of cities without slums?

53. The enabling environment may be in place to have the partnership move forward. Since the evaluation mission, the following events point in that direction:

- The First Lady of Egypt asked GTZ for advice and help by explaining to a gathering of concerned Ministries and her NGO how GTZ's participatory approach ("tool box" of actions) can lead to a national strategy. She asked to have this replicated in Helwan / Cairo (through her NGO) and extended to other urban areas.
- The Minister of Planning wants to present GTZ's recommendations towards a national strategy and the tested tools to the Prime Minister in order to improve the coordination of sector ministries and donors.

This can be the opportunity for the CA- supported partnership (NUDP, UNCHS (Habitat), KfW, and GTZ (which is also collaborating with the CA- supported City Development strategy in Alexandria) and others (i.e. the World Bank) to join forces to act at a scale and level of commitment to make a real change for Egypt.

Annexes:

1. Activity Timeline
2. Evaluation Methodology
3. Summary of the Findings of the Feasibility Studies and community/Family Profiles
4. List of Reference Documents
5. Partial List of Persons Contacted During the Mission

ANNEX 1: ACTIVITY TIMELINE (based on activity progress reports)

DATE	ACTION	ELAPSED TIME (months)
Nov. 28, 1999	Initial application submitted to Cities Alliance. Project dates: February-July 2000	
Jan. 11, 2000	Initial funding proposal screened by Cities Alliance	1
May 22, 2000	Letter of cooperation from the Governorate of Ismailia pledging US\$50,000 in support	5
September 1, 2000	Updated application. Activity implementation revised dates October 2000-April 2001	10
Sept. 1, 2000	Updated application. Activity implementation revised dates October 2000-April 2001	10
October 2000	Habitat Task Manager mission to Ismailia to meet with key players and “finalize MOU.”	11
March 13, 2001	Grant progress report, September- December 2000: MOU still not received; delays include local Ismailia elections; postal delays. Governorate begins (unspecified) activities on their side.	16
May 2001	Informal work begins (GOI funds).	18
September 31, 2001	Grant progress report, May- September 2001: Project start delayed due to local elections; transfer of funds being slower at the end of the financial year; bureaucratic delays of procedures for implementing surveys and work, as well as the bidding process. Expected completion: December 2001.	22
November 25, 2001	Grant progress report of October 24, 2001; studies completed except for last disbursement	24
December 12, 2001	Amendment to Grant Agreement. Amended disbursement schedule and life of agreement until March 31, 2002, or six months after Habitat expends funds, whichever is earlier. (New date of expiry of Agreement: June 30, 2003)	
December 31, 2001	Grant progress report, October- December 2001: Local teams have completed 80% of technical studies and national team is finalizing work, including implementation phasing. National counterparts plan to finalize studies by the end of March 2002. Expected completion: March 31, 2002.	25
February 2002	Client Feedback Report by Habitat Task Manager reports base line survey completed by Governorate; Governor has keen interest in upgrading project; conference of other upgrading projects, central institutions and donors planned for April 2002. Reiterates slowness of administrative procedures and that more time is needed for start-up phases.	26
March 31, 2002	Final disbursement date; project closing date.	27
April 2002	Participatory Planning Workshop: “The Participatory Urban Development of Bahtini and Halous Project: Guidelines for Detailed Planning”	28
April 27, 2002	Completion report prepared.	28

ANNEX 2: METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS EVALUATION

An evaluation team consisting of Yousef Hisat, a member of the Cities Alliance Policy Advisory Board; William Cobbett and Andrea Merrick of the Cities Alliance Secretariat; and George Gattoni, consultant, visited Egypt in the period of May 18 – 24, 2004. The evaluation team’s counterparts, who accompanied the team in its meetings and field visits, consisted of the National Project Director, Ms. Habiba Eid, Ms. Naglaa Arafa of UNDP and Dr. Ali F. El-Faramawy, UNCHS (Habitat) Program Manager. The UNCHS (Habitat) Task Manager for the activity, Mohamed El Sioufi, joined the team May 22-24. The team visited Ismailia for meetings with the Governor and his staff, the City Council, and the National Team Leader responsible for the activity. They visited the two sites that were the subject of the feasibility studies, and met residents, community leaders and technical staff of the GOI and utility company representatives. Two workshops were arranged:

- **“Assessing and Learning Workshop,”** attended by about 60 stakeholders – including community leaders, consultants that prepared the feasibility studies, City Council members, GOI staff, and representatives of the Ministry of Local Government, UNCHS (Habitat) and UNDP. It was chaired by the Governor. Its objective was to review the work done by the activity in preparing the feasibility studies and in the training and capacity building activities. The format also allowed for participants to ask questions, many of which were from community leaders and particularly directed to the Governor and head of the City Council. Lively and informative exchanges took place, with the Governor very much engaged and responsive. It gave the evaluation team an excellent chance to witness the dynamics of the stakeholders, and to see first-hand how capable and knowledgeable the community leaders are -- a testament of the effectiveness of the activity’s participatory training and capacity building components.
- **“Project Inception Workshop,”** with about 40 participants, mostly from the participating communities, GOI staff, the chairman of the City Council, the UNCHS (Habitat) Task Manager, and UNDP representative. The National Activity Director chaired this first monthly meeting, organized to encourage a continuing dialogue among the community and key implementing partners of the Participatory Upgrading Project. It gave the evaluating team another opportunity to gauge the impact of the preparatory work supported by the CA activity, and details of the work to be done, and how well the project is prepared to respond to the communities.

The evaluation team also had meetings in Cairo with the Minister of Local Development and his staff; the Ministry of Planning staff; and the staff of the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities to get an overview of policy as relating to upgrading, and to capture central government’s perspective on the Ismailia activity. The team also met

with CA partner agencies in Cairo: The Resident Coordinator of the United Nations, UNDP, UNCHS (Habitat), and GTZ, to brief them on this evaluation and get their input.

These meetings and workshops, along with one-on-one discussions with persons actively involved with carrying out the activity are the basis for this report. There has been a review of the activity documentation (which is sparse and not detailed) as well as a review of the studies and presentations prepared by consultants. This report is based primarily on the discussions and impressions gained during the field visits. It is not a rigorous data-based evaluation. It attempts to capture the picture of how the activity performed within the context and history of upgrading, and what was accomplished through it, and with CA funding, to make upgrading possible in Ismailia.

The consultant/author of this report, attempted to accurately capture the inputs and discussions of the Egyptian counterparts as well as the impressions passed on verbally by other evaluation team members. The author alone is responsible for any misunderstandings, errors or omissions.

ANNEX 3: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF THE FEASIBILITY STUDIES AND COMMUNITY/FAMILY PROFILES

Products of the consulting firms ADAPT, IHAB RASHED and GLOBAL consisted of site analyses, economic and social surveys (linked to the participatory trading and capacity building components), GIS mapping, engineering and cost estimating, etc. They are available in separate reports and power-point presentations in English and Arabic. These are summarized as follows:

El Halous and **El Bahtini** are informal settlements in Ismailia City (although El Halous is jurisdictionally outside the existing city boundary and is administered by the Ministry of Local Development) selected as the sites for the participatory urban upgrading project. No income data is available in English. Both share some major problems:

- Pollution of west lake adversely affects fishing
- Water, waste water and street lighting inadequate
- Shortage of health, public and other social services
- Urban development continues to encroach on arable land
- Electricity light posts are dangerously close to houses and many residents do not take safety precautions.
- Procedures for house connections are overly complicated.
- Land is inefficiently used
- Incompatible land uses
- Irregular road widths and levels
- Urban pattern creates health and environmental problems and hinders emergency vehicle access

Communities' and Families' Profiles³

El Halous occupies some 40 feddans (16.8 ha.) south of Ismailia City and being outside the city limit is not adequately linked by services, transportation or markets. Informal expansion has increased its size by five times and it is still experiencing rapid population growth. Other characteristics include:

Schools: 1 Primary: 369 pupils (188 boys, 181 girls); 1 Preparatory: 250 pupils
Community organizations: 1
Rural leaders: 2
Number of Unavailable women: Widows: 67 Divorced: 5 Deserted: 1
Number of fishermen: With license: 150; Workers: 650
Number of farmers: 35
Number of merchants: 35; Fish merchants: 9

³ Data provided by TAU.

Grocery shops: 25

Health problems: Bilharzias, diabetes, high blood pressure, kidney and liver ailments

Number of combating illiteracy classes: 3

Number of families with school drop outs: 50

Number of families receiving child pension: 2

Number of prisoners' families: 3

NGOs: one community development society with 166 members

Youth centers: one

The majority of the approximately 8,000 (6,131³) residents (1,600 households) are immigrant fishermen from Fayoum. 80% of the male residents are fishermen; the rest are engaged in small enterprises, agriculture and government service. Over 85% of women are housewives; others work in garment factories, in small enterprises, education or nursing. A good part of the land has been informally occupied by squatters. The landowners are either original owners who hold official land tenure, or those who own by deed of cession from the original owners.

Many houses have no water due to their unclear tenure status as well as the cost and complicated application and delivery procedures. The GOI has given priority to upgrading and extending the capacity of 16 existing stand pipes even as the studies were underway. Street lighting has been extended to Balagat Street as part of the Governorate's counterpart contribution to the project.

There is no waste water network so residents depend on trenches or pipes draining raw sewage into the drainage canal, with serious health and environmental hazards.

Opportunities for El Halous:

- There is ample vacant land for services and resettlement
- The elevated area near lake makes recreational development possible
- The lake's location has obvious economic potential
- Existing services can be readily expanded

The proposed upgrading investment plan includes:

- Upgrading the Old Suez Road (main street west of the area)
- Constructing a 10 meter peripheral access road
- Paving a network of inner roads 6-10 meters wide for improved emergency and service access
- Constructing public squares and playgrounds
- Improving pedestrian lanes where streets cannot be widened
- Providing parking space near primary and preparatory schools

El Bahtini occupies 23 feddans (9.66 ha) of the urban area of Ismailia City and its advantage is its proximity to the city center. Growth of the settlement is limited by development on all its

³ The TAU provided the population figure of 8,000; the feasibility studies indicate 6,131.

borders. There are 73 agricultural feddans that are part of the community, but are not subject to the upgrading project. Other characteristics include:

Number of schools: 3 - 1 Primary: one , 387pupils; 2 Preparatory 207 boys; 225 girls
Community organizations: 2
Youth centers: 1
Rural leaders: 2
NGOs: Society of Moslem Youth (females) / Society of Moslem Youth (males),
Community Development Society at Al Bar El Thany
Number of women : 205
Widows: 82; Widows without children: 27; Widows with children: 25; Divorced:36;
Deserted 9; Families of prisoners: 8
Number of families receiving child pension: 18
Number of fishermen: 1050: Fishermen owning boats: 165; Workers: 850
Number of farmers: 27
Merchants: 71; Fish merchants: 17
Grocery shops: 22; Fruits and vegetable stands: 5; Others: 27
Health problems: Bilharzias, diabetes, liver and kidney ailments
Number of combating illiteracy classes: 4
Families with school drop outs: 42

The majority of the (4,500⁴) residents are immigrant fishermen from Fayoum, and occupations are similar to El Halous. 75% of the land is titled and 25% is occupied by squatters.

There is no orderly road network. Most streets are 3-6 meters wide with buildings on either side (no easements). The area is well-connected to public transportation, and is close to the city center.

Most residents with land title have water connections. The Governorate started upgrading and extending capacity of water stand pipes as a part of the activity's counterpart contribution. Street lighting has been extended to Plajat Road.

About 80% of households are linked to the municipal waste water network, but 20% depend on trenches. A pumping station for El Bahtini is currently under construction and is to be completed within 2 years. The local treatment plant operates beyond capacity and sometimes overflows, draining directly into the lake or flooding surrounding streets.

Opportunities for El Bahtini:

- Proximity and easy access to city
- There is vacant land suitable for services and on-site resettlement

⁴ The TAU provided the population figure of 9,000 which probably indicates both rural and urban; the feasibility studies indicate 4,500 which probably includes only those to be upgraded.

- Settlement adjacent to important tourist route (Emara Touristic Road)
- Proximity to western lake has tourism potential
- Further development of fishing and associated economic activities is possible

The upgrading investment plan includes:

- Upgrading the main road to 10 meters wide and 900 meters long
- A southern road 8 meters wide and 750 meters long to separate the built-up area adjacent to cultivated land
- A network of inner roads 6-10 meters wide, incorporating public squares
- Pedestrian pathways 2-4 meters wide where streets cannot be widened
- Parking areas beside the waste water plant (under construction) and beside the primary school and public hall

The Abou Atwa Station has been upgraded by the addition of 250 kva and a 100 kva transformer (to serve both areas), also part of the activity's counterpart funding.

Economic Activity – both El Halous and El Bahtini:

Fishing is the main economic activity of both settlements, including production of fishing nets, boat construction and sale of fish.

Related problems:

- Pollution of lake
- Fishing is banned May and June and at night for security reasons
- Over fishing
- Fishermen's association is inactive
- Fishermen (especially west lake) exposed to diseases

Recommendations:

- Clean up lake
- Technical training and provision of insurance for fishermen
- Extend fishing hours
- Remove bans on fishing
- Activate association and create another for young fishermen
- Initiate recreational fishing
- Use boat construction as "open museums"

The Suez Canal Authority, the Governorate, the Housing Directorate, the National Organization for Potable Water and Waste Water, and the Water Resources Directorate are cooperating to combat pollution of Lake Timsah. A number of environmental monitoring projects were implemented, the most recent in 1995. The first phase of the project is implemented and the second phase is ongoing. The Lakeshore Road project aims to clean up the Berkat Sayadeen, improve the surrounding settlements, and establish a recreational area

and a lakeshore road. The project is in 3 phases, the first of which is funded by the Governorate and the Sinai Development Agency.

The combined population of El Halous and El Bahtini is expected to increase noticeably in the next five years. Development plans are:

Stage 1: Participatory urban upgrading – community contributes in-kind, with effort or financially (cost recovery plan and land sales)

- Strengthen and support working groups already trained in El Salam, Abou Atwa and El Hekr projects
- Establish Stakeholders Council
- Define roles of existing associations, assist in formation of women and youth groups
- Working groups prepare implementation scenarios
- Auto-finance in addition to Government finance
- Priorities and implementation remain flexible as development progresses
- Establish Local Initiatives Fund (Prime Minister's decree No. 578/1986)

Stage 2: The GOI implements technical and social infrastructure:

- Potable water and waste water networks costing £Le 3.0 million (approximately US\$487K) for each area
- Additional classrooms, social facilities, public transport, fish market at a cost of £Le 1.5 million (approximately US\$243K) for each area

The consultants produced a set of plans and studies that are complete, thorough and reflect state-of-the-art upgrading practice. The mapping, GIS and engineering documents are ready to be used in preparing tendering documents for the implementation of the participatory upgrading projects.

ANNEX 4: REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Early Upgrading Evaluations	Dated
"Ismailia From Master Plan to Implementation" by Forbes Davidson	May 1981
"Ismailia Sites-and-Services and Upgrading Projects - A Preliminary Evaluation" by Alistair Blunt, Clifford Culpin & Partners, Habitat International, Vol. 6,, No. 5/6, pp. 587-597, 1982	1982
"Upgrading in Ismailia: A Tale of Two Projects" by Forbes Davidson, Institute for Housing Studies, Rotterdam	August 1984
A Comparative Evaluation of Three Upgrading Projects in Egypt (Helwan, Manshiet and Ismailia) A Replicability Analysis" by Stephen C. Silcox, Final Report	April 1984
CA Activity Documents	
Funding Proposal, Initial Screening	November 28, 1999
Cities Alliance FY Application form, updated	September 1, 2000
Letter from Governor of Ismailia	May 22, 2000
Grant Progress Report for September 2000-December 2000	March 13, 2001
Grant Progress Report for May 2001-September 2001	September 30, 2001
Grant Progress Report for October-December 2001	September 30, 2001 (Date incorrect?)
"Upgrading Informal Areas, Ismailia, Egypt, Revision of Time Schedule" October 24, 2001 - Progress Review transmitted by Alioune Badiane	October 24, 2001
Progress Review "Upgrading Informal Areas, Ismailia, Egypt, Revision of Time Schedule" October 24, 2001	October 25, 2001
Amendment to Grant Agreement, signed by John Flora and confirmed by Daniel Biau	December 12, 2001
Client Feedback attachment, dated February 2002	February 2002
Governorate of Ismailia, Sustainable Development Project, Habitat/UNDP/World Bank: The Participatory Urban Development of Bahtini and Halous Project: Guidelines for Detailed Planning" Planning Workshop, April 2002	April 2002
Government of Egypt, Governorate of Ismailia and United Nations Development Programme: "Participatory Slum Upgrading in El Hallous and El Bahtini" Project Description and Budget	Not dated 2004 ?

ANNEX 5: LIST OF PERSONS MET included:

Fouad Saad El Din

Governor of Ismailia
Governate of Ismailia, Egypt

Gen. Ahmed Maher

Under-Secretary for the Minister of Local Government
Minister's Office Affairs

Architect Hussein Mahmoud El Gibaaly

President of the Board
Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities
General Organization for Physical Planning
Cairo, Egypt

Architect Hoda Edward Mikhail, General Manager

Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities
General Organization for Physical Planning
Physical Planning Center for Greater Cairo Region
Cairo, Egypt

Moustafa Adb El-Kader

Minister of Local Development

Samir Gharib

Under-Secretary Supervisor of the Technical Office
Minister of Local Development

Christian Voigt

Programme Manager
Participatory Development Programme in Urban Areas
Policy Advisory Unit
German Technical Co-Operation (GTZ)
Cairo, Egypt

Ali S. Dessouki

Programme Deputy
Participatory Development Programme in Urban Areas
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Dr. I.S. Hammouda

Project Director
Ministry of Planning
Economic and Social Planning for Spatial Development
United Nations Development Programme
Cairo, Egypt

Habiba Eid

National Programme Director
Sustainable Ismailia Project
United Nations Development Programme
Ismailia, Egypt

Ali F. El-Faramawy

UN-Habitat Program Manager
United Nations Human Settlement Programme
National Office, Egypt
Cairo, Egypt

Antonio Vigilante

Resident Coordinator of the United Nations
Cairo, Egypt

Dr. Mohammed El-Sioufi

Task Manager
UNCHS (Habitat)
Nairobi, Kenya

Dr. Ahmed F. Ghoneim

Advisor for the Ministry of Industry
On International Agreements and Foreign Trade
Ministry of Industry and Technological Development
Minister's Technical Office
Cairo, Egypt